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‘And there came strangers from the West, who made themselves lord and master 
of the land. They wished to reap the benef its of the fertility of the soil, and 
ordered the inhabitants to devote part of their labour and their time to fulf illing 
other tasks’ – there used to be talk namely of rice, which the Javanese people 
needed to stay alive – ‘other tasks, that would produce greater prof its on markets 
in Europe. To persuade the common man to perform these tasks, nothing more 
was needed than the simplest of politics. He would always obey his Chiefs. It was 
therefore only necessary to win over the Chiefs by promising them a share of the 
prof its ... and it was a complete success.’
Multatuli – On free labour in the Dutch East Indies, and the current colonial 
agitation. Amsterdam 1862: 38-39
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 Prologue: The need for forced labour
The cultivation of coffee on Java for the world market started in the early 
years of the eighteenth century. This study examines colonialism and 
its impact on the social structure of the main coffee producing area in 
Southeast Asia. The advent of Dutch domination considerably contributed 
to the expansion of the world economy, a process of long duration. The 
Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC; Dutch East India Company) 
sought colonial commodities in various parts of the Indonesian archi-
pelago. The coffee plant, imported from southern India, proved to thrive 
in the highlands surrounding the colonial headquarters in Batavia and the 
VOC’s agents encouraged cultivation of this exogenous crop. At f irst, they 
bought the harvest from peasant growers, but what started as a regular 
commercial transaction soon evolved into the compulsory cultivation and 
delivery of coffee at a price far below the market value. Rising demand 
for this new consumer good in the Atlantic world led to pressure on the 
growers to supply more and more beans. This required the VOC to extend 
its control deep into the hinterland. In the Sundanese region of West Java 
known as the Priangan lands, the VOC did not achieve this by building 
up its own machinery of governance. It remained at a distance, installing 
indigenous chiefs and binding the peasantry in servitude to them. This 
system of indirect rule, imposed through regents and the lower ranks 
of the Sundanese aristocracy, kept management costs down. The same 
mode of cheap exploitation continued after the fall of the VOC and the 
emergence of the early-colonial state in a regime that lasted far into the 
nineteenth century.
The history of colonial rule on Java has focused mainly on the coastal 
areas and the lowlands and much less on the more inaccessible hilly 
and mountainous country in the deeper hinterland, far out of sight of 
Batavia. The sparse population living in tiny, scattered settlements and 
engaged in shifting cultivation gave these regions the characteristics of 
a frontier zone, a type of colonization which was strengthened by the 
arrival of newcomers from elsewhere who opened up the wilderness, 
either on their own initiative or at the behest of the gentry. Labour was 
a scarce commodity which the VOC and later the early-colonial state 
tried to appropriate it by imposing restrictions on the mobility of the 
peasants. Coffee growing was a lucrative business that relied on forced 
cultivation. The cooperation of the native aristocracy was indispensable 
in requisitioning both land and labour. Such total control of these factors 
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of production was given a veneer of justif ication with the erroneous 
argument that it simply represented a continuation of obligations that 
had been imposed on the population since time immemorial. Coffee 
cultivation played a major role in the regime of exploitation, yet it has 
received scant attention in colonial historiography.
This book aims to offer more than the past history of a neglected 
region, the Priangan highlands, of a system of indirect governance that 
had already been replaced in other parts of Java in the early nineteenth 
century by making the village community the cornerstone of colonial 
management. The cultivation of coffee for the expanding world market 
was based on unfree labour, a mode of employment that was f irst applied 
in the Priangan highlands and remained pivotal when it was made the 
organizing principle of what became known as the cultuurstelsel (cultiva-
tion system) in 1830. The aim of my study is to establish how labour and 
land were mobilized, why forced cultivation became the mode of surplus 
extraction and what impact this brutal system of taxation had on the 
economy and society.
My account is based on the study of a large quantity of records and sec-
ondary sources. I have read through a large number of archives deposited in 
both The Hague (National Archives) and Jakarta (Arsip Nasional) but only 
those I have referred to are included in the bibliography. The Dutch edition 
(2010) has more references and quotations but I did not want to overload 
this English edition with too many details of archives only accessible in 
Dutch. I was shown the way to these old sources, mostly handwritten, 
by existing compilations of archives, not least that of Frederik de Haan, 
who was given the assignment in 1900 to ‘conduct a historical study of 
the development, impact and consequences of the system established by 
the VOC regarding the Priangan Regencies’. He continued his work after 
being appointed conservator of the colonial archives in 1905. De Haan did 
not restrict his task to that of archivist but – as his original assignment 
required – went a step further and, after many years of identifying, collect-
ing and cataloguing his sources, published his research f indings in eight 
parts (1910-12). His work, De Preanger Regentschappen onder Nederlands 
bestuur tot 1811 (The Priangan Regencies under Dutch Rule until 1811), was 
presented in four volumes totalling around 2,500 pages. I refer to this study 
frequently, especially in the f irst half of this book. For the later chapters, 
I was able to draw on another compilation, Bijdragen tot de kennis van 
het landelijk stelsel op Java (Contributions to the History of the Land 
Rent System) by Salomon van Deventer. Van Deventer was an off icial in 
the colonial administration on Java when he was given the assignment, 
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while on leave in the Netherlands in 1863, to collect and catalogue off icial 
documents relating to the introduction of the land rent and cultivation 
system. The f irst volume of his study, published in 1865, described the 
origin of the system. Parts 2 and 3, which appeared a year later, examined 
the working of the system from 1819 to 1836 and after 1836, respectively. The 
last part is incomplete because the resignation of Minister for the Colonies 
Fransen van der Putte, a declared opponent of the cultivation system, 
prevented Van Deventer from f inishing his work of documentation and the 
publication of his f indings. In the f inal part of this study, I draw on a third 
source, Algemeen Verslag der Uitkomsten van het Onderzoek betreffende 
de Koffijkultuur in Java (Account of the investigations concerning coffee 
cultivation in Java), a report submitted in 1868 which was included in the 
parliamentary papers for 1870-71.
The abolition of the Priangan system in 1870 marked a turning point. 
Administrative reform led to native chiefs in the region being stripped of 
the power they had enjoyed until then, while the cultivation of coffee was 
organized along different lines. Government commissioner Otto van Rees 
reported in 1867 on the how and why of the change in governance. Until the 
end of colonial rule, only a small number of insiders who were interested 
in the history of coffee cultivation and how it was managed were granted 
access to his f indings and recommendations, while they remained closed 
to the wider public. The report, which disappeared into the archives, is 
an important document because it offers insight into the debate pursued 
within a small circle of policy-makers. These deliberations addressed the 
streamlining of a regime founded on exploitation and oppression but which 
was presented to the outside world as something else, as introducing good 
governance and imposing an economic discipline that the peasantry was 
supposed to have sadly lacked.
The colonial policy pursued from the metropolis in Europe and its social 
impact on the native population has been a recurring topic of study. That 
also, and especially, applies to the cultuurstelsel. Its introduction by the 
early-colonial state was immediately accompanied by assessments for and 
against the system and that debate never f lagged. No matter how different 
opinions are, they all acknowledge that the forced cultivation of crops 
for the world market found its rationale in the objective to generate the 
highest possible surplus, appropriated as prof it by the metropolis. Much 
more disputed than the drain of wealth from the colonized economy is the 
question whether the heavy taxation on the native population improved 
their welfare – in other words whether it boosted not only growth but 
also development – or held the peasantry strangled in poverty, and thus 
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resulted in stagnation or even underdevelopment. In the Epilogue to this 
volume I position myself in this debate by rejecting the views of recent and 
reputed colonial historians who argue that the onerous system of forced 
cultivation, intentionally or unintentionally, also opened up new channels 
of progress for the peasantry. In contrast to these authors, I have highlighted 
in my f indings the faits et gestes with which the Priangan producers, pre-
dominantly hailing from land-poor and landless underclasses, continued 
to resist for a century and a half the coercive coffee regime to which they 
were exposed. My conclusion is that their sustained unwillingness to act 
in compliance with what the colonial authorities ordered them to do was 
of decisive importance in the ultimate decline and fall of the cultivation 
system.
Before moving on to my account, I would like to take a few words to 
explain why this study, which spans a period of 40 years, has taken so long 
to complete. The f irst steps were taken shortly after the mid-1970s. The 
initiative had its origins in the Comparative Asian Studies Programme 
(CASP), a research unit set up within the Comparative Sociology Depart-
ment at Erasmus University in Rotterdam. Under a cooperation agreement 
with the Socio-Economic Department at Bogor Agricultural University 
in Indonesia, staff from Rotterdam were seconded to Bogor on long-term 
teaching assignments. Our shared research interest focused on the lon-
gitudinal study of change processes in rural Java. Under the agreement, 
the Rotterdam group would begin by documenting the historical sources 
available in archives and libraries on the Cimanuk River basin, which 
descends from the Priangan highlands to the coastal plain of Cirebon. It 
was to become a substantial operation, both in terms of manpower and 
time.
I devoted myself initially to studying the peasant economy and society 
close to the north coast, the region to the east of Cirebon. The research 
resulted in a series of publications under the auspices of the CASP and a 
monograph entitled Control of Land and Labour in Colonial Java (1983). I 
later conducted anthropological f ieldwork in the same area, f irst alone 
and then with Gunawan Wiradi, one of our Indonesian counterparts. We 
reported the results of our village study, started at the end of the twentieth 
century and completed in the years that followed, in Good Times and Bad 
Times in Rural Java (2002). Jacques van Doorn and Wim Hendrix began 
researching the impact of coffee cultivation in the Priangan highlands 
long before the cultivation system was introduced. Wim Hendrix was 
the team member responsible for accessing the colonial archives. He 
described his f indings in great detail in an unremitting f low of internal 
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working papers, adding his own critical comments. He also built up a 
collection of the sourced material, arranged by theme, which took on 
the dimensions of a small library. One of the historical documents he 
came across while gathering this source material was the report drawn 
up by Otto van Rees in 1867 to bring the Priangan system to an end. In an 
interim CASP publication, The Emergence of a Dependent Economy (1983), 
Van Doorn and Hendrix summarized developments at the halfway stage 
of the project and outlined the contours of the late-colonial era that was 
to be studied to complete the research project. The Van Rees report led 
to a major change in the colonial administration of West Java. The library 
of the University of Amsterdam has made the document, transcribed 
and annotated by Emile Schwidder, available online (Rapport van Rees 
UvA-DARE). The original Dutch edition of this book – Koloniaal profijt 
van onvrije arbeid; het Preanger stelsel van gedwongen arbeid op Java, 1720-
1870 – was published in 2010 (Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam) 
and was also translated into Bahasa Indonesia. It was brought out in a 
slightly abbreviated format in 2014, entitled Keuntungan kolonial dan kerja 
paksa; sistem priangan dari tanam paksa kopi di Jawa, 1720-1870 (Yayasan 
Pustaka Obor, Jakarta).
The whole project not only demanded considerable stamina and a broad 
perspective on the part of the research team, but assumed that their aca-
demic work would continue. That latter assumption proved incorrect. In 
1986/87, the Faculty of Social Sciences at Erasmus University was trimmed 
down and there was no room in what survived for the Comparative Sociol-
ogy Department. Jacques prematurely became professor emeritus. Wim 
also took retirement, while I was appointed to the chair of Comparative 
Sociology at the University of Amsterdam. Our splitting up in different 
directions derailed the Cimanuk project and made it impossible for us to 
keep to our agenda. But the scale of the work already done and the enormous 
database that had been brought together with such perseverance meant that 
the research, which we had embarked on with great enthusiasm, could not 
simply be abandoned. Wim Hendrix continued, now without pay, to retrieve 
f iles and off icial memoranda from archives and track down documents 
in libraries, to make them accessible, adding his incisive comments. In 
1993, I agreed to write the entire history of the Priangan system, from its 
introduction to its abolition. This endeavour, recorded in this volume, was 
interrupted frequently and sometimes for long periods. That it was ever 
completed at all is due to Wim Hendrix’s persistence. I dedicate this book 
to him and to the memory of Jacques van Doorn, to mark the many years 
of friendship we shared.
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I am grateful to the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research 
(AISSR) for the grant awarded to me for the translations. Susi Moeimam 
has been very helpful in seeing the Indonesian edition to press while Andy 
Brown has once again translated my words into English. At an early stage 
Benedict Anderson patiently read through the Dutch version of my book 
manuscript. He made very helpful suggestions for alterations and addi-
tions but also strongly recommended bringing out an English edition. John 




I The company as a territorial power
Intrusion into the hinterland
The name Parahyangan for the highlands of West Java dates back to the 
early-colonial era. The name, commonly referred to as Priangan, has been 
attributed different meanings. The most common one refers to this remote 
and mountainous region as a heavenly abode, where the land reaches into 
the sky. The vast wilderness was believed to have been more settled and in-
habited once upon a time. According to one interpretation, the lands in the 
region had become wild and uninhabited. This recalled the social disruption 
following the fall and eventual destruction of the pre-colonial Hindu state 
of Pacacaran. Little is known about the history, organization and scale of 
the centre which must have been somewhere close to present-day Bogor. 
Archaeological f inds from the fourteenth and f ifteenth centuries provide 
evidence of its Hinduization but not of the agrarian order underlying it. De 
Haan (I 1910: 23) reported on the remains of this civilization at the start of 
the twentieth century. Prabu Siliwangi, the last ruler of the fallen kingdom, 
continued to f ight against Islamized rivals operating from harbour princi-
palities on the north coast. He was f inally defeated in the second half of the 
f ifteenth century by attacks on his territory from the harbour principalities 
of Banten and Cirebon (Ten Dam 1957; see also Ekadjati 1980).
Under the banner of the new religion the coastal rulers expanded their 
power to the thinly populated highlands. In the early stage of colonial 
domination this led Cirebon to claim control over the hinterland. A rival to 
f ill the political vacuum in the Priangan region was the empire of Mataram 
in Central Java that underwent a process of expansion from the end of the 
sixteenth century. As Mataram’s power grew, it annexed regions and peoples 
which had previously had little or no history of outside intervention. The 
ruler of Sumedang – who came to the court of the Susuhunan, the king of 
Mataram, on his own initiative, after a journey alleged to have taken three 
months (Van Rees 1880: 14) – was rewarded for his offer of fealty by being 
proclaimed his sovereign’s governor in all lands to the west. The growing 
power of Mataram was evident from its subordination of regional chiefs and 
the immigration of small bands of colonists from more densely populated 
areas who opened up river valleys in West Java. Under the supervision of 
headmen who accompanied them, the colonists spread throughout the 
region and prepared the land for regular cultivation. The colonization also 
had a strategic purpose, to prevent the harbour principality of Banten from 
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extending its power into the Sunda highlands. The political supremacy of 
Mataram facilitated the Javanization of especially eastern Priangan, a re-
gion that – unlike the northern coastal zone – had until then lost little of its 
original Sundanese identity. It is quite plausible that the name Parahyangan 
dates from this time, referring to the unknown and unsettled lands over 
which there was still little control and which were far removed from the 
court that acted as the magical centre of the empire. In the 1670s, Cirebon 
was forced to acknowledge the primacy of Mataram, and its subordination 
was sealed by hypergamous bonds of marriage between the royal families.
After the failed siege of Batavia in 1628-29, Mataram was gradually forced 
to relinquish all claims to territorial control in West Java. At f irst, the Dutch 
East India Company (VOC) was content to secure the countryside around 
its urban headquarters. In the course of time, this belt, initially only a few 
kilometres wide, increased in size, prompted by the need to grow food and 
provide building materials for Batavia. Privately operating entrepreneurs 
were granted permission to grow paddy, vegetables and other daily necessi-
ties. Within a short period, the f irst sugar mills appeared – the forerunners 
of an agro-industry that would remain in this region until the early nine-
teenth century. Later, these private estates went over to producing crops for 
export. The f irst franchise-holders were Europeans, Chinese and, to a much 
lesser extent, Javanese. Over time, the latter disappeared entirely, while the 
Chinese grew stronger. Employed by European owners, a number of these 
Chinese managers became entrepreneurs in their own right who remained 
dependent, however, on the VOC to market their produce. Henceforth, the 
cultivated belt around Batavia expanded on both flanks along the coast and 
gradually crept southwards until it reached the foothills. This f irst outer 
zone acted as a porous buffer to the remote and still unknown hinterland.
In the seventeenth century, after gaining a foothold on the coastal tract, 
the VOC was no longer satisf ied with solely building its urban headquarters 
and occupying the surrounding countryside. The Company became a 
stakeholder in the struggle for control of the highlands. A f irst treaty in 
1677 regulated the transfer to the VOC, as recognition for services rendered 
– military assistance in putting down an uprising in eastern Java – of the 
rights that Mataram had acquired over the Sundanese highlands in the 
previous century. None of the parties had a clear idea of the scale of the 
area covered by the agreement, also known as Pasundan. At f irst, the VOC 
was very cautious in making use of its new mandate. Local lords were told 
that they now had to obey both the Susuhunan of Mataram and the VOC. 
This simple instruction should also be seen in the light of the claims of the 
sultan of Banten to large parts of West Java, especially Krawang, Cirebon 
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and Sumedang. The withdrawal of Mataram had revived the aspirations of 
the Banten sultanate to regain and expand its stamp on the hinterland. The 
VOC successfully frustrated these ambitions in the years that followed. The 
rulers of Cirebon saw their subordination to Mataram replaced by an even 
more far-reaching dependency on the VOC. A treaty from 1681 obligated the 
priest-rulers of Cirebon to accept the suzerainty of the Company, a loss of 
autonomy that materialized in the building of a fortress, trade privileges 
and the surrender of all claims to adjacent highlands.
At the time when Mataram was expanding into the Sunda lands, both 
gentry and peasants initially fell back on the might of Banten. The sultan’s 
protection extended to armed conflict which, as Mataram withdrew from 
West Java, took the form of attacks both along the coast and in the Prian-
gan highlands. Such raids were common from the 1670s onwards. Bands 
operating under the leadership of Muslim leaders like Sjech Yussuf and Kiai 
Tjiliwidara strongly resisted outside intrusion in the area under the VOC’s 
control, which was as yet hardly pacif ied. Eventually, this threat was also 
removed by sending military patrols to back up the persistent pressure 
exerted on local gentry. In the early eighteenth century, a rabble-rouser 
named Prawatasari caused considerable problems in the Priangan lands. 
Hailing from Giri, in Central Java, Prawatasari was alleged to have been 
sent to the Sunda highlands by ‘fanatical clerics’ to resist the new occupier. 
Known as a devout haji, he aroused the religious zeal of the population 
to resist the foreign inf idels. The VOC ordered the regents to clamp down 
on the followers of this ‘Mohamatan zealot’, who subsequently sought 
refuge, together with his disciples, in remote Jampang. An expeditionary 
force sent to this sparsely populated and inaccessible southern part of the 
Priangan returned with the news that Prawatasari had been killed and 
his disciples dispersed. To avoid the risk of leaving a pocket of resistance 
behind in Jampang, all those who had settled down there were rounded up 
and brought back as prisoners. A large number of them managed to escape 
en route, many others did not survive the journey, and the remainder were 
designated a new place to live on the north coast (De Haan III 1911: 341-3). 
However, Prawatasari’s reported death proved premature and in 1704 he 
resurfaced as the leader of an army of some 3,000 men in the hills above 
Cirebon, which further grew in size as it advanced to the coastal zone. 
The fact that he was able to advance to the immediate vicinity of Batavia 
suggested that some of the chiefs appointed by the Company were not 
to be trusted. The suspects were summoned to Batavia, imprisoned on 
charges of insurgency and then, having been put on trial, were lashed, 
beaten, branded and sent in chains to the Cape, banned for 50 years. This 
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punishment was also intended as a warning to the Priangan regents who 
were ordered to capture the insurgents within six months, otherwise they 
themselves would be arrested and punished. Despite all these threats and 
the continually rising price on Prawatasari’s head, the unrest persisted and 
the fugitive remained at large. He was f inally tracked down and arrested in 
Kartasura in 1707 and executed (Ricklefs 1993: 337, note 90). His elimination 
did not mean, however, that the VOC’s rule in the highlands subsequently 
went unchallenged. Only three years later, there were reports that a new 
religious leader had emerged in Jampang and was rapidly gaining support 
among the population. He announced that his master was soon to join him, 
with a large company of followers (De Haan III 1911: 470). Within a year, 
this movement had expanded into the Batavian lowlands. The arrest of a 
number of leading insurgents could not prevent the agitation continuing 
in the years that followed. In 1715, there were reports, again from Jampang, 
that a certain Raden Dermakoesoema had gathered together a group of 
about 100 followers and was actively trying to persuade the chief of the 
region to support him. The VOC reacted to this news by holding the chief 
himself responsible for the uprising. He was accused of tolerating and 
supporting the rebels for many years and of being a ‘good-for-nothing, a 
madath (opium) smoker and a cheat’, and was sent in chains to Ceylon. 
After this experience the authorities in Batavia decided not to appoint a 
new chief for Jampang and to entrust the region in the future to the regent 
of Cianjur, who had remained loyal to the high command (De Haan III 
1911: 470-1).
Enclosing the principalities of Cirebon and Banten on the coast by cutting 
off their communication lines inland allowed the VOC to put an end to 
Mataram’s presence in the Priangan. A second treaty in 1705 confirmed 
the surrender of all the rights the now severely weakened Central Javanese 
kingdom had enjoyed in the Sunda territories. From then on the VOC acted 
as the only legitimate heir to Mataram’s former possessions, whose exact 
size and location were never delineated. The border was clearest to the east, 
where the Cilosari river traditionally marked the dividing line between Java 
and Sunda. By 1706, the VOC’s power was now so well established that it 
entrusted control of the land and people in the Priangan to the Pangerang 
Aria Cheribon, who had come to power as the company’s agent. He was 
authorized to pass on the VOC’s instructions to the local gentry and present 
their requests to the Company. When he died in 1724, the Company did not 
appoint a successor, no longer needing an intermediary. The directors in 
Batavia now did their business directly with the regents, individually or 
collectively. The eastern highlands, which initially continued to belong to 
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Cirebon, were subsequently split off from allegiance to the sultanate and 
were then elevated to the rank of regencies.
For a long time, the VOC remained unaware of the size and nature of the 
possessions it had acquired towards the end of the seventeenth century 
in West Java. The unrest continued and southern Priangan in particular 
remained a hotbed of resistance against the authority of the Company until 
deep into the eighteenth century. Clear geographical borders only became 
necessary much later as more and more became known about the landscape 
and greater demands were imposed on the inhabitants. The administrative 
structure was not established in any definitive form until the start of the 
nineteenth century. Under the new structure, the lowlands along the whole 
north coast of Priangan remained under the direct command of Batavia. In 
the broad buffer zone that had emerged between Batavia and Buitenzorg 
(Bogor), private estates were set up whose managers delivered their produce 
to the VOC. From the beginning, the southern border had been formed by 
the Indian Ocean. The eastern border remained essentially the same as 
under the agreement with Mataram and to the west, much later, a more 
precise border was demarcated with the sultanate of Banten.1
The foundation of Batavia was driven by mercantile interests and ambi-
tions. The VOC’s Eastern headquarters became integrated in much older 
networks of maritime trade that linked the Indian Ocean to the Pacif ic 
and extended from West and South to East Asia. A large number of harbour 
principalities, which rose and fell over the course of many centuries, 
acted as fulcra in this long-distance trade and Batavia adopted a similar 
role after it was established in the seventeenth century. The settlement 
grew to become a prominent centre of commercial activity in contact 
with a large number of similar coastal enclaves within and beyond the 
archipelago. The proximity to and interaction with outsiders – Gujaratis, 
Parsis, Bengalis, Klings, Arabs, Siamese, Malays and especially Chinese – 
underlined the international character of the trade. Only a very parochial 
view of history, like that which held sway in the late-colonial era, could 
see the arrival of the Dutch in the early seventeenth century as a decisive 
break in a trend that had already existed for centuries. Not only had they 
been preceded by other Europeans, notably the Portuguese and Spanish, 
but the newcomers also had to be satisf ied with a modest position in this 
multi-ethnic trade network driven by competition and f ierce rivalry. From 
the very beginning, the VOC aimed to achieve nothing less than complete 
control of trade in tropical products. Its main concern was to outdo its 
1 These borders had been established as early as 1642. See Van der Chijs 1885: 474.
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competitors and establish its own monopoly by concluding contracts that 
gave the Company sole marketing rights, by blockading ‘hostile’ harbours, 
by capturing ships carrying competitors’ cargo, by destroying what were 
referred as ‘pirate’s nests’. Raids over land were largely limited to the 
coastal belt, targeting Cirebon or Banten. The troops needed for these 
campaigns were recruited from among the Buginese, Balinese, Ambonese, 
Madurese or Makassarese, contingents which were often readily available 
in the environs of Batavia. Like all mercenaries they were taken on and 
dismissed as the VOC saw f it, and the same troops could sometimes be 
found f ighting on the other side. However, the exercise of power was 
primarily directed seawards and was supported by an extensive and 
far-reaching network of fortresses and trading posts. This was the role 
initially played by Batavia: the headquarters of a naval empire with little 
or no need for expansion inland.
This later perspective on the arrival of the Dutch in the archipelago was 
brilliantly construed and analysed by Jacob Cornelis van Leur shortly before 
the sun set on the Dutch colonial mission. His reappraisal of the patriotic 
doctrine of ‘we came, we saw, we conquered’ offers a more sophisticated 
view of early European expansion in Asia. What this reconstruction still 
lacks is an understanding that the long-distance trade was based on a more 
inwardly located mode of production that was predominantly – though not 
exclusively – agrarian in nature. The commercialization and monetization 
that dominated economic life in the small trading enclaves centred on 
harbour principalities was decidedly less developed in the main agricultural 
empires of inland Asia. Nevertheless, the long-held assumption that these 
societies lacked complexity and distant trade connections – consisting of a 
simple division between lords and peasants and an institutional structure 
typif ied by constant fluidity and turmoil at the top set off by an introspec-
tive, essentially static and subsistence-oriented village economy – must be 
considered obsolete. I am tempted to see the transformation of the VOC 
from maritime power to territorial ruler of wider tracts of Java in the light 
of my rejection of this erroneous interpretation. It means that the Company 
has to be seen as not only a maritime but also territorial power, as ‘a politi-
cal body exercising a particular form of sovereignty, as a Company-State’ 
(Weststeijn 214: 27). This major turning point occurred at a time when 
the Company’s trade within Asia was declining and the volume of goods 
being shipped to Europe steadily increased. The political and commercial 
transformation as made manifest in the records of the VOC was defined by 
shifts in the balance of power in the global economy, a process that would 
gather speed in the eighteenth century.
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Retreat of princely authority
The intrusion inland in the second half of the seventeenth century was 
precipitated by the need to take sides in the domestic political constel-
lation that was in constant turmoil. Lack of familiarity with the terrain 
made it diff icult for the VOC’s off icials to manoeuvre their way through 
the bewildering variety of local ranks and titles. They tried to impose some 
order on it by using European synonyms: the most prominent of all, the 
Susuhunan of Mataram, was given the title of emperor, and below him were 
kings and princes, governors and barons, squires and captains, with local 
names being used for the remainder. The tendency of many local notables 
to claim a higher rank than they actually held only added to the confusion. 
Some local chiefs could trace their lineage all the way back to the Pacacaran 
royal family, claiming that their ancestors, by intermarrying at opportune 
moments, had transferred their loyalty to the rulers of Cirebon. The chief 
with the most senior pedigree, the bupati of Sumedang, called himself 
Pangerang, which VOC off icials initially interpreted as ‘prince’. Eventually, 
however, Batavia decided to treat all the highest ranking notables the same, 
making no distinction between them. This meant that the primus inter 
pares now went through life as a regent. Since it can be assumed that the 
differences in hierarchy could not have escaped the notice of the VOC for 
long, ignoring them so demonstratively can be seen as a clear signal that 
it intended to completely restructure the administrative management of 
the region.
Under the traditional order, which the VOC considered neither ef-
f icient nor effective, the exercise of authority was based on the principle 
of concentricity, with the Susuhunan of Mataram as the f igure in which 
all power was concentrated (Moertono 1968: 112). He resided in his palace, 
the kraton, which was surrounded by domains that he governed directly. 
This epicentre of authority was in turn encircled by provinces governed 
in his name by a bupati. There were also differences between these latter 
territories: the ‘outer regents’ of Mataram, as the Company called them (of 
which the regent of Priangan was one), enjoyed greater autonomy than those 
in charge of provinces closer to the centre of the empire. These differences 
were not only geographical. In the Hindu-Javanese tradition, the prince was 
the embodiment of all power, a luminary radiating light with decreasing 
intensity as it moved away from the source. The mystic force that was the 
organizing principle of authority did not permit a territorial demarcation 
of the empire. The prince hardly moved around his realm, remaining in 
his kraton. His army was also quartered in the palace, rather than on the 
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borders. The empire was in a constant state of f lux and continued to exist 
as long as the ruler remained the symbolic, even sacred, pivot. His power 
rested not on territorial jurisdiction, but on the exercise of authority over 
obedient subjects. Powerful was the chief who had a large peasant clientele 
which he could mobilize to build temples or irrigation canals or for military 
campaigns and upon whom he could impose taxes.
Exercising symbolic authority in this way was of course not suff icient in 
itself. The ruler could not do without a governance apparatus, to control and 
exploit his own territories and so that more distant provinces could be ruled 
in his name. In the Hindu-Javanese order, these tasks were not performed 
by civil servants in the Western sense of the word, but by a managerial elite. 
The governors were appointed under the condition that they themselves 
were responsible for controlling and exploiting their subjects in such a way 
that, in addition to collecting taxes and providing manpower for the prince, 
there was suff icient left over for the governor and his entourage.
During the later Mataram period the king’s administration was essentially 
a hierarchical line of separate, self-suff icient and highly autonomous 
units of power, vertically linked by the direct and personal ties between 
the several power-holders/administrators. Apart from the binding ties of 
a common servitude and loyalty, there did not seem to be any horizontal 
administrative relationship which could limit the monarchs’ (inferiors’) 
independence from each other. (Moertono 1968: 104)
Moertono quite correctly called this system imitative as, at each lower 
level, the authority of the chief remained undivided. Vassals also issued 
land to clients and ruled in the domains entrusted to them with absolute 
power. In other words, they were not officials to whom tasks were delegated, 
but lords in their own right. This made the political balance thoroughly 
unstable. The arbitrary manner in which those in power at every level 
treated their inferiors – there was always a risk that a patron would favour 
a rival – forced his clients to restrict their loyalty. It was a game of strategy 
and counter-strategy in which the stakes remained covert as long as it 
served the interests of both parties to maintain the relationship. A variety 
of mechanisms kept the tensions between centre and periphery under 
control. Marrying into a high-ranking family gave a client direct access 
to the patron, but this of course also gave the latter a lever with which 
to control the new family member. Through such marital arrangements, 
the gentry of Priangan had allied themselves with the ruling dynasties of 
Pacacaran, Cirebon, Banten and, f inally, Mataram. Some prominent families 
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even claimed ties with all of these lineages, a claim for which there was 
often sparse factual evidence.
A long sojourn at court was another way that governors could show 
their loyalty. They were expected to at least attend the annual audience 
(pasowanan) and permission to be absent was considered a sign of trust.
The pasowanans had a special function, namely to enhance the glory 
of the king. On special occasions, like the Garebeg, literally all of the 
king’s off icials from every part of the country were required to come. The 
glitter and pomp displayed on these occasions, and certainly not in the 
least, the great number of persons attending, were perceptible evidence 
of the king’s greatness and authority. But from the point of view of the 
off icials, to be included in such events was a great honour, particularly 
as the strict hierarchical arrangement of seating, the distinctive colour 
of their apparel and paraphernalia, and the number of persons in their 
entourages clearly displayed their exact place in the bureaucratic hier-
archy (Moertono 1968: 99).
In the eighteenth century, Priangan regents would boast that their fore-
fathers had swept the courtyard of the palace in the capital of Mataram. 
This information did not have the intended impact on colonial chroniclers, 
who tended to see such demonstrations of the subservient origins of the 
regents as evidence of disdain and worthlessness, rather than recognizing 
this symbolic chore as a sign of past prestige and glory. Staying at court for 
an unlimited period prevented the gentry from managing the day-to-day 
affairs of their own territories with adequate propriety. They solved this 
dilemma by appointing deputies authorized to act in their name during 
their absence. This system of substitution was not limited to the highest 
level of administration, but was applied right down to the lowest tiers of gov-
ernance. Although the chiefs were entitled to appoint their substitutes from 
their own entourage, the presence of these shadow figures was illustrative of 
the inherent duality in the management of authority that allowed superiors 
to keep a close watch on those immediately below them. In addition to 
alliances through marriage and being retained at court for unstipulated 
periods, another way in which rulers could exercise their power was through 
the use of force. The chastising hand of a patron extended not only to a 
disobedient client, but also to the rebel’s family and retinue. Imperial rule 
on Java was in precarious balance. Nevertheless, no matter how repressive 
and immutable the system appeared to be, the regime also allowed for 
mobility, since capable newcomers could force their way up to the seat of 
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the emperor from below or from without to grasp power for themselves. If 
they were more ambitious, they might even attempt to dismantle the system 
altogether and replace it by another. Such a radical transformation, a break 
in the existing structure of relations, occurred when the VOC penetrated 
into the Sunda lands.
A treaty agreed in 1677 brought Mataram rule in Priangan to an end and 
the VOC now had absolute control of the region. The transfer of power was 
formalized in 1684, when the Priangan nobility was summoned to Cirebon 
to receive their new instructions. The region was parcelled out in separate 
units, each given in charge to a regent. This administrative demarcation 
underwent several changes until f ive units remained – Sumedang, Cianjur, 
Bandung, Limbangan and Sukapura. These divisions were established, 
abolished, split up and merged again, often more than once. One signif i-
cant intervention was not to acknowledge the vassalage of the gentry in 
the hinterland to the ruler of Cirebon. The decision to retain the native 
chiefs was a result of both the low managerial capability of the VOC and 
the compelling need to keep administrative costs as low as possible. The 
exercise of power was however completely reorganized. Although the f irst 
generation of regents came from families who had previously held positions 
of eminence, it did not mean a continuation of the ancien régime.
Territorial demarcation and hierarchical structuring
The early style of governance excelled in arbitrariness and indifference, 
as can be seen in the unexpected changes in the number and size of the 
regencies and the refusal to treat the chiefs as anything other than conveni-
ent pawns. Even after they were appointed, the regents could not be at all 
sure that they would be allowed to stay and dismissal or transfer were 
frequent occurrences. But was this high-handedness not equally a feature 
of the earlier despotic rule? The same applied to the rules of succession. 
Whenever there was a vacancy, there was no guarantee that a successor 
would be designated from among the previous regent’s sons and it was not 
uncommon for an outsider to be chosen. The criterion for being appointed 
was not the length of the candidate’s lineage, but his proven or suspected 
loyalty and trust in representing the interests of the VOC. Who would have 
dared to claim that this was a new practice that violated the traditions and 
customs of the kingdom of Mataram, which had so recently been displaced? 
From 1704, the Company undertook to provide the regents with a letter of 
appointment, stipulating the regent’s tasks as a keeper of order and supplier 
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of products, but offering no great security of tenure. What seems at f irst sight 
to be a rather hasty and indifferent approach, with regents and regencies 
being designated haphazardly, was partly due to ignorance of the principles 
on which the indigenous power was exercised. If nothing else, it goes some 
way to explaining why the VOC found it so diff icult to structure power 
relations to its own advantage. The regent families had no other choice than 
to accept the supreme right of the Company to appoint whoever it chose. 
After the death of the regent of Cianjur in 1707, for example, his eldest son 
travelled to Batavia to pay his respects (De Haan IV 1912: 346).
The advent of the VOC as the sole authority in the region represented a 
clear political break with the past in two respects. The f irst was that power 
was now based on territorial jurisdiction. The new regents held authority 
over all the inhabitants of their regencies and over them alone. This put 
a stop to the confusingly complex situation in which peasant households 
lived in a landscape with vague borders, and often had neighbours who were 
clients of another lord (see Breman 1979 and 1987a). It would take a long 
time for the new structure to materialize, but this slow impact – partly a 
consequence of the VOC’s strategy of not intervening in the internal affairs 
of the regencies – did not detract from the importance of the introduction 
of a form of governance based on territoriality.
The second break with the past was the imposition of a uniform hierarchy 
on the relationships between the new regents and their superiors in Batavia. 
An impression had been prematurely created that the direct predecessors 
of these regents owed unconditional obedience to the ultimate ruler: the 
emperor of Mataram, or the sultan of Cirebon or Banten. For various reasons, 
all the parties involved later acquiesced in this interpretation which, in my 
view, is incompatible with the ‘frontier’ nature of the Priangan highlands 
in the pre-colonial and early-colonial eras. Furthermore, large parts of the 
region would retain a multi-stranded character along lines of allegiance in 
different directions until deep into the nineteenth century.
Under the old regime, the power of individual chiefs varied considerably. 
Only a few were directly accountable to the far-off royal court. The others 
had to acknowledge them as their superiors on the basis of hierarchical 
gradations that were often invisible to the Company off icials. As already 
observed, this confusing and ambiguous configuration soon came to an end. 
The gentry who were appointed to rule the newly formed territorial units 
were all given the same rank and title, that of regent. More importantly, 
the idea of Priangan as a region in which the exercise of power had already 
crystallized into a more or less f ixed pattern by the time the VOC arrived 
requires correction. This erroneous perspective is based on a view of the 
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coastal hinterland not from the aft deck of a merchant ship – according to 
Van Leur, the perspective from which colonial history was written – but 
from the courtyard of the kraton, the royal palace. It was a distortion that 
not only had its origin in the babad, indigenous records, but also permeated 
the annals of the VOC. This should come as no surprise, as the Company’s 
chroniclers described indigenous structures on the basis of what they 
had been told by members of the aristocracy. It was very rare for them 
to make contacts beyond this received wisdom. In my view, however, the 
dynamics of power in Batavia’s hinterland largely focused around local 
heavyweights intent on improving their status despite having very little 
room to manoeuvre. To consolidate or extend their power bases they were 
forced to seek support from higher up, which often entailed them entering 
into temporary as well as variable alliances.
This contrasting interpretation also offers a different explanation for 
the stubborn resistance and continually changing coalitions that the VOC 
encountered during its slow penetration inland from its coastal enclave. 
Another development that received little attention was the change in the 
balance of religious power. When the Portuguese f irst visited the coast in 
1522, they found no Muslim rulers, but this had already changed when they 
returned in 1526. Islam had started penetrating the hinterland from the 
north coast before the VOC followed suit, but its social advance is neglected 
in the colonial records. The explicit Islamic identity of the leaders of resist-
ance movements that made life diff icult for the VOC and its allies was an 
indication of shifts in the basic frame of society, the consequences of which 
can only be assessed from a long-term perspective. When analysing the 
resistance that the VOC encountered to its efforts to expand, one needs 
to bear in mind that the instigators did not always or automatically act on 
orders from above – the kraton of Mataram or the priestly dynasties in the 
harbour principalities – but were responding to the loss of their own room 
for manoeuvre and the abrogation of their local power. Furthermore, the 
rebels often did not belong to a well-established elite, who rightly felt their 
position threatened, but had simpler origins and, while attempting to gain 
greater prestige, found themselves caught up in a political maelstrom. Only 
later would it become clear whether they had chosen the right side and 
could claim favours from the new ruler or would be labelled ‘fanatical and 
mutinous zealots’ who were fair game to all comers.
In this early-colonial era, the VOC forced the Sundanese nobility to ac-
commodate themselves to a structure of authority formed along territorial 
lines and with a hierarchical structure headed by a regent. Once established, 
the regency became in the course of time – in fact up to the moment when 
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indirect rule was abolished in 1871 – a much tighter straitjacket for the 
supra-local elite than the more fluid situation they had enjoyed during the 
pre-colonial era. The Priangan retained the character of a ‘frontier’ until 
deep into the nineteenth century. This was largely due to the fact that, 
when the VOC started to intrude into the highlands, the region was sparsely 
populated. Expeditions sent reports back of an inaccessible landscape of 
mountains and valleys, and of thick forests and marshes teeming with 
wildlife. Early travellers never failed to give special mention to tigers and 
rhinoceros, because of the threat they posed to people and crops. The few 
settlements comprised little more than a handful of peasant dwellings and 
a poverty-stricken habitat. Even the kota, the residence of the regent, had 
only a few hundred inhabitants, the majority of whom were the bupati’s 
family members and servants. The constant stream of guests who presented 
themselves at the dalem – later termed kraton – included minor chiefs 
who were also accompanied by their own retinues. But even with these 
temporary residents, the population of the settlement remained small in 
scale. It was a centre of political power in a rural environment from which it 
was hardly distinguishable. There was little or no communication between 
the separate regencies. Connecting roads were rare and, though simple carts 
were in use it was much more common for people to carry goods by buffalo 
or on their own head or shoulders. The simple technology limited both the 
volume of goods and the distance it could be transported.
The Priangan highlands as a frontier
Cultivation entitled rights to the land but, if a local lord had taken the 
initiative to open up the land and had perhaps help provide the means to 
do it – by for example, supplying food and tools while the land was being 
cleared and more general logistical support – he would claim a percentage of 
the yield. He would not take his share immediately, to give those tilling the 
land time to build up a reserve stock, but after some years. In addition, the 
lord himself owned fields – known as balubur – in the immediate vicinity of 
his residence, which were laid out and tilled by his clients. Sometimes such 
a notable f igure had worked his way up through his own efforts, but the 
custom was for a local influential to be designated the peasant households 
falling under his jurisdiction by a superior. There was a long and complex 
chain of patronage that led right up to the highest power – the emperor or 
sultan, later succeeded by the VOC – and down through the regents and 
lower chiefs to the peasants who spent their lives in servitude. How this 
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servitude operated in practice escaped the observation of the VOC off icials, 
whose contacts with the indigenous population extended no further than 
the chiefs. The Company aimed f irst to shield the Priangan region from 
external claims and then to put an end to the persistent wrangling between 
the regents. These disputes, which could lead to armed conflict, were part 
of their struggle to defend, and if possible increase, their own political 
power and economic gains. The chiefs tolerated no competition in their 
own domain, but tried to recruit clients from households that were already 
in servitude to another lord.
In the peasant order that the VOC as it were inherited, labour was more 
important than land. Chiefs laid claim to peasants’ labour power by attach-
ing them in bondage. Their subordination was a source of conflict between 
higher and lower chiefs. If these disputes seemed to be about land issues, it 
was because the land was to be ruled, intended for peasants to be settled 
on and thus to become subordinated to the lord. This dependence took the 
form of patronage that extended to higher echelons. Benedict Anderson 
described this power configuration as follows.
The administrative structure, while formally hierarchical, is in effect 
composed of stratif ied clusters of patron-client relationships. Both in 
the regions and in the center, off icials gather around them clusters of 
personal dependents on the model of the ruler himself. These dependents’ 
destinies are linked with the success or failure of their patrons. They 
work as administrative and political aides, and have no real autonomous 
status except in relation to him. They are f inanced by portions of the 
benefices allotted to their patron by his patron, or by the ruler himself 
if their master is highly enough placed. Just as the power of the ruler is 
measured by the size of the populations he controls, so the power of the 
subordinate off icial (patron) is gauged by the size of the clientele that 
he heads. (Anderson 1972: 34)
Jacobus Couper, who summoned the heads of the regencies in eastern 
Priangan to Cirebon in 1684 (those in the west not yet being demarcated), 
expressed the size of their jurisdictions in terms of the number of house-
holds allocated to each of them. The ceremonial appointment of the regents 
was accompanied by a warning not to interfere in affairs beyond the borders 
of their own territorial jurisdiction and not to attract people from other 
regions. That this warning had not the slightest effect became clear in 1686, 
when the regents were again summoned to come to Batavia with a record of 
the names and places of birth of all the people falling under their authority. 
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Anyone not on the list would from then on be treated as vagrants (Kern 
1898: 26-7). This f irst attempt to register the populations of the regencies 
would be much repeated, each time producing a result in which, quite 
rightly, the VOC would have little confidence. Another early instruction 
from the VOC ignored the divisions between the local chiefs, encouraging 
them to cultivate new paddy f ields in their territories. One of these was the 
Pangerang Aria Cheribon, whose letter of appointment as upper regent of 
Priangan in 1706 urged him to open up new land. The prince excused himself 
for his failure to recount the population of the Parahyangan by saying that 
the inhabitants had dispersed in all directions because of lack of food.2 
The very extensive use of land added to the low degree of sedentarization.
On the more densely populated plains along the north coasts of Java, 
peasants already practised a more advanced form of agriculture. The f ields 
were irrigated and surrounded by dykes, and they had cattle and better tools 
to till the land. The terraced sawahs or irrigated fields that came to dominate 
the landscape here, were much less common in the Priangan highlands. 
Colonial sources gave the impression that peasant colonists had brought 
wet land cultivation with them from Central Java. In this view, the prospect 
of generating agrarian capital by investing labour in improving the value 
of the land was insuff icient to persuade peasants in the Priangan region to 
settle down in one place to live and work. Agronomic research has shown 
that the technique of constructing sawahs was already widespread among 
the population of Java before the tenth century (Setten van der Meer 1979). 
It seems unlikely that the inhabitants of Priangan and other highlands were 
not familiar with this knowledge. Inscriptions dating from the f ifth century 
AD and old Sundanese manuscripts show that wet land cultivation did not 
come to West Java at the same time as Islam, but must have arrived much 
earlier (Hoadley 1994: 26-7). So why did this mode of cultivation, which 
had become more common in the more densely populated lowlands in the 
seventeenth century, make such little progress in the Priangan highlands? 
The inhabitants of these regions would long display a stubborn preference 
for rainfed agriculture, despite its lower yield. Contemporary chroniclers 
suggested a different reason for what became branded as non-economic 
conduct. The lords of the land found it much more diff icult to cream off the 
2 Elsewhere in his report on the situation in which the country found itself, he gave a different 
reason for the migration: ‘The people of the Priangan do not settle down quietly and peacefully 
because their large number of headmen are in conflict with each other and stir up the common-
ers to revolt, and consequently they forget about their obligations to the Company.’ (Van Rees 
1880: 90)
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surplus from nomadic peasants and thus, according to Andries de Wilde 
(1830: 222), the latter were of no use at all to the government or anyone else. 
Not only was their yield much lower, it was also more diff icult to estimate 
its volume. For the peasantry, remaining footloose was an effective means 
of avoiding lords wishing to lay claim to as much of their surplus as possible. 
According to an early nineteenth-century report describing the situation in 
interior Banten, the surplus the gentry eventually succeeded in appropriat-
ing was little more than ‘a handful of rice and a few farthings’. This makes 
it clear why both the old and new elite urged their clients to practise wet 
land cultivation. Yet, despite all these efforts, what was largely seen as the 
destruction of the forest by primitive peasants would continue until deep 
into the nineteenth century.
Although Priangan gradually became less wild and inaccessible and 
expeditions were able to provide information on areas about which little 
had previously been known, the higher and more distant lands in particular 
remained largely uncultivated (see the map of the Priangan highlands). 
Colonists moved into the region from the valleys, but significant population 
growth was hindered by the absence of roads while the rivers were only 
navigable in the plains. Andries de Wilde, who founded the Sukabumi 
estate in the early nineteenth century and cultivated a small part of his 
huge property – covering an area larger than a province in the Netherlands 
– described the remoteness of the landscape where he started his pioneering 
work.
In each regency, interminable mountain ranges and plains of enormous 
dimensions lie wild and desolate, yet would be extremely suitable for the 
cultivation of rice and other crops (De Wilde 1829: 15).
The southern regions of Priangan in particular were almost uninhabited. It 
was possible to travel for hours without seeing cultivated fields, huts or other 
traces of human activity. Colonial historiography attributes the low level of 
development to the exodus of the original population after the fall of the 
Pacacaran empire in the early f ifteenth century. In this colonial interpreta-
tion, the victory of Sultan Hassanudin of Cirebon led not only to the fall of 
the Siliwangi dynasty, but also put an end to the Hindu civilization that 
had until then been dominant. Islam, after f irst gaining a foothold in the 
coastal zone of North Java, now also penetrated inland. The mild-mannered 
and peace-loving inhabitants of the highlands were unable to withstand 
their war-mongering neighbours from Banten and Cirebon. Holding on to 
the Hindu faith of their forefathers, they left the land of their birth to avoid 
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the enforced introduction of the new religion by the sword. The memory 
of their origins remained in the name they gave the land they left behind: 
tanah preangan, abandoned land. This apocryphal legend, recorded by V 
J.C. van Beusechem in 1836-7, is an invention of a past that never existed. 
It is more plausible that peasants abandoned their lands when there was 
reason to, for example during times of unrest, or came from elsewhere to 
escape the grasp of local lords, opening up the forested wilderness to which 
they had fled. Peasant life in Priangan under the ancien régime was always 
typif ied more by continual mobility than by settling down indefinitely. In 
the mid-eighteenth century, rebels in Banten still absconded to Priangan 
to escape subjection by the Sultan (Ota 2006: 61-2). The conversion from 
Hinduism to Islam did not bring about any sudden change in this situation. 
The religious transition took several generations to complete. A source from 
the end of the eighteenth century reports that, while strict Muslims lived 
on the coast, the religious practices of the inhabitants of the hinterland 
were mingled much with superstition (Ota 2006: 32-4). Lastly, there is little 
plausibility in the claim that Hinduism on West Java was once the founda-
tion of a complex agrarian civilization and incorporated a large kingdom. 
Besides Siliwangi, there were a small number of other political formations, 
including Galuh in east Priangan, but these alliances were not deeply rooted 
or long lasting, dissolving as quickly as they were formed. What is known 
as Pacacaran was probably little more than a loose collection of local and 
small-scale kingdoms (Guillot 1991: 70). The Sunda highlands were never the 
heart of a highly organized agrarian order now veiled in mist. The region 
appears to have always been as it was when the VOC arrived: a frontier 
territory, sometimes expanding, sometimes contracting again, and slowly 
populated by colonists from outside.
Clearing the land for cultivation
The settlements that the early VOC agents encountered in the hinterland 
were without exception small, had few inhabitants and were almost 
exclusively located on or close to rivers. An initial census, dating from 
1686, records 508 negorijen (settlements). Almost three-quarters of these 
(353) comprised ten households at the most. The largest had more than 
20 households, but only a little more than a tenth of the total fell into this 
category (De Haan III 1912: 203). Many of the inhabitants had no permanent 
place of residence, leading a nomadic existence in the forest or in open 
f ields. They lived in small family bands and survived by growing food on 
34 MobiLizinG Labour for the GLobaL Coffee Market
a plot of land that they f irst cleared by burning away the vegetation and 
then cultivated using primitive tools. Little was written during the VOC era 
about their modus operandi, but a Swedish traveller through the Cirebon 
and Priangan regions in the late eighteenth century recorded that they 
cleared plots of land and then planted rice by making holes in the ground 
with a stick and dropping two or three grains in each. The harvest followed 
around three-and-a-half months later, during which time the peasants did 
little to tend the plants. The advantage of low maintenance was offset by the 
unpredictability of the yield. If there was insuff icient rain or wild animals 
damaged the crops, the peasants’ efforts came to nothing (Stützer 1787). 
De Haan also comments on the simple technology of these slash-and-burn 
cultivators.
... they have no buffalo; their only tools are a bedog (machete), parang 
(sickle) and kored (a hooked metal tool to pull roots out of the ground); 
they cooked their paddy in a bamboo basket. (De Haan III 1912: 216)
After one or two harvests, which yielded little, they would abandon their 
huts, made of branches, leaves and other non-durable materials, and move 
somewhere else, where they would also stop only for a short time. Usually, 
after some years, they would return to places they had abandoned earlier, 
where nature would have recovered from their previous presence. They 
also survived by hunting and gathering, which made them vulnerable to 
predators living in the forests and mountains of Priangan. Known as jalma 
burung, bird people, these huma or gaga cultivators, who possessed nothing 
and roamed around continually, were looked down upon for their rough 
and ambulant way of life. Settling them was considered a precondition to 
make them more civilized. From this perspective, a nomadic existence 
could easily lead to social impropriety (Geographische en statistische 
bijzonderheden 1835: 378).
Tipar tillers were also shifting cultivators and tended rain-fed f ields, 
but they were agronomically more advanced than their huma/gaga con-
temporaries. They had better tools, including a plough or hoe, and a few 
head of cattle, which allowed them to till the land more intensively and 
increase their yields. Their huts, built to last f ive to seven years, were still 
simple, but were starting to look more like permanent dwellings. Their 
f ields, also known as tegal, were located around the places they settled 
and were often abandoned humas. They would plant a tree on a plot of land 
to indicate that they had temporarily taken possession of it and intended 
to return in the future. The tipar peasants did not live clustered together, 
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but spread out over the land around the settlement. The scattered habitat 
made it diff icult to determine their share of the total population with 
any accuracy, but they were in the majority until the early decades of the 
nineteenth century. The f irst step towards sedentary existence had been 
taken but not yet completed.
The tegal peasants were gradually ousted from their dominant position 
as tillers of the land by the owners of sawahs, irrigated paddy f ields. Sawahs 
did not become commonplace in Priangan until the early-colonial era. 
Contingents of colonists from the coastal plain moved into the region in 
the seventeenth century, at the invitation of the regent of Cianjur, who 
was subordinate to the sultan of Cirebon, to construct irrigation systems 
and make the land suitable for permanent cultivation (De Roo de la Faille 
1941: 420). In bad times, for example successive failed harvests or serious 
political unrest leading to war, not only did the influx of settlers come to 
an end, but there was even evidence of outmigration. Early-colonial sources 
speak of buniaga, strangers, who would arrive and join the inhabitants of an 
existing settlement. The longer they stayed, the more rights they acquired 
Gaga (slash-and-burn) field of a nomadic cultivator in Jampang in the early 
twentieth century. The felled trees are laid out over the terrain to prevent erosion 
of the top soil and to terrace the hillside.
source: f. de haan – Priangan, vl. 1, p. 376
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and, although they would initially be dependent on a previously established 
peasant household, they would gradually till the land more autonomously 
themselves. There would also undoubtedly be incidences of one or more 
peasant households settling somewhere outside the boundaries of existing 
settlements and opening up wilderness land (see Peluso 1992). Due to a lack 
of information, we can only speculate on the extent of such ‘wild’ coloniza-
tion. There is little more evidence of members of the landed gentry ordering 
their subjects to cultivate new land within their jurisdictions. This would 
take the form of group colonization, with clients of local headmen setting out 
with bands of peasants, to reclaim new areas, often close by but sometimes 
further af ield. The report on an off icial survey of indigenous land rights, 
conducted in 1867, refers to large-scale migrations and attributes this form 
of organized mobility to a combination of economic and political motives.
There can be no doubt that the landed gentry promoted the development 
of sedentary farming and that colonists from other regions played a promi-
nent role. Oral tradition does not stipulate when and how tipar peasants 
started to irrigate their f ields, and whether this was at their own initiative 
or at the instigation of local chiefs, but it was a change that signif ied a break 
with their previous way of life. As sedentary cultivators, their socioeconomic 
security increased, with a lower risk of failed harvests, higher yields and the 
possibility of protecting their settlements against external threats, such as 
attacks by wild animals or robbers. The price they had to pay was the loss 
of the independence they enjoyed as footloose peasants, and it was for this 
reason that orders from above to lay out sawahs remained unheeded. The 
colonial explanation for what was seen as a rejection of progress was that 
the nomadic cultivators were lazy and satisf ied with their hand-to-mouth 
existence. Nineteenth-century sources abound with this interpretation; 
in 1809, for example, the Prefect of the Cirebon-Priangan Regencies wrote 
to Marshal Daendels, the Governor-General, that he had given orders that 
more paddy be grown to combat hunger during the periodic food shortages. 
But his instructions to construct ‘muddy f ields’ had little success.
Urging on my part to expand the cultivation of paddy to ensure suff icient 
healthy food in the bosom of the Prefecture is contrary to the customs 
of the inhabitants, is considered onerous by them, and may be seen as 
one of the causes of their uprooting and moving elsewhere. (De Haan 
III 1912: 212)
By remaining footloose, the peasants were able to escape the grip of the 
lords. If they settled permanently, the landed gentry nearly always laid 
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claim to a larger share of their harvest. The gentry justif ied this practice by 
stating that they bore the costs of cultivation, and guaranteed the peasants’ 
survival, offering them protection or even imposing it upon them. The 
peasants held ownership rights to the f ields, while the builder of a water 
canal held control over the common land that it could be used to irrigate. 
Colonial enquiries carried out in the mid-nineteenth century confirmed 
that off icial permission was not required to take unenclosed waste land 
into cultivation (Van Marle 1860: 13). The inhabitants of a settlement were 
permitted to use the surrounding uncultivated land not only to graze 
their cattle and gather wood but also to grow crops on an occasional basis. 
Ownership rights to f ields could only be claimed if they had been prepared 
for permanent cultivation, a time-consuming investment that required not 
only tools and draught animals but also a great deal of labour to build the 
sawah terraces.
The question whether the footloose peasants clung to their freedom or 
were prepared to exchange it for a form of socioeconomic security that 
would restrict their mobility is misleading, because in practice they were 
not free to choose. Nobles could only acquire clients by subordinating them. 
There was such an abundance of unenclosed waste land that the nomadic 
tillers had little diff iculty in escaping the ‘protection’ offered to them. The 
only way for the gentry to restrict their mobility was to tie agricultural 
labour to the land. The sparsely populated and scarcely cultivated Priangan 
was essentially a region of ‘open resources’. The Dutch ethnologist Herman 
Nieboer saw the incidence of unfree labour in pre-industrial societies as 
a consequence of free access to land. He argued that, if land were freely 
available, there would be no voluntary supply of labour and it would have to 
be acquired by coercion (Nieboer 1910). From this perspective, the Priangan 
peasants did not go in search of a patron, but were forced into servitude 
by the gentry. Sedentarization was the perfect means to put an end to the 
nomadic existence of the peasants. Laying out sawahs not only made it 
easier to cream off the now greater agrarian surplus of the peasants but 
also to tie them down in servitude. As clients, they enjoyed the support and 
protection of the lords in constructing paddy f ields and in conflicts with 
third parties.3 Conversely, the peasants had to hand over a share of their 
3 De Haan gives an interesting example of the mutual support between patron and clients: 
‘... a Chief in Cianjur has to contract out his clientele, so that he can pay a f ine imposed upon 
him because one of his clients has committed a murder – a curious example of the solidarity 
between the Headman and his subordinates: the Head is punished for the misconduct of his 
clients and so retains them as his property.’ (De Haan I 1910: 31)
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harvest to their patron and perform various services for him. In addition 
to tending to their master’s f ields, the peasants also had to be available at 
all times to carry out a wide variety of tasks in and around his house and 
grounds.
The relatively free space in which peasants were accustomed to move 
around as shifting cultivators slowly made way for a landscape covered 
with irrigated paddy f ields. Although this process was accelerated by the 
influx of colonists from elsewhere, the transformation of shifting cultivators 
into sedentary peasants was of much greater signif icance. This progressive 
trend towards sedentarization may not have been the root cause of the 
subordination of the population of Priangan to the nobility but it certainly 
gave it a very powerful impetus by enabling the gentry to claim a share of the 
expanded food production of the peasantry and requisition their labour for 
corvee services. De Haan concisely summarized the motivation for coercing 
peasants into servitude: ‘The wealth of a chief is determined by the number 
of hands at his disposal’ (I 1910: 19). The VOC supported the gentry in their 
attempts to gain influence and status by acquiring clients. The Company’s 
agents ardently promoted the expansion of sedentary agriculture from an 
early stage and called on local chiefs to put a stop to the peasants’ mobility. 
An instruction dating from 1686 outlawed all those who failed to place 
Sawah (irrigated rice field) in Sukabumi in the early twentieth century
source: f. de haan – Priangan, vl. i, p. 368
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themselves under the control of a chief and insisted on remaining vagabonds 
(Van Rees 1880: 81).
Perennial cultivation of land by sedentary peasants had a positive impact 
on public order. The instruction received by the Pangerang Aria Cheribon 
on his appointment in 1706 urged him and the chiefs under his control 
to expand the ‘paddy plantations’ in their districts (De Haan II 1911: 250). 
The VOC’s policy of imposing a hierarchical order of governance was not 
restricted to the top echelons but extended down to the base. Peasants were 
to subordinate themselves to the authority of a chief and would no longer 
be permitted to transfer their allegiance to a rival contender of power. For 
their part, chiefs were not permitted to persuade the clients of a rival chief 
to defect. Despite all these ordinances and regulations the area covered by 
irrigated paddy f ields remained limited. Towards the end of the eighteenth 
century, even in the immediate surroundings of Batavia, food was still 
more commonly grown in dry f ields and sawahs remained relatively rare 
(Hooijman 1781: 322).
The composite peasant household
The transition from swidden to sedentary agriculture brought about 
far-reaching changes in patterns of settlement. When shifting cultivators 
became sedentary, permanent settlements emerged. This transformation 
in their way of working and living certainly did not take place suddenly 
or evenly but evolved gradually over a long period of time, perhaps with 
temporary relapses into the former way of life. In the absence of records, 
it is only possible to speculate how the process developed. Although the 
interplay between the landed gentry and the peasantry was clearly the 
trigger, I believe it would be incorrect to assume that the initiative always 
came from the lords. Sooner or later, however, the emerging aristocracy, 
driven by its desire for distinction, succeeded in laying claim to a large 
part of the land and yield of the sawah farmers. They attempted to justify 
these claims by taking the credit for having instigated the cultivation of the 
land. As late as the early nineteenth century, Pieter van Lawick van Pabst,4 
at that time prefect of the Priangan lands falling under the jurisdiction 
of Cirebon, reported that the regent could not lay claim to any land that 
peasants themselves had cultivated (De Haan IV 1912: 778).
4 Referred to hereafter as Lawick.
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The process of agrarian sedentarization also set in motion a progres-
sive differentiation among the peasantry. Constructing irrigation systems 
and laying out terraced f ields required much more labour than dry-land 
cultivation. Growing paddy in sawahs also took longer – around f ive and 
a half months – and labour needed to be continually available during this 
period, compared to tipar farming, where it was required only at the start 
and end of the three-month planting cycle. Preparing the soil was not very 
time-consuming and in terms of hours worked, it was much more cost-
effective than tilling irrigated f ields. Becoming a client for a noble, which 
sedentary peasants could hardly avoid, therefore meant a considerably 
heavier workload. The yield may have been higher and more dependable, 
but much of the surplus was cancelled out by the compulsory tribute. On 
top of this, sedentary clients were obliged to perform a wide variety of 
services for their patron, from which nomadic peasants were able to escape 
far more easily.
How did the owners of sawah f ields fulf il this much higher demand for 
labour? It was no longer suff icient to call on the members of their own 
household, as dry-f ield cultivators were accustomed to doing during peak 
periods. Irrigated farming and the additional corvee imposed on the client 
required far more hands than the household itself could provide. The only 
solution was to acquire extra labourers. In my view, this must be seen as the 
origin of the cacah, a complex and stratif ied household that included not 
only the owner of the f ields and his immediate family members, but also 
one or more sharecroppers and/or farm servants, known as numpang. The 
population was not an undifferentiated mass of peasants, each cultivating 
their own plot of land, but was divided into several categories. Patronage 
did not end with the peasant landowners, but continued on downward to 
the base of society. The head of a cacah, called bumi or sikep, was patron to 
the sharecroppers and landless labourers who served him as clients. These 
subordinate households cultivated plots of land that belonged to the head 
of the cacah, which he had entrusted to them in exchange for a share in 
the yield. It was in essence a sharecropping agreement which assured the 
numpang a third or half of the harvest: the smaller share if they provided 
only their labour and half if they used their own tools and draught animals. 
Their dependency was not only economic, but also social: numpang meant 
‘co-habitant’ or ‘dependant’, concepts with a very literal meaning (De Roo 
de la Faille 1941: 421).
Similarly dependent, but more inferior in status, were the bujang, board-
ers or farm servants. The bujang did not form their own households, but 
lived in with their masters. They were young bachelors, sometimes members 
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of the master’s family, who had the prospect of promotion to sharecropper if 
they started a family. The sharecroppers themselves could become bumi or 
sikep by cultivating land locally or elsewhere and achieving the full status 
of independent peasants by establishing their own cacah. Access to as yet 
uncultivated land was a precondition for this upward mobility and they 
were dependent on the protection and support of the gentry to cultivate it. 
Conversely, the head of a cacah could escape subordination to his juragan 
(lord or patron) by deserting him and becoming a client of another member 
of the gentry. He could then take refuge as a numpang under the protection 
of a new juragan (Scheltema 1927-28: 281).
Servitude was inherent to the composite peasant household, and was 
expressed in the relationship of dependence between gusti (master) and 
ngawula (servant). Hoadley has made a number of interesting comments 
about this social configuration in the Priangan landscape in the pre-colonial 
and early-colonial eras. I disagree, however, with his conclusion that the 
cacah was based on a relationship of debt (Hoadley 1994: 37-43). He offers 
no evidence for this claim, for example how the debt originated and why 
some peasants were subject to it while others were not. In my view, clients 
were forced into servitude not because they were unable to repay a debt, 
but because lords at different levels in the social hierarchy desired bonded 
subjects. This started at the top with the regent and continued right down 
to the subordination of farm servants by the landowners. The principle of 
servitude has its roots in the exercise of power through subordination. The 
f irst generation of Priangan regents appointed by the VOC were assigned a 
specif ic number of households, ranging from several hundred to more than 
a thousand. This subdivision was based on an implausibly low census figure, 
according to which the six regencies together had a population amounting 
to a total of less than 6,000 subordinate households. Although the term 
does not appear explicitly in the early Company records, I am inclined to 
believe that these units, which – according to the information provided by 
the household heads themselves – included their dependants to make up 
the cacah household as the cornerstone of the settled peasantry. The sources 
provide no conclusive evidence of the average size of such a household, 
often quoting widely varying numbers. It would be incorrect to interpret 
this variation as proof of the unreliability of early-colonial reporting. As 
mentioned above, composite households could comprise several families 
– including ‘co-habitants’ or ‘dependants’ – but could also be much smaller, 
especially in their early phases or, later, when dependent servants may 
have left to set up their own households. Unlike wet-land owners, dry-land 
cultivators did not need households with so many members and their unit 
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of cohabitation was consequently less complex. Structuring the peasant 
population within a hierarchy was a condition for the levying of tribute 
which, as we shall see later, would under the VOC become heavier than ever 
before. The head of a composite peasant household had suff icient labour at 
his disposal to practise irrigated agriculture, f irstly to meet all his own food 
needs, secondly to produce a surplus for his patron, and lastly to impose 
a state of servitude on the servants and sharecroppers dependent on him 
to fulf il the services he himself was obliged to provide as client of a lord.
Over the course of time, an increasing number of peasants undeniably 
developed into sedentary and permanent cultivators of the land. Tying them 
to their f ields and settlements meant that they had left their nomadic past 
behind. Those in power packaged this change of lifestyle as beneficial for 
the peasants, projecting the image of a rustic man of the land as a prototype 
of the happy and contented villager portrayed in later colonial documents.
The sawah builder or owner of regularly irrigated paddy f ields enjoys the 
greatest prosperity and is, in that respect, the most peace-loving and, in 
all respects, the most respectable. The prospect of a f ixed annual income 
that is more than suff icient to fulf il his simple needs ensures that he 
does not exceed the bounds of his social obligations. He does not wish for 
any other property, and is not tempted to acquire it by criminal means 
(Geographische en statistische bijzonderheden 1835: 377).
With the increase in the number of inhabitants – which took place slowly 
and was more the consequence of a gradual decrease in the tendency to 
heavily underestimate the real size of the population than any genuine rise 
in numbers – some of the features that gave Priangan the character of a 
frontier society disappeared. It should not be forgotten that the colonization 
process continued until the late nineteenth century, and the population 
continued to be mobile even after the most primitive stage of nomadic 
agriculture was no longer the dominant means of livelihood. Although 
people did settle down close to their land, they could also leave again. The 
division of the population into agrarian classes suggests that the pattern of 
cultivation remained predominantly local. Landowners and sharecroppers 
fulf illed their basic needs by tilling land available in the vicinity. There 
were, however, peasants known as panukang who left their own villages to 
tend their master’s f ields, which were dispersed among several settlements. 
Landless labourers also found employment in various localities and did not 
work for one and the same landowner throughout the year. This leads me to 
conclude that there was an agrarian underclass that was relatively nomadic 
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and which receives little attention in the literature. References to these 
footloose labourers can only be found indirectly. In his 1836 monograph, 
for example, Van Beusechem referred to the low incidence of marriage in 
the Priangan Regencies in the preceding years and suggested that it was 
because a considerable proportion of the population was permanently 
on the move (1836: 8). The signif icance of this phenomenon cannot be 
understood without considering the claims that the landed gentry made 
on agrarian labour, both in opening up the region and in collecting the 
colonial tribute. This requires taking a closer look at the gentry itself, a 
social class that lived from the yield of agrarian production without taking 
an active part itself in cultivating the land.
Higher and lower-ranking chiefs
‘Regent’ was the name the VOC used for the select group of native chiefs that 
held power in the Priangan (De Haan I 1910: 338-57 and IV 1912: 325-38). That 
their numbers remained limited to f ive was more a matter of coincidence 
than a well-considered choice based on knowledge of the ranks and statuses 
of the indigenous aristocracy. The f irst chiefs to be designated as regents 
were those who could provide evidence – either real or fake – that they 
had been appointed by the ruler of Mataram. The VOC’s directors had no 
understanding at all of the intricacies with which these lords competed with 
each other for power and status, though they were aware that attaching 
clients from among the population was a decisive factor. The Company 
tried to impose some kind of order on this opaque situation by taking deci-
sions on the spur of the moment, with no clear vision of their purpose or 
reach. The lord of Sumedang could claim the oldest rights but his influence 
declined as that of vassals of the sultan of Cirebon, especially the lord of 
Cianjur, increased. However, the VOC soon enforced restrictions on the 
efforts of this harbour principality to extend its reach of control inland. 
It could do this only by assigning to itself sovereign rights and demand-
ing unconditional loyalty. From then on, Batavia would decide which of 
the candidates for succession would be chosen. This would usually be a 
son, though not always the eldest, and if it were more opportune for some 
reason or another, it might be an outsider. Van Beusechem described this 
unpredictability in 1836 as the prerogative of absolute power. A regent could 
be dismissed if there were any doubts about his loyalty or good conduct. 
This happened to the regent of Bandung in 1802. The VOC also periodically 
reviewed the administrative jurisdiction without warning. The regencies 
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of Parakanmuncang and Bogor, for example, were abolished only a short 
time after being established. Sukapura and Limbangan, on the other hand, 
remained part of the Cirebon Priangan territories in the early nineteenth 
century, until the divisional administration introduced by Daendels came to 
an end in 1815. The territorial demarcation established after Dutch authority 
was restored remained intact until the end of colonial rule and, through 
strict implementation of the earlier policy of exclusion, the region retained 
its separate status. The claim, however, that the ancien régime was preserved 
in the highlands of Sunda ignores the far-reaching reforms that f irst the 
VOC and later the early-colonial state introduced.
The policy of territorial demarcation made no distinction between indi-
vidual regents. This did not of course mean that their ancestral lineage, the 
size of the population in their jurisdiction and how this affected the colonial 
tribute were no longer of any signif icance, but they were all treated equally 
under the same rules, the essence of which was ranking them in juxtaposi-
tion. Relations between the regents were characterized by jealousy.5 The 
main principle of territorial rule was that the entire population of a regency 
were subjects of the regent, while he could lay no claim to clients living 
beyond his borders. The colonial off icials tried to create order in what they 
considered administrative chaos, where clients of rival lords often lived 
side by side. The reform carried out, based on the principle of territoriality, 
was justif ied in the name of proper governance, but the real motive was 
to make it easier to collect the colonial tribute. The VOC established its 
authority by cutting the chiefs’ ties with their former rulers. This transfer 
of subordination was a long process and the new regime would only have 
acquired legitimacy gradually. Colonial administrators were uneasy about 
affairs being conducted behind the scenes without them ever f inding out 
the truth about what was going on. They had every reason to fear that the 
chiefs were conspiring behind their backs and to be concerned about their 
hold over what they considered a seditious population. To defuse this threat 
in advance, the VOC had no qualms about encouraging the chiefs to pass 
on information about each other and stoking up their jealousy (De Haan I 
1910: 342). The regents f inally stopped resisting their territorial confinement 
when the benefits proved greater than the disadvantages.
5 ‘Their favourite pastime was to keep a close eye on everything their neighbours were doing, 
with the malicious pleasure of an old spinster, and to gossip about it to all and sundry, which 
made it extremely diff icult for the Company to keep a check on the situation, and explains why 
its off icials saw this dissension between the Regents, which was also cherished in the bosoms 
of the different families, as a useful means of governance.’ (De Haan I 1910: 343).
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The regents were expected to reside in the dalem or dajeuh (the Sunda-
nese name for their residence), a complex of buildings initially constructed 
from bamboo or wood. They spent most of their time here, isolated from 
the outside world. At f irst, these residences were quite modest, their status 
clearer from their size than the material comfort and luxury they offered, 
but over time they began to look increasingly like palaces. The practice of 
keeping a permanent house in Batavia and turning up at random to ‘pay 
homage’ to their superiors in the Company’s headquarters – just as their 
predecessors had regularly made the long trip to the court in Mataram – had 
become less common by the early nineteenth century. With their authority 
now territorially delineated, their superiors urged them to remain in their 
regencies. One old custom that was preserved was that each regent was 
permitted to retain two patih: one to run the lord’s elaborate household 
and the other to take care of affairs in the regency and represent the regent 
in his dealings with lower chiefs and their following. Patih were usually a 
sons or other close relations of the regent. The patih responsible for external 
affairs would issue orders to the lower chiefs in the regent’s name and was 
the hub through which all lines leading to the dalem f irst had to pass. As 
the highest-ranking servant, this patih lived close to the regent, but outside 
the enclave in which the latter lived a secluded existence.
The regent himself was considered too elevated to be troubled by day-
to-day affairs. He remained at a distance and had little more to do than 
act eminently and emanate the sacred power that he personif ied. Roorda 
van Eysinga, who visited the regent of Bandung in 1821, had few good words 
to say for his host. The main negorij in which the regent’s household was 
located may have been larger than a village, but it offered little more in 
terms of facilities. With three walls enclosing his court, the regent was both 
invisible and unapproachable for his people. His rare public appearances 
were accompanied by great pomp and circumstance. He was surrounded by 
a swarm of subjects carrying flags and lances. In Cianjur there were radèns 
(notables) everywhere, wrote Nicolaus Engelhard in 1797, contemptuous of 
what he had observed during his short visit to the regent’s headquarters. 
The presence of lower-ranking chiefs meant that their duties in their own 
jurisdictions were taken care of by substitutes (De Haan IV 1912: 397). The 
larger population of the regent’s negorij was intended to display his author-
ity and enhance his prestige. Its residents were not subject to the same 
obligations as the majority of the inhabitants of the regency. This attracted 
people who were looking for an easier life than cultivating the land, so that 
the main settlements acquired a reputation as magnets for layabouts and 
good-for-nothings. It was always possible to f ind someone prepared to do 
46 MobiLizinG Labour for the GLobaL Coffee Market
all kinds of jobs that could not stand the light of day (Geographische en 
statistische bijzonderheden 1835: 379-80).
The patih was assisted by a chief of police, who was responsible for main-
taining public order. Criminal acts were investigated by the f iscal or jaksa 
who would also mete out punishments. The jaksa had a staff of constables 
and a small contingent of prison guards. However, this indigenous apparatus 
gradually lost its authority to deal with police and judicial matters and the 
jail in the headquarters would be used only for petty criminals. The resident 
made sure that more serious crimes, like murder and manslaughter, were 
tried by the circuit judge. Travellers from Sumedang to Cirebon would no 
longer be confronted with the sight of iron cages hanging on poles and 
displaying the chopped-off heads of robbers to frighten off others (Roorda 
van Eysinga 1830: 218). Lastly, the entourage of a regent would include a high 
priest, a chief panghulu and a chief kalipah, who would also be one of his 
kinsmen. Their presence and leadership in religious matters emphasized 
the sacred nature of the regent’s authority.
Below the regents, who – with their patih, jaksa and ketib (a religious 
off icial) – were at the top of the pyramid of notables, there was a long 
chain of lower-ranking chiefs. The most important of these were in charge 
of the districts, territorial areas also established and demarcated by the 
colonial administration. Like the regencies, their number and size were 
arbitrary and also changed randomly. In 1836 the Priangan Regencies had 
a total of 73 districts: 23 in Cianjur, 14 in Bandung, 22 in Sumedang, 6 in 
Limbangan and 8 in Sukapura. Thirty years later, after being divided up, 
merged or abolished, 66 remained throughout the entire residency. Until 
1790, the district chiefs were appointed by the regent, but he did have to put 
forward the candidate of his choice to the Commissioner for the Indigenous 
Population for approval. After 1790, this authority was transferred to the 
resident. In 1802, Pieter Engelhard, prefect of East Priangan, ordered that 
the cutak (district) chiefs should no longer hang around in the main negorij 
of the regency, but had to reside in their own districts, so that they could 
keep a closer eye on matters there. In an instruction dated 19 June 1808, 
Daendels ordered them to choose a village, as close as possible to the centre 
of their district, as their place of residence. The same instruction included 
the provision that one or two lower-ranking chiefs could be appointed in 
all other villages in the district; in the larger localities, desas, these were 
known as kuwu or mantri and, in the smaller hamlets with between six and 
ten households, it would be a prenta or petingi. All habitations or kampungs 
with fewer households were to be incorporated into a neighbouring desa. 
This meant that the inhabitants would actually have to move there. With 
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this blueprint the policy of territorial demarcation extended to the base of 
peasant society.
The administration of the main village in a district was set up in a similar 
way to the headquarters of a regency, though on a more modest footing. 
The chief’s residence was smaller and built of less durable materials than 
the dalem where the regent held court. Like his superior, the district chief 
had a substitute who stood in for him during his frequent visits to the main 
negorij. Lower-ranking chiefs were expected to gather at his residence, 
whether he was there or not, as a show of their subordination and their 
instant willingness to carry out all of his orders. The colonial authorities 
put a stop to this practice, which they saw as frustrating the eff icacy of 
governance. This clash between domestic and externally imposed views on 
how to exercise authority was of course settled in favour of the latter but, 
again, it was a gradual change that did not occur overnight.
The native chiefs belonged to two classes. The members of the high 
nobility, including the regent and his deputy, the head jaksa, the high priest 
and the district chiefs were menak. They could speak Javanese or Djawareh 
(a mixture of Javanese and Sundanese) and used this language in their corre-
spondence. A small percentage of the privileged class learned the language 
by receiving instruction. In the early nineteenth century Resident Van der 
Capellen took the initiative of tutoring chiefs’ sons in skills that would 
enhance their administrative capability. The menak were closely related 
to each other. The indigenous structure of authority was kinship-based, as 
the key positions – including higher religious ranks – were usually f illed by 
members of the regents’ families. The regents themselves made a significant 
contribution to the reproduction of the following generation. The regent 
who ruled Sumedang from 1836 to 1882, for example, had 101 children, 53 of 
whom were still alive when he died. He gave them all a number and kept a 
register, so as not to lose count (De Haan I 1910: 359). The list was, however, 
more than just a memory aid; the sequence of their birth played a significant 
role in the allocation of positions. One wife was, of course, not enough to 
provide him with so many offspring. The more selir (additional wives) a 
regent had, the greater his prestige. It also allowed him to consolidate his 
power by entering into marriage ties with lower-ranking chiefs (Bijdragen 
tot kennis 1870: 271). Providing jobs for his close relatives was an obligation 
that a regent had to fulf il, but it also had another purpose: it enabled him to 
build up a network that extended from the top to the bottom of the social 
hierarchy, through which he and his retinue could keep a watch over what 
was happening in their domain. Of course, this network could also be used 
to serve conflicting interests, generating divisions between the holders of 
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formal positions. Marriage ties in any case played an important role in 
the competition for prominence. In 1805, Lawick noted that the regent of 
Parakanmuncang ‘had married and remarried so often that most of the 
chiefs were related to him’ (De Haan IV 1912: 390).
The second class of chiefs were the sentana, referred to in colonial reports 
as landed gentry. They had their roots in the agrarian order and retained 
close contacts with the peasantry. They bore titles like asep, ujang or agus 
as an indication of their distinguished origins. A chain of command ex-
tended down from district level to the peasantry at large. At the base of the 
hierarchy of nobility, the lurah or his deputy, the panglaku, received orders 
from their superiors. The orders were brought by the lengser, a messenger 
whose name indicated that he did everything instantly, and came from the 
bale-bandong, a kind of off ice that served as an administrative centre in the 
district. The orders that were sent down the chain came from the camat, 
who acted as substitute for the district chief. The Javanese name wedana 
was not introduced for the district chiefs in the Priangan Regencies until 
1846. Before then, they were known as kepala cutak, a reference to their most 
important task: collecting the share of the paddy harvest that the peasant 
landowners were obliged to relinquish to the regent. The village priest, 
the lebeh or amil, also played an important role in these worldly tasks. He 
did not restrict himself to off iciating at religious meetings and teaching 
children about the Koran, but helped collect the padi zakat, the tenth part 
of the paddy harvest destined for the religious leaders and which eventually 
reached the high priest in the regent’s entourage, via the district panghulu. 
As one of the few who could read and write, it became the task of the village 
priest to register births, marriages and deaths. He was also responsible for 
vaccinating children against cowpox and helping to collect the tenth part 
of the harvest destined for the regent.
Behind this line of command, there were many other chiefs whose duties, 
mutual relationships and position in the hierarchy are more much more 
diff icult to pinpoint with precision. Colonial administrators were thrown 
into confusion by the enormous diversity of ranks and distinctions that 
they found themselves confronted with: umbul, temanggung, patih, wedana, 
panglakue, ngabeh, lurah, petinggih, pencalang, pangerang, demang, kliwon, 
mantri, kepala, lengser, pangkat, priaji, jaksa, camat, etc., etc... It was an 
endless and colourful parade of important and less important dignitaries, 
the infinite differences between which the VOC, and later the governor, had 
great diff iculty in distinguishing. They vainly sought the key that would 
show them where these notables f itted into the hierarchy: who gave orders 
to whom and about what, and how was this reflected in the demarcation of 
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tasks between them? These were questions with no conclusive answers. The 
hierarchy was not necessarily arranged in a clear-cut vertical ranking, with 
superiors and inferiors. Chiefs could belong to the entourage of the same 
higher lord, alongside or even in conflict with each other. They were rivals 
competing for power, not off icials with clearly def ined mandates within 
an administrative apparatus.6 They had no qualms about transferring their 
loyalty to another patron or poaching clients from their rivals. Their room 
for manoeuvre contracted, however, as the Priangan started to lose its 
frontier character. Nevertheless, out of sight of the colonial administrators, 
defections to another lord continued until deep into the nineteenth century.
Rendering servitude
The introduction of territorial demarcation did, however, reduce this 
tendency to switch loyalties. It was no longer possible to achieve upward 
mobility by seeking the protection of another regent or moving somewhere 
else with your entourage and cultivating new land. The head of a cacah 
could work his way up to become what was known in the colonial records 
as a ‘minor chief’, just as notables in higher echelons tried to gather more 
clients around them so as to strengthen their standing with their own, or 
perhaps another, lord. The important issue was not how many clients a 
regent needed to fulf il the duties of his off ice, but how he could bind his 
clientele – a hard core of trusted followers with a looser and more fluid 
group of less trusty ‘hangers-on’ – in servitude by rewarding them for the 
services they performed for him. These included an endless flow of goods 
and services from below, a sizable proportion of which had to be set aside for 
redistribution. The collection of ‘donations’ was widespread (De Wilde 1830: 
188-9). The seizure of goods and corvee ran from above to below, imposing 
the heaviest burden on the landless peasants at the base of the hierarchy. 
De Wilde described this situation succinctly: ‘In all these respects, the 
chiefs follow the example of their regents; and, as such, each is in his rank a 
greater or lesser oppressor of the common man.’ The top of the pyramid was 
linked to its base not directly but through a profusion of intermediaries over 
which the colonial administration had little oversight and even less control. 
Yet it was here that the hierarchical order was most dynamic – continually 
6 Hoadley describes the situation in similar terms: ‘A chain-of-command, a hierarchy of 
power, or even the delegation of authority existed only to a very limited extent in Javanese 
governmental practice.’ (Hoadley 2004: 148)
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expanding and contracting, rising and falling. This was partly due to the 
tendency of the notables not be content with their legal due, but to make 
deals with smart operators working at their own expense and risk. In these 
transactions, the jago as handyman or troubleshooter for the elite long 
played a prominent but underexposed role.
Servitude was primarily expressed through the obligation of landowning 
peasants to relinquish a part of their paddy harvest to their lord. The district 
chief was responsible for collecting this cuke (harvest) tribute. In the set-
tlements in his district, it was collected directly by the camat or one of his 
off icials. The village priest was also involved, as part of his responsibilities 
for checking the schedule of agricultural operations, which also included 
when to sow the seeds, how to maintain the irrigation system, etc. A third 
part of the cuke went straightaway to the minor chiefs, who were closer to 
the peasants. The share destined for the regent did not leave the village 
immediately, but was stored until the order came for it to be transferred 
to the dalem or the main settlement in the sub-district. In earlier times, 
this tribute would have been limited to only a twentieth part of a harvest, 
but that was when rice was grown by shifting cultivators on dry soil that 
had been only roughly cultivated and would only be used temporarily 
(De Roo de la Faille 1941: 422). Both the low yield and ease with which the 
nomadic peasants could up and leave made it impossible to increase the 
tax. Generally, the owners of sawah f ields had to relinquish a tenth part of 
their harvest. Newcomers and those cultivating new land, however, were 
entitled to a temporary exemption, usually for three years. For reasons that 
remain unclear, after an inspection tour of the Priangan, Daendels decided to 
increase the cuke to a fifth part of the harvest. The chiefs would be entitled to 
the full tenth part that they received, rather than sharing it with the religious 
leaders, who would now also be entitled to a tenth part for their involvement 
in the agricultural process. This unexpected doubling of the tribute would 
fuel the unrest that was already widespread around that time, especially 
among the people of Cirebon. As well as having to hand over a larger share 
of their food production, the peasants had to fulf il a large number of other 
obligations, the most important of which was working in the chief’s f ields. 
Although the landed gentry used sharecroppers to cultivate their land, they 
also demanded that all cacah provided labour. The households belonging to 
a lord, juragan, would provide these services in turn, sending one of their 
members to perform this work, known as tugur, for perhaps one day a week. 
All those holding a position of authority were exempt from this obligation, as 
were the elderly, the disabled, and the needy. Newcomers were also exempt 
for the period that they did not have to pay the cuke.
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Servitude occurred in two forms. The panukang, peasants who owned 
no land themselves and were permanently employed by a lord as share-
croppers, represented the most onerous form of servitude. They received 
a share of the yield from the land they cultivated and also had to work in 
the stables and households of their juragan. The second group consisted of 
the rahayat, peasants who sought the protection of the lord voluntarily (De 
Waal 1866: 367). This lighter form of servitude required a show of ritualized 
deference and was known as mengawula. The relationship between the lord 
and the peasant was one of patronage. Van Rees discussed the concept of 
servitude in his report, explaining what it entailed in great detail. Peasants 
chose subordination to seek ‘shelter from the rain’ by entrusting themselves 
to the protection of a man of standing (ngali dung). In other words, they 
preferred subordinating themselves to a lord, in the expectation that he 
would not overburden them with obligations, to exposing themselves to 
the arbitrary forces that threatened them from all sides if they remained 
unattached (Van Rees 1867: 47). Moestapa defined the concept in similar 
terms: ‘serving a Lord with labour and other impositions, in exchange for 
being released from more general burdens’ (Moestapa 1946: 114, note 3). A 
client could rely on his lord protecting him from claims to his livelihood 
resources from others. From this perspective, the bond was not imposed 
from above and by force, but from below and willingly. It was an honour to 
be a client of a powerful man and perform services for him, while the lord 
could increase his prestige by expanding the size of his retinue. Territorial 
proximity was no consideration in the attachment of peasants as clients.
The suzerainty of each chief was comprised of the possessions of his 
subjects, irrespective of where they were located, such that the bond that 
tied the heads of peasant households was based not on where they lived 
but on the lord to whom they were obligated. (Eindresumé III, 1896: 129)
De Roo de la Faille summarized this principle of subordination succinctly 
as follows: ‘living where they were, serving where they wanted’ (quoted in 
De Haan IV: 415). Territorialized governance, as introduced by the Company 
and more rigorously imposed by the early-colonial state, put an end to this 
customary exercise of authority.
What was the social standing of clients? They were considered to have 
been among the better-off among the peasants. They owned land and, as 
the head of a cacah, had numpang (co-habitants) and bujang (boarders) 
who were their clients, just as they themselves were the clients of a higher 
lord (De Haan IV 1912: 413). The servitude was discretionary and varied 
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according to the claims the lord imposed on his clientele. Just as the head 
of a cacah had to be aware that a co-habitant or boarder might desert him, 
a higher lord who demanded too much ran the risk that his clients might 
transfer their loyalties to a rival. A Sundanese saying expressed this per-
fectly: ‘Turn your face, change your lord’ (Moestapa 1946: 210, note 6). Such 
switches of allegiance sometimes entailed moving to another locality, but 
not necessarily (De Haan I 1910: 361). Peasant and lord were separate social 
positions, but they depended on each other. There was no lack of lords at 
the tail end of the peasant order, not only because the gentry owned a large 
share of the agricultural holdings, which were cultivated by sharecroppers, 
but also because the head of a cacah, albeit a peasant in his own right, 
was himself a juragan to whom dependants were bonded. Society in the 
Priangan was therefore not divided into two segments, but a multiplicity of 
interdependent strata based on patronage, in which patrons had dependants 
while they themselves could be clients of higher lords. It was a society 
characterized by vertical ties, in both directions. The top and the base of 
the pyramid were linked through a chain of mediation. This rectif ies the 
view that only regents practised clientelism. As De Haan correctly observes, 
the large majority of the rahayat did not serve regents, but belonged to the 
retinue of lower-ranking chiefs. Van Rees came to the same conclusion in 
his report while, remarkably, Pieter Engelhard took this view as early as 
1804 (De Haan IV 1912: 411). Lords tended to use discretionary latitude in 
their treatment of their clients, taking account of their circumstances. If a 
peasant was unable to pay his full tribute because of a failed harvest or some 
other temporary setback, his patron would settle for a smaller share than he 
was entitled to. He might also demand smaller shares from new clients to 
keep them content. The threat of desertion or defection to another lord may 
also have tempered the severity of the terms of servitude. The relationship 
was fluid and negotiable, varied according to the situation in which both 
parties found themselves and with its closeness and duration. A good lord 
knew how to tie new clients in servitude and to keep them that way, while 
a good client would subordinate himself, but with reservations and always 
one eye open for more attractive options.
Peasants and their lords in the early-colonial era
Servitude is primarily seen as a form of subordination, with the emphasis 
on the burdens that it brought for the clients. But, as mentioned above, they 
consented to their dependency in the expectation that the patron would be 
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able and willing to restrain his claims on their labour power and the yield of 
their harvest. Furthermore, as with patronage in general, the relationship 
was not only economic in nature. A patron’s entourage served to enhance 
his power and prestige and make him more resistant to competition from 
his rivals. In his description of the state of Java in 1799, Van Hogendorp 
showed that he was aware of this facet of servitude, despite the critical 
tone of his f inal judgment.
The armed Troops, that the Regents could mobilize in this way, are little 
more than an unruly, undisciplined Mob who, at the f irst shot, fall or 
f lee, and are more troublesome than helpful, and are therefore of no use 
at all to Society, and never shall be, as experience has taught us so often. 
And not only do the Regents make such misuse of corvee or personal 
Servitude; but their Pepattijs, Brothers, children and many Mantrie’s or 
lower Chiefs extract from the Dessas, that the Regents have given them, 
as many people as they can muster, with no other intent than to show 
their status and greatness. (Annexe LL, Eindresumé III 1896: 154)
Van Hogendorp was of course correct in concluding that the peasants had 
little appetite for f ighting. Large-scale and regular conflicts or far-off raids 
were relatively rare. They would only be called upon to settle occasional 
conflicts closer to home: disputes between a lord and a rival, attempts to 
persuade or coerce peasants to defect from their patron, or just mobilizing 
them for a show of force or grandeur. An important facet of patronage, as 
suggested by the passage quoted above, was the use of clients for a public 
display of prestige. As already observed, the wealth of a regent was expressed 
by the ‘number of hands he had at his disposal’. Riding around on a horse 
with an armed entourage, large hunting parties, tournaments and receiving 
higher or lower chiefs in the presence of spectators at public meetings 
all served to illustrate the grand status of a patron, while the retinue of 
clients basked in the glory and power of their lord. Such a display of prestige 
required that the peasants treated their superiors appropriately. But the 
man who prostrated himself at the foot of the regent and crawled towards 
him in humble submission was in his turn a lord who demanded shows of 
hormat, respect and the greatest possible humility, from his subordinates. 
The landowner was never sure of his property, as the lord could seize it at any 
time. Regents and chiefs in the Priangan would still requisition the horses 
and daughters of their clients until the mid-nineteenth century (De Haan 
IV 1912: 439-40). Such dispossession of property was considered an honour 
rather than theft. Adapting themselves to the customs of the indigenous 
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elite if and as long that suited them, colonial administrators did not stop at 
urging chiefs to make their womenfolk available for sexual favours. A few 
colonial commentators expressed their disgust at such practices, of which 
even residents were guilty (Van Hogendorp 1913: 40).
Under the colonial regime, the relationship between peasants and their 
lords changed radically. This was of course primarily due to the tribute 
imposed by the new rulers. How this happened and what impact the much 
higher taxation had on the agrarian order will be examined in detail in the 
next chapter. What I wish to emphasize here is how these claims brought 
about far-reaching changes in the structure of society. An early indication 
of this process, which would undoubtedly have taken place even if the 
VOC had not penetrated inland from the coast in the second half of the 
seventeenth century, was the pressure exerted on nomadic peasants to 
adopt a sedentary existence. However, as described in the f irst chapter, the 
arrival of the Company accelerated the opening up of the Priangan. Even 
more signif icant was the administrative organization of the colonized 
areas on a territorial basis. Higher and lower-ranking chiefs were no longer 
rivals in the struggle for power but were assigned an area of jurisdiction, 
within which they could – in fact, had to – conduct themselves as lords and 
were authorized to impose taxes on all the inhabitants, but had no rights 
to subordinate those living beyond their demarcated borders. Of course, it 
took a long time for this new regime to take hold. Ties with dependants who 
lived far off, beyond the designated jurisdiction of their lord, continued to 
exist for many years and were expressed in displays of respect (bakti) to their 
former patrons. The lords of Cirebon, for example, stubbornly continued to 
consider the chiefs they had nominated in Cianjur as their vassals (De Roo 
de la Faille 1941: 420). The VOC took decisive steps to end such practices.
The policy of territorial confinement also applied to the peasants, though 
in their case it was implemented with hard-handedness. The ban on them 
transferring their allegiance to another chief, which came into force in the 
mid-eighteenth century, considerably weakened their options for changing 
patrons or moving elsewhere. Sedentarization was considered an indication 
of the progress of civilization in colonial times, as proof of growing security 
since the people no longer felt it necessary to keep moving around. A change 
presented as an improvement was actually a deterioration, in that they were 
no longer able to negotiate the terms of their servitude. This resulted in the 
situation that inspired Nicolaus Engelhard to describe the claims and power 
of the chiefs as a yoke from which the peasants could no longer escape 
(Engelhard to Elout, 12 April 1821). Not only were dependants no longer 
permitted to terminate the relationship with their lord, neither could they 
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The regent of Indramaju, accompanied by a haji (drawing by Rach 1770). According 
to colonial archivist F. de Haan, this is the only known portrait of a regent from the 
VOC period. De Haan noted that the native nobility were eager to imitate the dress 
style of VOC officials – the regent is wearing knee-breeches and a cocked hat. He 
failed to mention, however, that colonial civil servants also adopted native codes 
of distinction, such as payungs and the palanquin.
source: Perpustakaan nasional indonesia Collection, Jakarta
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use it as a threat if he raised their tribute. The ban on wandering from place 
to place, introduced in the early-colonial era and reissued repeatedly in the 
nineteenth century, had the same effect. The punishment for anyone not 
heeding the order to have a permanent abode was to be put in detention. 
Later, the government started to detain vagrants in workhouses in the main 
negorij of the regency, where they could be hired as coolies. An instruction 
dating from 1833 reaff irmed that vagrants who could not be found guilty 
of a specif ic crime must be consigned to ‘agricultural establishments’ and 
set to work (Van Deventer 1866: 177).7
The colonial policy of reorganizing governance put an end to the 
f lexibility and f luidity that had characterized the relationship between 
lord and peasant. Authority was exercised much more than before on 
the basis of clearly def ined task descriptions that established mandates 
and competences with orders that were carried out along hierarchical 
lines. Giving primacy to the interests of the VOC and later those of the 
early-colonial state required on the one hand a greater emphasis on the 
subordination of the peasants to their lords, while on the other hand 
restricting the diverse and discretionary claims that the latter imposed on 
their subordinates. Withholding the option for peasants to transfer their 
allegiance to another lord in fact intensif ied the burden of their servitude. 
A long series of early-colonial instructions to restrict the claims that the 
lords imposed on their dependants did not immediately have the desired 
effect. As we shall see in the following chapter, however, this did not mean 
that the instructions of the colonial authorities were simply ignored. The 
chiefs continued to cling to the institutions that were familiar to them 
and tried to defend their own interests and preferences, but eventually 
had to bend in the direction in which they were being pushed. They lost 
their freedom of manoeuvre and operated from within an apparatus over 
which they had no control. They found themselves trying to please both 
their own lords and give priority to the wishes of the colonial off icials. 
Their negotiating space declined and it became increasingly diff icult for 
them to escape the claims imposed on them by their foreign superiors. 
How this process developed and what impact it had on the peasantry will 
be described in the following chapter.
7 These were depots where labour could be hired out for public works or to private employ-
ers which Van Sevenhoven, in his function as Director of Cultivation, wanted to set up (see 
Chapter 7).
II The introduction of forced cultivation
A colonial mode of production
Early accounts of Dutch expansion overseas describe the rule of the Ja-
vanese princes as feudal. Use of this term is, however, based not on an 
in-depth study of indigenous social organization, but suggests a rather loose 
parallel with the agrarian order in Medieval Europe, with princes, vassals 
and subject peasants as the main actors. Burger, for example, described a 
social landscape populated by subsistence and village-based households 
supplying goods and services to the feudal nobility (Burger I 1975: 33). Van 
Leur rectif ied this viewpoint by arguing that the structure of power in 
the large Javanese principalities was different from what was understood 
under feudalism in Europe. The difference lay mainly in the way in which 
power was exercised, rather than in how the peasants were coerced into 
providing goods and services. Van Leur follows Max Weber in describing 
the pre-colonial state in the interior of Java as patrimonial-bureaucratic. It 
was a regime in which sovereignty and the right to property were concen-
trated in the person of the king. Family members and a chain of favourites 
shared in the king’s rule, without ever being entitled to use their positions 
of eminence to claim any independent authority or legal security. Their 
main tasks were to collect tributes and to mobilize military and labour 
power for the monarch (Weber 1922: 679-723). More recent authors have 
also characterized these societies as patrimonial (including Schrieke I: 
169-221; B. Anderson 1972: 8-22 and 33-43). Wittfogel suggested a different 
model referred to as ‘oriental despotism’ to describe the specif ic nature of 
the early agrarian civilizations in Asia. The strongly centralized despotic 
rule of the king was founded on large-scale irrigation works constructed 
with peasant labour. This is a variant of the theory of the Asian mode of 
production that Tichelman applied to pre-colonial Java (Tichelman 1975; 
see also P. Anderson 1974: 462-549).
I am concerned not as much with which label best describes the ancien 
régime, as with what replaced it when the VOC expanded its authority into 
the hinterland of Java from its headquarters in Batavia. The Company’s 
directors themselves adhered to feudal notions when introducing the 
system of territorially-based governance. In their records they referred to 
issuing letters of fealty and f iefdoms to the regents as vassals. According to 
Hoadley, the measures taken by the VOC led to a feudal mode of production 
on West Java towards the end of the eighteenth century. During what he 
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refers to as a process of feudalization, the people of the Priangan were cut 
off from free access to land as their means of livelihood. As the new ruler, 
the VOC declared itself the rightful owner of all these resources and derived 
from these usurped rights that it was entitled to impose claims of a tributary 
nature on peasant labour, using the regents as intermediaries (Hoadley 
1994: 148-151; 184-5). The problem with terms like feudalism or the various 
forms of patrimonialism remains that they are applied to other times and 
situations than those for which they were originally coined. This is equally 
true of the concepts of ‘political’ or ‘mercantile capitalism’, traces of which 
Van Leur identif ies in pre-colonial and colonial Asia. That is one reason 
why I, following Wolf (1982) and Banaji (2010), prefer to speak of a tributary 
mode of colonial production. An essential element was the mobilization 
of agrarian and other forms of labour using political rather than economic 
means, in the exercise of authority and domination (Wolf 1982: 79-82; 400-4). 
The emphasis must lie on the creation of a new, externally imposed social 
and political order rather than on the continuation of earlier despotic rule. 
The system of taxation that the VOC introduced at an early stage in the 
regencies it had established in the Priangan must be seen in this context. 
Establishing governance along territorial lines, coercing the peasants to 
adopt a sedentary mode of cultivation and restructuring social relations 
according to a strict hierarchy were all given a powerful boost when the 
VOC, as the supreme authority, began to lay claim to the peasants’ labour 
and the commodities they produced. After establishing itself as a political 
force, feeling its way in physically and socially unknown terrain, the Com-
pany devoted itself with much greater urgency and passion to converting 
this newly acquired territorial power into economic gain. The VOC’s main 
purpose, after all, was to appropriate commodities at the lowest possible 
price, a type of exploitation Banaji branded as ‘Company capitalism’ (ibid.: 
270). Its attention was not focused exclusively on the highlands behind 
Batavia, but extended along the whole north coast of Java. To assess the 
importance of trade to the VOC, it is necessary to examine its economic 
activities in the region. Taking my cue from the work of Van Leur, I rely for a 
case study on Luc Nagtegaal’s monograph on the VOC’s penetration into the 
Pasisir region on the north coast of Java between 1680 and 1743 (Nagtegaal 
1988). It was during this period that the Company also succeeded in slowly 
gaining control over the Priangan highlands.
Nagtegaal rejects the long-standing assumption that the peasant popula-
tion was predominantly – or even completely – subsistence-based and that 
the market had no role to play in rural Java. He shows that, on the contrary, 
trade was an important component of the agrarian economy. Furthermore, 
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the commodities on sale were not surpluses left over after the peasants’ 
basic needs had been met, but were grown or produced specif ically for the 
market. Nagtegaal concludes correctly that the VOC’s problem was not 
the diff iculty of introducing new crops which were of little or no interest 
to the peasants, but how to gain control of the production and marketing 
of agrarian commodities. There were no separate circuits in which various 
sorts of products were traded. Nagtegaal distinguishes three interlinked 
market levels, based on distance: regional, interregional and inter-insular. 
The merchants operating in these markets had varying amounts of capital 
at their disposal, but the commodities they bought and sold were largely 
the same. Van Leur distinguished various forms of what he called ‘peddling 
trade’ in his overview of early-Asian trade (1957: Chapter II). The bigger 
merchants often bought goods for export from peasant markets, while 
products from elsewhere would f ind their way to domestic consumers 
through peasant traders. The goods were moved primarily by water traff ic, 
explaining why the main pasars were located on rivers that f lowed into 
the Java Sea. A study of early maps suggests that there was considerable 
economic interaction between settlements spread along the river banks at 
some distance from each other. The routes to the highlands also ran along 
these rivers. The f irst expeditions to the Priangan region from Batavia 
did not travel overland but, as long as the river was navigable, by boat. 
This remained the main mode of transport until well into the nineteenth 
century, explaining why Cirebon was initially able to remain the main 
centre for collecting the tribute imposed by the VOC in Priangan.
The VOC stayed away from the peasant markets, which were generally 
comprised of a large group of part-time local traders, often women, who 
exchanged small quantities of goods over short distances (Nagtegaal 1988: 
43). The Company did take an interest in interregional trade, which was 
focused on the larger settlements. It was, however, unable to compete with 
the longer established merchants who were of a wide variety of nationalities, 
including Hindus from India, Moors from Malacca, Javanese from Banten, 
Europeans (including Danes and Englishmen), free citizens from Batavia 
and, last but not least, Chinese. Members of the Javanese aristocracy, includ-
ing local regents and high-ranking off icials at the court of Mataram, were 
also active in long-distance trade and sometimes provided the cash or 
credit that was required. Merchants from Solo came to Semarang overland, 
hiring porters for their convoys en route. As already mentioned, the VOC 
had little success in these intermediate markets. Its operations were still too 
large-scale and ineff icient and the network it built up was not suff iciently 
f ine-meshed. What the large trading company from afar lacked was regular 
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and intimate contact with the peasant population. In that respect, the Com-
pany was no match for the Chinese merchants who had been established 
on the north coast of Java for much longer and had become more deeply 
embedded in the local economy. Its coastal factories suffered from high 
costs and complained of persistent losses. The VOC changed tack and tried 
to persuade the regents and the merchants who worked with them to stop 
selling to all parties and do their business exclusively with the Company. 
The attempt at monopoly initially failed because the Javanese had more to 
gain by encouraging competition between the traders from outside.
The VOC had little choice other than to focus on the centres of inter-
regional and inter-insular trade. But this strategy could only succeed if the 
Company could also secure control over the more local trade circuits. That 
meant resorting to political alliances at trans-local level. In the 1677 treaty, 
the emperor of Mataram granted the VOC a number of trade privileges – 
including sole rights to the sale of opium and textiles and the purchase of 
sugar, the pre-emptive right to buy up rice, and exemption from customs 
duties – and placed all foreigners in his kingdom under the Company’s 
control and jurisdiction. Further steps were required to actually put these 
agreements into practice, including protecting the long-distance trade 
routes. By cancelling out Banten as a staple market – achieved in exchange 
for supporting the ‘right party’ in a conflict between the rulers of this 
harbour principality in 1684 – the VOC ensured that all inter-Asian trade 
would in the future be channelled through Batavia. Nagtegaal’s research 
contradicts the portrayal of a closed peasant economy in which a market 
was entirely lacking or limited to barter. There was clear evidence of the 
onset of an early form of capitalism, in both trade and production, also 
beyond the pasisir (Java’s coast to the east of Cirebon). The influence of 
international trade in the port of Banten was felt deep in the hinterland 
of West Java and was accompanied by a much more advanced degree of 
monetization than reported in later colonial accounts. The subjects of the 
emperor of Mataram had to pay a head tax in cash, which was collected 
by the local chiefs. In the Priangan Regencies, towards the end of the 
seventeenth century, this amounted to one real per cacah (De Haan I 1910: 
26). There is no reason to believe that money was used only to pay taxes. 
The rural economy comprised a wide variety of activities, and part of the 
resulting produce was sold in markets in the harbour towns on the north 
coast. Goods from overseas, for example textiles from India, would pass 
through these trading centres in the other direction and make their way 
to the rural hinterland. Furthermore, towards the end of the eighteenth 
century, the supply of opium which the Company imported from abroad 
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increased exponentially and, despite resistance from Javanese rulers, was 
forced upon the local population.
From free trade to forced delivery
The VOC’s interference in the local economy was not limited to its ambitions 
to acquire a hegemonic position in trade. In the early eighteenth century, it 
became increasingly involved in the production process itself. The Company 
had a shipyard in Rembang to build its own ships. Sawmills supplied the 
wood and ropes were manufactured from coconut f ibres in Semarang. Of 
greater signif icance was an instruction ordering the peasant population to 
abandon the traditional method of producing indigo. Around 1700, a number 
of Dutch indigo-makers arrived to supervise the new process, based on the 
technique used on the Coromandel coast in India (De Haan III 1912: 412-3). 
The experiment was a failure, however, and in the mid-eighteenth century 
Jacob Mossel made a renewed attempt, again without success (Hooijman 
1781: 301). The VOC also initiated the cultivation of coffee at the start of the 
eighteenth century. This commodity, at that time completely unknown 
to the local population, would in the course of time expand to become a 
monoculture. Before examining this in greater detail, however, I would 
like to reiterate how, in the early years of the VOC’s control of the Priangan, 
the region initially supplied the Company with a much wider variety of 
products.
Under the treaty that put an end to the remaining self-governance of 
Cirebon in 1681, the sultan was no longer permitted to trade with Makas-
sarese, Malays, Moors or any other foreign merchants. The inhabitants of the 
harbour principalities were not allowed to sail further than Bali or Borneo, 
and then only if they had a pass from the Company. The demolition of the 
city walls and the construction of the fortress – called De Bescherming 
(Protection), a name given with no irony intended – illustrated the coercion 
exercised by what remained, in effect, commerce pur sang. The closure 
of the transport route to and from the highlands heralded the start of a 
process of exploitation of the inhabitants of the hinterland, which would 
gradually grow in scale and intensity. The records of the factory manager 
in Cirebon show that the entire production of crops like rice and pepper 
was bought up by Chinese middlemen, who also sold textiles and opium 
to the local population. The VOC off icial complained that these brokers 
engaged in smuggling, so that not all the goods found their way to the VOC’s 
warehouses. In 1691, the Resident urged in a letter that the inhabitants of 
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the Priangan be paid directly in cash (Hoadley 1994: 102). This was driven, 
however, much less by concerns about withholding remuneration to the 
peasant producers than by a growing awareness that the system of bulk 
buying by middlemen was causing a serious decline in profit margins. As 
a consequence, the VOC started to intervene much more directly in the 
process of agrarian production. For example, it started employing paid 
labour to fell trees for timber (Peluso 1992). This was because the demand for 
timber had risen so excessively and, along with it, the pressure of work, that 
the required labourers failed to turn up or deserted. There was no guarantee, 
however, that the payment actually reached the labourers themselves, as 
it was paid out to the chiefs. Hoadley, who retrieved this information from 
the VOC archives, correctly points out that the supply of commodities by 
the peasants had not formerly been based on forced labour (Hoadley 1994: 
105-6). The Daily Register of 1694 includes an instruction ordering buyers 
of cotton and indigo to pay the producers promptly. Letters from Cirebon a 
year later indicate that peasants were only prepared to supply good quality 
indigo if they received a decent price. And in 1729 and 1739, the Resident 
proposed giving peasants cash advances, or at least paying them for the 
number of coffee plants they cultivated. These proposals, which were never 
put into practice, were intended to increase production by devoting greater 
attention to agronomical considerations. As the system of bulk buying 
gradually declined in importance, the Chinese merchants disappeared 
from the scene. The princes of Cirebon were banned from appointing 
Chinese off icials, as a result of which, although they did not entirely lose 
their influential position in the indigenous economic and political network, 
they were certainly sidelined. This dislocation was expedited by placing 
them under the direct supervision of the Company. The only authority that 
they retained was as managers or as estate owners in the areas surrounding 
the capital, with rights to land and the peasants living on it. Growing and 
milling sugarcane became important business in these environs and the 
Chinese held the upper hand in this agro-industry which showed distinct 
capitalist features (Hoadley 1994: 109-1).
From the experience it had gained at the end of the seventeenth and the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, the VOC learned that, if it wanted to 
lay claim to peasant labour in a way that was both effective and profitable, 
it was both necessary and desirable to work through the chiefs. Ignoring 
them had resulted only in persistent obstruction and sabotage. Direct 
contact with the population only undermined the chiefs’ authority. The 
Company felt that it was too risky and costly to f ill the resulting social 
vacuum. In a resolution in 1695, the High Command in Batavia ordered 
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the chiefs to supply a wide variety of goods (De Haan III 1912: 399). The 
instruction contained all the elements of the system of quotas that the 
Company had adopted. In the f irst place, the receipt for the goods delivered 
was to be accompanied by a note that, the next time, more of the same 
goods, and others as well, should be supplied. The quantities reaching the 
VOC’s warehouses were never enough to satisfy continually rising demand. 
Secondly, the instruction announced that cash payment was to be made 
for goods received, without going into further detail about the size of the 
payment or other conditions. Thirdly, the instruction gave no indication of 
how the chiefs should proceed to ensure the cooperation of the peasants. 
The system of quotas assumed that the Priangan peasants would obey their 
lords, taking it so much for granted that any discussion on the matter was 
deemed unnecessary.
The quantitative change introduced in the early decades of the eighteenth 
century – a progressive increase in the quotas – was accompanied by a 
qualitative change. The earlier products, such as birds’ nests, cardamom and 
wax, increasingly made way for indigo, cotton and, above all, coffee, which 
would eventually replace all the other goods almost entirely. This trend 
reflected the shift in the VOC’s activities from the purchase of high-quality 
commodities in small quantities, mainly for sale on Asian markets, to the 
acquisition of much larger volumes of tropical products to be shipped to 
the Company’s entrepôts elsewhere to meet new and swelling consumer 
demand in the global market. Although rice did not fall under the quota 
regime, transit notes drawn up in Batavia show that the VOC shipped as 
much rice as all the other trading companies together, a share that increased 
even further after 1730 (Nagtegaal 1988: 175). The overarching importance 
of this staple food, which was still largely bought up by Chinese merchants 
based in Cirebon and other coastal towns, was not entirely separate from 
the system of forced delivery. To pay off the debts it had accumulated when 
the VOC assisted its military operations in East Java, Mataram had agreed to 
supply the Company with 800 koyang of rice a year after 1705 (the equivalent 
of about 2.8 million pounds weight). This war tax accounted for a consider-
able share of the total volume of the VOC’s trade (Ricklefs 1986: 18).
The cooperation of the chiefs may have required the exertion of consider-
able pressure, but was mainly achieved by rewarding them f inancially. In 
1698, the VOC made it clear that nothing could be gained without continual 
pressure. A regional chief who had not fulf illed his obligations to supply 
goods was in default, but this was not yet followed up by sanctions (De 
Haan III 1912: 414). The intermediary role imposed on the gentry was very 
lucrative for them. The money they received was a form of payment for their 
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mediation: making sure that the peasants worked hard enough, keeping 
outsiders out of their regions and preventing practices that were contrary 
to the Company’s interests. Conversely, if they followed their instructions 
loyally, they could be assured of retaining their positions of eminence and 
of protection against rival attacks on their power base. Involving chiefs in 
the Company’s operations naturally reduced their independence and room 
for manoeuvre. According to Hoadley, however, the benefits were so large 
that they were not tempted by resorting to ‘illegal’ transactions, for example 
selling indigo, cotton or coffee to Chinese buyers, as well as rice. Smuggling 
or violating the rules in some other way may have been more profitable, 
but the risks were great. If they were caught, they might be dismissed or 
transferred, meaning a loss of power and income. From this perspective, 
the regents gave in to the demand of the Company ś agents because of the 
financial rewards they received. But did the peasants cooperate for the same 
reason? This is of course a distinct possibility, but loses some of its cogency 
in the face of evidence that payments intended for the peasants often only 
partially, if at all, reached them. Does this imply that their cooperation 
was based on coercion rather than choice? Hoadley rejects this conclusion, 
arguing that, until the mid-eighteenth century, coercion had not been the 
driving force behind the acquisition of tropical products under the bulk 
purchase system. In his view, the main incentive was money, and the VOC’s 
strategy was tempered by fear that a more rigorous approach might lead to 
conflict (Hoadley 1994: 128, 132-3). In my opinion, Hoadley overestimates the 
freedom of the peasants to trade with their chiefs under the old regime. I will 
return to this issue of voluntary or coerced cooperation later in this chapter.
The start of coffee cultivation
The VOC f irst became involved in the coffee trade in the seventeenth 
century, in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The f irst plants to reach 
Batavia, just before the end of that century, came from the Malabar coast 
of India. According to the VOC annals the coffee shrub was imported to 
Java towards the end of the seventeenth century but there is good reason 
to believe that this was done through the mediation of Muslim traders or 
pilgrims (Clarence-Smith and Topik 2003: 5). A few high-ranking Company 
off icials planted the f irst saplings in their gardens. After receiving a sample 
of the harvested beans in 1706, the Company directors in Amsterdam sent a 
letter to Governor-General Van Hoorn recommending that coffee be grown 
on Java. At the end of 1707, Van Hoorn informed his superiors that he had 
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distributed young coffee plants to a number of chiefs on the coastal plain 
between Batavia and Cirebon who were willing to take good care of them 
(Leupe 1859: 56). It soon became clear, however, that the coffee shrubs would 
not thrive on the low plains. Transferring them f irst to the hills of Krawang 
and then to even higher upland produced a much better result. The regent 
of Cianjur was the f irst to send a consignment of beans weighing almost a 
hundred pounds to the Company, in 1711. The price he received – 50 guilders 
per pikul (in 1695, 1 pikul was equivalent to 125 pounds) – was reasonable 
although, compared to the prices on the Dutch market, a little on the low 
side. Other regents in the Priangan also endeavoured to introduce coffee. 
Early sources suggest that this was not too diff icult as coffee was a crop that 
required no capital, no expensive tools and a minimum of knowledge (De 
Haan I 1910: 119). The new crop spread quickly, especially in the remote hilly 
hinterland to the south of Batavia which, by the middle of the nineteenth 
century, would expand to become the main cultivation area for this export 
crop on Java. The VOC would become one of the main suppliers of this new 
colonial commodity. In 1726, it controlled half to three-quarters of the still 
modest global trade, half of which was grown in Priangan, f irst and for all 
in the regency of Cianjur (Knaap 1986: 34).
In the early stages, coffee growing was exceptionally lucrative for the 
VOC, while the regents also saw their incomes rise enormously. When he 
died in 1726, the regent of Cianjur had amassed a fortune of 26,000 rijks-
daalders, on which he also earned interest. The chief of Kampongbaru was 
even richer: he was owed 32,000 rijksdaalders by the Company and owned 
considerable land and buildings in the environs of Batavia. This generosity 
soon came to an end, however. The first restriction was to bring coffee under 
the VOC’s monopoly regime. From 1723, it was an offence to sell coffee to 
private merchants. As negotiations on price and quantity with the chiefs 
made way for forced delivery and they no longer had a free choice, the 
relationship became increasingly based on coercion. This change became 
very clear when some years later, in 1726, the Company board introduced a 
radical price cut, expressing fears that the peasant producers were becom-
ing too wealthy and might use their new funds against the Company’s 
interests, for example to buy weapons (Knaap 1986: 41; Ricklefs 1993: 215). 
This sudden discovery that the natives were subversive by nature, together 
with doubts about the loyalty of the regents, strengthened the VOC’s resolve 
to lower the prices it paid. In the f irst instance, the price was reduced by 
half but, on closer inspection, even this sizable cut seemed insuff icient. In 
1726, acting on the orders of his superiors, the Governor-General decided 
that f ive, rather than 21, rijksdaalders per pikul was suff icient reward for 
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this relatively light work. As an excuse, the Company claimed that it had 
insuff icient cash and now argued that the coffee replaced the tenth part of 
the yield it was entitled to as the ultimate owner of the land.
The cuts aroused resistance among the peasants. The available archives 
do not give a full picture of the scale on which this occurred. One indication 
is the murder of the regent of Cianjur, the largest supplier, a few months after 
the radical price cut in 1726. He was the only chief in the Priangan ever to 
be killed by his subjects. It was later claimed that he was killed by a jealous 
lover of one of his wives, but the account that the murder was committed by 
a lower chief who was indebted to him is more plausible (Knaap 1986: 33). 
A cause of greater concern to the VOC than the unrest was that, in some 
places, the peasants destroyed the young coffee plants. After all, the price 
cuts had been intended to increase the Company’s prof it margin, not to 
reduce the supply. In 1726, the Resident of Cirebon complained that coffee 
gardens were being neglected and becoming overgrown. Other reports told 
of labourers who had come to the Sunda highlands from the coastal plain 
of Cirebon in previous years to harvest the new crop were leaving again 
(ibid.: 45-6). These expressions of protest suggest that, in the early years, the 
proceeds from the sale of the coffee did not disappear exclusively into the 
regents’ pockets, but that at least part must have f iltered down to the peas-
ant producers themselves. In Cianjur and Kampongbaru, the main centres 
of production at that time, the damage was so enormous that it would take 
more than 60 years to restore it to its former level. De Haan, the source of 
these and later data, concludes from the price cut that the free labour of the 
past had given way to servitude and what had been a trade transaction now 
became a form of tax tribute (I 1910: 122). This interpretation is supported by 
the measures the VOC took in response to the flagging interest in growing 
coffee. Batavia issued an order to ‘urge the lazy folk’ to get back to work and 
took the obvious step of blaming the native chiefs for the unrest – which 
could not be ignored – among those subordinated to them. The regents and 
lower-ranking chiefs were accused of keeping the coffee money themselves, 
rather than passing it on to the peasants. In this view, the problem was not 
the excessively low price, but the chiefs’ failure to pay the producers. To 
curb the extortion and fraud of the gentry – many of whom were suspected 
of increasing their income substantially by smuggling – it was suggested 
that European inspectors be appointed.
In 1729, the Resident of Cirebon ordered all households in the Priangan 
highlands under his jurisdiction to plant ten new coffee trees each year. 
The regents in Cianjur, Kampongbaru and Djatinegara also reported that 
they were having to resort to increasingly harsh measures of discipline to 
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persuade the peasants to grow coffee. They informed the Company that, 
if prices did not go up, coffee cultivation was doomed to disappear. Their 
request was rejected, as the measures taken to rectify the situation – essen-
tially the use of greater coercion – proved successful. In fact, they exceeded 
even the wildest expectations: the harvest was so high in 1735 that the 
VOC ordered the regents to stop the annual planting of new trees and to 
extirpate the oldest trees. This instruction was justif ied by claiming that the 
peasants themselves did not own the land, but grew coffee on the orders of 
the Company. As the Company also owned the trees, it was entitled to insist 
that no more coffee should be produced. The VOC directors in Amsterdam 
had no objection to their agents ordering the trees to be destroyed, as long 
as they were replaced by other crops, like paddy and, especially, pepper. The 
great difference between the off icial price and those on the black market 
led to a considerable increase in coffee smuggling, a problem that was only 
Change of horses and pasangrahan (accommodation for travelling officials) at 
Cimanggis on the road from Batavia to Bogor (drawing by Rach ca. 1770-72). Behind 
the bushes in the left foreground, the district head of Cimanggis can be seen 
walking, followed by two servants who are carrying the attributes of dignity to 
which their master is entitled. The main figure is in the centre foreground: the high-
ranking VOC Commissioner [D.J. Smith], with payung being held above his head. 
He is a young man, who owes his lucrative office to his uncle G.G. Van der Parra.
source: Perpustakaan nasional indonesia Collection, Jakarta
68 MobiLizinG Labour for the GLobaL Coffee Market
marginally affected by closer surveillance. When, some years later, supply 
once again fell behind demand, the order was given to stop destroying the 
trees and plant new ones again. If the peasants had ever received a share 
of the coffee proceeds, this would certainly have been much less after the 
price cut, which would not have increased their willingness to grow more. 
As long as the VOC had not yet established a f ixed position in the market, 
the volume of coffee it sold continued to vary widely from year to year. The 
budget available to f inance the coffee trade was already limited, making 
production for the world market risky, and this risk was passed on to the 
peasants of the Priangan. The lack of understanding among the planters for 
the continually changing orders from Batavia to deliver more or less coffee 
must have been exacerbated by the fact that the f irst payment for all the 
cultivation work done would not be received until after the f irst harvest 
four years later, while they were not paid at all for cutting down the trees. 
Refusal to increase or decrease the number of trees was punished heavily 
and inspections were carried out to ensure that the growers complied with 
these orders.
Increasing the tribute
Although the imposition of forced cultivation was a radical change, it 
initially only involved relatively small quantities. Coffee was most likely 
first grown only on the regent’s own land, around his dalem. The trees would 
be tended by peasants in turn, in the form of corvee services (De Haan I 
1910: 154). When the Company increased the volume that had to be supplied, 
trees were also planted on the land around the peasants’ own dwellings. 
They would take the harvested beans to the local chief or directly to the 
warehouse. Little labour would have been required for cultivation, main-
tenance and picking. There was a long-cherished belief that, after planting, 
the growers had very little to do other than wait until the ripe beans fell to 
the ground, after which he could gather them together with a light, wooden 
rake. They would then be dried in the house or under a veranda and, after 
the shell had been removed, they would be ready for delivery (De Haan I 
1910: 149; III 1912: 581). The work was allegedly light, required no training 
and could be performed by all members of the household as a minor but 
welcome supplement to their main preoccupation: growing food.
Of all the products that the people of the Priangan supplied to the VOC, 
coffee was ultimately the only one that remained. Initially the beans were 
mainly traded for consumption in West Asia and the Middle East. From 
the introduC tion of forCed CuLtivation 69
the Ottoman empire the beverage started to spread to Western Europe 
around the middle of the seventeenth century (Clarence-Smith and Topik 
2003: 26-7). As the strongly fluctuating sales in the early years showed, the 
Company initially held a modest position on the global market. It had to 
try and increase its share, especially on the Atlantic markets, and benefit 
from coffee’s slowly growing popularity. It had not yet become a drink 
of the masses, but the volume being traded had risen so strongly that it 
was no longer a luxury commodity whose supply had to be restricted to 
keep the market price high. The point had already been reached before 
the mid-eighteenth century when it was no longer suff icient to grow coffee 
around the peasants’ abode. To continue to fulf il the Company’s orders, 
the dry land around the kampungs had to be cultivated. There was plenty 
of waste land available at f irst, and the trees were planted on soil that had 
only been roughly prepared. The undergrowth was removed to make room 
for the young plants, but larger trees were left where they were. In the f irst 
year, paddy was planted between the coffee saplings, so that the work to 
cultivate the soil also had some immediate economic value. The first harvest 
of what came to be known as ‘forest coffee’, took place after four years. It was 
delivered in the same way as the coffee grown in the kampung courtyards, to 
the local chief or directly to the warehouse. In the early years, this new mode 
of cultivation was limited to settlements close to Batavia, on relatively low 
lands extending only as far as Krawang and Bogor. It made sense to expand 
cultivation in places where the people already had experience of growing 
the new crop but, given the diff iculties of transporting the coffee over 
great distances, it was more important to keep the supply lines to Batavia 
as short as possible. The lack of roads, bridges and modes of transport were 
undoubtedly signif icant factors in choosing the f irst areas for production. 
The areas selected for cultivation were transferred f irst to the foothills of 
the Priangan and later even further inland after it was discovered that the 
coffee grew better at a higher altitude than on the hot coastal plain. The 
regency of Cianjur, colonized by migrants from Cirebon, would grow to 
become the VOC’s main coffee-producing region in the eighteenth century. 
The harvested beans were initially carried to the coast along footpaths by 
porters with pikulan, carrying poles. The paths were later widened to allow 
transport by buffalo or packhorse.
Although the VOC succeeded in increasing the coffee quota, transport 
remained a problem. Before the mid-eighteenth century, two transit ware-
houses were built on the banks of the Citarum and the Cimanuk, at Cikao 
and Karangsambung. From there, the coffee was transported to the coast 
by water in boats. Because both rivers were not navigable upstream from 
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these points, the coffee had to be brought in over land by pack animal, a 
return journey of at least two months. Especially in the eastern Priangan, 
the coffee planters took a long time to carry their harvest to the collecting 
stations. The coffee was weighed before being loaded onto pack animals and 
transported to the transit warehouses. Because there were an insuff icient 
number of animals, porters were still necessary to help carry the steadily 
increasing volume. It was heavy work: a single load weighed a quarter of a 
‘bergse pikol’ (55.5 pounds). A buffalo could carry a double load plus enough 
rice for the driver.8 It was also common for the planters, who were only 
responsible for delivering the coffee to the small district warehouses, to be 
charged for the costs of transporting the goods further. These costs were 
deducted from the price the producers were paid for the coffee. Poorer 
peasants in particular, without their own pack animals, would be keen to 
deliver their harvest at the earliest opportunity, resigning themselves to the 
substantial deduction for the quantity of beans they had delivered. Planters 
who undertook the long journey themselves would often not return in time 
to tend to their rice f ields. It was more important to ensure that the coffee 
arrived on the coast before the onset of the monsoon than to allow them 
to plant and harvest paddy in the proper season and therefore give priority 
to secure their livelihoods.
A harvest of 100 pounds in 1711 had expanded to some 100,000 pikul a 
century later. This massive increase was only the start of a much greater 
increase in volume in the decades that followed. In the second half of the 
eighteenth century, the concentration of coffee production in the Priangan 
region, which had started earlier, continued. A revision of the quota regula-
tions in 1763 almost entirely exempted the lowlands adjacent to Batavia from 
compulsory coffee cultivation. Private estates in this region, closer to the 
coast, not only survived but even increased in size and number. Since the 
VOC bought coffee and other commodities on which it held a monopoly 
from these large-scale agrarian estates at low prices, the owners preferred 
to sell their goods directly on the urban market in Batavia. The main ac-
tors in this market were Chinese moneylenders/bulk buyers (Boomgaard 
1986). They were not permitted, even temporarily, to roam around as free 
8 As early as 1805 Lawick, appointed as acting commissioner, reported hearing from a regent 
‘that, instead of using pack animals, the people carried the coffee to the warehouse themselves’, 
that ‘1,200 people from the district of Galonggang were employed to carry the coffee’ and 
that ‘these people had been given such heavy loads that they succumbed under the weight...’ 
Elsewhere, he said that the Regent took the buffaloes away from the people, so that the latter 
hid them from sight and therefore had to carry the coffee themselves, with the result that many 
succumbed (De Haan III 1912: 636).
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traders in the Priangan region. They were known as notorious breakers of 
established monopolies and were kept safely at arm’s length. Not far enough, 
however, as the difference between the excessively low price paid by the 
Company and what these clandestine traders were prepared to pay was 
too great. The lands around Batavia acted as a buffer zone in which coffee 
beans bought up underhandedly in the hinterland could be whitewashed. 
VOC off icials were, of course, also party to these illicit practices and the 
quantities involved must have been considerably larger than suggested by 
the off icial records. When coffee cultivation was moved further into the 
Sunda highlands, it imposed a heavy burden on the sparser population 
settled there. To ease the burden a little, the VOC gradually exempted 
these upland peasants from the obligation to supply a wide range of other 
products. In 1752, Jacob Mossel reported that 2,600 pikul of pepper had 
been delivered in addition to 12,000 pikul of coffee, but the rising demand 
for the latter led to a drastic reduction – or complete abolition – of the 
compulsory delivery of other crops that had formerly fallen under the quota 
regulations, such as pepper, cotton and indigo. At the start of the eighteenth 
century, indigo had been high on the list of the Company’s priority products 
(De Haan I 1910: 220-5). However, coffee soon became a monoculture that 
left the peasants no time for any other activity, except growing paddy for 
their own subsistence. Compared with the much more varied crop pattern 
that had existed earlier, this change signif ied a declining diversity in the 
agrarian economy. A clear indication of this contraction was the small 
number of local market places operating in the Priangan region at the end 
of the eighteenth century (De Haan I 1910: 400-1).
Imposing a tribute was of course not new. The court of Mataram 
demanded the delivery of a wide range of products from the Priangan, 
which varied widely from region to region. When it extended its authority 
over the region, the VOC made it clear that it intended to take over the 
sovereign rights of its predecessors. Local chiefs received orders to follow 
the instructions of the new rulers and subordination continued to form 
the basis for imposing obligations on the population. The annual ritual 
of bringing in ‘muddy-footed Javanese’ from the vicinity around Cirebon 
to do maintenance work on the on the canals and harbour of Batavia was 
justif ied by referring to similar corvee arrangements in former times. It is, 
however, doubtful whether this early-colonial claim on native labour power 
can be considered a continuation of the duties to which peasants had been 
subjected under the old regime, as they were now nominally rewarded for 
the work they had performed. Nevertheless, the costs to the VOC were low: 
the peasants were badly paid and only those who survived the harsh work 
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regime – sometimes no more than half of the total workforce – actually 
received payment (De Haan I 1910: 262). The term ‘corvee services’ is even 
less applicable to the work gangs, also procured in the surroundings of 
Cirebon by agents of the sugar mills around Batavia to cut and mill the 
cane produced. Though these seasonal labourers also received a wage 
for the work they performed, they had no say at all in the terms of their 
employment.
Coercion and desertion
A far heavier burden than these new ways of mobilizing labour was of course 
the obligation imposed on the peasants to cultivate certain crops, especially 
and increasingly as time passed, coffee. They were not only forced to grow 
the coffee, but also to deliver the beans to the VOC’s warehouses and to 
accept whatever price the Company decided to pay for them – or at least 
whatever was left of it after the chiefs had deducted their share. Because 
of the trade monopoly imposed by the VOC, the peasants had no space at 
all to negotiate. By disallowing outsiders, and the Chinese in particular, 
access to the region, the Company usurped the market entirely (De Haan 
I 1910: 390). Forest patrols went around to enforce the ban and violators 
were arrested and, if they were lucky, kept in detention in chains (De Haan 
I 1910: 105). The region was almost hermetically sealed off. The closure of 
the Sunda lands was the consequence of a colonial policy initiated in the 
eighteenth century.
The VOC considered itself not only as the ruler but also as the owner of 
the land and its people and conducted business accordingly. But the levying 
of tribute should not be seen as holding on to old customs. The increased 
scale and intensity of the burden imposed on the peasants was not the 
only difference between the new and old regimes. They were now coerced 
to practise sedentary agriculture to enable the extensive cultivation of the 
crop that increasingly monopolized the VOC’s attention. In De Haan’s words: 
‘It was the cultivation of coffee that sealed the fate of nomadic peasants 
and forced them to live in permanent settlements’ (De Haan I 1910: 16). The 
mandate entrusted to the native chiefs meant that they made peasants’ 
access to land to cultivate food dependent on their willingness to fulf il 
the colonial obligations to grow and supply prescribed crops. Conversely, 
as Van Imhoff noted in a report of his journey through the Priangan in 
1744, the laying out of the coffee gardens also helped to turn the nomadic 
rice growers into sedentary cultivators. Sundanese peasants were willing 
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to grow coffee, but only if they had enough sawahs to do so (De Haan I 
1910: 371). The peasants were not only required to plant the coffee and 
deliver the dried beans to the designated collecting stations, but also to 
build warehouses, lay roads and perform all other kinds of labour on the 
VOC’s orders. What was later referred to as cultivation services comprised 
both growing and delivering specif ied crops. On top of these came corvee 
services for their own chiefs, most important of which were relinquishing 
a share of their own rice harvest and tilling the lord’s own f ields, but they 
also included a wide variety of services in and around the patron’s house. 
Lastly, the regents were also entitled to collect all kinds of taxes, including 
tolls, pasar fees, pass duties, a tax on slaughtering cattle or on marriages, 
etc., without having to account for them in any way at all. After all, such 
forms of income were part and parcel of what stubbornly came to be defined 
as ‘self-government’.
Altogether, this meant that the peasants were burdened with a much 
heavier package of taxes and obligations than under the ancien régime. The 
difference in quantity was reflected in the quality. This change was related 
to the weakening of the peasants’ bargaining power, already referred to 
above. The protest that this invoked did not receive much attention in 
colonial accounts and must be derived from indirect indications, such as 
the resistance that the Company experienced when collecting the tribute. 
As we have seen above, by the end of the eighteenth century, the volume 
of coffee supplied had expanded steadily. However, this increase did not 
occur gradually and in a controlled manner, but was subject to strong 
f luctuations. The periodic adjustments to the quotas imposed on the 
growers were less an indication of the VOC gaining a tighter grip on the 
production process than a response to the continually rising demand for 
coffee in faraway markets, where more people were now also developing a 
taste for this exotic new drink from afar. Management at arm’s length may 
have been suitable in the early days of international trade, which focused 
on a limited volume of high-quality products, but proved to hamper the 
mobilization of mass quantities, even when supply had to be backed up by 
coercion. In practice, the VOC was unable to ensure that its orders were 
carried out adequately. Its incomplete control over the peasants, mediated 
by native chiefs, is ref lected in the extremely volatile nature of coffee 
supplies between 1721 and 1800. The production records for this period, 
based on f igures collected by De Haan (III 1912: 920-2), show that it was 
not until the latter years of the eighteenth century that a certain degree 
of stability emerged and the wildest f luctuations became a thing of the 
past (see Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1  Coffee supplied to the VOC by the lands and regencies under the control 
of Batavia, 1721-1800
Year Pikul Year Pikul Year Pikul Year Pikul
1721 1,515 1731 – 1741 21,086 1751 9,022
1722 3,882 1732 – 1742 – 1752 11,738
1723 8,818 1733 – 1743 – 1753 18,063
1724 15,465 1734 45,096 1744 4,224 1754 15,870
1725 26,968 1735 20,848 1745 6,539 1755 14,068
1726 26,198 1736 29,827 1746 10,195 1756 20,015
1727 16,791 1737 28,698 1747 8,413 1757 20,922
1728 15,748 1738 43,480 1748 12,799 1758 16,023
1729 15,770 1739 23,292 1749 15,330 1759 14,468
1730 13,026 1740 40,925 1750 13,225 1760 11,191
Year Pikul Year Pikul Year Pikul Year Pikul
1761 9,022 1771 24,374 1781 31,110 1791 49,562
1762 11,228 1772 15,258 1782 24,816 1792 72,983
1763 5,458 1773 25,479 1783 20,170 1793 86,686
1764 15,000 1774 22,301 1784 25,375 1794 67,875
1765 7,361 1775 16,375 1785 17,796 1795 65,866
1766 28,207 1776 30,275 1786 20,196 1796 57,769
1767 26,987 1777 24,935 1787 23,501 1797 81,986
1768 35,724 1778 22,444 1788 24,586 1798 56,178
1769 33,017 1779 26,923 1789 50,779 1799 44,062
1770 28,484 1780 32,409 1790 58,317 1800 62,764
source: de haan i 1910: 920-4
The Company directors in Batavia must have been anxious each year to 
see whether the harvest had increased, perhaps doubled or even more, or 
would perhaps be half or even less than the year before. Attributing this 
uncertainty solely to a lack of insight among the managers on the workfloor, 
while ignoring the very real resistance of the peasants, does not paint the 
whole picture. Opposition to the command economy took many forms, 
one of the most notable of which was land flight. Already at the start of the 
eighteenth century, hundreds of peasant families deserted to the inacces-
sible mountains in the south of the region, leaving dozens of abandoned 
settlements to the north. Many fled the highlands and hinterland of Cirebon 
in other directions and moved either to the nebulous zone around Batavia 
or found their way to Banten. At one point the population of the regency of 
Sumedang had declined by a third. Migration was a long-standing problem 
and early reports contain complaints about it, but the information reached 
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the VOC too little and too late. During his tour through the Priangan in 1744, 
Van Imhoff linked land flight to the excessive demands that chiefs imposed 
on their subjects. Elsewhere in his report he noted that many people fled 
to Banten because their burden of taxation was less excessive there. The 
same applied to flight from the lands under the Company’s control to the 
principalities of Central Java. Sometimes, the cultivation of coffee or some 
other crop was introduced in an area where the poor soil offered few favour-
able prospects of a good harvest, simply to stop peasants from fleeing there 
from other regions that were already subject to forced cultivation.
Reports from the early eighteenth century and later show clearly that 
much of the peasant migration was motivated by attempts to escape the 
new regime of compulsory delivery of goods and services. The VOC did its 
utmost to limit the exodus. As described in the previous chapter, Jacobus 
Couper informed the regents as early as 1684 that they were not permitted 
to subordinate people or villages that were under the jurisdiction of other 
regencies. In 1693, the Company’s agent in Tanjungpura ordered that anyone 
moving from one district to another should be sent back, an instruction 
that was extended to cover all the Priangan Regencies in 1697 (De Haan III 
1912: 431-2). This instruction was reissued regularly in the following century, 
no longer purely to put a stop to the inconvenient tendency of peasants 
to defect to another lord but, by demanding unconditional and exclusive 
servitude to the regent in whose jurisdiction they lived, to ensure that they 
could not escape the system of forced cultivation. An order was introduced 
in 1728 to secure the continued cultivation of coffee and other crops by 
making desertion a criminal offence. Deserters were to be apprehended 
and returned to their masters, while chiefs who gave them refuge were 
also to be punished. Defaulting chiefs were dismissed on the spot, sent to 
the Resident in chains and exiled overseas to a location specif ied by the 
Governor-General and the VOC’s High Command in Batavia (Hoadley 1994: 
147). Sometimes a regent would submit a request allowing peasants arriving 
from elsewhere to stay and help grow the coffee (De Haan III 1912: 173). 
Such cases were often settled on an ad hoc basis, showing a clear conflict of 
interests between the place of origin and that of arrival. A resolution in 1778 
accused regents and chiefs of transgressing the Company’s orders. In their 
eagerness to give sanctuary to deserters and nomadic peasants, they caused 
great harm to the cultivation and delivery of the crops. The punishment for 
encouraging peasants to defect remained the same as half a century earlier. 
Deserters themselves were called to order by a form of corporal punishment 
referred to as ‘a good whipping’ (De Haan I 1910: 417). Recidivists were put 
in chains in their district of origin for six months.
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The VOC refused to acknowledge that desertion and defection were a 
consequence of the system of forced cultivation. They attributed it to the 
footloose character of the Priangan peasants, who would up and leave, even 
abandoning their wife and children, at the slightest provocation. Perhaps 
they did not like maltreatment by their chief or had other objections that 
were evidence of their lack of discipline and unwillingness to lead a more 
regulated and settled life. Land f light, absconding to the mountainous 
upland beyond the reach of claims from higher up, is how Scott has charac-
terized the footloose life and preference for swidden agriculture segments 
of the peasantry in Southeast Asia resorted to in their counter-strategy to 
avoid being governed and taxed in subaltern regimes of dependency (Scott 
2009). The Company’s complaints of such ‘vagrancy’ continued until well 
into the next century, showing that the policy of immobilization did not 
produce the expected results, despite the rigorous sanctions imposed on 
malefactors. The f iasco can partly be explained by the inaccessibility of 
the region, together with the Company’s limited reach of control. In this 
light, it can be concluded that Mossel’s estimate in 1754 that the Priangan 
lands had 31,479 inhabitants (Bijvoegsel beschrijving Soendasche eilanden 
1781: 272, note c) is little more than a shot in the dark. Knowledge of the 
hinterland, as well as of the nature and size of its population, remained very 
superficial. The early expeditions sent out to learn more about these remote 
regions included land surveyors and map-makers but, notwithstanding all 
these efforts, such attempts initially had little success. Despite its strong 
words and sometimes equally strict sanctions, the Company remained 
floundering in a society that was inscrutable and offered its members a 
wide range of options for escape and evasion. The only way the VOC could 
gain control over peasant labour and deploy it for the forced delivery of 
goods and services, especially coffee, was to rely on the loyal collusion of 
the native chiefs. The following section examines to what extent this was 
a realistic proposition.
Indigenous management
The VOC employed the local chiefs as contractors doing the bidding of their 
Dutch superiors. They were held accountable for implementing the system 
of compulsory delivery of goods and services. The Company’s off icials had 
no direct contact with the peasants and were not interested in how the 
chiefs carried out the orders they received and handled the problems they 
encountered. It would nevertheless be incorrect to see this governance at 
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arm’s length as a continuation of the old regime. The position of the chiefs 
had changed radically, and their role was substantially different from that 
of their predecessors. As before, they were subject to an absentee superior, 
but now their subordination was clearly, even primarily, economic in nature. 
The chiefs became the jobbers of the colonial mode of production. Like the 
peasants beneath them, chiefs of all ranks would be punished for violations 
of the cultivation regime, ranging from negligence to refusing to carry out 
orders from their superiors to outright resistance. The Company pursued 
a policy of zero tolerance to disobedience in any form. In De Haan’s words, 
wherever coffee grew, the cane was there, too, at the ready (I 1910: 282).
Money was a much more positive incentive in obtaining the loyal coop-
eration of the chiefs and the people. The VOC used it so sparsely because 
it wished to earn as much as possible from coffee by minimizing the share 
of the proceeds that it passed on to the producers and their bosses. The 
main issue, of course, was how much the planters received for their labour. 
At f irst, the Sundanese peasants received nothing at all for the work they 
performed until the f irst harvest, i.e. four years after the trees were planted, 
not even an advance on what they would ultimately be paid. Throughout 
this period, the Company used the labour of the peasants for free. And when 
they did deliver the beans, the sources show that they were paid very little. 
The price cuts introduced shortly after the successful introduction of coffee 
cultivation have already been mentioned. The VOC proved very inventive 
in f inding ways to cut its costs. The weight of a pikul, initially 125 pounds, 
was increased in a series of stages. In 1777, the term bergse pikol (mountain 
pikul) was introduced. This meant that the weight of a pikul varied from 
200 to 300 pounds, depending on the regency, while regents continued to 
be rewarded according to the old measure of 146 pounds per pikul. As a 
result of this typical example of mercantile cunning, the payments to the 
peasants declined sharply. The regents received the old price since, without 
their cooperation, growing coffee would not have been possible. Company 
off icials at all levels creamed off the surplus earned from this increase in 
the weight measure to f ill their own pockets. This also explains why the 
weight of a pikul – always higher in the mountains than on the plains – 
varied according to the place of delivery. In addition, the VOC was very 
innovative in lowering the value of the money it used to pay for the coffee 
beans. In 1782, part of the payment was made in paper vouchers of little 
worth, and which were circulated little further than in Batavia. Much more 
harmful to the people of the Priangan was the circulation of low-quality 
farthings and other coins. After 1780, due to a shortage of copper money, 
coins known as ‘bonken’ came into circulation. They were worth so little 
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that the peasants traded them for salt as soon as possible, which was a more 
valuable means of exchange. It can be concluded from this evidence that 
the gradual monetization of the indigenous economy took place at various 
distinct levels which were hardly interconnected, if at all.
The combination of punishment and reward was not enough to assure 
the VOC of a steadily growing supply of coffee from the Priangan region. The 
Company therefore gradually stepped up its supervision of the chiefs. A f irst 
step was the appointment, in the early eighteenth century, of a high-ranking 
off icial with the title Commissioner of Indigenous Affairs, later referred to 
simply as the Commissioner or Indigenous Commissioner (De Haan IV 1912: 
1304). While the Governor-General primarily concerned himself with trade 
and focused his attention seawards, there was a growing need for someone 
below him stationed in the colonial headquarters to keep an eye on inland 
affairs from Batavia. Although a formal instruction was never issued for 
the Commissioner’s portfolio, his mandate and the power attached to it 
increased rapidly. After 1730, all correspondence with the regents passed 
through his hands. He acted with a considerable degree of autonomy and 
took decisions bef itting a position of high authority: changing the borders 
of regencies, granting exemptions from or enforcing cultivation systems in 
districts, opening up the hinterland to improve the infrastructure, etc. In 
1745, an instruction was issued that when he went on tours outside Batavia 
– though not in the headquarters itself – he would be accorded full military 
honours. The upgrading of this off ice in the hierarchy of the VOC was 
undoubtedly related to the increasing signif icance of coffee. Initially, the 
Commissioner was also charged with maintaining law and order. He was 
assigned guards and native police constables, who were responsible for 
punitive operations. The transfer of crop cultivation from the coastal plain 
to the highlands meant a change not only in the Commissioner’s area of 
command, but also in how he worked. He and his staff no longer patrolled 
the lowlands, but went to the highlands in person to ensure that the orders 
issued to the regents regarding the delivery of coffee and other commodities 
were being followed to the letter.
In the f irst half of the eighteenth century, the Commissioner rarely dared 
to venture outside the immediate environs of Batavia. Later, he would 
occasionally undertake short tours to the interior, which were made more 
diff icult by the bad state of the roads. Rather than travel by coach, he would 
go on horseback or be carried in a sedan chair. There were a handful of 
European agents who stayed permanently in the hinterland to oversee 
delivery of the colonial tribute. The original intention was to have one of 
these ‘coffee sergeants’ in each regency, but in practice this rarely happened. 
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As their name suggests, they were lower-ranking off icers in the VOC’s 
military branch. It was not until 1790 that they were made into full civil 
servants and given the title of bookkeeper. These inspectors, who operated 
close to the workfloor and acted as the Company’s eyes and ears, were in 
turn closely watched by a small number of native overseers to make sure 
they didn’t engage in any underhand business with the regents, for example 
not delivering all harvested and processed coffee beans to the Company’s 
warehouses or tampering with weights or payments. The Commissioner 
received only a meagre salary from the Company, from which he also had 
to pay his small staff of inspectors and guards. And yet his income rose to 
an astronomical level, due to a system of reward that was customary in the 
early-colonial era. Most of his wealth stemmed from his cut in cultivation 
and trade, such as a commission on the purchase of coffee and the sale of 
other goods, especially opium, from taxes on markets and presentations. 
He also received large sums of money from regents and lower chiefs who 
depended on his goodwill. The landed gentry did nothing more than what 
they were accustomed to doing under the emperor of Mataram: present-
ing gifts to mark appointments or promotions, at New Year, when visiting 
G.G. Van der Parra, seated in a palanquin on a visit to Sukahati or Heart’s Desire, 
the corralled residence of Bogor’s temanggung (drawing by Rach 1772). The 
buildings to the left are most probably sheds for storing coffee beans.
source: Perpustakaan nasional indonesia Collection, Jakarta
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Batavia, or to accompany requests for favours, in short a mixed bag of 
tributes and bribes. The regents were tied hand and foot to the Commis-
sioner by the advances they received. As early as 1741, the regent of Cianjur 
authorized his patron in the higher echelons of the VOC to conduct all his 
f inancial transactions, a precedent that was followed by the other regents 
in later years. It was not unusual for the Commissioner to make payments 
on behalf of the regent without the latter’s knowledge. A newly appointed 
regent was not issued with proof of appointment until he had undertaken 
in writing to take on the debt of his predecessor and to stand as guarantor 
for the commitments of the other chiefs. In this light, it is not surprising 
that a large part of the money required to pay for the products acquired by 
coercion never left Batavia. The regent was the actual supplier of the coffee. 
Generally he would receive an advance payment, based on a calculation 
made in the f irst half of the eighteenth century, equal to about a third of 
the ultimate price. He would spend half of the remaining balance, the 
amount the Company was willing to pay up in the end, on transport costs, 
while the other half was intended for the peasant producers. This formula 
would hardly change in the years that followed, nor would the unwritten 
rule that those at the bottom of the chain received what was left after all 
other payments had been made. Occasionally, as in 1777, the entire coffee 
revenue disappeared immediately into the pockets of the Commissioner 
as payment for advances and interest on loans.
The f igure of the Commissioner f itted perfectly into the tableau of 
eighteenth-century Batavia as the headquarters of the VOC. High-ranking 
Company off icials lived, like the high nobility of Java, a life of pomp and 
circumstance, with country houses and stables and an extensive entourage 
of quartermasters, servants and slaves who accompanied them when they 
travelled. All this took place at the expense of the local people, partly 
because these excursions entailed tournaments, hunting parties and fes-
tive receptions, for which the local chiefs and their clients had to supply 
a wide variety of goods and services: accommodation, horses, food, drink, 
women – and all in abundance. Nepotism was rife and open. Promotion 
was possible without the protection of a prominent f igure, but came more 
easily if you were from good, preferably aristocratic, stock back in Holland 
and could use the contacts that came with such a respectable background. 
Despite its initially rather low ranking in the hierarchy, the position of 
Commissioner became one of the most lucrative jobs that the Governor-
General had at his disposal. Once appointed from among the latter’s circle 
of close favourites, the newcomer could soon loosen his ties of dependency 
and establish an almost unassailable position. It is not an exaggeration to 
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see the Commissioner as the white patih of the Governor-General. He was 
the one who actually exercised the Company’s authority in all interactions 
with his native counterparts. His off ice, with all its powers, was strongly 
patrimonial and thrived in a tribute-based society. The Commissioner held 
court in the capital. His desire for prestige, the display of ceremony that 
surrounded him, his gracious acceptance of the homage and the gifts of the 
chiefs that came to visit him, as they used to visit the court at Mataram, were 
all the features of a system of neo-patrimonialism that formed the facade 
behind which the tributary mode of production was developed and refined.
The social proximity between the VOC off icials and the regents by no 
means meant that the former considered the local chiefs their social equals. 
They treated them with disdain and a lack of respect, saw them as barely 
civilized and accused them of repressing and exploiting their people. The 
fact that the system of tribute forced them to act in this way was completely 
ignored. An instruction from 1778 tried to put a stop to the worst forms of 
extortion by paying the coffee growers directly and on the spot, but little 
came of this in practice. The coffee sergeant, who usually had no command 
at all of the local language and had never seen a coffee tree before being ap-
pointed, kept a close eye on the regent’s actions. In theory, the regent ranked 
higher than the sergeant, known in the interior as Toewan Mandor, but the 
chief was often treated as though he were the inferior of the two. Although 
it gradually became less acceptable to refer to the natives, including those 
with positions of status, as ‘black dogs’, the tone remained objectionable, 
right up to the highest level (De Haan I 1910: 305-6). And this browbeating 
was not only verbal. While on tour, the Commissioner would not shy away 
from giving a district chief a good dressing down, which included kicking, 
slapping and beating, and on one occasion the regent’s substitute was put 
in the stocks. Whether it was also normal to treat the common people with 
equal roughness is not reported. They remained outside the f ield of vision 
of the small number of Europeans who had contact with the society they 
had colonized. In De Haan’s words: ‘The eyes of the Dutch off icials looked 
out over the squatting Sundanese to the coffee trees beyond’ (I 1910: 306).
Despite the Company controlling the Priangan from early on, its knowl-
edge of the social order in the region increased only at a snail’s pace. The 
principle of indirect rule that formed the basis for exploiting the land and 
its people, meant that the interior remained unfamiliar and alien territory 
until deep into the eighteenth century. After the outer frontiers had been 
demarcated, the land was rapidly appropriated, but it took a much greater 
effort to gain a grip on the social ties that bound the colonized population. 
The Company had hardly any understanding of the peasant order, having 
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no desire at all to descend to this inferior level of society. Delegating the col-
lection of the tribute to the rural gentry, however, made it crucial to gather 
strategic information on the composition, background and modus operandi 
of the Priangan elite. This ‘intelligence’ was acquired in practice and was not 
a goal itself, but served solely to facilitate the Company’s primary objective: 
the forced cultivation and delivery of colonial commodities. It soon became 
clear that the patih was the pivotal f igure in the economy of the regency. As 
the direct executor of the regent’s orders, this off icial in effect managed the 
work performed in his master’s service. This early insight led the Company, 
in 1706, to reserve the right to appoint and dismiss the regent’s right-hand 
man. The VOC’s off icials, however, continued to lack guidelines to help 
them navigate through the tangle of main chiefs and minor heads that 
made up the regent’s apparatus – toemenggoeng, kepala tjoetak, ngabehi, 
demang, oemboel, patinggi, jaksa, mantri, etc. – and they soon lost their 
way. The names of course held the key to understanding how indigenous 
governance was organized, but for outsiders it remained a mystery who did 
what, how far their authority extended, and how they ranked in relation 
to each other. The confusion partly originated in the fact that power and 
authority were not exercised along lines of territoriality. The agents in the 
Company’s outposts were further hindered by their inability to interact 
with the people. Candidates were not required to have even a minimum 
command of the language. More often than not, the reverse was true: chiefs 
were expected to have a reasonable knowledge, if not of Dutch, then of pasar 
Malay. The instructions forbidding desertion and defection, for example, 
were published only in these two languages. But the Priangan aristocracy 
spoke mainly Sundanese or a debased form of Javanese. It is not diff icult to 
imagine the communication problems that this must have caused.
Under the Company’s control
In 1744, the regent received an order to inspect his territory ‘in person or 
by his Pepattij’ once a year and to submit a report to the Commissioner 
(De Haan IV 1912: 334). As the locus of colonial management was gradually 
transferred from the regency to the districts, inspection duties were also 
increasingly focused at this level. An instruction from 1778 ordered the 
inspectors to monitor the payments to the coffee growers (four rijksdaalders 
per bergse pikol), draw up a monthly statement of production f igures, con-
duct a survey of the number of villages, dwellings and inhabitants involved 
in the cultivation of compulsory crops and the transport of the tribute 
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to the Company’s warehouses, send deserters arriving from elsewhere 
back where they came from, report immediately on the danger of harvest 
failure, and so on (De Haan II 1911: 592-5). The transfer of the bulk of the 
administration to the lower echelons was jeopardized by the tendency of 
lower-ranking chiefs to remain in the close proximity of their immediate 
superiors as long and as often as possible. In 1744, for example, some 60 to 
70 of these minor chiefs resided at the kraton of the regency of Cianjur, from 
where they issued orders to their substitutes. The highest VOC off icial to 
encounter them engaging in this old custom while on a tour of the interior 
ordered them to visit their own cutak (district) at least four times a year, 
also commanding the regent or his substitute to visit all the districts once 
a year (De Haan II 1911: 502). All these memoranda were to no avail for the 
time being. Half a century later, the district chiefs were instructed to be 
present in their cutak at least twice a year, when the coffee was planted and 
harvested, and to accompany the inspector during his annual inspection 
tour. In 1802, these measures reached their logical conclusion in the form of 
an instruction that the district chiefs should henceforth live permanently 
in their own cutak. As with earlier notif ications from the commanding 
heights, the chiefs continued to avoid complying with them for many years 
after they came into force (De Haan I 1910: 360). This meant that, even at 
the end of the eighteenth century, the Company’s supervision of coffee 
production extended just about down to district level and certainly no 
further downwards.
The policy of territorial demarcation also brought about changes in the 
hierarchical order. A clear line of command developed from the regent 
down to the coffee planters. The system of governance that the VOC tried 
to introduce allowed no overlapping competences or a fusion of these 
differentiated, but non-synchronized channels of authority. The various 
chiefs were now given more discrete tasks that were ranked vertically, 
from high to low. The traditional right of the landed gentry to transfer their 
loyalty to another patron – or at least, to threaten to do so – also came to 
an end. As with the peasants, the Company wanted subordination to be 
seen as a relationship that remained f ixed and could not be terminated 
or transferred. As a total ban proved impossible, a rule was introduced 
in 1728, by way of compromise, determining that clients who left their 
patrons would henceforth have to forfeit all their possessions (including 
their land and their own clients) to their former lord (Hoadley 1994: 147). 
It was a meaningless concession, as there was no point in defecting to 
another patron without taking one’s own clients. After all, it meant leaving 
behind the capital on which the economic power, political clout and social 
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status of the departing chief depended. Initially, the gentry undoubtedly 
did little more than take cognizance of these regulations. In the long term, 
however, the restrictive nature of the new configurations must have caused 
them to lose much of their room for manoeuvre. The ambiguous, f luid ties 
they enjoyed with various overlords were replaced by a more regimented 
top-down administration. On the other hand, the new situation had the 
major benef it that it assured them much greater security and stability. 
They no longer had to be afraid of rivals undermining their power base 
by encouraging clients to desert or competing for the favours of the same 
patron. This explains why high dignitaries from Cirebon petitioned the 
Company in the mid-eighteenth century to deprive the sultans of the right 
to dismiss them (ibid.: 125).
Structuring the administrative hierarchy along territorial lines strength-
ened the Company’s grip on the population of the Priangan and its productive 
capacity. Sedentarization, as observed above, made it easier to subordinate 
the peasantry to the colonial tax regime. One obstacle to achieving this, 
apart from the stubbornness with which the peasants clung on to their 
footloose way of life, was that the region was not densely populated. In 
its unremitting attempts to increase the supply of compulsory goods, the 
Company sought ways of raising the colonial tribute at the foot of society. 
It did this by coercing not only the sedentary peasants (bumi) in an area 
to cultivate specif ic crops, but also newcomers (numpang) who had come 
there to settle. The latter were seen as peasants who had run away from 
somewhere else to escape the excessive demands of a lord. While their new 
patron laid claim to the numpang’s labour power, allowing them to cultivate 
his paddy f ields in exchange for a share of the harvest for themselves, he 
did not use these new clients to grow compulsory crops (De Haan I 1910: 
362-3). The Company’s decision to include the numpang in the system of 
forced cultivation had a far-reaching social impact, and was made with 
that intention in mind. Its aim, after all, was to spread the burden of forced 
cultivation equally among all the peasants. This configuration no longer left 
room for the heads of the composite households (cacah), who were obliged 
to pay tax to the local chief unit and, therefore, ultimately constituted part 
of the retinue of the regent. Under the new regime, the complex composite 
households were split up into nuclear peasant households, all with equal 
obligations. In 1785, Leendert Rolff – who had been appointed Commissioner 
in the previous year – proposed that ‘each household, whether they were 
numpang or bumi, in the Priangan’ be involved equally in forced cultivation. 
He included this provision in the first article of his Coffee Instruction, issued 
in 1789 (De Haan IV 1912: 417-8; II 1911: 631-43). Whether it was actually put 
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into practice and, equally importantly, whether the definition of the peasant 
order on which it was based was an accurate reflection of the situation in 
reality are questions that we will return to later.
Rolff was most probably encouraged to draw up his guidelines for the 
cultivation of coffee by a missive from the ‘Heren XVII ’ (the VOC’s Amster-
dam Board of Directors) in 1788 ‘that Javanese coffee cannot be cultivated 
or delivered too much’. Rolff’s instruction specif ied how to choose the land, 
how to plant the trees and maintain them while they were growing, and 
lastly how to pick and dry the beans. He wrote the instruction on the basis 
of a questionnaire distributed among inspectors and chiefs. Their answers, 
which reflected prevailing practices, were used to draw up the guidelines. 
He certainly also made use of the impressions he had acquired himself dur-
ing a long tour of the Priangan some years before to acquaint himself with 
the region, which his predecessor had not taken the trouble to do. He was 
driven to write the instruction by his intention to improve the cultivation 
methods he encountered. At the end of the report of his tour, Rolff decried 
the bad state of the trees almost everywhere he went, and concluded that 
the regents were not following their orders and deserved to be punished by 
way of example. The instruction specif ied that coffee should be grown as 
close as possible to the planters’ homes and they were ordered to plant as 
many new trees as possible until they had a thousand trees a year to tend. 
They were also instructed to plant a hedge around the coffee plantations, 
to prevent the trees being damaged by cattle. The ground between the trees 
had to be raked four times a year to keep it free of weeds and dadap trees 
were to be planted to provide shade for the young coffee shrubs. These new 
requirements made it clear that coffee was no longer a crop the peasants 
could grow in their own yards. In the f irst two years, they were allowed 
to grow rice in between the young saplings, followed by a second crop. 
The beans were still dried at the peasant’s home. The regents and lower 
chiefs were obliged to pay for the beans immediately on delivery and to 
exempt their subordinates from other services as much as possible during 
the busy harvest season. Lastly, the European overseers had to inspect 
the crops from time to time, using horses and manpower supplied by the 
regents. Rolff had the instruction translated into Javanese and ordered it 
to be announced verbatim at the headquarters of the regencies during his 
subsequent inspection tour. As with all measures introduced during the 
eighteenth century to promote the collection of the tribute, issuing this 
instruction was much easier in theory than in practice. This f irst attempt 
to design a complete and thorough cultivation manual for producing this 
compulsory commodity was, however, even more interesting than the 
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inadequate level of compliance. A similar manual had been prepared in 
1778 for cultivating and processing indigo, but the instruction for coffee 
in particular coincided with an enormous leap forwards in the volume 
produced. This substantial increase, however, appears to have been more 
due to the steadily expanding mass mobilization of peasant labour to cul-
tivate coffee than to any improvement in the knowledge of the inspectors. 
A high-ranking Company off icial announced confidently at the end of the 
eighteenth century that as much coffee could be produced as there were 
ships made available to transport it to the metropolis.
Tardy population growth
A measure of the success of the new approach was a rise in production 
to 86,000 pikul in 1793. But intensif ication of the coffee cultivation was 
accompanied by persistent land flight. Spreading the work among more 
people than before could not prevent the burden increasing for everyone. 
Desertion was sometimes the only possible option remaining, and the peas-
ants repeatedly and in large numbers resorted to this solution. Others left 
because the sawahs they relied on to grow their food had been requisitioned 
to plant coffee (De Haan I 1910: 159). The increase in production towards 
the end of the eighteenth century would not have been possible without 
the introduction of forced cultivation in parts of the Priangan which, until 
then, had been spared. In 1808, Lawick reported that, as soon as the popula-
tion of Tjidamar in Sukapura heard that coffee was to be planted in their 
district, they left immediately without even starting to prepare the land. The 
following year, he reported that, in the Cirebon Priangan Regencies, some 
of the peasants used to move temporarily to another regency (where, as 
numpang, they were exempt from the forced cultivation) when the planting 
season arrived, only to return when it was over (De Haan III 1912: 629). In 
some places, like the Jampangs in south Priangan, coffee was introduced 
on ground that, although it was not very suitable for growing the crop, it 
stopped runaway peasants from settling there.
Around 1720, the Priangan could still be considered a frontier region, with 
no more than a little above one tenth of all land taken up for cultivation 
one way or the other. In 1777, the population was allegedly 55,000, rose 
to 206,494 in 1796, and was set at 150,822 in 1808 (De Haan I 1910: 953). 
The f irst headcount is as unreliable as the other two. Even the suggestion 
that the highest f igure is closest to reality is pure speculation. Due to a 
lack of adequate knowledge and access, the VOC’s statistical records at 
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that time were so incomplete that even a rough estimate of the true size 
of the population was impossible. They were not censuses in the literal 
sense of the word, but aggregated accounts submitted by the chiefs at the 
Company’s request. Nevertheless, there was no doubt that, until the end 
of the eighteenth century, demographic growth occurred very slowly, and 
was accompanied by strong variations in population density in the different 
parts of the region. After the initial arrival of colonists from the already 
densely populated coastal plain of Central Java, there was no influx of peo-
ple from elsewhere. It seems fair to assume that the heavy colonial tribute 
discouraged people from settling in the relatively thinly settled hilly tracts 
behind Batavia. Other factors undoubtedly also played a role, including 
several years of high mortality, caused by epidemics. A report from 1757/58 
notes that, because of the break-out of a kind of plague ‘whole negorijen had 
practically died out’, which had a very detrimental effect on the supply of 
Company products. A year later, the regent of Parakanmuncang reported 
that 425 of the 1,000 households under his charge had been wiped out within 
a period of six months. Vaccination against cowpox, started in the early 
nineteenth century, brought this disease under control. According to Pieter 
Engelhard, who became Commissioner in 1804, the campaign encountered 
diff iculties at f irst, as the people f iercely resisted being vaccinated. His as-
sistant Lawick used the mass exodus of the population on this ground as an 
excuse to suspend the campaign until a later date. Epidemics of course not 
only claimed many victims in the Priangan; elsewhere, too, demographic 
growth was checked by years of high mortality. In sparsely populated areas 
like the highlands of Sunda, recurring plagues hampered the growth of 
the workforce, which was required to increase production whenever the 
colonial authorities issued instructions to that effect.
An explanation for the persistent low population density in the Priangan 
Regencies would, however, be incomplete without mentioning another 
cause: the unremitting attempts of local chiefs in particular to keep as 
many of their subordinate peasants as possible, if not all of them, out of 
sight, so as to exempt them from the forced cultivation of coffee. We will 
see later to what extent they succeeded in this endeavour, but their actions 
meant that the colonial records underestimated the true size of the popula-
tion. The Company was aware of the discrepancy and did everything in its 
power to expose this hidden pool of labour. In 1805, Lawick, now acting 
Commissioner, wrote that the population was twice as large as had been 
reported. Similar observations can be found in many other sources from 
this period (De Haan IV 1912: 542). The implication was that the cultivation 
of coffee could and must expand. That did not occur immediately, as the 
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eagerness with which Rolff had set about his work made way in the years 
that followed for laxity among native managers and failing supervision by 
the Company’s agents. To make their lives easier, inspectors issued instruc-
tions to plant trees along the roadside, whether the soil was suitable or 
not, so that they could conduct their inspections as they rode past, not 
even having to dismount from their horses. It still happened that peasants 
were instructed to plant coffee in their sawahs and to set out new paddy 
f ields elsewhere. Pieter Engelhard’s travel journal in 1802 also mentions the 
requisitioning of sawahs to grow coffee, which most certainly must have 
involved the use of force. One inspector noted that regents considered it 
beneath their dignity to accompany him on his inspections, as they were 
obliged to do. In response to the disappointing annual report submitted 
by Commissioner Nicolaus Engelhard in 1799, he had to give the chiefs a 
serious dressing down about their failure to fulf il their duties. The regent 
of Cianjur, one of the worst culprits, was warned that he must mend his 
ways or measures would be taken to punish him. Failure to abide by the 
cultivation ordinances was given as the reason for dismissing the regents of 
Batulajang and Parakanmuncang in 1802. Tough measures were indispen-
sable in reaching the increased target of 100,000 pikul per year. The newly 
installed Commissioner Pieter Engelhard – a cousin of his predecessor, who 
had interceded on his behalf – was given Lawick as his deputy in 1802 to 
cope with the increased pressure of work.
Tying the peasants to the land, their compulsory involvement in the 
cultivation of crops for export, the ban on deserting their place of residence 
or transferring their servitude to another patron, confining the chiefs in 
a more streamlined bureaucratic hierarchy – all of these measures had 
the same goal: to raise the tribute. Tightening the tributary screw was 
undoubtedly successful, increasingly so as time passed. This does not mean, 
however, that those who were the victims of this early-colonial mode of 
production did not resist f iercely and persistently at all levels. The increased 
pressure applied after 1785 led immediately to an exodus from the Priangan 
to the lands surrounding Batavia to escape the ‘intolerable burdens and 
obligations’ (De Haan I 1910: 379). The Company prepared itself for collective 
resistance to the strict regime in the Priangan itself, but the isolation of the 
region worked in its favour. Agitators could easily be traced and rendered 
harmless. The Company’s agents focused particularly on tracking down 
followers of Islam (De Haan I 1910: 433).
But could the VOC be assured of the compliance and loyalty of the 
Priangan chiefs? After all, the native gentry had concluded an alliance 
with the Company and the nobility could consider itself obliged to defend 
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the economic interests of their alien masters to the best of their ability in 
exchange for generous revenues as well as protection – and even consolida-
tion – of their power. Whether they actually fully complied with all they 
had to do is highly disputable. The chiefs were not only differently ranked 
but also operated in circuits that were distinct from each other. The essence 
of their subordination was expressed in displays of servitude and in the 
compulsory delivery of commodities to the Company. In Batavia, the high-
est among them – the regents – had to show themselves regularly at the 
‘court’ of the VOC, as befits vassals, to demonstrate their humility and sub-
mission. A code of conduct for local chiefs was never written up, they had to 
make do with the coffee instruction. The chiefs displayed their eminence 
with shows of pomp and circumstance (De Haan I 1910: 350). Their conduct 
may have appeared similar to that of their predecessors in the pre-colonial 
era, but their demonstrations of aff luence were much more opulent than 
their forefathers had ever achieved. The coffee money, or rather the credit 
that they enjoyed in exchange for delivering this commodity, gave them 
the opportunity to excessive displays of extravagance that soon earned 
them the name of parvenus. During their stays in Batavia – which they 
sometimes stretched out to several months – the overpaid regents would 
do their utmost to outdo each other in shows of splendour. The regent of 
Cianjur used to ride around in a gilded coach. These ‘shopaholic’ grand 
seigneurs would pay extortionate prices for valuable goods. When they 
returned to their regencies, they would take opium, tobacco and textiles 
with them, which they would then sell on to local chiefs. At home, in the 
headquarters of their regencies, they may have lived a little more simply, 
but here too they were at the hub of power and wealth, elevated far above 
the peasant folk. The Company was dependent on the landed gentry’s 
influence on the population as a whole both for its legitimacy and to set 
up the tributary system. The chiefs were nevertheless treated with little 
respect by the VOC off icials. As already observed, they were considered 
inferior to their European bosses. Behind this facade of disdain, however, 
lurked a fear and uncertainty of having insuff icient control over the chiefs’ 
actions. This suspicion could lead to measures intentionally aimed at 
damaging them in some way, such as forcing them to continue growing 
unprof itable crops, as a lesson in obedience. So as not to become prisoners 
of their allies, the VOC pursued a policy of divide and rule. The contact 
between the regents was reputed to be formal, measured and cool, not 
in the last instance because the Company wanted it that way. It did not 
shy away from breeding envy and animosity among the chiefs (De Haan 
I 1910: 343, 357).
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In the late eighteenth century, there was a discussion about whether 
the moment had come to rescind the decision to place coffee cultivation 
under indigenous management. Sebastiaan Nederburgh, sent to Batavia 
by the VOC as Commissioner-General to come up with proposals for how 
to proceed further, made it known in his report in 1796 – which was prob-
ably ghost-written by Nicolaus Engelhard – that governing the Priangan 
Regencies and taxing the peasants was currently costing the Company 
nothing. This money-wise conclusion put an end to any further discus-
sion on alternatives. Even the costs (and incomes) of the inspectors, the 
Commissioner and his staff, were not borne by the Company itself. While 
the VOC did reward the chiefs for their collusion in coffee production, 
the price paid for their services was completely out of proportion with 
the prof its that the VOC enjoyed from the subsequent trade. Even after 
coffee had been upgraded from luxury good to mass commodity, prof it 
margins remained exceptionally high. The commission paid to the regents 
for their mediation brought them wealth and an opulent lifestyle. But they 
lost their fortunes just as easily as they made them through the excessive 
f inancial manipulations of the highest-ranking Company off icials. The 
regents, placed under the tutelage of the Company were only appointed if 
they paid off the debts of their predecessors, and had to act as guarantors for 
each other. But no matter how detrimental this deceit must have been for 
their willingness to meet the Company’s demands, the treatment meted out 
to the chiefs was many times preferable to what the peasants could expect. 
Lack of information makes it impossible to determine whether they saw 
the cultivation of coffee as unpaid corvee services. In a memorandum from 
1804, Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp expressed an opinion that many before 
and after him were to share: ‘All the coffee beans picked by the Javanese 
must be supplied at a low price or, as is widely acknowledged, for nothing’ 
(De Haan III 1912: 704).
Tackling ‘cultivation delinquency’
Because the Company refused to pay a reasonable price for the coffee, 
the planters were tempted not to surrender some or all of their harvest by 
throwing away or burying the beans, so avoiding the recurring and tedious 
journeys to the warehouses. Sometimes they would sell the coffee clandes-
tinely to merchants who were willing to pay more than the Company. This 
evasion of the VOC’s monopoly f irst of all affected the chiefs, from whom 
the peasants kept their illegal transactions secret. These practices were 
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mentioned as early as 1727, almost immediately after the f irst radical price 
cut. Yet the chiefs themselves were even more inventive than the peasants 
in ensuring that not all the coffee they had collected actually reached the 
Company’s warehouses directly. Many loads switched owners on the way, 
often more than once, and the nearer they got to the coast, the higher 
the price the buyers were prepared to pay. If a regent failed to deliver the 
quantities that were expected of him, he or his subordinates were soon 
suspected of doing business with private traders. To combat these practices, 
the Company decided that no one should be permitted in the Priangan who 
did not belong there. The measure was a logical extension of the forced 
cultivation and delivery of coffee, but was presented as expressing the 
Company’s desire to protect the simple and honest inhabitants from ‘bad 
external influences’. The ban on ‘strangers’ in the region applied in the f irst 
instance to Chinese merchants who, as elsewhere, acted as intermediaries 
between the Company and the local people. They would buy the coffee 
up at their own cost and risk, but also operated as agents for European 
landlords living close to Batavia or – a better kept secret – Company of-
f icials. The inhabitants of the Priangan were also not permitted to leave 
their settlements. Growing or transporting the coffee were the only excuses 
they had not to be where they belonged: at home. They were not allowed to 
travel without a written permit issued at the off ice of the residency or by 
a chief. Failure to produce this pass on demand was punished by a lashing 
with a cane or a few days in the stocks. More serious offences like stealing 
cattle or coffee would mean a year in chains. There was little opportunity 
for anything other than growing your own food and the compulsory crop, 
and performing corvee services for your chief. These rigorous restrictions 
explain why there was little trade in the Priangan other than transactions 
with the Company and why there were almost no pasars in the region. 
Whatever non-local goods were available were brought back by the drivers 
of the pack animals that had taken the coffee to the warehouses at the 
frontiers, where petty traders offered goods such as textile or ironware that 
were in demand in the interior.
The peasants complained that the obligation to plant new trees each year 
left them insuff icient time to maintain the standing plantations regularly 
and properly, but to no avail. A proposal in 1802 to reduce the number 
of trees per household to 500 was rejected but, again in 1808, Lawick did 
acknowledge that the number of trees that had to be planted had risen to 
an unbearable level. It had been established earlier that expansion of coffee 
cultivation to all regencies had led to a fall rather than a rise in production. 
‘The people f lee, desert and defect from regions where they are placed 
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under such excessive pressure,’ he reported to the Deputy Commissioner. 
He warned that adhering overly strictly to the demand that each household 
should maintain 1,000 trees a year would lead to large-scale desertion and 
revolt. This burden had become more onerous since Nicolaus Engelhard 
had announced in 1795 that the ban on deserting to escape the obligation 
to grow coffee also affected numpang households. When this instruction 
was f irst introduced in 1739, it applied only to landowning peasants, in 
light of the custom that landless peasants were exempt from the tribute. 
As we have seen, this was no longer the case from 1789 and extending 
the ban on desertion or defection to the landless helped include them in 
the system of forced cultivation. As before, the chiefs did all they could 
to expand their clientele, but this was no longer driven by the desire to 
steal a march on their rivals in terms of power and prestige, but to en-
able them to fulf il the Company’s demand for coffee, coffee and more 
coffee. Sealing off the highlands as a sort of reservation and forcing the 
inhabitants to stay put were the main instruments used by the Company 
to collect the colonial tribute. What started as a free trade transaction in 
the early eighteenth century ended up as a system of forced cultivation 
and delivery. The chronicler of this regime described how the peasants 
were driven by fear of punishment and the chiefs by fear of their superiors, 
and how the whole system of cultivation prevailed because no one had the 
power to resist it. The violence used to keep the population under control 
remained outside the Company’s f ield of vision, as it had no direct contact 
with the workfloor. Nevertheless, Nicolaus Engelhard spoke of the need for 
‘continual punishment’ to get the peasants to work and keep them working. 
We know more about the pressure exerted on the chiefs to combat ‘cultiva-
tion delinquency’. Even when these offences had been committed by their 
subordinates, the Commissioner and his overseers did not shy away from 
caning the managers of the coffee businesses, putting them in the stocks 
for days or months, or sentencing them to long periods in chains. As the 
highest chiefs, regents faced dismissal and exile for serious and persistent 
neglect of duty. Was the exercise of all this violence not excessive, even in 
the context of the times? Nicolaus Engelhard – who was by no means severe 
compared to the other Commissioners – expressed the certainty that no 
native would ever plant coffee without being forced to do so. In this way, 
what was actually a consequence of a ruthless regime was also identif ied 
as its cause and justif ication. The refusal to pay the peasants for their work 
gradually became standard practice in the eighteenth century and was also 
legitimized with hindsight as a continuation of the pre-colonial system of 
tribute.
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Every expression of concern would almost automatically end with the 
argument that there was simply no other choice. The Sundanese were seen 
as naturally lazy and slothful; in Engelhard’s words to Nederburgh, they 
were capable of ‘no labour of any kind other than what they saw as abso-
lutely necessary to meet their basic needs’ (De Haan IV: 732). Left to his own 
devices, the Priangan peasant was completely unprepared to do anything 
more than he had to. That could only be achieved by subjecting him to strict 
control and discipline. From this perspective, coercion was a possibly regret-
table but unfortunately necessary part of a long civilizing mission. In the 
final instance, the chronicler of this period shared this conclusion regarding 
the forced cultivation of coffee. In an economic sense, the introduction of 
the system was a great step forwards which the population may have taken 
reluctantly but which also put a stop to the under-utilization of the forces of 
production which held the Priangan back in its development. As late as the 
beginning of the twentieth century, colonial archivist De Haan assessed the 
impact of the Priangan system with striking light-heartedness: certainly, 
the coercion was severe, but for the native population compliance with the 
coffee regime meant merely a loss of leisure time, a change to which native 
life would duly become accustomed (De Haan I 1910: 148). Whether this is 
really true will become clear below as we explore the eclipse of the VOC 
and the transfer of power to the off icials of the colonial state around the 
end of the eighteenth century.

III From trading company to state 
enterprise
Clashing interests
There was clearly no organized resistance to the VOC’s domination and 
the system of compulsory cultivation and delivery. However, this does not 
mean that the landed gentry of the Priangan gave their full cooperation to 
the new regime. The regents and, through them, the lower chiefs were paid 
commissions for their mediation, but not generously enough for money to 
have been their only incentive. Most of them accumulated an enormous 
debt to their benefactors in Batavia. Political coercion, or the threat of it, 
was potentially a more important motive for collaborating. The annual 
appearance of the regents at the colonial headquarters gave added gloss 
to their superiors’ power and was intended to reaff irm the chiefs’ sense of 
dependence. Although this arrangement offered them no opportunity to 
display their own grandeur, once they had returned to their home bases 
in the hinterland, the regents no longer acted as the eager jobbers that 
the VOC wanted them to be. Far removed from their superiors in Batavia, 
they had wide-ranging powers which they could exercise with little fear of 
being checked up on. The Company had no desire to concern itself deeply 
or constantly with indigenous affairs. This reluctance even took on the 
form of antipathy, caused not only by a complete lack of interest but also 
by a blissful ignorance of the way indigenous society was structured and 
organized.
Early-colonial reports emphasized how the feudal lifestyle of the landed 
gentry conf licted with the Company’s economic interests (De Haan I, 
1910: 356). It is tempting to suggest a deep contrast between the contract-
driven thinking of the trading company and the primary concern with 
status among the Priangan chiefs, the former concerned with growing 
coffee and the latter with hunting parties. But the divergence in aims and 
interests denies the many nuances on both sides. I have referred earlier 
to the lifestyle of the VOC directors in Batavia, which in a number of 
ways resembled that of the landed gentry and could easily be classif ied 
as neo-feudal. As for the regents, there has been little attention to the 
way in which they and the chiefs below them manifested themselves as 
economic entrepreneurs. There are indications that the landed gentry 
in the Sunda lands, as elsewhere on Java, played an important role in 
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trade and economic activity until the Company cut them off from these 
direct sources of power and wealth. Above all, they continued to be 
actively involved in the laying out and cultivation of new paddy f ields. 
The steady conversion of dry land into irrigated f ields often took place, 
as in former times, at the initiative and under the supervision of higher 
or lower patrons who belonged to the landed elite. The cultivation work 
itself was conducted by their clients among the peasant population who 
were entitled to till the new sawahs in exchange for a share of the fruits of 
their labour. Alongside the coffee production chain, with its managerial 
network extending across the rural landscape, there was also a distinct 
chain of production for paddy, over which the Company had no authority 
whatsoever and which continued to be organized completely outside its 
control. This explains why early-colonial accounts contain little or no 
information on how paddy cultivation was organized, how it gradually 
expanded and how supra-local chiefs requisitioned a share of the harvest. 
This lack of attention also applies to the involvement of Islamic clerics 
in agricultural affairs. Their active role in the daily work of the peasants 
would not come to light until much later.
The regents and the chiefs below them had many other sources of in-
come, the nature and scale of which the Company had little insight into. 
According to the doctrine of non-intervention in indigenous affairs these 
were customary forms of tribute based on the servitude of the population 
to the chiefs that continued under the new regime. It was considered 
improper to abolish them or take them over. That also applied to the head 
tax, one of these old forms of tribute which the chiefs may have used to 
appropriate a considerable share of the payment the peasants received 
for growing the coffee. Lastly, the regents received income from the mod-
est trade that developed in their regions, earning commissions from the 
monthly pasar and selling goods from Batavia to the local people, directly 
or through their agents. Sometimes the regent himself would bring these 
goods back in his caravan when returning from his annual visit to the 
colonial headquarters. I mention all these activities not only to correct 
the view that the Priangan regents were primarily or even exclusively 
concerned with indulging in ostentatious leisure, hunting and engaging in 
other feudal pastimes. More important is the conclusion that the economic 
interests of the regents conflicted, rather than coincided, with the expan-
sion of coffee cultivation. In the eyes of the Company’s accountants, the 
regents’ attempts to exempt their clients partially or even completely 
from compulsory coffee cultivation was evidence of their non-economic 
mentality.
froM tradinG CoMPany to state enterPrise 97
The greater the numbers of these unproductive dependants, the greater 
the pomp and ceremony. That is why the main negorij, which was teeming 
with such idle servants, not only of the Regent but also of the District 
chiefs and other lesser off icials, usually fell short of the standard norms 
of morality. (De Haan I, 1910: 366)
The fact that there were always so many people hanging around the regent’s 
kraton and that no chief went anywhere without being accompanied by a 
whole entourage, was a source of great irritation to their colonial masters. 
But even more frustrating, of course, was that so many peasant clients 
who should have been working to raise the colonial tribute were used 
exclusively to work in the sawah kaprabon, the paddy f ields owned by 
the chiefs themselves. Only with ‘horrendous threats’ did Rolff succeed in 
urging the regents to include the previously exempt numpang in the system 
of compulsory cultivation (De Haan I, 1910: 133). In the reports on the size 
of the population that they had to submit periodically, the chiefs probably 
only listed the class customarily subject to servitude: the peasant-owners. 
The diff iculties involved in holding the regents accountable for producing 
and delivering the volume of coffee required eventually led the VOC to take 
action. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, it transferred primary 
responsibility for supervising the coffee growers from the regents to the 
district chiefs. This new policy was laid down off icially in a resolution in 
1790.
The aforementioned cutak chiefs are also primarily responsible for the 
neglect of the coffee plantations and thus are obliged, on occasion that 
the neglect is the result of the extortions of the direct producers, to 
remonstrate them; if in the reverse case, that is if such is concealed, by 
its discovery [they] are to be considered and punished as accomplices 
and supporters. (Hoadley 1994: 162)
This forced the regents back, even more than before, into a position of 
mainly decorative signif icance, a demotion defended by reference to their 
‘despotic capriciousness’. An alternative would have been to expand the 
number of European inspectors, but this was probably not even considered 
because of the costs involved. The indigenous chiefs received no stipend and 
the Company remained resolute in its refusal to depart from the principle 
of cheap governance. Furthermore, it cannot have escaped the notice of 
the VOC’s directors that the coffee sergeants charged with inspection had 
proven very susceptible to all kinds of corrupt practices.
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The solution chosen by the Company may have been the cheapest, but 
was it the best option for increasing production? The delegation of author-
ity to the district chiefs was little more than a cosmetic change, as the 
exercise of power at this level was little different from that in the regency 
headquarters. Chiefs, from high to low, acted as agents implementing the 
system of compulsory cultivation and delivery. Behind the facade of their co-
operation in collecting the colonial tribute, however, they were in charge of a 
completely different economic activity: growing paddy. Although the paddy 
was not intended for export, it was of considerable economic importance, 
also to the chiefs themselves, and they gave this staple food preference over 
growing coffee at the behest of the VOC. They kept double accounts and gave 
priority to activities that were more lucrative and over which the Company 
had no control. In an attempt to ensure proper supervision, the Company 
issued the regent’s substitute and his district chiefs with deeds of appoint-
ment. Nevertheless, coffee production continued to depend nominally on 
the regents, as a consequence of which their prosperity increased. But it 
was arguable whether this was enough to ensure their loyalty. Nicolaus 
Engelhard, Commissioner in the f inal decade of the eighteenth century, 
poignantly observed that the regents would have happily exchanged their 
riches for their lost freedom of action (De Haan I, 1910: 146).
Failing management
The discussion among policy-makers in the latter years of the VOC on how 
to proceed with the system of colonial exploitation did not at f irst lead to 
any change in the production of coffee for the expanding world market. The 
improved results were partly due to the Cultivation Instruction drawn up 
by Commissioner Rolff in 1789 on where, when and how coffee should be 
tended and harvested. He composed the manual based on his own experi-
ence, but also obtained information from the coffee sergeants and regents. 
It was the f irst attempt to use practical knowledge to give the cultivation 
of coffee a more professional basis (De Haan II, 1911: 631-43). Demand had 
risen gradually in the course of time, sometimes increasing more rapidly 
in response to specif ic events. In 1791, for example, when a slave uprising 
on the island of San Domingo put a stop to the export of coffee from this 
West Indian colony. The price rise that this caused on the European market 
stimulated the expansion of cultivation on Java. Newly appointed Commis-
sioner Nicolaus Engelhard rapidly increased the level of supply, thereby 
playing an important role in assuring the budget required to continue the 
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colonial endeavour. He was succeeded in 1800 by Pieter Engelhard, who 
undoubtedly had his predecessor to thank for his appointment. Their close 
family ties (their mothers were sisters) did not prevent a rift developing 
between them, caused by the disappointing revenues in the f inal decades 
of the eighteenth century. The Company’s directors had expressed their 
displeasure and the blame for this unexpected setback was laid at the door 
of the Regent of Cianjur, which was the main area of cultivation. He was 
accused of not supervising the picking, collection and delivery of the coffee 
properly. This criticism was just as applicable to the Commissioner, but 
he defended himself by accusing the coffee sergeants of false reporting. 
Shortly before he stepped down, Nicolaus saw an opportunity to rehabili-
tate himself by planting new trees on a large scale to compensate at least 
partly for the fall in production. With a display of admirable diligence, his 
successor succeeded in increasing production within a few years to the 
unprecedented level of more than 100,000 pikul. This was only possible by 
increasing compulsory cultivation to 1,000 coffee trees per household per 
year and stepping up the supervision by the inspectors.
In 1805, the greater effort required of the Commissioner to fulf il his 
demanding tasks led to him requesting a deputy to assist him. His request 
was approved and he agreed to the appointment of Lawick, who was his 
closest colleague, but the two soon clashed. Four regents who had dealings 
with the new Kommissaris Kecil complained to Engelhard about his deputy’s 
inappropriate behaviour. According to the Regent of Sumadang, Lawick had 
set f ire to a number of kampungs in the highlands in 1806, causing a local 
uprising that had led to an exodus to Cirebon (De Haan I, Personalia, 1910: 
106). An alternative interpretation claimed that the Deputy Commissioner 
had incurred the displeasure of the Resident of Cirebon by alleging that his 
bad governance had led to the unrest. A committee set up to investigate 
the affair ruled in favour of Lawick, though its conclusions were disputable. 
Engelhard was suspended and his deputy was appointed acting Commis-
sioner. Lawick continued to be held in high esteem under the new regime 
and Daendels would appoint him Prefect of the Cirebon Priangan lands.
Although the former Commissioner had fallen into disfavour, the in-
convenience this caused meant only that the kongsi to which he belonged 
had to lie low for a while. Two years later, however, Engelhard found a 
powerful patron when Daendels was appointed Governor. Besides being 
promoted to influential and lucrative positions, he was also a partner in 
the purchase of private landed estates. From Daendels, who had called 
him ‘very experienced and mild in his dealings with the natives’, the once 
disgraced Commissioner had little difficulty in transferring his allegiance to 
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Thomas Stamford Raffles, who also had nothing but praise for Engelhard’s 
governance of the regencies. De Haan summarized his career as follows: ‘It 
is clear that he sought to make improvements and planted coffee with great 
enthusiasm, but it is equally certain that he had much cause to be grateful to 
his competent deputy, and that there are serious doubts about his f inancial 
integrity’ (De Haan I, Personalia, 1910: 98). This was a judgment that could 
have applied just as easily to his cousin Nicolaus and to many other high-
ranking VOC off icials. Following these often long-lasting feuds reveals the 
lines along which individual interests were promoted. It was a close-knit 
network in which the various factions were held together or driven apart by 
family relationships or other ties of aff inity. It is interesting to note that the 
regents, too, were very sophisticated in forming alliances with the colonial 
authorities, switching to a new coterie of prominent f igures in good time 
whenever they felt it was necessary.
The downfall of the VOC manifested itself in a f inancial crisis, mainly 
due to huge internal corruption, that made it impossible to continue to run 
the Company on the old footing. De Haan described the activities of the 
trading company at the end of the eighteenth century as one big swindle (I, 
1910: 324). The establishment of a state commission in 1790 could not prevent 
the debt burden from running up even further to the gigantic amount of 134 
million guilders when the Company was wound up at the end of 1799. The 
VOC’s bankruptcy must be seen in the context of the political changes that 
took place in the Netherlands at the end of the eighteenth century. During 
a political revolt in 1795, a republican movement which sided with the 
French revolution deposed the party favouring the princely stadtholder and 
established what was known as the Batavian Republic. In the wake of this 
regime change, on which I shall elaborate more in the next chapter, a state 
commission was set up by the new Dutch republic to replace the governing 
board of the VOC. This Raad der Aziatische bezittingen en etablissmenten 
(Council for Asian Possessions and Establishments), installed in 1800, took 
over all the assets and liabilities of the VOC. The Council’s mandate was to 
prepare a blueprint for the future handling of colonial business.
In the preceding years, the VOC’s governing board had tried in vain to 
avert the debacle by putting its own house in order. In 1793, a Commission-
General arrived in Batavia to put a stop to the increasingly heavy losses. 
The most prominent member of the Commission, Sebastiaan Cornelis 
Nederburgh, based his investigation completely on the selective informa-
tion provided by the company’s directors. Driven in the f irst place by their 
own interests, they were f irm in rejecting far-reaching reforms from the 
very beginning. In his policy memorandum from 1796, Consideratiën over 
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de Jacatrasche en Priangan-Regentschappen, Nederburgh acknowledged 
that the payments to the coffee growers were indeed very meagre, not even 
enough to cover the costs of transport. But the Commissioner-General re-
jected a price rise to stimulate production, preferring to calculate how much 
the Company’s profits could be increased by cutting back on expenses. The 
only dissenting voice from within the colonial apparatus was that of Dirk 
van Hogendorp. Shortly after being appointed as the VOC’s trading agent 
in 1786, Van Hogendorp had been sent to Northern India to manage the 
Company’s factory in the town of Patna that lay upstream from Calcutta on 
the Ganges river. He witnessed from close quarters the introduction of the 
Permanent Settlement, the tax system imposed by the British East India 
Company to reshape its domination over Bengal along different lines (Guha 
1981). The debate then raging on who should be considered the owner of 
the land inspired him, a few years later after returning to Java, to express 
increasingly vocal criticism of the VOC’s policy. In a radical departure 
from existing practice, Van Hogendorp advocated a land tax based on 
recognition of the ownership rights of the peasant population, paying 
civil servants and regents a f ixed salary, abolishing corvee services and 
the system of compulsory delivery. He also recommended, as in India, the 
introduction of free trade between colony and mother country. The vested 
interests in Batavia were vehemently opposed to these modern ideas and 
were able to prevent Van Hogendorp from making his plans public. He 
was also a veritable thorn in the side of his superiors in other respects. In 
1798, this high-ranking VOC off icial was even held in detention in Batavia 
accused of abuse of power and fraud (Fasseur 1985). He managed to escape 
and, after a halt in Bombay, reached the metropolis. He released his f irst 
publication in 1799, Berigt van den tegenwoordigen toestand der Bataafsche 
bezittingen in Oost-Indië en den handel op dezelve, in which he outlined 
his ideas on how to manage the colonial domain to the new government 
in Holland. And not without success: he was made a member of the state 
commission set up in 1802 to design a Charter for the East Indies. This 
document was, however, ultimately drawn up without him, due to his 
sudden departure abroad on diplomatic service for his new republican 
masters. His adversary, Nederburgh, had in the meantime returned from 
his colonial mission and was also appointed to the Charter Commission, 
so that he did have the opportunity to leave his mark on its report, which 
was published in 1804 (De Haan IV, 1912: 763-4). Nevertheless, the principles 
that Van Hogendorp advocated had won suff icient support for the f inal 
ordinance to be a compromise that satisf ied neither party and had no 
impact at all on policy or practice.
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The arguments employed in the dispute between the main proponent 
and opponent of radical reforms around the turn of the century continued 
to resound in colonial circles until the introduction of the cultivation system 
three decades later. In his riposte to the deliberations of his opponent, 
Nederburgh pointed out that the enormous costs incurred in building up 
a f inely meshed government apparatus would reduce the profit destined 
for the state’s coffers. Perhaps even more persuasive was his opinion that 
Javanese peasants would never increase production of their own free will. 
He believed that they lacked the sense of enlightened self-interest on which 
Van Hogendorp’s argument was based. The exercise of force remained 
unavoidable, as Nederburgh had already stated in his Consideratiën.
As far as the nature of the Inlander is concerned, he is lazy and sloth-
ful, and capable of no labour of any kind other than what they saw as 
absolutely necessary to meet their basic needs. (Nederburgh 1855: 122)
Van Hogendorp on the other hand, took account, if not of the presence, 
then of the imminent emergence of homo economicus in the Javanese 
landscape. Javanese peasants could, after all, only earn the head tax he 
proposed imposing along with the land tax in place of the corvee services 
by acting as market producers, i.e. by selling at least a part of the crops they 
produced. As Van Hogendorp wrote to his brother:
… let us have the courage, as the English have done successfully in Bengal, 
to permit the Javanese peasant to own or lease his land. We shall then 
have people to deal with, rather than slaves or draught animals. Let 
us have the courage to abolish forced labour and corvee services, and 
introduce land tax on products and a small poll tax. And then we shall 
earn millions, yes millions, from this beautiful island, the most fertile 
land in the whole world. (Van Sillem 1890: 58-9)
The disagreement between Van Hogendorp and Nederburgh became less 
marked when the former proved willing to compromise on the issue of 
absolute ownership rights. He saw no reason why land that was not already 
in use should not be issued to non-native leaseholders. And the view that 
he was much more concerned with the welfare of the Javanese population 
than his opponent was somewhat tempered by the fact that both he and 
Nederburgh, as members of the Charter Commission, were bound by the 
instruction that exploitation of colonial possessions must ‘provide the 
greatest value for the trade of the Republic and the greatest benefit for the 
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country’s coffers’. Experience had shown that laying claim to the labour 
power of the peasants was a necessary condition for achieving this objec-
tive. Consequently, what became known in the f irst half of the nineteenth 
century as the cultivation system is correctly interpreted as an expansion 
and standardization of the regime set in place by the VOC.
After the fall of the VOC
When the VOC was wound up, the possibility of abandoning all interests 
built up in Asia over a period of two centuries was apparently never consid-
ered. There was clearly little doubt about the potential prof itability of this 
distant endeavour. All experts in colonial affairs consulted were in favour 
of continued exploitation of the Dutch possessions in the East Indies. The 
Company’s management had proved ineff icient and ineffective. From this 
perspective, state-directed policies would increase colonial production and 
the consequential benefits for the mother country. After all, the purpose of 
a colony was to make a prof it, and as much as possible. This was the main 
priority and the interests of the native population should not stand in the 
way. Only a few were willing to admit that the ideals of the Enlightenment 
that underpinned both the American War of Independence and the French 
Revolution should perhaps also be applied to the colonial rule in the tropics. 
Not of course with full recognition of the universal validity of liberty, equal-
ity and fraternity. These principles were essentially applicable only to the 
white tribes of the Atlantic community, and not to other parts of the world 
where other races lived and worked. But was it unthinkable for a foreign 
ruler, while seeking his own benefit, to also concern himself with increasing 
the happiness and prosperity of his indigenous subjects? Van Hogendorp 
believed in this civilizing mission and urged that it be recognized.
In terms of our domination of Java this means specif ically: ‘to protect 
these same Inlanders from all violence and hostility from without and 
within; to provide and assure them of civic liberty, the right to own property, 
protection from all oppression and the exercise of impartial and fair justice’ 
(Van Hogendorp 1800: 8). Nevertheless this enlightened politician, too, 
proved unwilling to demand the unconditional and immediate application 
of these high ideals.
The advice that the Charter Commission published in 1804 essentially 
recommended continuation of the existing state of affairs. That was not so 
surprising since, after Van Hogendorp’s premature departure, Nederburgh 
had free rein in the Commission. He was the f inal editor of the report 
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and made sure that the system of forced cultivation and corvee services 
remained intact; his opponent’s proposal to acknowledge the peasants 
as the rightful owners of their f ields was explicitly rejected in the text. 
Nederburgh wrote to the private owner of an estate who had returned to 
Holland to ask how the indigenous population would respond to abolition 
of the compulsory cultivation of coffee. The answer he received – that they 
would no longer grow it – was exactly why Nederburgh wanted to preserve 
the regime of forced cultivation. The outcome of the clash between the re-
formers and those who wanted to retain the existing system was determined 
much more by external conditions than by the power of the arguments 
on both sides. The political changes in the metropolis made it imperative 
that the old regime in the colony be maintained for an unspecif ied period. 
The uncertainty about the nature and limits of the state-building process 
in Europe may not have been an obstacle to the drafting of radical plans 
for reform, but there was no question of these ideas or of a complete new 
system, as envisaged by Van Hogendorp (1800: 194), being introduced in 
practice for the time being. That political uncertainty was fuelled by the 
unpredictability of the economic future. Would an increase in production 
not lead to a much greater supply of colonial goods than the demand that 
could be expected to materialize in the world market?
Besides the political and economic volatility, the unfamiliarity of the 
main actors with the structure of colonial society also played a role in the 
ambivalent policy climate of these years. Van Hogendorp had only recently 
returned to Java when he committed his far-reaching reforms to paper. 
His opponents especially criticized him for his lack of experience with 
the situation on the workfloor. But this objection, though never explicitly 
expressed, applied much more to Nederburgh. He based his reform plan 
completely on what he had been told by Commissioner Nicolaus Engel-
hard, who was both a f ierce defender and one of the main benef iciaries 
of the Priangan coffee regime, and was dismissed from his post several 
years later after being accused of involvement in illegal and oppressive 
practices. Nederburgh’s familiarity with the region that he had been sent 
to investigate was limited to a week’s tour of Cianjur. The Consideratiën 
with which he concluded his assignment in 1796 was based on a single 
source: the Commissioner’s reports on the regencies from the preceding 
years. As custodian of the colonial archives, De Haan did not have a high 
opinion of the Company directors’ knowledge of the country and its people 
towards the end of the eighteenth century. The battle for or against reform 
was fought without concrete facts or information on which the conflicting 
parties could agree or disagree.
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What was actually known about Java? Very little, according to the 
archivist himself (De Haan I, 1910: 442). The Commissioner may have had 
to submit an annual report after the middle of the eighteenth century, but 
there was no such memorandum left behind when he stepped down. Knowl-
edge gained on the job was hardly recorded and certainly did not go further 
than his own off ice. The curiosity of the VOC directors was limited to the 
Company’s trade results (De Haan I, 1910: 423). With the disappearance of 
the VOC, an early-colonial state emerged in the early years of the nineteenth 
century. What form did this take and what arrangements were made for the 
Priangan Regencies? After all, this remained the f irst and most prof itable 
region for producing coffee for export to the metropolis. The experience 
gained in the Priangan was taken into account when drafting plans for the 
future and new policies were often f irst tried out here in practice.
A conservative reformer
The transition at home from the Batavian Republic to the newly founded 
Kingdom of Holland under French tutelage also meant a changing of the 
guard in the East Indies. A strong character was needed who could bring 
order to the chaotic colonial affairs and who possessed the military qualities 
to withstand the growing threat to Java from the English enemy. Herman 
Willem Daendels was the perfect man for the job. He was already Field 
Marshall of Holland when he was appointed Governor-General. On arriving 
in the colony in early 1808, he had a reputation as a domineering personality, 
which would be confirmed by the way in which he fulf illed his tasks in 
the three years that followed. His orders had been to prevent the British 
from taking over Java and, no less important, to bring order and structure 
to the management of the country’s Asian possessions without causing 
too much disruption. He was given explicit instructions not to introduce 
radical reforms (De Haan IV, 1912: 772-4). His f irst concern was to secure 
the incomes that were indispensable to Holland’s f inancial solvability, and 
there was no doubt about how they were to be obtained. Shortly after his 
arrival, he announced what would take priority in his policy: the cultivation 
of coffee (Daendels 1814).
The instruction announcing this intention to continue on the same 
course was known as the Priangan Ruling. It applied primarily to the 
region where coffee cultivation had f irst been made compulsory and had 
acquired the character of a tax in the form of labour. In Daendels’ opinion, 
Pieter Engelhard had greatly improved the payments owed to the peasant 
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producers for the coffee they supplied. Strict instructions were now in-
tended to put a stop to practices allowing the long chain of European and 
native intermediaries to appropriate much more or, conversely, be paid 
much less than was merited by the services they provided. To achieve this, 
he proposed a differentiated scale of payment according to rank, based on 
a standard pikul, the unit of payment. One aim of the reform was to release 
the Priangan regents from their debts to the Commissioner or the coffee 
sergeants, which they attempted to pay off by extorting money from the 
peasants, who were therefore held in a state of subordination. In exchange 
for cancelling the enormous debts of the regents, they had to promise to 
give up their spendthrift behaviour. The new system also meant that the 
native chiefs would no longer be entitled to the homage and annual gifts 
they were accustomed to receiving and would give up their right to demand 
unlimited corvee services from their clientele for their own requirements. 
According to the same principle, the government could only requisition 
labour, for example for the transport of goods and persons, if it paid for the 
work done. The cautious attempt was to redesign the colonial apparatus 
along modern bureaucratic lines. It was no more than a f irst step, as the 
salaries of the off icials remained linked to the collection of the colonial 
surplus. Furthermore, day-to-day practice remained far removed from this 
administrative guideline. The reforms meant no change in the modality of 
forced coffee cultivation, for example by introducing free labour or consider-
ing a transition to the free market, but represented more an attempt to 
clean up its corruptive features. Daendels solemnly promised to exempt 
the population from all other obligations than the cultivation of coffee. 
Essentially, this perpetuated the situation that he had encountered in the 
Priangan Regencies on his appointment. He made the pledge in the resolute 
expectation that it would result in an enormous boost in production.
To realize his optimistic planning, Daendels considered it advisable to 
introduce coffee cultivation in other parts of Java, and on the same basis 
as that he had ordered in the Priangan Regencies. The harvest, which had 
been 120,000 pikul the year before Daendels arrived, would – according 
to his calculations – rise to 180,000 pikul in the short term, and to no less 
than 300,000 pikul in the somewhat longer term. It was not until quite some 
time after the Priangan Ruling was announced that Daendels specif ied the 
tax that he would impose on the people of the main region of production: 
maintaining 1,000 fruit-bearing trees per household, twice as many as 
elsewhere on Java.
There were almost no exemptions from this labour tax (De Haan I 1910: 
450-1). His long-serving advisers contradicted their superior’s belief that lack 
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of administrative will and carelessness had prevented a rapid expansion 
of coffee cultivation outside the Priangan Regencies. According to them, 
it would not have succeeded there without resorting to naked coercion. In 
1810, Lawick once again made it clear that none of those involved in coffee 
cultivation, from the regent down to the most lowly cultivator, would have 
chosen to do freely what had been imposed on them as an obligation. This 
piece of information was not new; in his last annual report as Commissioner 
in 1800, Nicolaus Engelhard had stated that ‘the Javanese, with very few 
exceptions, plant coffee unwillingly and have to be driven to work at it with 
the use of violence’ (De Haan III, 1912: 628). Daendels did not appreciate 
or accept these assessments from his subordinates. He claimed that the 
Javanese peasants had never owned the land they tilled and had always had 
to pay tribute to their chiefs. In his view, the system of coffee cultivation was 
simply a continuation of a form of tribute through labour that the peasants 
had traditionally paid to their monarch, who was also the owner of the land 
(Daendels 1814: 104). Lawick was one of those who did not shy away from 
disagreeing with Daendels. In a memorandum he reported that the paddy 
f ields in his jurisdiction, the Cirebon Priangan lands, were privately owned. 
Daendels put forward other arguments to justify his policy. The Governor-
General admitted that the lot of the common man was pitiful and needed 
to be improved but blamed this on the extortion of the indigenous chiefs, 
having nothing to do with the system of forced cultivation and delivery. 
He alleged that it was little effort for the Priangan peasants to do what 
was required of them. Moreover, their anything but heavy burden was 
richly rewarded with a wage equal to eight stuivers a day. Daendels made 
no secret of the fact that, since he had appeared on the colonial scene, the 
poverty-stricken lives of the local people had much improved. This was a 
conceit that not only later critics, but also many of his contemporaries, were 
not inclined to accept. There was no basis for Daendels’ statement that, 
under his regime, the coffee growers were paid the off icial rate, which was, 
moreover, f ixed at an extremely low level. The man who actually created 
the Priangan system undeniably succeeded in increasing coffee production 
but, as before, coercion was the lever used to achieve it.
Strengthening the government apparatus
When he left the Netherlands, Daendels was given strict orders not to 
introduce any reforms. That would have to wait until peace had re-
turned to the European continent now in a state of turmoil. The new 
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Governor-General adhered to his mandate to mind the colonial shop until 
better times arrived and not to make any radical changes. His tenure was 
characterized by tightening up the regime as it existed. Nevertheless, 
the avalanche of instructions he issued did lay out the contours of a new 
system that brought to an end a long period of makeshift arrangements, 
indecisive muddling through and a general lack of direction. The process 
of standardization entailed restructuring the Priangan Regencies. Al-
though he further bifurcated the ties between the lands around Batavia 
and the highlands, Daendels chose to retain those between the highlands 
and the coastal plain more to the east. This administrative division in 
turn came to an end with the abolition of the sultanate of Cirebon, the 
demotion of the royal family in rank, and the reduction of this old prin-
cipality in size to little more than the coastal belt. The border changes 
were not restricted to the re-demarcation of regencies but, strikingly, 
also extended to designating districts as well-bounded territorial units. 
The introduction of new powers for the police and the judiciary resulted 
in both a widening and deepening of the power of the colonial state. 
These changes signif ied the end of the much less structured and more 
f luid rule practised under the old regime. After the reorganization, each 
regency formed a geographical entity and the enclaves of the native chiefs 
in each other’s domains disappeared. But this process of administrative 
streamlining went even further and led to the random abolition and 
merging of old administrative landscapes – not once, but repeatedly (De 
Haan IV 1912: 870). The nonchalance with which this policy was put into 
practice was accompanied by a government apparatus that remained at 
a distance and operated through the mediation of the native aristocracy. 
The Governor-General’s order to produce maps, keep statistical records 
and gather information on the economy was intended to furnish the 
government with more and better knowledge of the land it was govern-
ing. The colonial hierarchy was reformed by def ining administrative 
competences and by better coordinating the tasks of European off icials, 
placing them within a streamlined top-down structure. The instruction 
to submit accurate reports on the implementation of assignments served 
to build up an institutional memory that would improve the quality of 
governance and policy. When Daendels asked in 1809 about the size of 
each Priangan regency and district, he was told that this was impossible 
to determine because there were no accurate maps of these lands. A 
year later, his staff informed him that the population of these areas was 
much larger than the regents, fearing an increase in taxation, were ac-
customed to claiming. The need for more knowledge about the land and 
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its people grew as the government’s involvement in indigenous society 
deepened. Gathering this information was not only an end in itself, a 
condition for more effective government, but was primarily inspired by 
the desire to increase colonial prof its. The embedding of the early-colonial 
state apparatus in indigenous society left much to be desired. Towards 
the end of the eighteenth century, for example, an order came from the 
headquarters in Amsterdam to increase coffee production to 100,000 
pikul, but the preconditions for achieving this were not in place. There 
was no capacity to store experience that had been gained or to make use 
of what had happened or been decided before. A good example is how 
the coffee manual designed by Rolff was simply lost in the badly kept 
records. When Pieter Engelhard tried to f ind the document in 1806, he 
did not come across a single copy in the archives. The revised version he 
drafted did not last long either as, in 1808, Lawick felt compelled to issue 
an instruction that was a compilation of the two previous documents. 
Nor was this the last time; in 1819, after searching in vain for the manual 
on coffee cultivation, the Inspector of Finances again had to draw up a 
new set of guidelines, which in their turn soon disappeared from sight 
(De Haan II, 1911: 633-5).
The reinforcement of the government apparatus was accompanied 
by a new system of appointing, promoting and paying European staff. 
The introduction of f ixed salaries was intended to impose restrictions 
on all kinds of fringe benef its, such as gifts in exchange for favours. The 
hierarchy of off icial ranks meant that the system lost the mercantile 
character that harked back to the VOC period and increasingly took on the 
characteristics of a proper government bureaucracy. The administrative 
reforms were of course not unrelated to the advent of the Napoleonic 
state in Europe. Much more radical than the change in the position of 
this rather thin upper crust of expatriate administrators was the incor-
poration of the regents in the colonial bureaucracy. From now on, these 
indigenous chiefs would enter the service of the Dutch state when they 
were appointed and were no longer their own bosses but subordinate to 
the prefect. The latter would nominate them – and the patih who acted as 
their substitutes – for appointment or dismissal to the Governor-General. 
The prefect himself would decide on the continued services or not of 
lower chiefs. This new step towards establishing a hierarchy of authority 
restricted the free room for manoeuvre that the Javanese nobility had 
enjoyed and should be seen in the light of persistent complaints in the 
preceding years about the large numbers of lower chiefs, the retinue of 
hangers-on with which the regents surrounded themselves. As before, the 
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indigenous authorities were obliged to collect taxes from the peasants 
in the form of products and labour services. For this mediation, they did 
not receive a f ixed salary, like their European counterparts, but a modest 
share of the tribute. By strictly regulating the distribution of the costs of 
mediation, Daendels endeavoured to bring to an end the discretionary 
powers of the aristocracy to redistribute part of the emoluments among 
their subordinates as they saw f it. A provision from 1808 prescribed 
that, for every rijksdaalder that the regent was paid for a pikul of coffee, 
twelve stuivers were to be paid to the lower chiefs. These chiefs and the 
remuneration they were entitled to were specif ied in minute detail (De 
Klein 1931: 50). It was a cash reward for their involvement in the cultivation 
of coffee and possibly other export crops. The regents and, through them, 
the lower chiefs received even more in kind, in the form of a share of the 
paddy harvest. These indigenous off icials were treated as subordinates, 
as nothing more than the executors of the orders issued to them by their 
white bosses. The loss of the less constricted power they had enjoyed until 
then also led to the disappearance of the respect they were entitled to in 
the past. Daendels himself set the tone for this new form of governance. 
The harsh and crass way he treated even the most high-ranking chiefs 
meant that his name became a legend in the Priangan lands (De Haan I, 
1910: 469). The undisguised contempt with which the colonial off icials 
treated the indigenous aristocracy was bolstered by their suspicion that 
this intermediate administrative layer was guilty of extorting their people. 
At the same time, Daendels was fully aware that, without the voluntary 
cooperation of the regents, his attempt to increase colonial revenues was 
doomed to failure.
Perhaps it was with this in mind that Daendels decided to increase 
the share of the paddy harvest that the peasants had to relinquish to 
the regent and his entourage. The cuke was traditionally no more than 
a twentieth part of the harvest. At the end of a tour of the Priangan 
region in 1809, which took him from Batavia via Cianjur, Bandung and 
Sumedang to Cirebon, Daendels offered to double the share of the harvest 
destined for the chiefs. On top of this came the zakat, the share that went 
to the clergy, which was also set at a tenth part. This brought the total 
share that the peasants had to surrender to no less than a f ifth, much 
more than what they previously had to give up. Unfamiliarity with or 
confusion about prevailing customs most probably had little to do with 
the granting of this generous remuneration to the landed gentry, at the 
expense of the peasant population. After all, the tenth part of the harvest 
that the chiefs were formerly entitled to explicitly included the share of 
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the clergy. An important consideration for Daendels in attributing the 
regents a higher share in the paddy production was the state of debt in 
which they continued to f ind themselves, also after the bankruptcy of the 
VOC. Their continued cooperation in the cultivation of crops for export 
could only be assured by rewarding them more generously and in a way 
that did not cost the colonial state a cent. There was no money to give 
the native chiefs a f ixed salary and the discovery that they had to incur 
a wide variety of previously unknown costs for the coffee cultivation 
contributed to this material generosity towards them. Daendels did not 
consider it a problem that the peasant population had to bear the costs of 
this greater generosity by surrendering a much higher share of their food 
production than before. Increasing the local chiefs’ share of the peasants’ 
food production gave new impetus to the restructuring of society along 
hierarchical lines under early-colonial rule in the early nineteenth century. 
In sparsely populated regions, however, where much of the land had not 
yet been cultivated, the gentry was more reserved in collecting the share 
of the harvest to which they were entitled. High-ranking off icials were 
sensitive to this accommodating attitude and proved equally willing to 
be f lexible in imposing obligations on the chiefs. This changed, however, 
once the colonial bureaucracy began to acquire a better understanding 
of peasant society on the ground. The landed gentry proved to have a lot 
more people at their disposal than had previously been assumed, meaning 
that a large part of the potential surplus labour remained underutilized. 
In this light, it is not surprising that, parallel to the restructuring of social 
relations along strict hierarchical lines, there was also progressive trend 
towards structuring the administration on a territorial basis.
Knowledge of the landscape in which the colonial government operated 
was still superf icial and the chiefs were instructed to meet the urgent need 
for more information (Daendels, 20 September 1808, Bijlagen Organique 
Stukken 1814). The administrative instruction introduced by the Governor-
General signif ied a break with the inadequate, incomplete and slapdash 
way in which acquired knowledge had previously been handled. On the 
other hand, however, his reform can be seen as a logical continuation and 
streamlining of the policy that the VOC had initiated much earlier. Atten-
tion to indigenous social life, if it existed at all, was also based solely on 
utilitarian considerations. To solve the scarcity of labour, Daendels issued 
orders to discourage people from roaming from place to place without a 
permanent address and to encourage marriage as a way of stimulating the 
persistently low population growth. In an instruction issued in 1808, he 
imposed this responsibility on the regents.
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One of the main concerns of the regents should be to ensure that the 
common inlander does not remained unmarried and to encourage all 
marriageable young men and women to enter the state of matrimony, 
so as to prevent aimless drifting around and many other undesirable 
tendencies, and to ensure that the population grows in a regulated man-
ner. (Van Deventer I, 1865: 32 footnote)
A f inal new development was recognition of the role of the clergy in impos-
ing agrarian discipline on the population. The village priests supervised the 
preparation of the f ields for cultivation and told the peasants when they 
should perform the various operations and kept a calendar of rotation for 
this purpose. In addition to their religious duties, such as leading prayers, 
reading from the Koran, attending family celebrations and sacrif icial feasts, 
and performing rituals on holy days, they kept records of births, marriages 
and deaths in the peasant communities to which they were attached. Besides 
collecting the religious taxes, the clergy also helped to collect the cuke, the 
share of the harvest destined for the chiefs. This task was a form of recogni-
tion of their involvement in civil governance. Cianjur in particular was a 
bulwark of piety, and the ruling nobility made a signif icant contribution 
to this reputation. In the early-colonial period, the Priangan experienced 
a process of Islamization, which received remarkably little attention in the 
annals of the VOC. It was no coincidence that the new religion spread par-
ticularly quickly in the region that owed allegiance to Cirebon. In 1778, the 
regents of Cianjur and Bogor submitted a request for permission to each send 
a priest to Mecca and in 1802 five radèns from Cianjur likewise expressed the 
same wish. Completing this pilgrimage was incidentally not recommended 
for those wishing to be eligible as regents. Fear of unrest provoked Daendels 
in 1810 to order that Mohammedan priests were permitted to travel only if 
equipped with a pass and, a year later, the English authorities distributed a 
circular warning that the Saids ‘or native priests’ were f irebrands (De Haan 
IV, 1912: 747). The large groups of village priests, especially those in Cianjur, 
were referred to as ‘parasitic plants’ and the Governor ordered in 1809 that 
the excessive numbers of priests in Sukapura should be reduced and their 
exemption from coffee cultivation rescinded.
Social restructuring
Western authority gradually moved closer to the workf loor of the co-
lonial enterprise, or at least attempted to do so. One indication of this 
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trend is an instruction issued by Daendels in 1809 to combat the widely 
dispersed pattern of settlements in the Cirebon Priangan lands. The 
instruction ordered the population from then on to live in villages of 
a specif ic minimum size. Small hamlets with less than six households 
were not recognized and had to merge with larger settlements. The same 
instruction also specif ied who was in charge at this local level. Larger 
settlements with more than ten households were given permission to 
have two headmen, while those with six to ten had only one (Organique 
Stukken Cheribon, no. 4, art. 14 and no. 7, art. 27, Daendels 1814). A next 
step, taken some ten years later, was to order the village council to write 
reports on the demeanour of the villagers. A regulation for the police 
administration in 1819 instructed village headmen to keep records of the 
number, gender, age and occupation of all their inhabitants. These records 
were passed up through the district chiefs to the regents, who sent them 
on to the Resident. The need for this kind of ‘intelligence’ was driven by 
the ambition to step up colonial surveillance, but the orders to submit 
accurate reports came up against a lack of both willingness and ability 
to pass on this information.
Under the Field Marshall, the compulsory cultivation of coffee expanded 
strongly. The number of trees on Java grew by more than 45 million, from 
26,956,467 in 1808 to 72,669,860 three years later. The pretension of keep-
ing a very accurate count – down to the very last tree – was typical of the 
colonial administration’s facade in the f irst half of the nineteenth century. 
Besides the Priangan Regencies, coffee was grown in a large number of 
new areas in Central and Eastern Java. In 1808, as a consequence of the 
expansion of the area of land planted with this crop, Daendels appointed 
an Inspector-General for Coffee Cultivation, C. von Winckelmann, who 
was given the tasks that the Commissioner of Indigenous Affairs had 
until then performed, but solely for the Priangan Regencies. Daendels 
dismissed the last Commissioner on the spot, who had the impudence to 
blame his boss for causing such unrest among the people during his last 
tour of the Sunda highlands in 1808 that it was sure to have a detrimental 
effect on the imminent coffee harvest. The Marshall would bully his close 
associates as easily as he did the indigenous chiefs. With almost two 
thirds of all the coffee trees on Java, the Priangan remained the prime 
money-spinner, as Table 3.1 shows. This region, where coffee growing 
had long been concentrated, experienced the greatest expansion in the 
f irst decade of the nineteenth century, from 7.5 million trees in 1801-02 
to almost 42 million in 1810-11.
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Table 3.1  Number of trees planted from 1806/7 to 1810/11 and of planters in 
1810/11 in the Jakarta and Priangan Regencies9
Regency 1806-7 1807-8 1808-9 1809-10 1810-11 h/holds
bogor 336,370 274,100 262,505 447,000 463,000 2283
Cianjur 1,444,106 821,603 1,401,644 918,715 1,169,570 5813
bandung 1,357,525 811,540 665,500 1,620,200 1,042,730 4060
Par.muncang 560,700 479,860 1,040,570 1,186,800 678,621 3271
sumedang 362,760 189,300 538,550 918,130 702,500 2998
krawang 359,398 145,915 151,958 160,490 119,100 636
Limbangan 96,000 110,000 314,400 346,210 … 1918
sukapura 304,800 110,000 1,255,200 686,300 36,800 2656
Galuh 67,400 54,700 1,370,000 1,351,500 522,100 1705
total 4,889,059 2,898,018 7,000,327 7,635,345 4,735,421 25,340
The stricter regime that Daendels introduced is illustrated in the Priangan 
Ruling for the cultivation and delivery of coffee, which he announced in 
1808. Among the new provisions was the ordinance that, with the exception 
of chiefs and those unf it to work, no one was exempt from compulsory 
cultivation. This included the elderly, widows and village priests, who had 
formerly been exempt. Children counted from below the age of 14, but before 
then had to work along with their parents. Three years later, the Governor-
General stipulated what the labour tribute was to be for the people of the 
Priangan: besides maintaining 1,000 trees a year, they had to plant 200 new 
saplings to compensate for older trees dying off. The lifetime of a reasonably 
fertile tree was set at f ive years, so that a f ifth part of the total number of 
trees had be replenished each year to consolidate productive capacity. This 
was the same requirement as before but, because of the intention to make 
the government’s claim more effective, compliance would be monitored 
more strictly. Keeping records of those liable to pay the taxes – the ‘coffee 
books’ that the work bosses had to keep and submit – played an important 
role here in achieving this aim. To discourage people from deserting if the 
pressure became too great, coffee cultivation was also introduced in areas 
that were ill-suited to it because of low soil fertility or inaccessibility (De 
Haan III, 1912: 626). The increase in the harvest in 1810 to around 120,000 
pikul shows that these stricter rules had the desired effect, and that the 
9 Figures submitted by Inspector-General for Coffee Cultivation C. von Winckelmann 
in 1811 and annexed to Organique Stukken der Koff ij-Cultuur, in: H.W. Daendels – Staat der 
Nederlandsche Oostindische Bezittingen. The Hague 1814.
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efforts in previous years had been successful, with the planting of new trees 
driven up to record levels. Daendels was clearly pleased with the results, 
but realized that the population had reached its limit and nothing more 
could be demanded of them (De Haan I, 1910: 142).
The fanaticism with which coffee cultivation was driven forward in the 
Priangan Regencies is shown by f igures provided by Daendels himself. 
The 25,340 households that, according to his calculations, were involved 
in coffee production in these regions in 1810-11 were responsible for an 
average of 1,653 coffee trees each. A report from 1812 claims that these 
f igures are even higher in most districts: ‘Each family has the charge of 
1,000 fruit-bearing trees, and in most districts two or three times as many’ 
(De Haan IV, 1912: 785). As observed above, Daendels had no objections at 
all to preserving forced cultivation, though he recognized the right of the 
growers to a reasonable payment for their efforts. The abuses surrounding 
the payment of the coffee money, he declared in no uncertain terms, must 
come to an end. The Governor-General did not, however, include among 
the extortionate practices he tried to deter the extremely low payments 
with which the peasants were palmed off. The price they were paid, four 
rijksdaalders per pikul, had been at the same level for many decades. In his 
own words, this payment was not to be seen as a realistic wage but more 
as a kind of ‘collection allowance’ since, according to his reasoning, by 
delivering coffee, the growers were rendering the tribute they owed to the 
state. What they received was in any case a fraction of the price that was 
paid for the coffee when it arrived in Batavia. The peasants were ultimately 
fobbed off with so little that, in some areas, they did not even make the 
effort to deliver the beans to the warehouse.
For Daendels, extortion referred only to the deductions the chiefs ap-
propriated for themselves before paying the growers. This meant that, while 
he tried to combat minor irregularities and other abuses by standardizing 
the weight of the pikul in which the coffee was measured on delivery, en-
couraging the building of more warehouses to lighten the load of the heavy 
transport, banning the practice of charging peasants for overhead costs, and 
ordering that coffee money be paid directly to the growers on delivery, the 
greatest injustice simply continued to exist. The regents received a separate 
commission of one rijksdaalder per pikul of 128 pounds weight, much lower 
than the 225 pounds on the basis of which the peasants were paid. Around a 
quarter of this commission was to be passed on to the lesser chiefs. The debt 
the regents owed to the government was cancelled, but they were told that 
they could no longer ask for or receive credit. It is doubtful whether these 
instructions were actually put into practice. Most of them got no further 
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than the drawing board. Tampering with the weights continued. If the 
growers delivered their coffee to small depots closer to their habitat, they 
were paid much less than they were entitled to for transporting the beans 
to the main but far-off warehouses. According to a report from 1811, they 
received around half of what they had a right to (De Haan 1910: 457). Nor was 
there any change in the standard practice of paying the regents an advance 
and deduct this when their accounts were settled each year. Daendels saw 
himself as a reformer who was very concerned about the welfare of the 
population. One of his early instructions was remarkable, giving very precise 
guidelines for how to till the paddy f ields in Cirebon. The landowners had 
to keep a store of seed of exactly the right quality in suff icient quantities, 
comply with a planting schedule to minimize the risk of a failed harvest, 
leave no f ields untilled, inform the lower chiefs of the time of the harvest to 
ensure that they received the f ifth share, etc., etc. Ensuring strict compli-
ance with these orders also entailed expanding the network of irrigation 
canals to allow paddy to be grown in inundated f ields. When regulating the 
cultivation of compulsory crops, Daendels assumed that growing coffee did 
not require a great effort from the population. He calculated that it would 
mean no more than two months’ work a year per household (cacah kopi), 
a tally that included picking, drying and transporting the beans to the 
warehouse. In exchange, with an average production of two to three pikul, 
the peasants were supposed to be paid eight to twelve rijksdaalders. This 
converted to a daily wage of eight stuivers, according to Daendels the highest 
rate paid on Java.10 In other words, rather than complain about coercion and 
underpayment, the peasants should have had good reason to be content.
Stepping up corvee services
The Governor-General also prided himself on having considerably reduced 
the extent of corvee services. He may not have gone as far as Van Hogen-
dorp, who had argued in favour of completely abolishing these unpaid 
labour services, but did want to restrict them to maintenance of roads 
and bridges and the transport of persons and goods on the orders of the 
government. Laying new roads, digging canals, building government offices 
and other infrastructural works would from then on have to be paid for in 
the form of a daily wage or subcontracting. This regulation, too, remained 
10 This amount is apparently based on an average annual production of two to three pikul of 
coffee per household.
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non-operational. Daendels wanted to open up Java to modern traff ic and he 
requisitioned the labour required to achieve that ambition. He explained 
the need for this in his memoir: ‘There were no paved roads, no checkpoints, 
no bungalows for overnight accommodation; even in the lands around 
Batavia, there were only a few roads that were suitable for wheeled vehicles’ 
(Daendels 1814: 17). Suitable, that was the keyword in the mass mobilization 
of unpaid labour. From this perspective, the roads already existed, so the 
working population could be requisitioned to improve them en masse and 
free of charge. Even the Grote Postweg, the main trunk road traversing the 
region, was largely laid ‘at no cost to the state’. Little came of the intention 
to hire coolies to build the more diff icult sections of the road and the work 
was done by rounding up villagers in Priangan, who not only received no 
payment but no food either. The use of forced labour for this project cost 
many thousands of lives, and a much larger number f led to avoid being 
conscripted. The regions through which the road passed were deserted for 
many miles on both sides and the heavy transport duties that accompanied 
the construction work led to failure of the rice harvest and a fall in coffee 
production (De Haan I, 1910: 491; IV: 97-904). The new long-distance road 
was primarily of military and strategic importance, enabling faster com-
munications between different parts of Java. The indigenous people were 
not allowed to use it to transport their coffee in buffalo carts. This meant 
that there were sometimes three roads running parallel, the worst of which 
was for indigenous traff ic. The custom of requisitioning unpaid labour 
continued not only for infrastructural works: in the regency of Bandung 
alone, 200 porters had to be permanently available to carry letters and 
accompany off icials. Horses and their drivers were also conscripted in 
large numbers for the same reasons. Daendels himself did not shy from 
emphasizing his supreme status by making almost unrestricted use of the 
services of the Priangan people in the palace that had been built for him in 
Bogor (De Haan I 1910: 493-4). Looking at the cultivation and corvee services 
required by the government as a whole, it would not be unreasonable to 
conclude that the pressure on the population much increased rather than 
decreased under Daendels’ regime.
The self-righteousness displayed by the Governor-General contrasted 
strongly with the dismal outcome of his policy. Despite his claims to the 
contrary, he failed to perform the task he was charged with when he was 
appointed Governor-General, namely ‘to improve and secure the lot of the 
common Inlander; to abolish all irregular and arbitrary taxes and other 
abuses’ (art. 29 in the instruction from the King of Holland). When all is 
said and done, the reforms introduced by the Field Marshall benefited the 
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colonial state and harmed the people. Although the reach of the govern-
ment came closer to the peasant order and the requirements for detailed 
reporting were gradually raised, insight into what actually happened at 
the foot of the economy remained very limited. A lack of factual data is, 
however, no excuse for the praise that Daendels bestowed on his own deeds. 
Contemporary critics made it clear that he should have known better. Ac-
cording to Johannes van den Bosch, who was to become the founding father 
of the cultivation system, forced coffee cultivation under Daendels took up 
not two but six months of a household’s annual working time. This much 
higher estimate also took no account of the peasants’ obligation to provide 
transport services and accompany travelling off icials (De Haan, I: 458). Van 
den Bosch’s calculations were undoubtedly driven by hostility towards the 
former Governor-General, who had forced him to leave Java in 1810. But, in 
the same year, Lawick – a loyal servant to the Governor-General – sent his 
superior a letter that left no room for misunderstanding about the hatred 
of the indigenous population, from high to low, for the coffee regime (De 
Haan IV, 1912: 811). In the absence of reasonable payment for their labour, 
the people of Priangan had such an aversion to growing this crop that brute 
force was the only way to ensure its continuation.
Were there no alternative options to derive the greatest possible prof it 
from the possessions in the East Indies? Very soon after the VOC had es-
tablished its authority over the hinterland, large estates had grown up in 
the area around Batavia, which grew food for the city as well as a variety of 
commercial crops, including sugarcane and, later, coffee for export. These 
private estates were often owned by Company off icials, who usually left the 
daily management to hired hands, caretakers who had left the Company, 
and contractors, who were usually Europeans, Chinese or locals of mixed 
race. These managers employed local peasants and migrants from elsewhere 
who had settled in the area. On some of the estates, these newcomers – who 
came from close by or further af ield – made up the main workforce. Over 
time, the number of estates increased, mainly on the coastal plain but also 
encroaching on the foothills of the Priangan highlands. They dominated 
the area known as the Bataviasche Ommelanden, the lands on the urban 
outskirts. Lacking suff icient public funds, Daendels was forced to sell off 
land, resulting in a new wave of expansion of these privately owned estates. 
The Governor-General did not lose sight of his own interests in this process. 
He had the Council of the Indies allocate him an extensive area of land in 
Bogor that had been owned by the government. This domain covered an 
area of no less than 236 square kilometres. After increasing the profitability 
of his acquisition, by raising the paddy tax and other levies, he sold part of 
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it back to the government, including the land on which the palace he lived 
in stood, and another part in the form of private estates. These transactions 
were very lucrative for him, but irreparably sullied his reputation.
Daendels considered the promotion of private agro-industry an effective 
means of stimulating economic growth. Land was now sold not only on the 
northern coastal plain of West Java but also elsewhere on the island, ‘a large 
part of which can be transformed into plantations for sugar, cotton, indigo 
and other products in only a few years’ (Daendels 1814: 111). There was no 
interest in buying such government concessions from among the Javanese 
gentry. Daendels took this as proof of his belief that land ownership was 
an unknown and undesirable notion for the colonized people. He made it 
clear that no land was to be sold in the Priangan Regencies as this would 
have a harmful effect on the cultivation of coffee, which he was resolute to 
avoid at all costs. He was, however, prepared to allow Chinese interested in 
cultivating new land to do so. They would have to grow crops like tobacco, 
cotton, indigo and peanuts, which in his view the native population were 
not willing or able to grow. Daendels expected this form of agribusiness to 
contribute to increased prosperity in the Sunda lands. His experiment to set 
up Chinese kampungs, encouraging ‘this diligent but not very trustworthy 
race’ to live in settlements of their own so that they could be more easily 
kept under control, also ended in failure. The Governor-General’s intended 
policy seemed to be based on an agronomic division into two zones, with 
private estates on the coastal plain focusing on newer crops for export and 
the higher lands reserved mainly for the production of coffee under the 
direct supervision of the government. There was, however, insufficient time 
to promote this two-pronged policy out, both modalities of which assumed 
the sustained servitude of the peasantry.
The common denominator of all the measures introduced was that they 
should not negatively affect the coffee regime, and the profit that this crop 
generated for the state’s coffers remained the main priority in all deci-
sions taken. The regents and lesser chiefs, subject to the instructions of the 
colonial administration even more than in the Company period, continued 
to be indispensable as mediators in imposing the heavy burden on the 
population. The entire package of measures relating to coffee cultivation 
in western Java drawn up by the Governor-General would continue to exist 
from 1808 as the Priangan Ruling. The colonial exploitation of this region 
at the start of the nineteenth century differed substantially in a number of 
ways from the policy practised throughout the rest of the island. As before, 
the Priangan regime was determined by the government monopoly on 
coffee production and the forced planting, cultivation and harvesting of 
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this crop by the local population. The regents received no fixed allowance in 
money or kind for their managerial role, but a commission which depended 
on the volume produced. Daendels is rightly seen as the formal founder of 
the Priangan system (De Haan I, 1910: 496). He owed this reputation not 
to his introduction of a new system in these highlands in West Java but, as 
bef its a conservative reformer, to the fact that he streamlined a mode of 
production that had been established much earlier.
Sealing off the Priangan
The separate regime imposed to ensure that the metropolis continued to 
enjoy maximum prof it from its colonial assets was emphasized further 
by sealing off the Priangan Regencies from undesirable contacts with the 
outside world. The best way to preserve peace and order was to keep the 
inhabitants shut away in their settlements to the greatest extent possible. 
After all, they had no reason whatsoever to go elsewhere. Outsiders were 
permitted to travel through the Priangan lands only with a pass. European 
visitors were kept out with the argument that they disrupted the lives 
of the local population by demanding their unpaid services. In addition, 
View of Buitenzorg (Bogor) in the early 19th century
source: J. Crawfurd, vl. 1, 1820
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all other newcomers who did not belong in the region were considered 
suspect. On discovery, they were relentlessly expelled, even if they showed 
no evidence of bad intentions. There were various reasons for this vigilance. 
Firstly, the state of extreme unrest in the neighbouring Ommelanden, the 
twilight zone between Batavia and the foothills further inland. At the end 
of the eighteenth century, this buffer had a bad reputation as a refuge for 
thieves, robbers and murderers, who could commit their criminal deeds 
here beyond the reach of colonial authority. In the surroundings of Bogor 
there were regular bandit gangs active with upwards of 100 members. By 
keeping an eye on the traff ic to and from the highlands, the authorities 
wanted to ensure that the disorder on the coastal plain did not spill over 
into the coffee producing areas, where the people were known for their 
simplicity and natural tractability.
A second, less publicized reason for this sharp surveillance was to combat 
coffee smuggling. The government monopoly meant that the coffee brought 
a much higher price on arrival in Batavia than had been paid to the growers 
and their brokers in the hinterland, who could get a much better deal on 
the black market. By denying merchants and bulk buyers access to the 
Priangan Regencies, it was possible to shield the planters from these shady 
and undesirable transactions. The measures had some effect but not enough 
to put a stop to the illegal purchase and transport of coffee. However, the 
main beneficiaries of this illicit trade were the agents and brokers, both 
European and indigenous, whose job it was as coffee sergeants, warehouse 
masters, loaders or clerks to take care of the receipt and further transport 
of the products of forced cultivation from the hinterland to the coast. The 
Ommelanden, through which various routes passed, played an important 
role in these smuggling practices, which were never fully brought under 
control.
A third, and not the least important, motive was the often unspoken 
fear in the colonial administration that the local population would revolt 
against the repressive labour regime. Daendels himself was very aware 
of this danger, as can be seen from his response to resurgent restiveness 
in the area around Cirebon. This was only the most recent episode in a 
situation of continued turmoil in this region in the preceding years. The 
unrest f lared up again when, in 1808, Daendels announced at the end of 
a tour of the Priangan the ordinance that essentially doubled the paddy 
tax. Although the report submitted to him on this local uprising blamed 
it on the terrorization of the rural population by Chinese moneylenders 
and traders, his own later account makes it clear that there were more 
reasons for the unrest (Daendels 1814: 23-4). What did not fail to shock 
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the authorities was that the peasants destroyed their coffee trees and set 
warehouses on f ire. In 1806, a wandering band of robbers had murdered 
all the Chinese and a European inspector that they had encountered in the 
Cirebon highlands. The rebels rejected Lawick’s offer to negotiate. Nicolaus 
Engelhard was summoned from Northeast Java to restore order. He did that 
not by taking military action, but by making concessions to the leaders of 
the revolt (De Cirebonsche onlusten in 1807: 148-51). In addition to permitting 
the deposed sultan to return to Cirebon and expelling the hated Chinese 
from the villages, he also allowed planters higher up in the sparsely settled 
hinterland to deliver the coffee closer to their homes. A primary concern 
in subduing this local revolt was to prevent it from spreading to the heart 
of the Priangan. One inevitable outcome of the unrest was the immediate 
introduction of stricter instructions for the police (De Haan IV, 1912: 876). 
It was up to the people themselves to ensure public order.
To maintain peace and good order, the Inhabitants, of both the main 
Negorij and the respective Districts and Dessas, will be duty bound, in 
the District, Dessa or Campong to which they belong, both inside and 
outside, to keep a night watch, and to establish watch houses at appropri-
ate distances from each other; said watches to begin in the evenings at six 
o’clock or at sunset and to end at six o’clock in the morning or at sunrise; 
and to conduct, from hour to hour, a round of the Campongs, Dessas, and 
of the Lord’s roads (Daendels 1814, Organique Stukken, Cirebon, art. 10 of 
the Policie en het Werk der Wegen en Posterijen)
In this way, Java was transformed into a night-watch state in the most literal 
sense. The police regime introduced by Daendels would remain to the very 
end a typical feature of colonial domination in the archipelago.
The land rent system
The British takeover of the main Dutch domain in Asia brought a radical 
change of policy. Lieutenant-General Raffles, appointed by the East India 
Company as commander of Java and its dependencies, started off cautiously. 
He immediately set up a commission of inquiry in 1812, all the members of 
which except the chairman were Dutch off icials who had transferred to his 
staff, to gather a wide range of information to prepare his intended reforms. 
The new order that had come to prevail abolished the government monopoly 
on trade in commodities and the compulsory deliveries (both of which were 
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aimed primarily at coffee production) and the corvee services, which were 
also founded on unpaid labour. This was replaced by a system in which 
peasants were free to use their land and labour as they chose. Based on the 
assumption that the state owned the land, in exchange for recognition of 
their right to till the land, the peasants had to relinquish part of their harvest 
by way of lease or rent. This system of land rent introduced by Raffles was 
similar to taxation systems enforced by the East India Company in its 
territories on the South Asian continent (in Bengal, but more specif ically 
so in Madras and Bombay). The new system also closely resembled the 
ideas announced by Van Hogendorp around the turn of the century, which 
were partly inspired by his earlier stay in the British colony as a trading 
agent for the VOC. During his f irst appointment to the Council for Asian 
Possessions, Herman Muntinghe had had the opportunity to witness close 
up the exchange between Nederburgh and Van Hogendorp on the course of 
colonial policy. At that time, he felt the greatest aff inity with the opinions 
of the former and his appointment as Daendels’ secretary undoubtedly 
gave him the opportunity to express his opinions openly. As a member of 
Raffles’ commission of inquiry, however, he again focused his attention on 
the ideas propagated earlier by Van Hogendorp regarding the introduction 
of a land tax. That line of thought displayed many parallels to the system 
envisaged by the English governor. Raffles showed exceptional interest in 
Van Hogendorp’s ideas and even gave the order for the treatise in which the 
latter had outlined his proposals in 1799 to be translated.
The memorandum that Raffles published in 1814, Substance of a Minute 
on the Introduction of an Improved System of Internal Management and 
the Establishment of a Land Rental on the Island of Java, had an annex by 
Muntinghe. The essence of the annex was closely related to what his new 
superior had outlined and proposed in the previous pages. He had nothing 
but praise for Raffles’ intention to do away with servitude and subordina-
tion. This entailed abolition of the compulsory cultivation of crops and of 
all feudal services that stood in the way of completely free agriculture and 
trade.11
Raffles expressed great appreciation for Muntinghe, who informed him 
of what liberal ideas had existed during the period of Dutch domination 
11 Raff les based his opinion partly on those of his Dutch advisers. Together with J. Knops, 
Lawick wrote a memorandum arguing in favour of freedom of production and trade: Memoran-
dum by J. Knops and Lawick on the possibilities of replacing the existing system of monopoly, 
compulsory deliveries and quotas on contemporary Java by one of free trade and free cultivation 
(NA, Van Alphen-Engelhard collection, 29 July 1812, 1916, 136.)
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(Wright 1952: 236). The new Muntinghe rejected the customary portrayal 
of the character of the Javanese, exaggerating their inherent indolent and 
workshy nature. He denied that the indigenous population, though less 
civilized than Europeans, only had limited needs and did not strive for 
greater prosperity. In his view, Javanese peasants were perfectly able to 
pay a regular tax. Raffles himself suggested that their lack of energy, in 
as far as it existed, was partly a result of the exhausting climate, but even 
more due to a government that imposed excessive demands. Who, he asked 
himself, would not become impoverished and lazy when deprived of all 
rights of ownership and every opportunity to improve? More interesting is 
the view that both held of the colonial enterprise. According to Muntinghe, 
the administration should try and improve the situation of the indigenous 
population. He followed this statement immediately, however, with the 
observation that this effort was and remained naturally subordinate to 
a higher interest, namely ‘that every Colony does or ought to exist for the 
benefit of the Mother-country’. In this respect, Raffles held a dissenting 
opinion. He made it clear that he gave priority, above all other concerns, 
to the welfare of the Javanese. Not only because this provided the best 
guarantee for increasing the colonial assets, but also as an aim in itself (1814: 
14-6). This worthy ideal explains why, in his later historical account, Raffles 
was so outspokenly critical of the coffee regime in the Priangan Regencies. 
His decision not to apply his memorandum of 1814 to the Sunda highlands, 
however, runs directly contrary to this resolute opinion.
The Priangan region therefore remained excluded from the radical 
changes that the English Governor introduced during the British interlude 
in the political economy of the colony, both in the nature of the taxation 
and how it was collected. In his new set-up, the regents and their entourages 
in lands outside the Priangan no longer acted as mediators responsible for 
collecting the tax that the peasants had to pay the government, which varied 
with the size and quality of the cultivated f ields. In these other parts of Java, 
the chiefs were relieved of their duties, allowed to keep their ranks and 
titles, and given a monetary reward to thank them for the services they had 
rendered. This was an important step in the de-feudalization of authority 
and the abolition of corvee services which was intended to contribute to 
this policy. There had been no lack of criticism of the regents and other 
members of the indigenous aristocracy during the Company period, but 
the establishment of a colonial state was accompanied by a more marked 
eclipse of this buffer layer between the government and the peasant order 
outside the Sundanese highlands. Rather than adding value to peasant 
production, they were now seen as living off it like parasites. The regents had 
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already shown their displeasure at their loss of autonomy under Daendels, 
who was only prepared to tolerate them in his own apparatus as executive 
and subordinate off icials. In the system envisaged by Raffles, there was 
no place for them at all. Indigenous history was rewritten with the landed 
gentry playing the role of marionettes, appointed and dismissed according 
to the whim of the sovereign.
It is established from every source of enquiry, that the Sovereign is Lord 
of the Soil; that lands are bestowed upon the several classes of chiefs and 
public off icers provisionally or during pleasure; and that, with the excep-
tion of particular instances, where land is alienated for religious purposes 
or to the descendants of the reigning Dynasty, the actual property of the 
land is vested in the Prince: in short, that between the Sovereign and the 
cultivator there exists no actual right, and that the several intermediate 
off icers, whether at the heads of districts, divisions, or towns, were nomi-
nated by the chief authority, removable at his pleasure, and possessing 
so little right of inheritance, that the descendants of men in high off ice 
were, in a few generations, found in poverty among the lower class of 
society. (Raffles 1814: 6)
Raff les believed that the Dutch regime had wrongly failed to maintain 
direct supervision of and contact with the peasant population, but his Dutch 
advisers warned him against acting too hastily and rigorously in sidelining 
the indigenous elite. Muntinghe informed his superior that, in revenge for 
the damage caused to their authority and prestige, the local chiefs might 
turn their discontent into actual rebellion. The fact that the regents still 
retained their policing responsibilities is an indication that the attempt to 
neutralize them was not very successful. More important was that, faced 
with a lack of f inancial resources, Raffles had to compensate chiefs who 
had lost their power by allocating them land that they could lease out to 
peasants. The inevitable consequence of this measure was the continuation 
of the customary cultivation and corvee services that the peasants had to 
perform for their lords. Nevertheless, the new system formally confirmed 
the exceptional position that the Sunda highlands had already held for 
many years.
On his arrival on Java, Raffles found the warehouses full to the brim 
with coffee. Sales had stagnated as a consequence of the blockade set up 
during the Napoleonic wars in continental Europe. The commodity that 
was intended to generate the lion’s share of colonial prof its had become as 
good as unmarketable and Raffles ordered the warehouse masters not to 
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accept any new deliveries. It remained possible to export small quantities 
to other markets, in America and elsewhere, and in ships sailing under 
the flag of one of the few countries that had succeeded in staying out of 
the conflict on the European continent. But the sharp fall in price this 
caused meant that Raffles lacked the income required to implement his 
radical reforms in any resolute way after taking power. The assurance of 
his confidant Thomas Macquoid, appointed as Inspector of the Cultivation 
of Coffee in the Priangan, that coffee cultivation in this region could be 
increased to any level he might wish, caused him to abolish the forced 
cultivation of this crop in all coastal areas to the east of Cirebon. Coffee, 
which had generated high profits for almost a century, had now become an 
uneconomic proposition for the colonial administration. The selling price 
had fallen below the f ixed price that the peasants were paid on paper for 
the forced delivery of coffee. Nevertheless, Raffles insisted that his most 
important reason for freeing the population from this burden was their 
mass reluctance to continue growing it.
Nearly the whole of the coffee gardens in the Eastern Districts were 
planted, during the administration of Marshal Daendels, by means of 
forced service; and in many instances, the gardens and even graves of the 
Javanese, were sacrif iced in the general arrangement. From the period of 
the conquest, the people have, with diff iculty, been forced to attend the 
plantations, and many of them had, long previous to their being given 
up by Government, run to decay: others from being in an improper soil, 
had failed altogether; and the measure of abolishing the establishment 
has perhaps, in point of time, superseded, but in a very trif ling degree, 
the natural consequence which must have ensued, had the establish-
ment been even continued on the former footing. (Raffles, Substance of 
a Minute 1814: 66-7)
In the Priangan Regencies, however, Raff les expressly maintained ‘the 
system of vassalage and forced deliveries’. Elsewhere, the British authorities 
had offered no resistance to cessation of the planting of new coffee saplings. 
According to some sources, they even gave the order to stop maintenance in 
some of the gardens or even to chop down trees. This was reputedly the case 
in Cirebon. It was largely due to the efforts of Macquoid that the cultivation 
of coffee continued in Cianjur, the old stronghold of production. Although 
not unnoticed, the decline was much less disastrous here than elsewhere 
on Java. To maintain production at the required level, Macquoid drew up 
a new instruction for planting and maintaining coffee trees. He expressed 
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the opinion that, if forced cultivation was abolished in other parts of Java, 
production in the Priangan could be increased to far more than the volume 
achieved thus far. Raffles appeared to share his optimism. In his view, in 
light of the soon to be expected resumption of coffee export, the government 
had to show its willingness to pay the planters a fair and agreed price for 
their deliveries (1814: 175). This prognosis raises the question why Raffles 
failed to abolish forced cultivation in the Priangan Regencies, as he had 
in other production areas on the island. The not very convincing answer 
he provided in his later history of Java was that the Sundanese people had 
become accustomed to their state of servitude over the course of time and 
only tried to escape from it if the demands of forced cultivation rose to an 
excessive height.
A government of colonial monopolists, eager only for profit, and heedless 
of the sources from which it was derived, sometimes subjected its native 
subjects to distresses and privations, the recital of which would shock 
the ear of humanity. Suff ice it to say, that the coffee culture in the Sunda 
districts has sometimes been so severely extracted, that together with the 
other constant and heavy demands made by the European authority on 
the labour of the country, they deprived the unfortunate peasants of the 
time necessary to rear food for their support. Many have thus perished 
by famine, while others have fled to the crags of the mountains, where 
raising a scant subsistence in patches of ga(n)ga, or oftener dependent 
for it upon the roots of the forest, they congratulated themselves on 
their escape from the reach of their oppressors. Many of these people, 
with their descendants, remain in these haunts to the present time: in 
their annual migration from hill to hill, they frequently pass over the 
richest lands, which still remain uncultivated and invite their return; but 
they prefer their wild independence and precarious subsistence, to the 
horrors of being again subjected to forced services and forced deliveries 
at inadequate rates. (Raffles I, 1830: 143-4)
The true reason was that Raffles could not do without the income from 
the forced cultivation to f inance the expenditures his superiors had 
permitted themselves on taking over power on Java. The introduction of 
the free market and the integration of the West Javanese highlands in the 
colony-wide system would have to wait for better times to arrive. Another 
consideration that contributed to the unique nature of the region was the 
ban on the free movement of goods and persons, which the government 
maintained. The Chinese, whose presence Daendels had wanted to allow 
128 MobiLizinG Labour for the GLobaL Coffee Market
in a controlled manner to stimulate economic activity, were under the 
English interim government as unwelcome as all other outsiders.12 The 
coffee regime remained almost exclusively restricted to the Priangan 
Regencies. This meant that the British Governor continued the policy that 
had secured this part of the island in an exceptional position. Daendels had 
consolidated and intensif ied this system, but its main characteristics – the 
forced cultivation and delivery of coffee by peasants under the supervision 
of their own chiefs rather than colonial off icials – were already visible in 
the early eighteenth century. This exception to the political economy that 
applied in the rest of Java became even more distinct with the introduction 
of the land rent system. By adhering stubbornly to how it had once begun, 
the Sunda highlands were designated as a major enclave within the larger 
colonial domain. To quote De Haan yet again: ‘almost every reform stalled 
at the Priangan border’ (I, 1910: 449).
12 ‘No Chinaman, Malay, or other native, not an inhabitant of the Regencies, shall be permitted 
to go off the great road leading from one head-negree to another, and in case any are found in 
the campongs, they shall be immediately apprehended and sent up to Buitenzorg. Chinamen, 
Malays and other natives, not inhabitants of the Regencies, found there without a pass, shall 
be instantly taken into custody.’ (De Haan IV, 1912: 876)
PLATES I
Plate I  Regional map of Priangan regencies in the early twentieth century
Source: F. de Haan – Priangan, vl. 1
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Plate II  Map from 1778 of the Priangan highlands under direct control of the VOC. 
The eastern regencies Sumedang and Surakarta were still claimed by the 
princely state of Cirebon on the north coast.
Source: NA
PLATES III
Plate III  Marriage procession in the Salak valley. Painting by A. Salm (1872). 
Colour lithograph by J.C. Greive Jr.
Source: KITLV Collection
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Plate IV  Moonlit landscape near Sumedang. Painting by A. Salm (1872). Colour 
lithograph by J.C. Greive Jr.
Source: KITLV Collection
PLATES V
Plate V  Posthumous portrait of H.W. Daendels by Saleh (1838). The Governor-
General is pointing on a map to the Great Trunk Road, near 
Megamemdung mountain in the Priangan regencies. The construction 
of this Jalan Pos led to the deaths of many thousands of forced corvee 
labourers. P. Engelhard noted that laying the section across this mountain 
alone cost the lives of 500 men recruited from a nearby regency.
Source: Rijksmuseum Amsterdam
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Plates VI and VII  Two drawings of the village on Java. The first shows the 
unregulated lay-out, as was commonly found, and the second 
the planned ‘barrack’ design. The blueprint of the model 
village was designed by Van Sevenhoven a few years after the 
introduction of the cultivation system.
PLATES VII
Source: NA
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Plate VIII  Portrait of O. van Rees as Governor-General (1884-88)
Source: KITLV Collection
IV Government regulated exploitation 
versus private agribusiness
Discovery of the village system
As legitimate successor to the kings on Java, Raffles decreed that the peas-
ants had to pay rent to the state for the land they tilled. The initial intention 
was to give responsibility for collecting the tax to the demang, bekel and 
loerah, the lowest level of indigenous chiefs who, as petty landlords, were 
closest to the agrarian population. They were in charge of collecting the 
tribute that had to be paid by the landowning households of each peasant 
locality in money or in kind. The Lieutenant-General changed his mind, 
however, when he received new information suggesting that the people in 
various parts of Java were certainly no strangers to the notion of agrarian 
property. The information came from off icials who had gained experience 
with the introduction of the ryotwari system in the Presidencies of Madras 
and Bombay in British India. Under this system of land rule, individual 
peasants were recognized as the primary targets of taxation. Some members 
of the inquiry committee sent out by Raffles to investigate the tribute levied 
from the peasantry had already established earlier that individual property 
was also known in West Java. In addition, they determined that only the 
inhabitants of a settlement were permitted to lay claim to the waste land 
around it (Bastin 1954: 57). The report on land rights that J. Knops submitted 
to Raffles noted that peasants who cultivated dry land to grow rice were 
considered the individual owners of the f ields.
The Javanese who clears such lands from the root of trees, brushwood, &c., 
and renders a wilderness f it for cultivation, considers himself as proprie-
tor of the same, and especially as owner of what it produces, on which 
no taxes are levied. These lands admit of cultivation every second year 
only, which, however, is no loss to the proprietor, whose [next] harvest 
is more abundant in consequence. (Raffles 1814: 131)
The rights of ownership also extended to the trees that the peasant planted 
and excluded all imposition of taxes. The Lieutenant-General concluded 
from these new f indings that peasants had at least the right to usage of 
the f ields they tilled. He could not permit himself to ignore the sovereign 
right of the government to the land, as the colonial administration and 
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its right to impose taxes were founded on this principle. Raffles assumed 
that he had discovered the traditional structure of Javanese rural society: a 
community of peasants with an advanced degree of control over their own 
agrarian resources, which had been best preserved in areas the furthest 
removed from the courts of the kings.
The feudal structure that had replaced this system in the more recent past 
under despotic Muslim rule had rendered the old community institutions 
obsolete. Raffles saw it as his duty to restore the primacy of community 
authority and to respect the rights of the people of Java to use the land 
as they saw f it. This led him to propose a new, more detailed regulation 
based on a head tax for all landowners and issuing them with deeds of 
ownership. Properly introducing the land rent system required not only a 
much more extensive apparatus than Raffles had at his disposal, but also 
the creation of a very detailed system of land tenure for the registration 
of property rights, a survey of land use and other data on the structure of 
peasant production. It was a task that far exceeded the existing capacity of 
the colonial administration. Raffles was aware of this problem and, as an 
interim solution, introduced a desa-based land rent. The demang, bekel and 
loerah were still the linchpins of this system. But, where they had previously 
been seen as landlords in their own right who, commissioned as agents of 
the government, were responsible for collecting the land rent, they were 
now attributed the role of local headmen, acting as intermediaries between 
the peasants and the colonial bureaucracy. Raffles himself underlined the 
importance of this reversal of authority (1814: 115). In the new interpreta-
tion, the village headmen were seen as the f irst among equals and peasant 
households were accustomed to choosing the best candidates from among 
their own ranks democratically through annual elections. Raffles issued 
orders for this ‘traditional custom’, which he saw as having been destroyed 
by the despotic rule of the kings, to be restored. By taking this step, he was 
undoubtedly motivated by the desire to break the concentration of power 
in the hands of a small supra-local gentry. The designation of the village 
head as the collector of taxes also suited the goal of keeping the costs of 
administration to a minimum. As a reward for their mediation, the village 
heads were exempted from paying land rent, were allocated off icial f ields 
from the village lands, and the right to lay claim to the labour services that 
peasants still had to provide.
In this way, the village head, assisted by other members of the village 
council, became the focal point of the land rent administration until regula-
tions could be introduced that were directed at the peasant households 
individually. The reforms initiated by Raffles gave a powerful boost to the 
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idea of an ‘original’ form of village autonomy, the restoration of which was 
a high priority for the colonial rulers. Yet this early source, from which the 
existence of a local community of peasants is derived, contains numer-
ous features that cast doubt on the alleged close-knit nature of this social 
formation. For example, it was common for peasant households belonging 
to the same lord to live at some considerable distance from each other. 
Another factor that sheds doubt on the institutional self-suff iciency of 
the settlements is their minuscule size. The 734 villages surveyed in the 
two regencies of Bandung and Cianjur during the British interlude had an 
average of 39 inhabitants (Bastin 1954: 81). The settlements on the northern 
coastal plain were a little larger but here, too, the number of huts was never 
more than a few dozen. Their small scale must have imposed limits on the 
autonomy and autarchy of these settlements.
In a number of respects and in a very short time, therefore, Raffles radi-
cally revised his original design. This rapid turnabout is illustrated by the 
fact that Crawfurd, the most senior member of his staff, claimed confidently 
in an early report ‘that there is not an acre of land in the country to which 
the shadow of hereditary right or title could be made’, while a year later, 
he opened a memorandum on the situation in Cirebon by declaring with 
equal aplomb ‘that the right of private property in the soil is generally 
acknowledged and tolerably well understood’. Raffles’ comment on this 
latter observation was that, in areas far removed from the courts of the 
despotic rulers, such as West Java, the old community institutions must 
have remained intact. This explanation is especially inaccurate regarding 
Cirebon, a centre of sultanate power where Islam gained a foothold at an 
early stage. These changing opinions on what the ‘original’ situation had 
been and where it had been preserved most purely displayed a lack of 
knowledge of both the present and the past. Moreover, the interpretation 
derived from these opinions was not based on any intrinsic interest in the 
country and its people but primarily in satisfying the immediate ambitions 
and interests of the colonial ruler. The promise to restore a vanished past 
was adjusted so as to be as much as possible in harmony with these ends 
(Breman 1979).
Raffles did make a greater effort than his predecessors to gather intel-
ligence that was relevant for policy. Daendels had made a start by ordering 
accurate maps to be drawn and by drafting a survey in 1809 for all districts 
on the basis of 21 questions that the inspectors of the coffee cultivation in 
the Priangan Regencies were made to answer f irst (Van ’t Veer 1963: 134). 
But, like many more of his directives, the quality of their implementation 
left much to be desired. That his English successor took a more systematic 
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approach became immediately clear when he appointed a heavy-duty com-
mittee of inquiry. The report the committee produced was not only more 
comprehensive than all earlier exercises of this kind, but also of a much 
higher quality. Nevertheless, this ‘statistical’ record also contained many 
flaws and spurious facts. In addition to the tendency, already referred to, 
to report f indings that supported pre-conceived administrative intentions, 
the members of the committee were also given far too little time to do their 
inventory work thoroughly. The great effort that it took them to travel meant 
that they hardly penetrated inland and, even on the coastal plain, only visited 
the most accessible places. It was rarely possible for them to spend more than 
one day in each regency, according to the committee chairman. Another 
problem was their lack of command of the language. With one exception, 
none of the committee members were able to talk directly with the people 
living in the area they were investigating. Translating the questions and 
answers from English into Dutch, Malay and, lastly, Javanese was extremely 
cumbersome. As the committee only had a limited number of writers and 
translators, and of dubious competence, a large amount of information must 
have been recorded incorrectly or lost. Furthermore, the submissiveness of 
the ordinary peasantry towards their superiors made it impossible to ask 
people to give their opinions frankly and freely. When the chairman of the 
committee complained to his Dutch fellow members that the West Javanese 
regents were so reluctant to give him information, they advised him not to 
attach too much value to what they had to say anyway (Bastin 1954: 125).
The closer the colonial government came to the peasant’s habitat, the 
greater was the need for more knowledge on its structure and modus 
operandi. Also interesting is the attempt to bring some kind of order into 
this multiplicity of widely varying facts by deploying insights derived 
from colonial rule over peasantries elsewhere in Asia. It was of course no 
coincidence that, under Raffles, reports on the native population in British 
India became an important source of inspiration in getting to grips with the 
social structure and culture on Java. Neither Daendels nor Raffles held their 
posts for longer than three years. But the reforms that they initiated laid the 
foundations for an early-colonial state that did not develop to the full until 
after they had departed again. The impact they left behind therefore by far 
outweighed the duration of their governance on Java. Raffles had to justify 
the costs of the occupation of the colony and to persuade his lukewarm 
superiors in Calcutta that the domain he had acquired could be extremely 
profitable. As already noted, this was one of the main reasons for him to 
exclude the Priangan Regencies from the new system of taxation. Rather 
than paying land rent, the people here had to continue delivering coffee 
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to the government, as before. The forced cultivation of this perennial crop 
also meant that the authority of the regents in the Sundanese highlands 
remained unaffected. The difference between this and the regulations that 
Raffles had introduced in the other parts of Java, a difference that had al-
ready started to emerge in the time of Daendels, exposed the separate place 
that the Priangan region occupied in the system of colonial exploitation.
The continuation of what was in effect the coffee regime of the VOC did 
not generate the great profits that Raffles needed. He himself attributed the 
disappointing results to the costs of production, including transport to the 
market, which were twice as high as the selling price had been in recent years. 
He added to this that the planters received an unreasonably low price for their 
labour (Raffles 1814: 67). It is a telling comment on the gigantic rise in price 
that took place from the moment of delivery to the government’s warehouses 
inland to the arrival of the coffee on the coast. This increase, we can conclude, 
disappeared almost exclusively into the pockets of a series of indigenous and 
European intermediaries. The fall in the selling price was a consequence of 
the British blockade of continental Europe for overseas products during the 
Napoleonic wars. The stagnating sales not only kept the prices down but 
also resulted in overfull warehouses. At f irst supply continued to rise as a 
consequence of the large-scale planting of trees in new production area on 
Daendels’ orders. The response to the overproduction was exactly the same as 
in the earliest history of coffee cultivation on Java: mass extirpation of trees 
which, in some areas, led to the complete destruction of the crop. Peasants 
who had to deliver their harvest without receiving any payment at all did this 
on their own initiative. Rather than taking action to combat this dereliction 
of duty, the government even offered its silent collaboration (Van der Kemp 
1916: 129). After production had fallen from 116,648 pikul in 1810 to 21,348 pikul 
in 1811 as a result of the stagnation in sales, this was compensated for a year 
later with a doubling of the much reduced volume. In the next two years, the 
recovery remained at this level, while in 1815, it rose to 60,186 pikul. That this 
improvement was considered likely to continue in the years after that can 
be concluded from Raffles’ decision in 1813 to plant more than two to three 
million new trees in Priangan. Still, it would take great efforts to restore the 
number of trees lost to their former level.
Land sale
There was another way of raising money for running expenses, namely 
auctioning off estates together with the peasants who lived and worked 
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on them. Before Raffles, Daendels had taken refuge in the same solution 
and had in this way made himself master of a large domain around Bogor 
(De Haan I, 1910: 475-6). Anyone examining these affairs more closely will 
quickly realize that, as well as the colony’s budgetary crisis, this speculative 
deal was also motivated by the self-interest of the Governor-General and 
a small circle of top-ranking off icials. Assisted by his personal physician, 
Andries de Wilde, Daendels had become the owner of extensive estates 
in the Priangan foothills. In Bogor, he had a palace built, which he used 
as his off icial residence. The part of his possessions that he did not need 
to demonstrate his seigneurial status, Daendels sold back to the govern-
ment for a much higher amount than he had paid for it. These fraudulent 
transactions made him a wealthy man. Raffles followed the example of his 
predecessor and entered into business relationships with De Wilde, who had 
served as a coffee inspector in Bandung under Macquoid, the Resident in the 
Priangan together with Macquoid himself and with former Commissioner 
Nicolaus Engelhard. These gentlemen became shareholders in the purchase 
of land in the Sukabumi region of West Priangan, which had hardly been 
opened up. Their plan was to set up large-scale agribusinesses to grow coffee 
and other commercial crops. This led to the opening up of an enormous 
privatized enclave in the Sunda highlands. Accused of abusing his off ice, 
Raffles hastily sold his share, mostly to De Wilde. But, unlike Daendels, he 
was punished for the malpractice of using his off icial position for his own 
enrichment. Raffles was suspended as Lieutenant-Governor and, shortly 
before the restoration of Dutch rule, was called back to the headquarters 
of the East India Company in Calcutta.
The solution that Raffles thought he had found to the country’s f inancial 
problems was therefore the same as that devised by Daendels, namely to sell 
off land to private men of business. The purchase price included use of the 
labour power of the peasants who lived on the land under the same terms 
that applied to government-controlled land. The urgent need for revenues 
to keep the colonial apparatus running was the direct reason for taking 
this step. An important contributing factor in the background, however, 
was an instruction that Lord Minto, Governor-General of the East India 
Company in South Asia, left behind for his subordinate after a short visit 
to Java immediately after the transfer of power. The instruction ordered 
Raff les to dismantle the feudal system and to replace it with a form of 
governance that was less oppressive and left more scope for private interest. 
Minto’s suggestion to radically change the basis of the political economy 
on Java was largely aimed at agrarian production for trade, and export in 
particular. The order from higher up was to exercise moderation at f irst in 
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introducing the new policy and not to be too hasty. Landed estates should 
not be sold off on a grand scale but leased, and then only for a limited 
period. Acute need of money most probably prompted Raffles not to pay 
too much heed to this prudent advice. As mentioned earlier, private estates 
were not unknown on Java, having arisen during the Company era. Most 
of them were on the coast, not too far from Batavia. In the course of time, 
however, they had spread to other parts of the island, although most of the 
newer estates were also to be found on in the coastal plain. Raffles’ orders 
were also focused on these areas already well-acquainted with agribusiness 
under non-indigenous management. Under his governance, however, more 
concessions were also granted in the higher parts inland.
When he issued his instruction to give more scope to private initiatives 
in the promotion of agribusiness, Minto noted that a lack of capital and 
capitalists would probably pose an obstacle to this policy (Bastin 1954: 16-7). 
One social category, however, had shown its ability to engage in the required 
capitalist behaviour: the Chinese minority that, as traders and moneylend-
ers, had a long-standing record of interaction with the peasant population. 
The most successful of them had worked their way up to be tax farmers for 
the king and the landed gentry, but not without acquiring a reputation for 
exploiting the common people. Among the Chinese were also those who 
had established themselves as the owners or managers of private estates. It 
was therefore not surprising that there was great interest from the Chinese 
in Raffles’ plans to increase production and expand the agrarian tax base 
by issuing land to private parties. After all, Minto himself had expressed 
his hope of internal capital accumulation. Yet Raffles was reticent about 
alienating land temporarily or permanently to the Chinese, largely due to 
what his Dutch advisers had told him about their pernicious practices. In his 
f inal memorandum of 1814, the Lieutenant-General compared the simplicity 
of the Javanese peasant to the chicanery of the Chinese tax farmers or toll 
collectors. The unrest in Cirebon, which f lared up at regular intervals, 
would most certainly have contributed to the unfavourable opinion of 
these non-native landowners. The people of the region had become so 
antagonistic to the presence of the Chinese that the latter were no longer 
permitted to lease land there, a ban that was imposed in other parts of the 
island for the same reasons. This meant that only Europeans were eligible 
for concessions to set up large-scale agribusinesses. It was Raffles’ Dutch 
off icials who urged him to promote the formation of a class of white settlers 
by issuing land on a large scale. In this context, it is important to note 
that the option of encouraging the emergence of an indigenous class of 
entrepreneurs was hardly considered, if at all. The Javanese elite had a 
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reputation for leading a parasitical existence and for showing no interest 
at all in actively practising agriculture, while the large mass of peasants 
were believed to possess neither the means nor the energy. The following 
passage from the report that Rothenbühler, as a member of the committee 
of inquiry, submitted to Raffles in 1812 illustrates the lack of confidence 
the majority of colonial policy-makers had in the economic disposition of 
the common cultivator.
I am convinced that if once the Javanese has land in his possession & is 
left to himself without any restriction, he will not work any more than 
is absolutely necessary for him & his family, whose wants are besides of 
very little consequence – a poor bamboo house covered with ... leaves, a 
handkerchief & some few cloths for him & his wife, & a small quantity of 
rice or Turkey-corn boiled in water, with some vegetables, & sometimes a 
small quantity of fish, this is all ... he wants. Lazy by nature, & effeminate by 
education, the Javanese seems only to exist to live in indolence, occupying 
himself ... by sleeping or sitting alongside a river, contemplating the current 
of the water, or if he is inclined, taking some fish for his dinner without ever 
feeling the desire to ameliorate his fate by work.(Bastin 1954: 65)
Notwithstanding the sale of land that Raffles was forced to resort to by 
pressure of circumstances, he pursued a statist policy that ran contrary to 
the transfer of either responsibilities or authority from the government to 
private entrepreneurs. He persisted in his refusal to change Java into an 
agrarian society in which the local population would be left at the mercy of 
white landowners to be used as a mere labour commodity. The colonization 
by Europeans continued under his rule, but went much less far than his 
advisers, who included many old hands of the former Dutch civil service, 
would have wished.
Raffles’ policy in favour of the peasantry did not change the fact that 
he belonged to a batch of colonial administrators who never lost sight of 
their own interests and even allowed their decisions to be determined by 
them. They were part of a power clique of high-ranking off icials who, since 
the VOC era, had been renowned for the shamelessness with which they 
in the f irst place f illed their own pockets. They were called to order by the 
highest authority only if they exceeded the very porous margins of what 
was considered acceptable degrees of fraud and corruption. This fate befell 
Pieter Engelhard, for example, who was relieved of his post as Commissioner 
of Indigenous Affairs in the early nineteenth century. Earlier accusations 
of extortion played a role in his ultimate dismissal. But these well-founded 
GovernMent reGuLated exPLoitation versus Private aGribusiness 137
suspicions were no obstacle at all to him continuing his career in the service 
of the colonial state. His case is a random example of the protection and 
preferential treatment that were customarily enjoyed by those who held 
lucrative positions. Old friendships and family connections were also 
invaluable. The colonial power complex could be divided into a number of 
factions: old guard and newcomers, ‘conservatives’ and ‘liberals’, reformers 
and anti-reformers. Sometimes, though by no means always, these dividing 
lines coincided. But their mutual differences of opinion did not prevent 
them from forming a united front when it came to the quest for personal 
prof it. In that respect, they were more competitors than opponents. While 
writing his work on a new fundament for colonial rule, Dirk van Hogendorp 
was preoccupied with accumulating a personal fortune to enable him to 
continue to lead the opulent life to which he had become accustomed as the 
highest ranking off icial on Java’s East Coast (Fassseur 1985: 214). Daendels 
was not only a forbidding governor but also an astute businessman who 
allotted himself state property for a bargain only to sell it back for ten 
times the original price. Lastly, Raffles made a good show of himself. As 
mentioned before, De Wilde was happy to take over Raffles’ share when 
his involvement in the shady land deal became public knowledge and he 
hastily withdrew from the partnership. As the main owner, De Wilde would 
eventually develop Sukabumi. Other members of Raffles’ entourage also 
acquired estates at a bargain. Lawick, Knops, Rothenbühler, Von Winckel-
mann, Van Motman and Muntinghe – the man who declared that colonial 
revenues should f irst and foremost benef it the mother country – were 
among those who owned splendid domains in Krawang. The plantations on 
sale were so extensive that only ‘capitalists’ could take part in the auction. 
This scarce category proved to be strikingly well-represented among those 
holding the highest public positions (Bastin 1954: 76-88). The white kongsi 
on Java displayed all the typical behavioural traits of the British nabobs 
in India in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: the state of 
opulence in which they lived, their unbridled but vulgar greed for money, 
their conspicuous leisure and ostentation, a social strategy in which ties 
of kinship and patronage played an important role, etc. (see for example 
Moorhouse 1983: 40-2, 56; Woodruff 1963). The removal of regents and other 
indigenous chiefs from their positions of power in the early nineteenth 
century in most parts of Java was accompanied by criticism of the feudal 
lifestyle of this aristocracy, who were branded as a plague on the country 
and its people. The directors and lower-ranking expatriate staff of the civil 
service behaved no less parasitically, but the self-enrichment of this caste 
of white off icials was rarely a matter of discussion.
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The colonial hierarchy tolerated little criticism from within, while the 
tendency to present a united front towards outsiders also did little to encour-
age a free and frank exchange of opinion. Yet the transition from trading 
company to state enterprise did seem to have contributed to a very gradual 
change in the code of conduct. Compared to the servants of the VOC, who 
sought to maximize their own profit with little ado or embarrassment, their 
successors as state officials at least tried to deny or conceal the fact that they 
were acting in any way other than in the public interest, no matter how it 
was defined. Once they had been found guilty of misconduct, it was more 
diff icult for the new generation of administrators to restore their earlier 
reputation for honour and integrity. Raffles lost his job prematurely partly as 
a result of his abuses in the sale of land, while Daendels, after being accused 
of f inancial misconduct, was not permitted to return to Java as Governor-
General in 1816. The higher requirements that were progressively imposed on 
those in positions of authority did not of course mean that these new public 
morals were introduced without problems but, compared with the previous 
regime, violations were tolerated less easily and punished more severely. 
This was a change that helped mark the advent of the colonial state. Behind 
the dividing lines that separated the old and new administration of the 
colony around the turn of the nineteenth century, however, lay a continuity 
that can also be seen in the career prof iles of the administrators. Many 
of the old guard simply transferred their loyalties to the new masters, no 
matter whether they were Patriots or Orangists (monarchists), or were – in 
succession – Dutch, French or English. These old retainers not only followed 
all the swerves and curves of policy, but claimed that they had always been 
f ierce supporters of the new course. Muntinghe was perhaps the ultimate 
personif ication of this flexibility, according to the derisive judgment of his 
contemporary and rival Willem van Hogendorp, who described him as ‘at all 
times the obedient servant and cowardly follower of whoever holds the reins 
of power’ (Van der Kemp 1916: 34-5). After having worn out Nederburgh and 
Daendels, Muntinghe became a great favourite of Raffles, who praised him 
as his right-hand man. After the departure of the English high command, he 
patiently awaited the restoration of Dutch authority in the f irm belief that it 
would once again make use of his standing as a man of all colonial seasons.
In search of a new policy
The fall of the Napoleonic empire ended in a major realignment of the 
multinational state structure on the European continent. At the Vienna 
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conference in 1815, the combined diplomacy of Britain and Prussia saw 
to it that the territorial aspirations that had magnif ied the role of France 
in the wake of the 1789 Revolution were revoked. As part of the policy of 
containment, the United Netherlands were cut off from political allegiance 
to their southern neighbour and reconstituted in a new monarchy. A son 
of the last princely stadtholder Willem V from the Orange-Nassau dynasty, 
who had taken refuge in Britain, invested himself in 1815 as King Willem 
I of the newly formed state in northwest Europe. I shall f irst discuss the 
repercussions for colonial governance and in a f inal paragraph at the end 
of this chapter, briefly comment on the changes in the political setting in 
the metropolis.
Back in Holland from his years of exile, Willem I appointed three 
Commissioners-General and gave them orders to come up with proposals 
for a new colonial policy. At the instigation of the chairman, Muntinghe 
was not included among the candidates. He had, after all, joined the ranks 
of the occupier after the British takeover. In the foreword to his work on 
Java and its people, published in 1817, Raffles thanked his prominent adviser 
profusely for the services rendered.13 This praise raised doubts about the 
impartiality of this undeniably expert and experienced man. Baron Godert 
van der Capellen was new to colonial affairs and had been appointed chair-
man exactly because of his unblemished record. This lack of familiarity 
with the situation in the colony also applied, though to a lesser extent, to 
Cornelis Elout, the second and most prominent member of the trio in terms 
of rank. Elout had been sent to Java earlier, in 1806, on a similar mission but 
it had been recalled before reaching Batavia. The third Commissioner was a 
nondescript f igure who soon faded into the background. With these choices, 
the King made it clear that he did not trust the old guard. Others who 
were not considered were Dirk van Hogendorp and Daendels, whose track 
records worked against them. The trio of Commissioners departed from 
13 The publication of The History of Java (1817) immediately incurred the displeasure of the 
colonial policy-makers. They accused the author of having political motives and questioned 
whether British rule had indeed left such a favourable impression on the Javanese as Raffles had 
suggested. Just to be sure, the author of an off icial memorandum warned that it was advisable to 
see to it that the indigenous leaders of Java did not become familiar with the work ‘… to ensure 
that the f lattering way in which the Javanese are presented does not encourage them to develop 
ideas that may be disadvantageous to the crucial importance of a good relationship with the 
inland rulers.’ (S. van Deventer I, 1865: 270). Fear that the British Governor had left behind 
an overly favourable impression did not prevent later colonial authors from expressing their 
undisguised admiration for Raff les. As M.L. van Deventer wrote at the end of the nineteenth 
century: ‘At the pinnacle of the history of Java in our century stands a foreigner, with his system, 
his sensible designs, and the introduction of his radical reforms.’ (1890: 16)
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Texel at the end of October 1815, arriving six months later in Batavia. This 
gave them plenty of opportunity to discuss their mission on board, armed 
with an instruction issued before they left and a government regulation 
drawn up on the basis of a draft charter dating from 1803. The question the 
Commissioners had to address was whether to adopt the principles of free 
cultivation and free labour that the British administration had introduced 
or to return to the previous regime of a captive peasantry and forced cultiva-
tion and deliveries of export crops. Van der Capellen showed himself to be 
a cautious man and had already informed the King before his departure 
of his doubts about the feasibility of implementing the liberal ideas that 
formed the core of the government regulation drawn up in 1815 regarding 
the Asian possessions in the near future. The ‘liberal ideas’ boiled down to 
the instruction to put an end to the regime of coercion and monopoly that 
dated back to the VOC era. What was to replace this remained unclear for 
the time being. In the period of trial and error that now commenced, there 
was no avoiding the need for practical arrangements to be made in a number 
of areas. The most important of these was the decision to accept or reject 
the principle of tax collection introduced by Raffles, henceforth referred 
to as the land rent system. The decision had to be made without the Com-
missioners having the opportunity to give thorough consideration to the 
advantages and disadvantages. The Raad van Financiën (Financial Affairs 
Council) argued in favour of retaining the land rent system. That was by 
no means surprising, as its president was Muntinghe, who had contributed 
prominently to Raffles’ design for its promulgation. His reservations about a 
village-based system of collection – he referred to the ryotwari settlements 
introduced in western India – were practical in nature and required further 
investigation to seek a solution. The recommendations that Muntinghe 
submitted to the Commissioners-General on 11  July 1817 gave primary 
importance to coffee cultivation which, as one of the cheapest forms of 
state income, had to be maintained.
Muntinghe gave two answers to the question as to how that was to be 
achieved. He observed that the only way for the government to secure its 
supplies under conditions of free cultivation and delivery was to pay a good 
price. Conversely, if the price of labour was set too low, coercion would be 
imperative. Muntinghe recalled that the VOC had engaged in free trade 
when it f irst arrived, and that supply was adequate because the suppliers 
received a reasonable price. He opposed the claim that the Javanese lacked 
the virtues required for any other system than forced labour and warned 
against the costs of enforcing such a coercive system, which should not be 
ignored in calculating the advantages and disadvantages. Is it conceivable, 
GovernMent reGuLated exPLoitation versus Private aGribusiness 141
he argued, to enforce people to plant and tend to 72 million coffee trees and 
to deliver 35 to 36 million pounds of coffee without fear of unrest, deser-
tion, rebellion or some other form of calamity and thereby, in the long run, 
bringing about the downfall of the regime? What would happen, Muntinghe 
wondered, if a Dutch farmer were forced to supply his produce at half, or 
a quarter or a tenth part of the real value? Certainly, the Javanese became 
slow and unwilling as soon as they were forced to work for others and 
under supervision. Yet behind this lethargy was the zeal and enlightened 
self-interest that drove every simple peasant. Muntinghe described these 
qualities in lyrical terms (Van Deventer I, 1865: 319).
This advocate of free labour also referred to the system of village-level 
governance that had so conveniently come to light during the period of 
British rule. The village headman was supposedly elected by the inhabitants 
of the locality in rotation and was given responsibility for representing the 
interests of the community. Muntinghe called on the European authorities 
to make use of this institution, which had existed since time immemorial, 
to interact with the peasantry. With the village council, the government 
had an instrument that was ‘like a clog, tractable enough to take on any 
form that a benevolent and compassionate government may wish to give it’ 
(Muntinghe, in Van Deventer I, 1865: 331). In the regulation governing the 
collection of the land rent, issued at the start of 1814, the village headman 
was already identified as the agent in matters regarding the tribute imposed 
on the locality. Raffles had discarded his original intention to impose a 
land tax on the cultivating households individually for practical reasons. 
Instead, he introduced a system of taxes per village, with the headman of 
the desa acting as the intermediary, ‘renting’ the land from the government 
and responsible for parcelling it out to the peasants for cultivation. The 
Commission-General decided to maintain this regulation. The recognition 
of the village council and its designation as the lowest level of administra-
tion dated from this period. It completed the ‘descent’ of the exercise of 
power to the colonial workfloor, a system that would remain intact until the 
end of Dutch rule. The village headmen, charged with collecting the land 
tax, were considered the representatives of the peasant households. Their 
periodic election by the villagers from their midst was formal confirmation 
of their status. This was considered an ‘ancient custom’ on Java, which had 
been brought to an end by despotic rulers and reinstated by Raffles.
In 1818, the Commission-General issued an instruction that made this 
interpretation, based on the discovery of a past that had never existed (Van 
der Kemp 1916: 362-4; Breman 1979 and 1987a), normal practice for the largest 
part of Java that fell under the land rent system. To facilitate supervision 
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of the newly appointed local tax agents, Raff les’ Revenue Instruction 
included a provision that each village council should keep a record of the 
amount of tax levied and how it was distributed among the villagers, but 
little had come of this provision in practice (Van der Kemp 1916: 43-4). As a 
consequence, the Land-Rent Inspectorate had no idea at all of how much 
cultivable land there was in each village or what crops were grown on it, 
in total or per household. Land registers would not be initiated until much 
later, unlike in British India, where the classif ication of landownership, 
known as survey and settlement records, had been introduced on a large 
scale from the early nineteenth century. The colonial authorities on Java 
had little other choice for the time being than to determine a reasonable 
collective tax in consultation with the village councils. This procedure, 
known as the admodiation system, generally entailed rather unpredictable 
negotiations, usually conducted with the intercession of the gentry. After 
many expressions of praise and much bargaining, the result was often a 
far too low or excessively high estimate. The latter could lead to peasant 
protests which, as happened on the coastal plain around Cirebon, could 
escalate into a full-scale popular revolt. The collective tax imposed through 
the village council, in cash or agrarian produce or a combination of the 
two, was therefore a continuation of the system which had been initiated 
in earlier years under British rule. It was a pro-bureaucratic and anti-feudal 
style of administration. Nonetheless, the Commission-General did rescind 
Raffles’ decision not to depend on the landed gentry as an intermediate layer 
between the government and the peasant order. Van der Capellen proved 
to be very much aware of the resistance of the nobility to their exclusion 
and took this into account. Muntinghe made general recommendations for 
the cultivation of coffee, proposing no measures that would apply solely 
to the Priangan region. He pointed out that, from Cirebon to the east, 20 
million trees had been lost in 1812-13 during the British interlude due to 
negligence or wilful destruction. He added that the government should lease 
the remaining coffee plantations on the northeast coast to the Javanese for 
free cultivation. A general inspectorate would be established to supervise 
cultivation and to encourage the peasants to grow crops, in particular 
coffee, for the European market.
The deregulation of coffee cultivation, except in the Priangan
It was clear advice, but the Commissioners-General did not implement it 
for the time being. A few days after receiving the report from the President 
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of the Raad van Financiën, they left for a four-month tour of inspection 
through Java. The purpose of the tour was to make site visits, starting in 
Cirebon, to see for themselves how the land rent and coffee cultivation 
ordinances worked in practice. Before returning to Batavia at the end of 
1817, the Commissioners-General issued a statement about this main export 
commodity. This interim measure, announced on 7 November of that year, 
had a clear liberal intent. Coffee planters could lease land at a reasonable 
price and were free to work on it as they saw f it. They were also promised 
that they would be protected against abuse of their rights. The Priangan Re-
gencies were however explicitly excluded. The Commission-General simply 
stated that coffee growing in this main production area should continue as 
before. This outcome was intended to be a temporary compromise as Van 
der Capellen considered it inconsistent to allow a system to exist in part 
of Java that was based on principles contrary to the rest of the island. In 
exchange for being exempt from land rent, the people in the Priangan were 
obligated to grow coffee and deliver it to the government’s warehouses for 
a small reimbursement. In other words, everything remained the same as 
it had been before. Van der Capellen offered his apologies for maintaining 
this exceptional situation in a letter to minister Anton Falck in 1816 (Van 
der Kemp 1916: 189-90).
There was no village autonomy nor elected village headmen in the Sunda 
lands. The regents continued to wield the power once bestowed upon them 
by the VOC. The forced cultivation of coffee thus continued in this part of 
Java. Not on the basis of persuasive argumentation, admittedly, but for the 
same practical reasons that Nederburgh, Van Hogendorp, Daendels and Raf-
fles had appealed to in their turn. The continued isolation of the Priangan 
Regencies from the outside world was part of this policy. An ordinance to 
cordon off the region was issued once more in 1820, following complaints 
in the preceding years of coffee being smuggled from the highlands to the 
coast, where it was brought at a much higher price to the market. That this 
illicit trade was conducted more by the gentry than by simple peasants is 
illustrated by an off icial demand to the Residents of Priangan and Cirebon 
in 1819 to warn the local chiefs about the unacceptability of such practices.
The Commissioners-General now gave priority to introducing the land 
rent system. The f irst article of this decree, announced in mid-March 1818, 
was that the land rent would be collected at village level. It was hoped 
that, with the appointment of Lawick as Inspector-General and H.J. van 
de Graaff as Deputy Inspector-General of Land-Rent Revenues, the future 
could be faced with confidence. Of course, many instructions followed on 
the further elaboration of the system that was to be in force for most of the 
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island. There was however no adequate explanation of why the Priangan 
lands, and not elsewhere, should remain the epicentre of coffee production. 
The only reference to the continued apartheid of the region was the explicit 
instruction that the state of affairs that was soon to be introduced in the rest 
of the island did not apply to this traditional centre of coffee cultivation. 
The persistent exceptional position attributed to the Priangan was the 
result of a compromise. The colonial policy-makers wanted the maximum 
volume of coffee at the lowest possible price. Not complying with the ide-
als of enlightenment that had blown over from Europe may have been a 
little awkward, but if coercion was necessary to increase the cultivation of 
this most important export crop, then so be it. The enormous profits that 
the forced supply of coffee generated were now easily defended with the 
argument that the non-economic behaviour of the Javanese peasant – or 
more accurately, the Priangan peasant – did not permit his freedom of 
action. The low rung of civilization on which these people lived justif ied the 
postponement of their freedom until a later date. The only way to help them 
on the road to progress was to restrict their freedom of action. Moreover, 
this was a regime that they were familiar with from their time under the 
rule of the Javanese kings. This reasoning provided the fundament for an 
ideology on which colonial domination would rest until the very end.
Based on the f indings gathered during its long tour and on the study of 
memoranda and other documents left behind by the British authorities, 
the Commission-General outlined the course to be followed. Newly ap-
pointed Residents were given instructions to report back on the situation 
they encountered in their areas of jurisdiction. The transfer of power from 
the British to the Dutch went off peacefully, except in Krawang and western 
Cirebon where a revolt raged again in 1816 (Van Deventer 1891: CLXVI). The 
cause of the unrest was the nature and scale of the compulsory services and 
forced supply of commodities. The f irst demand of the rebels was for the 
workload to be lightened. An intercepted letter showed that local chiefs had 
called on their people to join the f ight: ‘Have all food prepared and have all 
people who wish to have a different lord or ruler ready to march to Cirebon.’ 
Muntinghe, whose estate lay in this area, tried in vain to ward off the use 
of violence by telling Van Motman, the Resident of the Priangan Regencies, 
that the ‘rebels’ were nothing more than ‘innocent creatures’. But the crowd, 
which had swelled to 2,500, refused to disperse. The armed response was 
carried out not only by colonial troops under the Resident’s command, but 
also soldiers on foot and horseback led by the regents of Sumedang and 
Limbangan. Sixty of the insurgents were killed, 100 wounded and 500 taken 
prisoner (ibid.: 138-42). After the revolt had been quashed, a commission was 
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set up to investigate its causes. Its report referred to excessive oppression 
and exploitation by private landlords, who had pursued their regime of 
coercion with the support of local chiefs. It made an urgent plea for the 
lot of the common people to be improved. Although the unrest had been 
restricted to the coastal plain, there were fears that it would spread to the 
Priangan highlands, where the people endured a much heavier burden. 
The rebels were led by a notorious and feared gang-leader. This was not 
the f irst time that public order had been disturbed in this region. It was 
perhaps this reputation that had inspired the decision not to reintroduce 
forced cultivation in this area bordering on the Priangan. When Resident 
Servatius instructed the regent in the hinterland to encourage his people 
to grow coffee, he was informed that the Javanese had developed an almost 
insurmountable aversion to growing this crop and to the coercion that 
accompanied it.
In his report on the Priangan Regencies and Krawang in 1816, Resident 
Van Motman was content to give a rough estimate of the quantity of coffee 
produced, 42,000 pikul at the most, as there had been no regular inspections 
in the previous years. There were very few coffee inspectors and even fewer 
with more than a year or two of experience. Nevertheless, Van Motman 
predicted a rapid recovery in production, claiming that it should be possible 
to increase it to 100,000 pikul in the short term. The European staff who had 
to supervise production comprised, in addition to the Resident and four 
assistants, one inspector for each of the f ive regencies (Cianjur, Bandung, 
Sumedang, Limbangan and Sukapura). At that time, the Resident was still 
living in Wanayasa, on the border between Krawang and Cianjur, where 
Macquoid, as Superintendent of the Coffee Culture in the British period, 
had moved into a simple pasagrahan while waiting for a wooden house to 
be built. Van Motman suggested relocating his off ice to Cianjur. When this 
occurred, shortly afterwards, it was a clear sign that coffee cultivation had 
moved from the foothills to the highlands.
The survey initiated by the Commission-General also included investigat-
ing the state of coffee production. This important task was entrusted to 
the Inspector-General of Land-Rent and his deputy. Lawick and Van de 
Graaff reported on their f indings at the end of 1818.14 Quite logically the 
prospects for the Priangan Regencies were given most attention. This old 
production centre would have to continue to supply the greatest share of 
the export crop. It was therefore necessary to maintain the instruction that 
14 Memorandum by Lawick and H.J. van de Graaff, 5  December 1818. NA, Schneither 
collection, 26.
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each household should plant and tend to 1,000 fruit-bearing trees a year. The 
reporters established, however, that the number of households was much 
larger than the number of coffee planters. This was because the tribute was 
imposed, according to local custom, on the basis of the composite peasant 
household.
... the coffee planters understand a tjiattya koppie as a whole extended 
family of blood relations; for example, a father, his sons and sons-in-law 
will all count as belonging to the same tjiattya koffij, while in effect there 
are often three or four households, all living independently. (Lawick and 
Van de Graaff 1818)
In addition, by no means all coffee planters had to tend 1,000 trees, as coffee 
production had not penetrated everywhere, and especially to the more 
remote districts. A new road was urgently needed to expand production 
to the still inaccessible region of Sukapura. The observation that the coffee 
inspectors had been negligent in ensuring an even distribution of produc-
tion was accompanied by a recommendation to the Resident to instigate a 
further investigation into the size of a cacah kopi and to determine whether 
the work involved in producing the coffee was distributed proportionally. 
The inspectors were criticized for relying too much on information from the 
regents rather than touring around to inspect the planting and tending of 
the trees themselves. There were also concerns whether the peasants were 
receiving correct payment for the compulsory delivery of their harvest. 
The two warehouses where this took place – Karang Sembung and Cikoa, 
situated where the highlands gave way to the coastal plain and the rivers 
became navigable – did not possess reliable weights and scales required 
to determine the volume of the loads. Bad roads and the long distances 
that the planters had to travel to deliver the coffee – the return journey, 
with pack animals or carts could often take a month or even longer – led 
to a proposal to open small warehouses spread over the districts to make 
the delivery of the beans less burdensome. Another suggestion was to 
ensure that there were suff icient pack animals and carts available for the 
transport.
In their report Lawick and Van de Graaff lastly drew attention to the 
problem caused by the alienation of land in the Priangan to private own-
ers. Daendels had limited himself to selling land around Bogor, but under 
Raff les a much larger area had been sold off. The owners of these huge 
tracts often imposed different, and even heavier, burdens on the peasants 
than their countrymen endured under the government. The reporters’ 
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main concern, however, was not the injustice suffered by the peasants. 
Their much more serious objection was that the existence of two parallel 
systems of taxation was a source of confusion and conflicted with colonial 
interests. They recommended a ruling on this grave and urgent matter from 
the metropolitan headquarters, a suggestion that must have come straight 
from the top of the colonial machinery.
Patching up leakage and other irregularities
The authorities tried to restrict the widespread smuggling of coffee by 
building watch-houses on the main through routes and manning them with 
guards to check passing traff ic for contraband. In addition mounted police 
( jayangsekar) accompanied by constables (pancalang) patrolled the whole 
area. To ensure that they themselves did not engage in corrupt practices, 
they were relocated to another district every month. And that was not 
all; the Resident also used ‘disguised inspectors’ who moved amongst the 
population dressed in Sundanese clothing. Posing as traders, they would 
go to Krawang, Bogor, Cirebon, Tjampea and even Batavia to track down 
buyers of smuggled coffee. According to Jean Chrétien Baud, the ban on 
the sale and use of opium in the Priangan Regencies announced in 1824 
was introduced out of fear that inhabitants of the region would sell coffee 
illegally to pay for their addiction (Baud 1852: 161). Another interpretation 
suggests that the fact that the Chinese acted as opium sellers was reason 
enough to ban them from the residency. This implies that the Chinese 
had persuaded the local chiefs and their people to use the drug. Colonial 
archivist De Haan emphatically rejected this explanation stating in plain 
language that, at the end of the eighteenth century, VOC off icials used 
opium to pay for the coffee delivered to them.
It was not the Chinese who were to blame for these practices, but in the 
f irst instance the Commissioner of Indigenous Affairs who, of all the 
various articles that he supplied to the highlands, had found none more 
prof itable than opium, and who, through his privileged position, could 
easily quash all competition. (De Haan I, 1910: 248)
The permission granted to the Priangan regents to sell the drug was re-
scinded because of fears that the local chiefs’ desire for income from this 
source might become too strong, at the expense of their primary task: to 
supervise the cultivation of coffee.
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After a tour of the Sundanese highlands, Resident Van der Capellen 
expressed his dismay at the bad condition of the coffee gardens. The colonial 
authorities had already realized that their efforts to increase production had 
not resulted in the expected breakthrough. This called for more detailed 
investigation, a task entrusted to Inspector of Finances Van Haak. In the 
autumn of 1822 he reported his f indings to the Chief Inspector. He began by 
observing that, after 1800, the coffee trees had not been planted on fertile 
ground. This had only recently improved. He also noted that, since 1808, 
the chiefs had failed to perform their supervisory duties satisfactorily. He 
conf irmed that planting gardens on higher ground had produced much 
better results. Figures provided by the Resident’s off ice showed a total of 
29,290,733 trees, of which 12,093,248 had been planted between 1817 and 
1820. Deducting 3,124,941 trees that were no longer fruit-bearing, this meant 
that the harvest was the product of 14,072,544 trees. Since the number of 
coffee planters in the off icial records was 18,645, there should have been 
18,645,000 fruit-bearing trees. That left a production shortfall of more than 
f ive million, caused by many years of neglect or even destruction during 
the British era. In short, there was still a large pool of underutilized labour 
that could be deployed to increase production further. The peasants had 
to travel between 40 and 70 poles15 to deliver the beans, a journey of 8 to 
14 days for porters and pack animals, or 10 to 18 days for buffalo carts. The 
opening of warehouses in a few district headquarters in 1819 meant that 
smaller planters, who had no animals, could deliver their beans closer 
to home. They were paid less per pikul because freight drivers had to be 
subcontracted to carry the coffee in carts from these collection centres to 
the coast. The exhausting journey, the bad state of the roads and shortage 
of cattle feed meant that many of the animals died en route. Because of this 
risk and the low price the peasants received, as well as the fact that they 
were underpaid for the weight they did deliver, there was a great tempta-
tion to smuggle. The ban on Chinese from moving around in the Priangan 
Regencies was extended to Moors, Bengalis and Arabs, while Europeans 
were also forbidden to trade in the region. Sealing off the Priangan, rather 
than paying the peasants more for the coffee they delivered, remained the 
preferred solution.
In Van Haak’s opinion, this was indeed the right choice. He then noted 
that coffee was produced with neither the Resident nor the inspectors being 
familiar with how it was grown. Consequently they lacked the knowledge 
to supervise the process. The sense of duty of the European staff left much 
15 1 Java pole is approximately 1,500 metres.
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to be desired, certainly given the high incomes they enjoyed due to the 
generous commission in cash they received for the coffee planted and 
delivered under their supervision. Besides their lack of experience with 
what they were supposed to do, their exceptionally meagre knowledge of 
the country and its people was an obstacle to them performing their tasks 
with any degree of competence. They also had insuff icient time to become 
acquainted with the area under their jurisdiction. Their command of the 
language was pitiful, despite this being a condition for being appointed 
to the job. Their failure to give the regents the respect they deserved and 
to give them the money due to them was also a cause for concern. All 
in all, this meant that the European off icials did not take measures in 
the interests of the local population, such as promoting agriculture, and 
because of sheer negligence jeopardized the goal of increasing coffee 
cultivation. The sale of estates to private landowners had disadvantaged 
the regents, who could no longer derive income from the land and peasants 
alienated from their jurisdiction. Lastly, Van Haak expressed his concern 
about the neglect of paddy cultivation, which made it diff icult to meet the 
food requirements of the population. The main thread of his argument was 
to warn the European management in charge of coffee production not to 
push up the level of forced cultivation too high and to take an example 
from the indigenous chiefs, who also moderated their demands on their 
subordinates. Conversely, however, expansion of the paddy f ields should 
not occur at the expense of the land planted with coffee trees. The Inspector 
of Finances made it clear that the government could not permit such a 
reduction in the production of this major commercial crop. Van Haak 
added a large number of appendices to his report containing data on the 
size of the population (almost 200,000, of which only 44 were European), 
the number of coffee planters, the state of the trees and the yield of the 
crop from 1817 to 1820, which he had obtained from the Resident’s off ice. 
The distribution of the data among the different regencies offered insight 
into the relative importance of each. The epicentre was still in Cianjur, 
but the f igures gave an early warning of the shift to Bandung that would 
gather pace in the following years, in terms of both population numbers 
and coffee cultivation. The statistics also included the production of coffee 
and paddy on the private estate of Sukabumi. The revenues from the harvest 
of both crops showed the enormous scale of this territorial intrusion into 
the Priangan Regencies.
The restoration of ties with the markets in the Atlantic world after the 
end of the Napoleonic wars gave a strong boost to the production of export 
crops in the colony. The Commission-General had found coffee production, 
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especially in the new production areas that had emerged since the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century, in a bad state. The stagnating sales in the 
f irst years of British interim rule had led to widespread neglect of the trees. 
Restoring the area under cultivation to its former size took a considerable 
time. Although there was no change in the existing regime for the Priangan 
Regencies, it was the intention to encourage coffee production elsewhere 
on Java on the basis of free labour. The impression was created that the 
choice for unforced cultivation and sale had the approval of King Willem I 
(Van der Kemp 1916: 136). And yet, it did not reap the success that had been 
expected. Daendels had already driven coffee cultivation to unprecedented 
heights ten years previously, especially on the plain of Cirebon and on 
Java’s east coast. But, once they were ripe for picking, the many millions 
of trees that he had ordered to be planted there produced an extremely 
meagre harvest. This f igure was so low compared to the Priangan region, 
where a coffee tree would produce seven times as many beans, that in his 
report to Raff les in 1812 Rothenbühler proposed terminating growth of 
the crop completely in the region of Surabaya (Rothenbühler 1881: 55). In 
hope of better results, the Commission-General decided in 1817 to switch 
to free cultivation in areas where coffee was hardly grown, if at all. But 
the aversion to growing the crop was so strong, based on earlier experi-
ences, that even the higher prices that private (Chinese and Arab) buyers 
were prepared to pay could not persuade the peasants to plant coffee on 
a genuinely large scale in the new production areas. The disappointing 
results led the government to fall back on the tried and trusted method 
of using coercion. An instruction that came into force in 1823 ordered 
coffee-planting villages to continue to do so in the future, but henceforth 
in the form of a levy in kind. The measures signif ied the cancellation of the 
free agreements of previous years. The new course had the desired effect 
but the pretension of free cultivation proved impossible to maintain, as 
Leonard du Bus de Gisignies reported a few years later (Van der Kemp 1916: 
164). Willem van Hogendorp, who was the actual author of the report, was 
told by an informant in Central Java in 1828 about the way in which the 
peasants were put to work: ‘They are driven to the gardens with a stick, 
just as everywhere else’. The difference from the situation in the Priangan 
Regencies was therefore not as great as intended. The traditionally much 
tighter control on compliance with the system of compulsory supply in 
this region probably explains why, as in the past, the cultivation of coffee 
continued to be linked primarily to these districts. A prognosis in 1818 
forecast that three-quarters of the total production would come from the 
Priangan Regencies (ibid.: 192).
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Increasing leverage for private estates
In its efforts to increase colonial production, to a large extent driven by 
the need for ever more funds to f inance the development of economy and 
infrastructure in the metropolis, the Commission-General investigated the 
advantages and disadvantages of the various options. One was to promote 
free European colonization and agribusiness. A regulation drawn up in 1818 
which effectively heralded the end of the Commission’s activities – Van der 
Capellen remained behind alone as Commissioner-General – ordered that 
land be issued to European landowners to establish large-scale agricultural 
enterprises. As soon as it had taken off ice, the Commission-General had 
received applications from interested landowners from many quarters 
with plans to grow crops for export. The tour of Java undertaken by the 
three members of the Commission in 1817 to acquaint themselves with the 
situation at local level unleashed a new wave of applications. Under Raf-
fles, a lobby of merchants had emerged, consisting of Europeans and other 
aliens (including Armenians), who also speculated in land. Many private 
entrepreneurs came from this mercantile background and, in the 1820s, 
they endeavoured to meet the growing demand for colonial commodities, 
not only coffee but also cotton, sugar and indigo. In various parts of Java 
they concluded rental or lease contracts with members of the landed gentry 
(Stevens 1982: 137-40). These new forms of commercial agriculture were 
concentrated mainly on the northern coastal plain and the principalities 
of Central Java. Although this trend was essentially in line with the course 
set out in the 1818 regulation, Van der Capellen and his colleagues were 
hesitant about continuing down the same road. There were a number of 
reasons for this. First of all, there was the uprising that had broken out in 
1816 in Krawang and Cirebon, traditional hotspots of unrest. A committee 
of inquiry reported that the disturbances, stirred up by hangers-on of the 
exiled sultan, had spread rapidly. There were justif iable fears that it would 
spill over into the Priangan Regencies. As usual, the people’s anger had been 
directed at Chinese racketeers. But there was no denying that European 
landlords had also been guilty of ‘irregular and random appropriations 
and harassment’.16 It is interesting to note that Muntinghe, who owned 
an estate in Indramaju, was among those accused of treating the people 
living on his land as mere serfs, ‘taillables et corvéables à merci’, always at 
his beck and call (Van der Kemp 1916: 303-9). It was partly these excesses 
16 For a description of the repressive labour regime on the private estates during this period, 
see Stevens 1982: 123-65.
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that caused Van der Capellen to be less than accommodating to applicants 
for new concessions. Ironically it was Muntinghe himself who advised him 
to impose strict conditions on issuing land concessions.
Excluded shall be not only kampongs and dessas, but also all lands known 
to the village council and lying within the bounds of the village, or used 
as grazing land for cattle. No Javanese shall be put to work on these lands, 
except that they themselves choose to do, and for payment of a full day’s 
wage. (Van Deventer I, 1865: 345)
In addition to this fear of excessive exploitation of the indigenous population 
by the European-led agribusinesses, there was another argument against 
the alienation of land to private interests. Many of these landlords were not 
of Dutch origin and the policy-makers were concerned that their growing 
prominence might upset the political stability of the colony (Ottow 1937: 
67). Van der Capellen’s reluctance to issue new concessions angered many 
old hands. Conversely, however, he was initially hesitant to buy back land 
that had been privatized in the past, despite calls to this effect from many 
supporters of state control.
The property that De Wilde had accumulated through successive pur-
chases17 – f irst together with Raffles as the major partner and then with 
Nicolaus Engelhard, by taking over the share of the British Governor at a 
bargain price – covered a thinly populated and largely still uncultivated 
area of Sukabumi, the size of a small Dutch province, in the western part 
of the Priangan highlands. The new owner started his large-scale agribusi-
ness in 1814 by encouraging the cultivation of paddy. He took considerable 
care to ensure that the peasants could grow suff icient food to live on by 
constructing a network of irrigation canals. Furthermore, it was not only 
local people who were permitted to cultivate the land. Newcomers were 
also encouraged to settle in and around Sukabumi. At that time, labour was 
scarcer than farmland and De Wilde realized that he needed to attract more 
people to his lands if he were to increase production. When he purchased 
the land, there were some 16,000 people living on it. Their number was to 
rise to far above 20,000 in the years that followed. This explains how, in 1814, 
the Regent of Cianjur lost not only a third of his land but also a substantial 
proportion of his subjects. The latter probably contributed to the decline in 
17 For a description of the life and long career of this largest private landowner known on Java, 
see De Haan I, Personalia, 1910: 284-309. De Wilde’s own publications also add much information 
to De Haan’s account.
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his income much more than the former. Land-poor peasants in particular 
would have surrendered to the temptation to desert their patron in the 
hope of a better future under the tutelage of a large landlord. In his later 
years, De Wilde described why and how he had taken the measurement of 
the land in the f ive districts that comprised his estate. For those who had 
remained landless, spatial mobility was an opportunity to rise a little up 
the agrarian ladder.
Food security for his tenants was not the only reason that De Wilde gave 
priority to the cultivation of paddy. The right to a f ifth part of the harvest 
had been transferred from the regent to the new landlord, so that the owner 
of Sukabumi also had an interest in increasing paddy production. As a result 
of these efforts, the yield of the main food crop almost doubled in the f irst 
six years of operation (De Haan I, Personalia, 1910: 292). Because the estate 
was not too far from Batavia, De Wilde was able – despite the lack of proper 
roads and other diff iculties with transport – to sell his share of the harvest 
for a good price on the market. The building of rice-husking mills was clear 
evidence that this food crop had become an attractive commercial com-
modity. Ensuring that the increase in growing paddy did not occur at the 
expense of coffee production was a major point of concern for the colonial 
authorities. Under the British, many coffee gardens had been converted into 
paddy f ields, a move that was commented upon as regrettable when Dutch 
rule was restored, as it would mean less profit for the government. Absolute 
priority could not be given to the forced cultivation of what remained the 
main export crop, as this would create the risk of food shortages. In that 
respect, De Wilde appears to have made the right choice by steering a 
middle course between the two. He made it possible for the peasants to grow 
paddy in irrigated f ields, but also forced them to plant coffee on dry ground. 
The result was a rise in production for both crops, though the increase was 
more even for paddy than for coffee. Years of rapid growth in the volume 
of coffee harvested, such as 1817-18, were followed by a temporary fallback 
to a much lower level.
The problem was less one of unstable production than of getting the 
coffee onto the market. The sale of the land and its exploitation as a large-
scale enterprise run by European owners or managers not only required the 
preservation of forced cultivation but also the compulsory supply of coffee 
to the government at the same low price as was maintained throughout the 
Priangan Regencies. As Sukabumi fell outside the control of the regulated 
regime, suspicions arose that private landlords like De Wilde were guilty 
of illegal practices. Rather than supplying the coffee to the two designated 
warehouses at the off icially f ixed low price, they could make a much higher 
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profit by selling it outside the zone covered by the government monopoly. 
Once it arrived at places along the coast, in the vicinity of Batavia, in 
Cirebon or Banten, the coffee was immediately worth much more than 
when delivered in the Priangan Regencies. Smuggling – which is what the 
clandestine transport of the goods from the closed to the free market boiled 
down to – took place through a black market circuit in which consignments 
of goods repeatedly changed hands. By the end of its journey, the price of the 
coffee had risen to a multiple of what had been paid for it at the start (Van 
der Kemp 1916: 210). The increase in value during transport was typical of a 
monopoly system with purchase prices at the source of production therefore 
set at a minimum level from higher up. It is striking that these suspicions 
of illicit trade focused especially on the private landowners. There was no 
lack of evidence that the regents and lower chiefs were equally as guilty 
of evading the compulsory supply of coffee. They were undoubtedly more 
skilled in evading government control of their covert deals than the large 
landowners, who remained strangers in their own domains.
It would have been easy to put a stop to the smuggling of coffee by raising 
the price to the level paid for it on the free market. This simple solution was, 
however, rejected again and again. The f irst argument, nothing more than 
a pretext, was that there was no pressure at all to do this from the supply 
side. The regents did not openly voice their complaints, and the peasants 
even less. Remunerating the indigenous managers more handsomely would 
enrich them to an extent that would upset the existing balance of power. 
Rewarding the peasants more would be inadvisable because what they 
were paid had been shown to be suff icient to meet their simple needs. But 
De Wilde and Engelhard, the joint owners of Sukabumi, protested – not 
against the forced cultivation of coffee but against its compulsory supply 
to the government at what they considered too low a price. The answer 
from the colonial policy-makers was that no other interest should have 
priority above making the maximum profit. The Commissioners-General, 
to whom both landlords directed their complaints, refused to allow them to 
sell the coffee on the free market or even to legalize the sale of land in the 
Priangan to private landowners. Lawick, the newly appointed Inspector of 
the Land-Rent Department, proved to be responsible for this unsympathetic 
response. Commissioner-General Van der Capellen showed De Wilde and 
Engelhard the coffee report from 1818 in which Lawick and his deputy had 
expressed their disapproval of the continued existence of private domains 
in the Priangan Regencies. Their response was of course highly critical. 
For a start, they decried the lack of feeling with which Lawick, who was 
familiar with the miserable plight of the highland peasantry, had resisted 
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any increase in the price paid to the simple coffee planters. They were also 
very scathing about the force used to extort the peasants’ labour. The far 
too heavy burden imposed upon them left them insuff icient time to grow 
food. Pitiful was how they described the lot of the people of the Priangan 
Regencies. It was not a response that brought the parties closer together. 
The owners of Sukabumi followed a course that challenged the monopoly 
system in the Priangan Regencies and led them to clash with the top of the 
colonial apparatus.
The downfall of the free enterprise lobby
It should come as no surprise that the Priangan gentry did not exactly 
appreciate the presence of these foreign intruders in their backyard. The 
latter conducted themselves in a completely different way, as energetic 
businessmen driven by their own enlightened self-interest to make their 
enterprises a success (De Wilde 1830: 199). Although they lived in comfort 
and luxury on their estates, their treatment of the peasants was at variance 
with that of the Sundanese nobles. De Wilde himself drew attention to this 
difference in 1815, when he had the opportunity to attend an audience of the 
regent of Cianjur. He summarized his impressions of courtly ostentation 
as follows.
The [regent] is seen as an elevated personage, and enjoys the slavish 
respect of all the people. No one, not even the highest of chiefs, may 
approach him standing up, but must do so crawling on the ground. If 
the chiefs of the outer districts of this Regency are summoned or come 
of their own accord, they are admitted to the Regent on their hands 
and knees, and are permitted to touch his knee with their hands folded 
together. But lower chiefs and common folk fall to the ground, bow their 
heads on their folded hands, after which they may, very quickly, touch 
his foot. (De Wilde 1830: 173)
When Commissioner-General Van der Capellen, together with his brother 
Robert – who he had appointed Resident in the Priangan Regencies – de-
cided that owners of private estates were not permitted to make use of 
corvee services which the peasants were obliged to render, this was an 
immediate and direct threat to the continued existence of the large agribusi-
nesses. That a similar ban had been in force since the time of Daendels 
and Raffles, without civil servants of all ranks taking any notice of this 
156 MobiLizinG Labour for the GLobaL Coffee Market
restriction in their call on free labour, was of course not up for discussion. 
There is no doubt that much of De Wilde’s considerable success with his 
businesses was due to the large-scale mobilization of unpaid or underpaid 
peasant labour to construct irrigation works, cultivate the land, lay roads 
and build his luxurious mansions – including not only Sukabumi but also 
Udyungbrung, which was close to Bandung – and of course by requisitioning 
a considerable share of the paddy harvest. Private estates had to be returned 
to government hands and that could only be achieved by taking steps that 
would eventually lead to the landowners having to give up the concessions 
they had bought. De Wilde in particular was not afraid to resist these efforts 
forcefully. At the end of 1819, when he no longer found a sympathetic ear 
among the leading off icials in the colonial headquarters, he returned to 
the Netherlands to plead his case at the highest level, starting with the 
Minister for the Colonies. With the help of friends, his petition reached 
the King and, in June 1821, he was granted an audience at which he had the 
opportunity to reveal his ambitious plans to Willem I. It would take little 
effort, he told the King, to increase coffee production to a much higher 
level, but f irst a higher price would have to be paid for it. If not, then the 
large estate owners would have no other choice than to switch to other 
crops. A month later, without consulting Van der Capellen, the King gave 
De Wilde permission to sell coffee at the free market rate rather than supply 
it to the government. The ruling in which this agreement was laid down, 
which the Commissioner-General in Batavia was informed of a little later 
by the Minister, also stipulated that the private landowners would receive 
reimbursement equal to the average market price for their loss of income 
in the previous period and for the coming two years. This expression of 
the monarch’s goodwill was not well received by the policy-makers in the 
colony, not least so because De Wilde justif ied his decision to bypass the 
colonial bureaucracy by claiming that he was in a hurry and that the high 
command in Batavia would probably ‘not feel authorized to decide on his 
petition’ (De Haan I, 1910: 299). Despite the fact that the King’s ruling was 
clearly not open to different interpretations, this is exactly what happened. 
When De Wilde, thinking he had won his case, returned to Sukabami a 
year later he was accompanied by an entourage that included not only a 
music tutor for piano and organ – for the diversion of his recently acquired 
young wife – but also an agricultural expert, a veterinary doctor and a 
horticulturalist together with his family. On arrival he was, however, given 
to understand that the royal order was still under deliberation. It soon 
became clear this delay would be permanent. With the affair thus brought 
to an end, there was no longer any need to raise the price of coffee supplied 
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by the private landowners closer to that of the market. Elout had set out in 
an advisory memorandum why granting De Wilde’s petition would have 
been unwise. His arguments included the claim that privileging the owner 
of Sukabumi would have an unfavourable effect on the peasants in the 
adjoining Priangan region, raising their hopes of getting a higher price for 
their coffee. Elout expressed the fear that this would also have a negative 
impact on production.
It is a fact ... that the Javanese in the Priangan Regencies have very few 
needs, that they are now accustomed to the price they are paid, that any 
increase in the price would lead many, even the majority, not to increase 
their production but have the opposite effect on some who, seeing that 
they could earn enough money to satisfy their simple needs by selling 
less coffee, would settle for that lower level of production and not make 
the effort to earn more. (Ottow 1937: 94)
The belief that indigenous producers behaved non-economically had be-
come f ixed in the colonial mindset. As will be discussed in the Epilogue, 
it was the dogma that later grew into the inverse elasticity of supply and 
demand, as Boeke would include it in his theory of dualistic economy.
The already rather unfavourable policy climate for large-scale Euro-
pean agricultural colonization worsened under Commissioner-General 
Godert van der Capellen. Around 1820, the course of economic politics had 
undergone a radical change of which the European entrepreneurs in the 
principalities of Central Java and elsewhere on the island would also be 
the victims. The owners of private estates were now seen in off icial jargon 
as ‘parasitic plants’. Besides scepticism about their economic proficiency, 
political reservations now added grist to the mill of those who opposed 
alienated land ownership. Aware that they were f ighting a losing battle 
– staying on any longer was no longer advisable as the government, in 
collusion with the regent of Cianjur, was turning the people of Sukabumi 
against the expatriate owners of the privatized enclave in the highlands – 
De Wilde and Engelhard made it clear after a few months that they would 
be willing to settle for compensation. The government set up a commission 
to negotiate the price. To f ight their case, the owners of the huge property 
called in a man who seemed to enjoy eternal life on the colonial stage: 
Muntinghe. With him as their intermediary, the parties reached agreement 
early in 1823 on a purchase price of 800,000 guilders. De Wilde left the colony 
shortly afterwards, this time for good. His disappearance signif ied the 
restoration of the Priangan Regencies as a sealed off reserve set aside for the 
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compulsory cultivation and delivery of coffee. And as a region where, under 
the overall supervision of a handful of European off icials, the indigenous 
gentry remained in control. They were in charge here, and the peasants paid 
tribute to them only, and not to outsiders, especially private landowners. 
The erosion of what passed for the traditional order had come to an end.
What De Wilde considered his life’s work had come to a premature and 
ungracious end. In a memoir written many years later the agro-industrial 
man of business described with due pride the pioneering role he had played 
and in which he had been thwarted by conservative forces that had gained 
the upper hand. In his perception, the landed gentry were completely 
superfluous as middlemen between the peasantry and the government. 
Extortion and repression were the inevitable consequences of this form of 
indigenous authority. He recommended dismissing the local chiefs, with 
the right to an annual purse, and replacing them with a corps of competent 
Dutch off icials familiar with the country, its language and its people. When 
Dutch rule was restored, rather than adopting De Wilde’s proposed path to 
the new era, the government chose to repair a system which was already 
known to be inadequate to achieve the acceleration of the economy that it 
had in mind. The alternative model of colonial exploitation that De Wilde 
advocated – replacing the regents as the supervisors of the coffee production 
by European landowners as private entrepreneurs, had come half a century 
too early.
The policy dispute continues
Godert van der Capellen had emerged the victor and he made no efforts 
to disguise his satisfaction. Under Resident Gerrit van Motman, the cof-
fee production in the Priangan remained at a disappointingly low level 
between 1817 and 1820. The latter’s successor, Robert van der Capellen, 
managed to improve these results, much to the satisfaction of his brother, 
the Commissioner-General. Whether the Sundanese peasants had equal 
reason to be content is extremely doubtful. Coffee cultivation continued 
and increased, but remained as unfree as before. In 1822, the Commissioner-
General produced a long ‘colonization report’ in response to those who 
criticized this course explaining what in his changed view would be the 
best basic policy from the perspective of maximum profitability for the me-
tropolis – that was, as always, the main priority – and for the development of 
the country and people of the East Indies. Although the report bore Van der 
Capellen’s name, there is little reason to doubt the verdict voiced by Ottow 
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that it had been written by Muntinghe. The Commissioner-General had 
learned from his experience in previous years that the political economy of 
Java should not rely on European colonists practising small- or large-scale 
agriculture. Of course, there was something to be said for using the colony 
to relieve the metropolis of the pressure of possible over-population and 
of a social class that had not fared well back home, offering the prospects 
of economic recovery in a new environment. However, as had occurred in 
other colonies, the expatriate population of overseas possessions would at 
some point wish to gain independence from the mother country. A relation 
of brotherhood would then develop with the newly independent state. 
After all, it would be populated by Asiatic Dutch descendants of the same 
tribe. The report did not describe the consequences of this scenario for the 
indigenous peasantry, considering the advantages and disadvantages only 
from a European perspective.
The small-scale farmer option was rejected straightaway. The arrival of 
large numbers of white peasant colonists from Europe to till the land was 
not a realistic proposition. Experiments along these lines by the VOC in the 
eighteenth century had been a miserable failure. This was not only because 
the labour capacity of the Europeans was not suited to a tropical climate. 
The strenuous effort that the settlers would have to make was far beneath 
the dignity of the native gentry, while manual labour in any form could 
be performed by simple indigenous peasants at a much lower price. Both 
general social and more specif ic economic considerations therefore made it 
necessary to reject this alternative. No doubt, the situation was completely 
different for big agribusiness, as it already existed on a limited scale and 
there were increasingly vocal calls to expand it. But, the report explained, 
it had by no means proved its value in practice. The reporter warned that 
European knowledge and entrepreneurial spirit, inasmuch as there was 
a need for it in the cultivation of tropical crops, should be applied with 
the utmost caution. As far as the cultivation of food was concerned, only 
poverty stood in the way of Javanese peasants increasing their production 
of paddy and other daily necessities. There was nothing to be gained at all 
from allowing European entrepreneurs access to the growing agro-industry. 
It was therefore not surprising that Van der Capellen, with Muntinghe as his 
ghost-writer, was accused of obstructing this alternative, i.e. private estates 
in the hands of non-natives as much as possible, with the ultimate inten-
tion of expelling them from Java entirely. Although this part of the report 
focused on how agrarian production should be increased, it also stated in 
the clearest terms that, while the government – by virtue of its dominion 
over the colony – had acquired ownership of all cultivated and uncultivated 
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lands, its power over both populated and less populated areas was restricted 
by indigenous norms and customs. The government was therefore not free 
to alienate the land and the labour power of the peasants that lived on it 
into private hands (Ottow 1937: 267). The report made a passionate plea 
for the state to develop the potential surplus value of the colony. It argued 
that, if all land were surrendered to European colonists, it was bound to 
generate less prof it for the state in 25 years than it would in a single year of 
indigenous rule under the direct supervision of the government. It is not 
diff icult to see in this statement the principles that would later constitute 
the essence of the cultivation system that would be introduced less than 
ten years later. Van der Capellen was known as a supporter of liberal views. 
But the question was what that entailed, besides his rejection of the regime 
of coercion and monopoly from the VOC era. The colonization report noted 
that what may have been considered liberal 3,000 miles away would have 
an extremely illiberal effect here in the colony. So what was seen as liberal: 
opening the colony to foreign capital rather than relying on internal ac-
cumulation, promoting private initiatives rather than the interests of the 
state in an entrepreneurial role, preferring agribusinesses to small-scale 
popular farming, replacing unfree with free labour, or combining these 
options in one way or another? The answers given in the report are by 
no means always clear. What Van der Capellen rejected in any case was 
colonization in the form of settler migration from the metropolis or – and 
this was much closer to colonial reality in the f irst half of the nineteenth 
century – surrendering Javanese land and the peasants that lived on it to 
large-scale European agro-industry. Van der Capellen strongly resisted 
the intrusion of capitalist enterprise presented as a liberal solution by its 
protagonists (Rengers van Welderen 1947: 153). It was the denial of the latter 
policy that aroused the displeasure of an important business lobby in the 
colony that had the sympathy of King Willem I and his closest advisers. The 
Commissioner-General had not restricted himself to a theoretical rejection 
of private land ownership, but had put his ideas into practice by nullifying, 
in 1823, all land rental contracts that European and their Chinese partners 
had concluded with the indigenous aristocracy in the principalities of 
Central Java. Van der Capellen’s opponents blamed this decision for the 
widespread revolt that broke out shortly afterwards and which took f ive 
years to bring under control. According to an alternative interpretation, this 
revolt – known as the Java War (1825-30) – was caused by the exploitation 
and repression of the local peasants whose chiefs had contracted them out, 
together with the land, to the new class of foreign entrepreneurs to cultivate 
commercial crops. Willem van Hogendorp, who travelled through Central 
GovernMent reGuLated exPLoitation versus Private aGribusiness 161
Java in 1827, believed that the people’s hatred of coffee cultivation was an 
important reason for the broad support enjoyed by the leader of the revolt, 
Dipanegara, in the early years of the war (Carey 2007: 466). At the time, 
however, the f irst interpretation was more popular, and one which – after 
being informed of the situation by the Resident of Yogyakarta, who acted as 
the representative of the planters’ lobby – the King and his close confidants 
adhered to. It was time for a change of course, not only to generate more 
profits for the metropolis, but also to cover the costs of a colonial apparatus 
that now found itself in a state of war. The f inancial situation in the colony 
was no less dire than it was in the Netherlands. It did not help that the coffee 
price, after an initial rise, had been falling severely and consistently since 
1822-23, and this continued for the f irst few years after the introduction of 
the cultivation system. Based on cheap land rates and slave labour, Brazil’s 
exports rapidly increased after the country had gained independence in 
1822. By 1850, Brazil was producing over half the world’s beans. Amsterdam 
remained the main entrepôt in the global coffee market but the shift in 
production resulted in a discrepancy between supply and demand which 
hit the volume imported from Java esspecially hard (Stevens 1982: 95-122; 
Clarence-Smith and Topik: 2003: 31).
By 1826, Van der Capellen had served his turn and was replaced by Vis-
count Leonard du Bus de Gisignies. The new Commissioner-General was 
sent to the East Indies with orders to do what his predecessor had failed to 
do: to put the liberal principles into practice by promoting the widespread 
foundation of large-scale private agribusinesses. Van der Capellen had 
f iercely disputed both the economic benefits and the political desirability 
of this strategy for colonial development. Du Bus took with him Willem van 
Hogendorp, the son of Gijsbert Karel,18 who illustrated his anti-statist views 
by pointing to the situation in the Priangan region, where the regents were 
extremely wealthy and the peasants lived in abject poverty. It could not be 
denied, he proclaimed, that the forced cultivation of coffee in the region had 
proved much more profitable than the pseudo-freedom that characterized 
agricultural production in the rest of Java. In his view, however, hanging on 
to this lucrative monopoly in the longer term also had a great disadvantage: 
the lack of purchasing power among the local population meant that there 
were no opportunities to develop a market here for products imported from 
the metropolis.
18 Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp had facilitated the return of the Orange Nassau dynasty and 
the installation of Willem I as King of the United Netherlands in 1815.
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It was now Van Hogendorp’s turn to write a colonization report (included 
in Steijn Parvé 1851), in which he, as an early-nineteenth-century advocate 
of the free market doctrine, argued in favour of the import of capital and 
business acumen from Europe for the cultivation of new land. The author’s 
liberal views, however, did not extend to concern about the Sundanese 
peasants who had to continue to work in a state of unfreedom. The report 
said little or nothing about protecting the population from injustice and 
abuse. Van Hogendorp did not have a very high opinion of the willingness 
of the native peasantry to work hard and improve their economic situation. 
The new-style European entrepreneurs should set a good example. He be-
lieved that the feudal subordination of the people to their own chiefs should 
be transferred to the European colonists who could act as white regents 
and help preserve law and order (Steijn Parvé 1851: 257). The advocates of 
liberalization hardly had the opportunity, however, to try out their propos-
als on intransigent colonial reality. The f irst results were anything but 
encouraging. The path they showed to the future seemed for the time being 
to be a dead end due a lack of energy, cooperation and even interest from 
the social class which they had envisaged as launching private initiatives 
and being equipped with agro-industrial know-how. It is unlikely that their 
proposal to give the much larger group of European settlers that they saw 
as emerging greater authority over the indigenous population was received 
with open arms within the governmental apparatus. Reports of overt op-
position to their plans from these quarters were rare, however. There were 
other, more direct reasons why this policy was doomed to failure, the most 
important being the lack of a suff icient supply of capital and qualif ied 
entrepreneurs. The returns of the existing large-scale agribusinesses on 
Java varied considerably. The risk of disappointing results hampered the 
investment of more agro-industrial capital on a large scale and there was 
also very limited expertise to manage it effectively. The time was not yet ripe 
for the up-and-coming planter-entrepreneur; this would not really come 
until well into the second half of the nineteenth century. There were also 
political objections to dividing Java up into private estates, with European 
colonists putting the local population to work, at a time that the colonial 
state had not yet sufficiently established itself. Van der Capellen had warned 
about the political consequences of this in his colonization report.
The whole form of rule in the Indies is untenable with this unlimited 
colonization by Europeans, and would in the shortest time be completely 
set on its head. The separation of these colonies from the metropolis 
would be brought forward to an inopportune moment, and the richest 
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jewel in the crown of the Netherlands, would be ripped off by unholy 
hands. (Ottow 1937: 292)
There was another argument in favour of declaring the colonial economy 
a matter of state business. For a century, the monopoly had been restricted 
to the sphere of production: the exclusive cultivation and supply of com-
mercial crops, at f irst to the VOC and then to the government. The next step 
was to extend it to shipping the coffee and selling it on the global market. 
Although the East Indies had been returned to the Netherlands in 1817 
after the British interlude, in economic terms the foreign influence had not 
been shaken off by far. Raffles had set himself the goal, with the creation 
of Singapore, of gaining control of Southeast Asian trade and inter-insular 
traff ic in the archipelago remained in non-Dutch hands for several decades 
(Mansvelt 1938). Perhaps most striking of all, the majority of trading houses 
and shipping companies in the Indies were in foreign, mainly British, hands. 
In the VOC era, ships flying the Company flag carried the largest share of 
the colonial products to Europe for export, but the French occupation of 
Holland in 1795 made the VOC’s home ports inaccessible as a result of the 
British blockade of the coast. This led to goods being sold directly from the 
warehouses in Batavia to foreign traders who were neutral in the continen-
tal wars. Around the turn of the century, they carried large quantities of 
coffee to Atlantic ports that had remained outside the conflict. The free 
shipping traff ic that grew up in the archipelago ensured that coffee from 
the Priangan remained reasonably saleable, but the price that had to be 
paid for this solution was the loss of the trade monopoly. It was once again 
the indestructible Muntinghe, designated by Raffles in 1817 in a letter to 
Van Hogendorp as the linchpin of colonial policy-making, who persuaded 
Willem I of the danger of the dominant role of British trade and shipping 
in the archipelago. His conversations with the King while taking leave 
the Netherlands in 1823 led a year later to the establishment of the Dutch 
Trading Company (NHM). The recalcitrance that Muntinghe had displayed 
throughout his long career stood in the way of his appointment as a director. 
The initiative for which he had given the prime impulse was grounded in the 
desire to retain the profits of the colonial economy for the Netherlands and, 
as in the days of the VOC, to tolerate as little foreign competition as possible. 
It was a kill-or-cure remedy because it not only denied foreign competitors 
access to the Indies, but also Dutch entrepreneurs; they would not gain 
a position of some signif icance until the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Nor did the measure produce the desired effect immediately. 
Success only came with the introduction of the cultivation system, when 
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the revenues of the production ordered by the government were given to 
the NHM in consignation. The NHM became the commercial complement 
of the forced cultivation and delivery to the government of colonial goods. 
It was subsequently given sole rights to ship and sell the goods on arrival 
in Europe. This decision created one long monopoly chain that started 
with forced cultivation in the Sunda highlands and ended with the buyers 
at the coffee auctions in Amsterdam. The archipelago, which had always 
been an exploitation colony, became more than ever the overseas pool for 
Dutch economic interests. The close relationship that had been established 
between production and distribution called for uniform management – by 
the government.
Political turmoil at home
A separate study would be required to do justice to the restructuring of the 
relationship between the colony and the metropolis from the end of the 
eighteenth century onwards. Such an endeavour is beyond my current study, 
which essentially remains limited to a treatise on the Priangan system in 
successive stages of colonial exploitation. The insolvency and subsequent 
collapse of the Dutch East Indies Company at the end of the eighteenth 
century coincided with radical shifts in the political constellation at home. 
This upheaval, again, had major repercussions on how to govern the colonial 
domain. In order to comprehend the new state regime that came about I 
shall outline in a brief summary what happened in the metropolis and 
the consequences of this change in the political setting for the promotion 
and outcome of the policies pursued in what was and would remain the 
Netherlands’ major colonial domain.
The Republic of the United Netherlands, formed by seven provinces in 
the sixteenth century, had by the eighteenth century fallen into a state of 
stagnation and regression. The trade and industry that had generated so 
much prof itable activity was in decline as the focus of the international 
economy shifted to new routes and commodities. As a consequence of 
increasing protectionism, the textile industry in particular saw its markets 
dissipate and the ensuing loss of employment caused severe economic 
distress in many towns that had grown prosperous around it. Dutch society 
retained its strong agrarian-cum-artisanal character. Where there was a 
gradual transition to machine-based production in other parts of Europe, 
the development of industrial capitalism in the Netherlands did not progress 
past the manufacturing stage. The country’s extensive maritime industry 
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– f ishing, shipbuilding, sail- and rope-making – fell into decay. A large 
proportion of the population – which had grown only to a little under 
two million at the end of the eighteenth century – led a miserable, often 
impoverished existence. A telling comment was made by a foreign visitor 
to this parochial landscape.
In such circumstances this trading nation must be in a bad way. Most 
of their principal towns are sadly decayed, and instead of f inding every 
mortal employed you meet with multitudes of poor creatures who are 
starving in idleness. Utrecht is remarkably ruined. There are whole lanes 
of wretches who have no other subsistence than potatoes, gin, and stuff 
which they call tea and coffee… (Pottle 1952: 287)
This picture that James Boswell painted of Utrecht in the early 1760s was 
typical of many urban locations. The situation was no less critical in the 
countryside, though it was less visible in the public eye. The prevailing 
misery was of course not equally desperate for everyone or across the 
board. The slave trade, for instance, remained a very profitable business 
as shipping black humans from Africa to America was a lucrative source 
of income for the merchants and conveyors of this valuable commodity. In 
some sectors and provinces, it is also possible that the decline largely took 
place in the f irst half of the eighteenth century followed by a slight recovery 
in later years. A lack of exact f igures and more detailed information makes 
it diff icult to draw up the balance of economic progress and regression. The 
outcome was in any case a widespread deterioration in standards of living 
and a growing divide between rich and poor.
The skewed distribution between society’s top and bottom also became 
politically manifest. The divisions between the supporters of the Orangist 
party and the Patriots, who were more in favour of a republican system, 
were not new but, partly under pressure from the political turbulence in 
continental Europe, became more sharply def ined. The rank and f ile on 
both sides were now embroiled in armed clashes. The political coup d’état 
by stadtholder Willem V, prince of the house of Orange-Nassau, in 1787 
brought an end to the swelling tide of the republican cause (Schama 1977). 
Defeated in their contest for state power, many of the leading Patriots went 
into exile in France from where they propagated the ideals of the revolution 
that came soon afterwards. When French troops invaded the Netherlands, 
Willem left the country and in 1795 the Batavian Republic was declared, 
named after a Germanic tribe that had challenged the might of the Roman 
empire in the remote past. A revised constitution enacted in 1801 expanded 
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political representation and conceded civil rights withheld earlier. But the 
emancipatory ideals of the revolution remained inoperative outside the 
metropolis. A study of the impact of Patriotic politics on the handling of 
colonial affairs concluded that the principles of the Enlightenment were 
considered not to apply to people of other races. Pamphlets condemning 
slavery were distributed and discussed as a crime against humanity but 
the sentiments expressed by radical reformers were not widely shared and 
certainly not by the main policy-makers. Treating whites and non-whites 
equally would have endangered the profits made overseas.
The explanation may be found partly in the inconsistencies present in 
that way of thinking, partly in the inability of the ‘Patriots’ to pursue a 
clearly def ined policy of their own under unfavourable circumstances, 
and above all in their clinging to the possession of colonies for the benefit 
of Dutch prosperity (Schutte 1970: 223).
The new state formation remained f irmly under French tutelage although 
the allegiance became less rigorous with the installation of Napoleon’s 
brother as King of Holland in 1806. But this regime change was also a short 
interval, ending with the annexation of the provinces as departments into 
the French empire in 1810. Again, this was short-lived, as the breakdown 
of the Napoleonic project led to yet another restructuring of the territorial 
boundaries of the lowlands.
The radical uprisings throughout Europe had failed and what followed 
was an anti-democratic restoration of political power also embodied in the 
return of monarchical governance. At the Vienna Congress in 1815, the allied 
nations which had joined forces to resist the expansion of France in Europe 
agreed to the formation of the new Kingdom of the United (i.e. North and 
South) Netherlands. The monarch foisted on the amalgamated population 
of Belgium and the erstwhile Netherlands by international diplomacy was 
the son of the late stadtholder of Oranje-Nassau who proclaimed himself 
sovereign King Willem I. The geopolitical shift engineered by Great Britain 
and Prussia in tandem aimed to hold France, now cut down in size ter-
ritorially, in containment by creating a buffer state on its northern borders. 
Being upgraded to a higher political stature in continental Europe came 
at a price for the Netherlands – the loss of most of the maritime colonies 
it had acquired in Africa and Asia during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. At the time of the French occupation the British had taken over 
a number of important enclaves conquered and retained by the VOC. After 
Napoleon’s downfall, Britain refused to hand back most of the appropriated 
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Dutch colonies, seeing its ambition to become a global power realized with 
the help of mostly coastal settlements it had acquired outside Europe. The 
only prize the Dutch regained in Asia was Java, not much larger than the 
territory of the new kingdom in the metropolis. Admittedly, that overseas 
possession would subsequently grow into a much larger domain, the Neth-
erlands East Indies, but that did not occur until later in the nineteenth 
century and only because the British understood that the spread of Dutch 
imperialism in the archipelago was less of a risk than allowing the French 
or, possibly also the Germans, to penetrate into this resource-rich region 
in Southeast Asia. It was the protection as a client state which enabled 
the parochial metropolis – by grabbing what came to be called ‘the Outer 
Islands’ and incorporating them into the colonial state – to slowly build up 
the framework of the giant Indonesia as we know it today.
The United Kingdom of the Netherlands did not start with an upswing 
in the economy. The malaise of the preceding decades had lingered on and 
was further aggravated in the wake of the changes to the continental system 
introduced by Napoleon. When the British imposed a naval blockade on the 
coasts of France in 1806, he retaliated by proclaiming an embargo on all Brit-
ish commodities in the many parts on the continent under his control. Both 
Belgian and Dutch trade and industry bore the brunt of being cut off from 
import and export traff ic overseas. The economy of Amsterdam, the main 
harbour, was badly affected by the maritime blockade. Shipyards which 
had employed some 2000 carpenters and other craftsmen in 1800, closed up 
shop. In 1765 less than 10 per cent of the urban population depended on poor 
relief but from 1807-09 not less than 40 per cent lived on charity. There was 
a strong rise in the number of beggars and, according to police reports, each 
and every day ten babies were left abandoned in the streets. From 240,000 
in 1730 Amsterdam’s population dwindled to little more than 180,000 in 1805 
(Joor 2015: 266). The economic and social havoc caused by the ceaseless wars 
which Napoleon had waged throughout the continent continued in the f irst 
few decades of the nineteenth century. Political turmoil contributed again 
to the protracted economic stagnation. Belgium ventured to split off in 1830 
because Willem I, who proved to be an autocratic ruler, refused to meet 
demands for reform. A burden to the remaining state budget, the dispute 
lasted until 1839 and ended with partition of the united territory along the 
old demarcation lines between the northern and southern Netherlands. It 
was a humiliating blow to the King’s grand design to be acknowledged as a 
top-ranking state-builder and power contender in the new Europe. A no less 
severe setback was the war fought against Dutch rule in Central Java from 
1825 to 1830 at heavy military cost. Willem I took it upon himself to reduce 
168 MobiLizinG Labour for the GLobaL Coffee Market
the deficit and the colony was of crucial importance in the sustained effort 
to boost the metropolitan economy with higher growth rates. Achieving 
this major objective, the production of a rapidly rising colonial surplus, 
became the state’s core business.
A small coterie of counsellors unswervingly loyal to the King advised 
him on how to solve that prime question, rather than the national assembly, 
which had hardly any say in determining the framework and course of for-
eign policy. Willem tolerated no outside – let alone public – interference in 
his handling of colonial affairs and treated the tenaciously held possession 
in the East Indies as crown property. He chose from among his circle of Royal 
favourites who to send to Java with the mission to organize the ‘surplus’ 
and extract it for repatriation. The successful candidates were elevated to 
the rank of a nouveau nobility, an innovation which tended to be regarded 
with disdain by those holding titles of older and more feudal vintage. In 
the next chapter we shall return to the Priangan coffee lands to examine 
what these Royal emissaries did to comply with the instructions of their 
overlord. Willem I dictated his policies with brazenness and promulgated 
them in Royal decrees without bothering, even in a show of semblance, 
to involve parliament as a main stakeholder. His cunning temperament 
and obnoxious stubbornness not to compromise on the powers he had 
usurped was a major reason for his downfall. In 1840 he stepped back, 
having grudgingly been obliged to settle the dispute with Belgium, but more 
tellingly because of his absolutist intransigence to be held accountable for 
his f inancial misdemeanours in colonial affairs. What was called ‘the Indies 
def icit’ deferred to a style of bookkeeping which implied that the colony 
had to provide most of the cash required for running the metropolitan 
economy in a way that defeated monitoring by political guardians who were 
sitting in parliament and insisted on a clear divide between the Royal purse 
and the national treasury. His intractability in providing information on 
income and expenditure stood the King in good stead as a private man of 
fortune. When he crowned himself in 1815, Willem I’s fortune was valued 
at 20 million guilders and the wealth he amassed once in kingly power was 
said in 1840 to have amounted to 200 million guilders. Colonial exploitation 
had been profitable, if not for the Dutch population at large than certainly 
for their ruler, who went down in history as the Merchant King.
V Unfree labour as a condition for 
progress
Shifting coffee cultivation to gardens
The initial practice of permitting peasants to plant coffee near to their 
homes had the advantage that they could combine the work of tending to 
the new crop with what had always been their priority: producing food for 
their own subsistence. Using the balubur – the regents’ own f ields – for the 
compulsory cultivation of coffee, with their subjects coming in turn to the 
main negorij from near and far, could also be interpreted as a continuation 
of existing relations of servitude. But the progressive rise in production 
towards the end of the eighteenth century led to this system being revised. 
The peasants indicated that there was no more land around their homes 
to grow more coffee or claimed that these f ields were depleted through 
over-use (De Haan III, 1912: 610). More important than the lack of space 
in and around the peasant settlements was the fact that it was impossible 
for the Commissioner and his small staff of coffee sergeants to conduct 
regular inspections of the numerous and widely scattered plots of land. 
Both problems made it necessary to organize the cultivation of coffee along 
different lines, moving it to more remote, as yet uncultivated, land. The 
objection that the new coffee gardens were further from the settlements 
was outweighed by the advantage that there was ample space to expand 
into the forest around them, as they were far from any human habitation 
and land already in regular use to grow food.
The f irst hillside coffee gardens were laid out at the end of the eighteenth 
century and required the mobilization of an enormous army of labour. 
First of all, the land had to be cleared by chopping down and burning the 
trees. Levelling the ground was especially time-consuming as terraces had 
to be constructed on the slopes to stop the soil being washed away. After 
that the soil had to be tilled repeatedly with a pacul, a kind of hoe, and all 
the stubble and stones removed. The gardens were divided into sections 
by broad paths and the outer boundary was marked by a fence and a moat, 
which served to carry off excess water and to keep wild animals at bay. 
Tigers and rhinoceroses made the forests and the mountains unsafe until 
deep into the nineteenth century. The remote and inaccessible locations 
of the coffee gardens fuelled the fears of the labourers mobilized from far 
and wide to prepare the land for cultivation that they would be attacked by 
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predators on the way to and from their work. If there were reports of tigers 
being seen in the area, they would refuse to go (De Haan I, 1910: 155-6; see 
also III; 1912: 612-3). It is hardly surprising then that many peasants left their 
habitats on hearing that they were shortly to be set to work to construct 
hillside coffee gardens in distant places.
Coffee saplings were initially planted using shoots that had germinated 
from fallen berries under existing trees. It was not until later that they 
were f irst grown in nursery plots and then, after two years, transferred to 
the garden, where they would start to bear fruit after another two years. 
To prevent the trees from growing together, they had to be planted six to 
eight feet apart. This meant that it remained possible to walk between 
them. After every two rows in both directions, there was a row of dadap 
trees, which were planted before the coffee shrubs and grew high enough 
to keep them in the shade. This practice continued until the discovery that 
the coffee trees did not need shade in the higher zones, because the sun 
was weaker. From 1807 it was no longer permitted to plant paddy or pisang 
shrubs between the coffee trees. As this was a break with a long-standing 
tradition, it was not at f irst strictly enforced. Later, however, orders were 
issued to uproot paddy and pisang that had been planted between the 
young trees. Everything other than coffee was banished from the gardens. 
According to the colonial off icials, this gave a neater impression. They 
showed no concern for the benefits the planters had enjoyed from growing 
other crops in the gardens while the coffee shrubs were still developing.
During the f irst three years the planters had to return once a month to 
the garden to remove the weeds that grew between the trees and to remove 
leaves and fallen branches from the paths. Off icially, this maintenance 
work was intended to make it easier to pick the berries, but the inspectors 
also wanted to keep the gardens neat and tidy. It would later be discovered 
that loosening the soil regularly with a hoe made the fertile upper layer 
wash away more quickly, reducing the yield. To prevent the trees from 
growing too high for the berries on the top branches to be picked by hand, 
the trunks were topped off, while the lower branches were also removed 
to leave room on the ground for fallen berries. Topping off the trunks was 
considered a good way of restoring the growing power of old trees until it 
was discovered that this very labour-intensive operation did not have the 
desired effect. It became normal practice to abandon coffee gardens that 
had been in production longer than six to eight years and replace them 
with new ones, since there was no shortage of uncultivated land at a more 
elevated level in the Sunda highlands. Picking the berries was extremely 
labour-intensive and, because they were not all ripe at the same time, could 
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take two to three months. This meant that the planter and his family had to 
relocate to the garden for this whole period, because they lived too far away 
to cover the distance every day. They had to take enough food with them for 
the duration of their stay, or arrange for a regular supply to be brought up. 
When the coffee was still grown close to the villages, the beans were dried 
over a wooden f ire in the yard around the peasant’s homestead but, after 
it was moved to the gardens, this took place there, too. Instead of carrying 
the wet berries to the settlements after picking, the planters removed the 
flesh and husked the beans on the spot. The beans were then spread out 
in bamboo drying sheds, under which a small f ire smouldered day and 
night. The army of harvesters would also sleep in these covered sheds at 
night and take shelter there during heavy rainfall. Speaking from his own 
experience, De Wilde noted details that were not to be found in any of the 
off icial reports, because his account also refers to the inspection practices.
In such work-sites there are usually one or more blocks of wood with 
holes, in which the feet of lower Chiefs and common people are locked, 
for the slightest misdemeanour, for several hours, a whole day or longer, 
by way of punishment. These are deeds that the Javanese Chiefs commit 
in the highlands, with or without the knowledge of the Regents and 
Sergeants. ... In some districts, when the Resident, or some other high-
ranking f igure, comes to inspect the coffee gardens unexpectedly, the 
people are driven into the mountains at night to clean the gardens by 
torchlight. I know for a fact that, on one of these occasions, an old woman 
was dragged off by a tiger. (1830: 184)
The advantages of growing coffee in gardens were self-evident. It was much 
easier to monitor these large-scale cultivated estates than small plots widely 
dispersed throughout a much more diverse agrarian landscape. Separate 
sections in the gardens were allocated to labourers from different villages 
and numbered pickets stated how many trees had been planted and when. 
With the various sections subdivided by the footpaths, it was possible to 
organize the work even further by allocating plots to individual households 
mobilized for cultivation. The gardens were accessible only through an 
opening in the perimeter fence, which reinforced the sense of conf ine-
ment. Shifting the cultivation of coffee to gardens was driven not only by 
the lack of suff icient waste land for large-scale production nearer to the 
peasant settlements, but also by the desire to keep both the coffee and the 
planters under close surveillance. Although the ‘hedge’ and kampung coffee 
continued to be grown for many more years it was considered less effective, 
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because it was small-scale and difficult to keep track of (De Haan I, 1910: 154). 
The distance between the peasants’ homesteads, where they grew their food 
crops, and the coffee gardens where they worked for the colonial tribute 
was certainly a major nuisance. At f irst, efforts were made to keep the 
distance to a minimum. A modified instruction that came into force in 1805 
contained the provision that the most suitable land must be chosen ‘as close 
as possible to the campongs’, but the decisive criterion was that the gardens 
must not be too far apart. This condition, stipulated for the convenience 
of the colonial inspectors, was given priority over the distance from the 
settlements. The order issued by Rolff when he was Commissioner in 1789 
that every household had to tend to 1,000 coffee trees each year and to plant 
new trees until this number was reached, actually heralded the transition 
to larger-scale cultivation. Gardens with 200,000 trees or more needed a 
large area of forested land, and that lay beyond the zones where peasant 
agriculture was concentrated. The latter were located on lower ground in 
valleys where rivers or streams flowed, while coffee proved to thrive best 
on higher land in the mountains. This meant that the coffee planters not 
only had to cover great distances, but also differences in altitude, making 
the journey even longer and more laborious. While it might take 20 minutes 
to walk a pole’s distance on flat ground, it could take twice as long climbing 
up a hillside. Rather than four hours, it would therefore require at least eight 
to reach a garden situated at a distance of 12 poles from a village.
Mobilizing labour
These large-scale enterprises may have been referred to as ‘gardens’, but 
they were in fact extensive plantations, prepared for cultivation by a large 
army of 1,000 or more menfolk recruited from far and wide. It was not 
uncommon for them to remain unproductive because the soil was not 
suitable, the trees were planted too close so that they grew together, or 
because the labourers deserted en masse due to bad treatment, lack of 
food and inadequate shelter during the cold nights and heavy rains. The 
term ‘mountain plantations’ is more accurate also because the mode of 
production differed substantially from the way coffee was grown in and 
around the villages. The work in the gardens was organized from the very 
beginning along more industrial lines. Early in the nineteenth century, 
an overseer was appointed to supervise the planters and ensure that the 
work progressed as it should in the different stages of production. He was 
in charge of a work gang, known as a t’rup, of some 30 to 50 labourers. This 
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mandador or kepala t’rup recruited the members of his gang from different 
settlements, brought them to the site of the new garden and stayed with 
them as long as the work of opening up the land lasted (De Haan III, 1912: 
615). The peasants allocated to the gang boss planted and tended the trees 
and were joined by their wives and children for the duration of the harvest, 
who would help with the picking, peeling and drying of the beans. Above 
the gang boss was a koemetir kopi, who was usually in charge of three gangs 
and reported to a native supervisor in charge of coffee production, who 
was responsible for ensuring that everything went according to plan in 
his district. He had to keep a ‘coffee book’ (a register of names of all the 
gardens and gang bosses, together with the number of labourers they had 
working for them), report to the Coffee Sergeant and accompany the regent 
and patih when they made their tour of the gardens. In this way, the native 
management gradually became more structured.
How much time did the peasants spend on raising the tribute? Daendels’ 
estimation of two months a year for each household was a wild guess with 
no basis in fact. The relocation of coffee cultivation to the hill plantations 
had increased the workload substantially. The order to maintain 1,000 
trees a year was a shot in the dark, not based on what the peasants could 
reasonably be expected to produce, but on the growing demand for this 
colonial commodity on the global market. The price paid to the planter 
was completely out of proportion with the profits made f irst by the VOC 
and then the colonial government. The picking alone took the planter and 
his family several months each year, not to mention the work of laying out 
the garden, the processing of the beans and their compulsory delivery to 
the warehouses. De Haan did not venture to estimate how much time this 
took, but concluded cautiously that it must have imposed a considerable 
burden on the planters and their families (De Haan I, 1910: 159). It was not 
only the amount of time involved, but the extremely low price the planters 
received and the fact that they were not paid a single cent for all the work 
done until they delivered the coffee. The involvement of the other members 
of the household in growing the coffee occurred almost unnoticed. The 
early notion that the planter would tend to the coffee trees and pick the 
berries, while the other family members would grow food and do all the 
other work, had long become obsolete. The whole family was considered 
subject to the tribute and, by the end of the eighteenth century, what started 
as a secondary activity alongside meeting the household’s basic needs, had 
become the peasants’ household main occupation. According to the colonial 
wisdom of the time, the heavier burden would act as an incentive to the 
indigenous economy (De Salis 1809: 25).
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Transporting the now much greater volume of coffee from the highlands 
to the coast continued to be a serious problem. On his arrival in 1808, 
Daendels noted that there were hardly any paved roads inland. Traff ic 
had to use narrow tracks that were almost impassable during the monsoon. 
The construction, on Daendels’ orders, of the Grote Postweg, the main road 
across Java, reduced the travelling time for mail and off icials with their 
equipment but, to limit damage to this long-distance route, it was closed for 
the transport of coffee. The beans were largely carried to the warehouses 
using buffalo, of which there was a serious shortage. Nicolaus Engelhard 
had already issued a ban on the export of pack animals from the Priangan 
regencies as early as 1793. To prevent them from being requisitioned for the 
notorious coffee caravans, the peasants hid their draught animals, which 
they needed to tend their paddy f ields, or sold them off. Some of them 
preferred to carry the coffee on their own backs and spare their animals, 
which were valuable and scarce possessions. They could transport the coffee 
on foot if they were permitted to deliver it to a small local depot nearby, even 
though this meant that they received a lower price for their corvee labour. 
The existing warehouses at Cikao and Karangsambung were considerably 
expanded to be able to deal with the much greater supply. The long wait-
ing times on arrival and departure added to the privations that had to be 
endured during the journey. The footpaths taken by the caravans widened 
to become roads. In the bustle, animals were lost, injured or stolen, or died 
from exhaustion and lack of food. The journey progressed slowly through 
the diff icult terrain, no more than a few poles a day, so that it might take 
more than two months to complete the return journey. There was an added 
risk of being robbed by gangs roving around in the hinterland in search 
of booty: labour and animals to work in the sugar mills around Batavia. 
Lawick refuted these accounts, saying that the highland peasants were not 
being robbed at all but were in fact selling their draught animals to free 
themselves of the claims made by their chiefs not only on their labour but 
also on their possessions (De Haan IV, 1912: 556).
The introduction of carts to transport coffee, an innovation that did 
not start to take off until after the turn of the century, was an enormous 
improvement. It happened gradually and at f irst only on a few stretches, 
because the state of the roads did not permit them to be more widely used. 
The most common form of carts, pedatis, could of course carry more coffee 
than the pack animals. But the heavy, cumbersome vehicles, with their 
large, solid wooden wheels took a long time to cover any distance and 
caused considerable damage to the roads they used. So much so that the 
following caravan would have to seek out a new track, resulting in three or 
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four ‘roads’ running alongside each other. Using animals to pull the carts 
often meant that there were not enough left to plough the sawahs when 
they were most needed. Peasants’ priorities naturally lay with producing 
food rather than delivering coffee. They sabotaged the additional task by 
burying the beans they had picked, throw the sacks in which they were 
packed away or get someone else to take the burden off their hands at 
no cost or even for payment. They did so as not to lose the use of their 
own labour power and that of their buffaloes when they were needed to 
meet their own basic needs. The colonial authorities were aware that the 
forced cultivation of coffee could jeopardize food production. In 1804, Pieter 
Engelhard noted an excessive shortage of rice in all regencies. Expansion 
of the f ields planted with paddy progressed at an extremely slow pace. 
Resident Van Motman established in 1808 that the quantity of uncultivated 
land in the Priangan was many times larger than the area that had been 
Pedati. From the beginning of the 19th century, these unwieldy and heavy peasant 
carts facilitated the transport of coffee from the hinterland to the Company’s 
warehouses on the coast. The introduction of the pedati brought to an end the use 
of pack animals, mainly buffalo, for this purpose.
source: f. de haan – Priangan, vl. 1, p. 165
176 MobiLizinG Labour for the GLobaL Coffee Market
brought under cultivation: ‘generally speaking, it is safe to estimate that 
two-thirds to three-quarters of these lands are uncultivated wilderness’ (De 
Haan IV, 1912: 451). In 1809, the Prefect of the Cirebon Priangan Regencies 
reported to Daendels that the sawahs in his jurisdiction could only provide 
less than a third part of the food requirements of the population. The great 
majority of paddy was still grown on non-irrigated tipar and gaga. The 
forced labour in the coffee gardens meant that the peasants had insufficient 
time to convert the dry f ields into sawahs. This explains why Daendels, in 
his usual commanding style, ordered expansion of the area of irrigated land 
and made the local chiefs responsible for keeping a close eye on the rhythm 
of the agrarian calendar (Van Deventer I, 1865: 31-3). It was their task to 
ensure that the peasants had suff icient cattle and tools to till the land and 
that sowing and harvesting were not delayed. That this work schedule had 
to be achieved within the bounds of a policy that gave absolute priority to 
the forced cultivation and delivery of increasing quantities of coffee was a 
consequence that the Marshall and his subordinates were not prepared to 
accept. Their refusal to do so was based on both a lack of factual knowledge 
and unwillingness to recognize that these objectives were incompatible.
Expansion of forced labour
Immediately on his arrival Daendels showed himself to be a conf irmed 
supporter of the forced cultivation of coffee. He did not consider for one 
moment breaking with the old VOC regime as had been practised in the 
Priangan Regencies. He argued that the low state of development of the 
native population did not permit the transition to colonial production 
based on free labour. The Marshall resolutely rejected the argument that 
the Javanese had an aversion to the system of compulsory cultivation and 
delivery and wished instead to be recognized as the owners of the land they 
tilled. According to him, the peasants were accustomed to working for their 
chiefs since time immemorial and had no concept at all of agrarian property 
rights. As far as the situation in the Priangan lands was concerned, Daendels 
should have known better. In 1809 Lawick, at that time the Prefect of the 
Cirebon Priangan districts, had clarif ied to him that the land for growing 
crops did not belong to the regents. In Daendels’ view, the state’s forceful 
hand was necessary to ensure that the Javanese would pay their taxes 
without fail. The Governor-General even had his doubts if the incentive of 
compulsion could ever be lifted. He believed that these people had no other 
needs than to fulfil their absolutely basic requirements and were not willing 
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to work any harder than necessary to achieve this (Daendels 1814: 104). The 
ideas he had inherited from former VOC officials had also taught him that it 
would be highly inadvisable to encourage the peasants to want more than 
to satisfy their basic needs and to arouse a desire to aspire for progress that 
would make it diff icult to maintain their current state of dependency. Pieter 
Engelhard had expressed this standpoint early in the nineteenth century 
and, in 1829, when he was a member of parliament, Daniël François van 
Alphen had also argued against enlightening the indigenous population of 
Java. The introduction of a form of government that would increase their 
freedom of thought and action was out of the question (De Haan IV, 1912: 
738-9).
The notion that the cultivation and delivery of coffee was evenly dis-
tributed across the whole population was based on a far-reaching failure 
to acknowledge or, conversely, a desire to ignore the way in which local 
chiefs tried to manipulate the allocation of obligations in their own favour. 
Lawick satisf ied the arbitrariness of the chiefs in distributing the workload 
unevenly in 1808 by agreeing to a regulation stipulating that peasants per-
forming services for the regent or the district chiefs had to maintain only 
500 rather than 1,000 trees. In 1810 he reported to Daendels that many of 
the peasants liable to cultivation services remained unaccounted for (ibid., 
1912: 421). Possibly in response to reports of this nature, Daendels ordered in 
1811 that, if segments of the population temporarily or permanently evaded 
work in the coffee gardens, the remainder would have to make up the 
shortfall. This meant that the number of trees that each household had to 
maintain could rise to as high as 3,900 (ibid.: 786). In effect, this instruction 
boiled down to the fact that the colonial high command in charge of coffee 
production did not care who did the work, as long as it got done. The off icial 
policy was, however, to ensure that the workload was evenly distributed 
and to put a stop to the arbitrary way in which the chiefs treated their 
subordinates by relieving some of them of the burden, while overloading 
others to way above the norm. In short, the pretence was maintained that 
the whole population was or should be involved in the forced cultivation 
and supply of coffee.
Daendels’ attitude towards the gentry was far from accommodating and 
the way in which he treated them smacked of condescension. To make the 
difference in standing between them comprehensible, he gave them military 
ranks (Van Deventer I, 1865: 21) The Governor-General acknowledged that 
the chiefs were indispensable, as the inherent respect of the population for 
the aristocracy made it possible to continue and increase the cultivation 
of coffee. The peasants’ subordination to their chiefs should not, however, 
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be preserved and acknowledged at the expense of the dominant role of the 
government. The regents were therefore deprived of a number of judicial 
and police tasks that they had hitherto performed. Limiting the space in 
which the chiefs were accustomed to operating demanded their explicit 
obedience to the authority of the colonial government. The local chiefs were 
integrated into the colonial apparatus by giving them the status of civil 
servants, albeit without salary. As before, their income remained linked to 
the coffee money they collected: the regents received a rijksdaalder for every 
pikul supplied within their area of jurisdiction, a quarter of which they had 
to pass on to the chiefs under their command. Although this represented a 
substantial income for the patih and cutak chiefs, those in the lower ranks 
of the indigenous administration earned very little. They made up for what 
they did not receive formally by appropriating part of the peasants’ share. 
The European staff also shared in what was later to be called ‘cultivation 
commission’. The Commissioner and his successor, the Prefect, received a 
quarter of a rijksdaalder per pikul, as did the Sergeant. Lastly, the warehouse 
masters also received a sizeable commission, on top of what they charged 
for storing the coffee beans and for organizing the transport to the coast. 
In addition to these legal dues, they kept for themselves part of the cash 
payments set aside for the peasants when they delivered the coffee.
Despite the condescension and disdain that the regents had to endure, 
they had no reason to complain in material terms. Daendels decided to write 
off the enormous advances they had received in successive instalments 
and which tied them in debt to their European superiors in the colonial 
apparatus. The steady rise in coffee production increased their wealth, 
which they used to live in great opulence, an ostentatious display in which 
their large entourage of lower chiefs-cum-clients shared. The position of the 
Sundanese landed gentry and clergy suddenly became even more comfort-
able when Daendels quite unexpectedly decided to increase the cuke that 
the peasants were obliged to surrender from a tenth to a f ifth part of the 
rice harvest. In 1804, as Deputy Commissioner of Native Affairs, Lawick 
had informed his superiors who should benefit from this share, a motley 
crew of local chiefs. And this was not the last time the peasants’ burden 
was increased. The early-colonial state, the foundation of which was laid 
by Daendels, imposed demands on the availability of labour free of charge 
for infrastructural works, including the construction and maintenance 
of roads and bridges, off ices, warehouses and bungalows for off icials, for 
the transport of goods, mail and the colonial bosses, and – not in the last 
instance – to enable expatriate off icials to show their status in a similar 
way to the local chiefs – by having a retinue of minions at their disposal. 
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De Haan established rightly that the term ‘corvee services’ only became 
popular in Daendels’ time (I, 1910: 264). By mobilizing labour cost-free and 
on a large scale for shorter or longer periods for a wide range of activities, 
useful or not, the government made it clear that it was stepping into the 
shoes of the indigenous rulers. It was a continuation, at least so it was 
claimed, of a tribute that the people had been accustomed to pay from 
generation to generation. The obligation to cultivate coffee did not relieve 
the peasants from their duty to provide corvee services to their own lords, 
or only partially so. Lawick’s report to Raffles on Bandung in 1812 referred 
to the tugur, the obligation of peasants to report to their chief for rendering 
corvee in large numbers in turn (De Haan II, 1911: 690-1).
Daendels originally intended to pay for the work done on building roads 
but failed to do so because of a lack of funds. The peasantry felt the pressure 
not only of the corvee labour itself, but also the callous treatment that 
accompanied it, while the risk of not surviving the brutality of the work 
regime drove many of them to desert. Even after the Grote Postweg was 
f inished, a broad area along both sides of the road remained uninhabited. 
The inhabitants had every reason to believe that they would be forced to 
work whenever the government felt it necessary to repair the roads or for the 
The Great Trunk Road with change of horses near Cianjur (photo pre-1880)
source: kitLv Collection
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transport of goods and officials. Attempts to abscond were frustrated by the 
introduction of a rule that the whole population of a district was obliged to 
perform corvee services and could, if necessary, be set to work far from their 
homesteads. Requisitioning them cost nothing and the distance they had 
to travel was also of no relevance. After all, according to the stubborn but 
mistaken belief of the colonial rulers, the peasants had time on their hands.
A new measure was that all colonial buildings – including off ices, check-
points, warehouses and even dwellings – had to be guarded day and night. 
The early-colonial government took on the characteristics of a night-watch 
state, a regime of surveillance that gradually extended along roads and 
into villages (De Haan I, 1910: 262). Of course, the process of opening up 
the hinterland, which was now progressing more systematically, led to 
greater mobility and ‘vagrants and beggars’ perhaps made these regions 
less safe than before. But the new measures were not so much aimed at 
assuring security as equipping the colonial apparatus with a whole corps 
of guards, orderlies, messengers and other servants who made the lives 
of their colonial white masters more comfortable. A substantial part of 
these services were provided without payment. The Governor-General 
was permitted to requisition local people by the hundreds to work in his 
palace in Bogor, the Resident was allowed several dozen personal servants, 
while lower off icials had to rely on a handful of guards and attendants 
to dignify their status. As mentioned above, Daendels was planning to 
alleviate the burden of corvee services and meant to use the records now 
kept by his subordinates to f ind out why and how to do this. They were full 
of complaints about the ease with which native chiefs obliged their subjects 
to displays of servitude. The rancour expressed in these reports mainly 
focused on the wastefulness of using subjects purely to satisfy a desire for 
prestige and f inery, a contempt rooted in the perpetually severe shortage 
of labour for the coffee gardens. There was not a word, of course, about 
the free services enjoyed by the colonial off icials themselves. Rather than 
contributing to economic growth, a large number of idlers and layabouts 
hung around the abodes of their masters of whatever complexion.
Beyond the reach of the government
Reducing the burden of the corvee services seems to have been commonly 
interpreted as restricting the entourage with which the landed gentry were 
accustomed to surrounding themselves. As early as 1804, Pieter Engelhard 
had tried to persuade the Regent of Bandung to call only on clients living in 
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the immediate vicinity of the headquarters to perform corvee services. All 
such attempts foundered on the obstinate refusal of the chiefs to abandon 
the displays of servitude by their clientele, which were so closely related 
to their prominent status. Out of desperation, the colonial authorities gave 
up trying on condition that ‘following the chiefs around for no purpose’ 
did not occur at the expense of coffee cultivation. Of course, it was the 
peasantry which paid the price for this uneasy compromise. Besides the 
greatly increased pressure of forced cultivation and the range of services 
performed for their own chiefs meant that the peasants were now faced with 
a staggering assortment of new corvee obligations that they had to fulf il for 
the government (Schoch 1891). The early-colonial state, of which Daendels 
was the architect, succeeded in turning the Priangan peasant into a coolie.
The Governor-General continued the policy of cordoning off the Sun-
danese highlands with great zeal. The increased insecurity in parts of the 
region fuelled fears that threats to law and order had to be prevented by 
reducing contact with the outside world to a minimum. Robbery, extortion, 
theft, looting and murder were the order of the day throughout the lands 
surrounding Batavia, a vast and unsettled area stretching out from the 
coast to the hills. Those with any form of property were the main victims 
of threats and bribery. Cock f ighting, gambling and organized prostitution 
were accompanied by a great deal of violence. This was contrasted with 
the image of peace and security of which the inhabitants of the highlands 
were assured under their regents. Along the intermediate zone between 
the colonial headquarters and the hinterland, illegality and crime reached 
unprecedented proportions. Consignments of coffee that had been stolen 
or smuggled changed hands, there was a lively trade in stolen cattle, and 
small traders offered their wares, including opium, to customers who took 
these products with them on their long journey home. Around 1810, the 
south coast suffered from pirates from Riau, who penetrated the Priangan 
Regencies by sailing up the rivers from their base at Cilacap. Their raids, 
during which they abducted many hundreds of inhabitants to be sold into 
slavery, led to large-scale f light from Sukapura and Galuh.19 Surrounded 
by these areas of persistent unrest, including the plain around Cirebon, 
the Priangan was sealed off to ensure the maintenance of law and order. 
Europeans, too, were permitted to travel through the region only if they 
19 Piracy had reached alarming proportions by the second half of the nineteenth century and 
was closely connected to the political turbulence in the regions of the archipelago where these 
pirates-cum-traders came from: the islands in the Strait of Malacca and the adjoining coastal 
areas (Ota 2006: 124-8).
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had a permit. The reluctance with which these licences were issued made 
it diff icult to receive permission to enter the Priangan without connections 
high up in the colonial apparatus. It was even more diff icult for Chinese 
because, as traders and moneylenders, they were considered to have a 
corruptive influence on the local inhabitants. An additional argument for 
restricting them in particular was that their economic activity distracted 
the peasants from growing coffee. The punishment for violating the ban 
was at least physical chastisement or even a year’s imprisonment. When, 
under British rule, the ban on small traders settling in the region was less 
strictly enforced, it was the regents who insisted on the expulsion of all 
Chinese.20 Discouraging economic activity therefore took place partly at the 
insistence of the native aristocracy. The reason they gave for not holding 
markets was that it would encourage the peasants to grow crops for trade 
at the expense of growing coffee. Summing up the available intelligence, 
De Haan said that a Priangan pasar gave a rather run-down impression. 
Where they were held, they were little more than a small collection of stalls 
for sirih (betel) and fruits, with a few others selling pots and pans, a little 
ironware and cheap linen. Only towards the end of periods of fasting, which 
the Sundanese people celebrated with meals that included buffalo meat, was 
trade a little more lively (De Haan I, 1910: 482). The freedom of movement of 
the local population was also restricted. When they were not at home, the 
only other place they were at liberty to be was in the coffee garden. They 
had no business going anywhere else. This restriction on movement was 
accompanied by an instruction that ‘alien’ natives – people whose place of 
origin was unknown – could not be offered accommodation without the 
regent f irst being informed. This was only the most recent in a long line of 
bans on ‘vagrants’ and ‘deserters’. Establishing the Priangan as a reservation 
where the presence of outsiders was seen as a disruption of public order 
meant that the peasantry had contact only with the government through 
their local chiefs. This state of quarantine constituted an excessive reduc-
tion in their social life, even by the standards of the time.
On his arrival, Daendels had described the condition of the people of 
the Priangan as pitiful. But it is arguable whether this changed under his 
rule. Yet the Governor-General himself was proud of the progress he had 
achieved. He was convinced that growing coffee took up less than one-
sixth of the peasants’ time, and that they received a handsome reward for 
20 Resident Macquoid explained why: ‘… from a conviction, they assure me, that their free 
intercourse with the Javanese inhabitants would in time be fatal to the tranquillity and happi-
ness that has prevailed throughout the Regencies for so many years’ (De Haan IV, 1912: 879).
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their efforts. As a result of his benevolence, the natives had become ‘much 
happier’. The proviso that he added to this – ‘as happy as they could be in 
such an uncivilized state’ – said more about the defects of Priangan man 
than the shortcomings of colonial rule. Daendels’ opponents, however, held 
a different opinion. Van den Bosch spoke of the ‘cruel and inhuman force’ 
suffered by the coffee planters to ensure that ‘these unfortunate wretches 
performed the hard tasks imposed upon them’, which – not counting the 
transport of the coffee – meant that they were not able to do any other 
work for six months of the year. This harsh judgment reflected the disdain 
of Van den Bosch for the Marshall. It was, after all, on Daendels’ orders that 
he had to leave the colony. In the light of the practices that took place 20 
years later under his responsibility as founder of the cultivation system, 
his withering criticisms of Daendels – ‘the rule of Robespierre was neither 
more cruel, nor more bloodthirsty’ – are not very convincing. But there were 
other eyewitnesses, such as Nicolaus Engelhard. The former Commissioner, 
with his long service record, denounced in a retrospective the arbitrary and 
brutal regime that Daendels had pursued. The belated condemnation by 
this veteran in colonial service – made in 1816 when he had decided to take 
on the role of private landowner – rather detracted from what he had stated 
in a memorandum in 1805, questioning whether the further advancement 
of the Javanese people was in the interests of the home country. Back then, 
he had expressed the opinion that the Javanese had to be ‘driven to work by 
force and with beatings, as though they were beasts’ (De Haan I, 1910: 428). 
Are we then to assume that the founder of the early-colonial state did little 
more than act according to the spirit of the times? That he can be accused of 
nothing more than ensuring the preservation of an already existing regime 
simply because it generated the greatest prof it? As compiler of the colonial 
archives, De Haan weighed up the merits of the different standpoints and 
came to the damning conclusion in which nothing remained of promises 
to improve the lot of the Javanese. On the contrary.
Daendels wittingly lied, and out of self-interest, to re-enter state service. 
To achieve that, he not only had to make excuses for the way the people 
of the Priangan were treated, but also portray the coffee garden as a 
Sundanese heaven on earth. (De Haan I, 1910: 459)
The decision of the restored Dutch rulers in 1815 to maintain the land 
rent tax introduced by Raffles as the cornerstone of colonial policy, while 
introducing a different system in the Priangan Regencies, was grounded in 
the desire to continue coffee production on the old basis and to expand it 
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with a view to meeting the growing demand in the Atlantic world. In 1818, 
only a few years after Dutch rule had been restored, the price of a pikul of 
coffee had risen to more than double that of 1815 (Van Deventer 1891: CLXII). 
This robust position on a competitive and growing global market assured 
a golden future for the black beans. By 1822, worldwide consumption of 
coffee had risen to 225,000 tons, 100,000 tons of which came from the East 
Indies (Wild 2004: 99). This was nearly half of the total demand, and the 
major part of that was grown in the Sunda highlands. What measures were 
required to allow this staple product of the colonial economy to expand 
even more? Seasoned officials, with experience reaching back to long before 
Daendels, again held high-ranking positions in the government apparatus 
and their judgment carried a lot of weight now that it was necessary to set 
out a new course. Lawick was one of this small circle of adepts. The report 
he drew up in 1818 together with his deputy Van de Graaff focused on the 
question of how to proceed further with coffee production in the Priangan. 
Considerable attention was devoted to whether it might be better to abolish 
the system of forced cultivation and replace it with free labour. And if not, 
whether the peasants should be paid a better price than the pittance they 
currently received. The authors of the report acknowledged that this was 
an arguable proposition, given the enormous prof its being made by the 
government. But this would mean abandoning the fundamental principle 
of the Priangan system, namely excluding all other options for securing 
the supply of coffee than paying the growers a minimum wage. They also 
claimed that there was no reason to increase the price because there was 
no pressure to do so (Lawick and Van de Graaff 1818). Developing these 
simple folk to the higher level of existence found elsewhere on Java would 
take time. Paying the peasants a higher price without reason to do so would 
only arouse the greed of the regents and chiefs. After all, they argued, the 
essence of the Priangan system was to acquire as much coffee as possible 
at the lowest possible price and supply it exclusively to the government 
(Lawick and Van de Graaff 1818: 5). The subordinate conduct displayed 
by the people of the Priangan was even more reason to assure the regents 
a good income and treat them with respect. Increasing the commission 
they received for supplying the coffee would also discourage them from 
taking part in the clandestine transport and sale of coffee. The people 
would however stand to benefit from the immediate abolition of the head 
tax. This annual monetary tribute had been imposed in the past, but was 
lifted when coffee was grown on an increasingly large scale. The tax had 
been reintroduced under British interim rule to replace the compulsory 
supply of coffee but was now abolished.
unfree Labour as a Condition for ProGress 185
The obligation to perform coolie labour and the need for tight 
surveillance
The report therefore recommended preserving the government’s monopoly 
and maximizing prof it by maintaining the greatest possible difference 
between purchase cost and sales price. Remarkably, hardly six months 
previously, Lawick had expressed completely different sentiments. He 
had distanced himself from his earlier statement about the non-economic 
disposition of the native producer. Under Raffles’ rule, this stereotypical 
standpoint from the VOC era had been rejected and the peasants were 
praised for their unremitting zest for work. Lawick had joined these voices of 
praise just in time and, in 1817, showed that he still adhered to this changed 
viewpoint, declaring: ‘I cannot agree with the views of so many, that the 
Javanese are lazy’ (De Haan IV, 1912: 733). There could therefore be only 
one reason for forcing the peasants to grow and supply coffee: to deprive 
them of any benefit at all from the proceeds of this cash crop. A private 
landowner wrote in 1816 that, during the peak of the harvest, the whole 
population – including women, children and the elderly – was driven to 
the coffee gardens when the work bosses gave the order: ‘the mandur called 
this “giring”, a round-up’ (De Haan III, 1911: 614). When in 1818, as Land-Rent 
Inspector, Lawick expressed in the strongest of terms his ardent support for 
continuing this policy of repression and exploitation, he departed from what 
he had said only a short time before about the Priangan peasant: ‘Because of 
the current bad practices and failing management, the unfortunate coffee 
planter does not even have suff icient time over to till his own paddy f ield’ 
(De Haan III, 1912: 627). It was a critical note that was flagrantly incompat-
ible with the main recommendation of the coffee report that he submitted 
to his superiors only a few months later. He and his deputy must have 
concluded that the most important consideration had to be given priority, 
and that was the interests of the colonial ruler over and above those of the 
native population.
Criticism of this viewpoint, so easy to make with hindsight, can be coun-
tered with the well-known argument that the spirit of the times allowed no 
other course than to give priority to acquiring the highest prof it possible 
at any price from conquered colonial possessions. As a close associate of 
Raff les, Muntinghe may also have expressed the greatest appreciation 
for the diligence and perseverance of the Javanese peasants, but that 
admiration did not prevent him from announcing that colonies existed to 
serve the interests of the metropolis. Yet there were contemporaries who 
immediately and vehemently opposed the advice presented by Lawick and 
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Van de Graaff. The former in particular was the butt of much criticism, 
with Nicolaus Engelhard and De Wilde referring to his long and intimate 
familiarity with the situation in the Priangan. The critics were themselves 
no less experienced in these matters than their opponent. Engelhard was 
Commissioner when Lawick was still in the early stages of his long career 
and De Wilde had been Inspector of the Coffee in Cianjur before Raffles took 
him under his wing and he became a partner in the purchase of Sukabumi. 
His ownership of this enormous estate, with Engelhard as a silent partner, 
brought both of them into conflict with Lawick (see Chapter IV). Their 
dispute with him about their private economic enterprise gave them the 
opportunity to express their aversion to the treatment of the Priangan 
peasantry and to respond with indignation to the resolute refusal of the 
Land-Rent Inspector to pay a single cent more for the coffee. Nicolaus 
Engelhard, who in his previous position as Commissioner had called the 
peasants lazy and slothful and said that they could only be galvanized 
into action to satisfy their own limited needs, showed himself now to be 
seriously concerned about these people, who were the victims of a tortuous 
mode of production (De Haan IV, 1912: 814-5). De Wilde was equally damning 
in his retrospective (1838: 181).
Perhaps in anticipation of such criticism, Lawick and Van de Graaff tried 
to argue that the inhabitants of the Priangan were still on a very low rung 
of civilization and had no other needs than to secure their basic means of 
subsistence. This justif ication, too, dated back to the Company era. They 
saw a contrast between the situation in the Sunda highlands and the social 
climate that had developed elsewhere on Java. There, the people were free 
to dispose of the fruits of their labour as they wished and had gradually 
achieved a somewhat higher level of well-being. The Inspector and his 
Deputy, however, warned against pursuing this example too hastily as 
the regime of subordination under which the peasants lived meant that 
any higher payment would not f ind its way to them but would end up in 
the pockets of their lords. From this perspective, underpayment was an 
instrument to encourage progress, but at the slowest possible pace. In a 
letter to Nicolaus Engelhard in 1826, Jean Chrétien Baud explained why 
a little progress, though not too much, should also be seen as serving the 
interests of the metropolis. He wrote:
I am by no means a supporter of the reckless emancipation and civilization 
of the Natives, that can be found in some systems; on the contrary, I believe 
that they should be kept in a childlike state as long as possible, to enable 
the exercise of paternal control over them with ease. (De Haan IV, 1912: 739)
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This high-ranking colonial policy-maker advocated allowing the natives to 
‘accumulate a little capital’ to enable them to buy Dutch products. Forced 
cultivation, which was an obstacle to such accumulation, was therefore to 
be rejected; as was freedom, since this only made the natives idle. In this 
interpretation, Baud – who took over leadership of the cultivation system 
from Van den Bosch as Governor-General and later served as Minister 
for the Colonies – rejected forced cultivation not because it was in itself 
reprehensible but because it frustrated accumulation of the minimal assets 
required to allow the development of a native market for industrial products 
from Europe.
Lawick and Van de Graaff also called for another organizing principle 
of the Priangan system to be preserved. A decision had already been taken 
earlier to maintain the leadership of the chiefs over their subjects rather 
than place the latter under the direct authority of the government. The 
reporters supported their plea not to change this regime by arguing that 
the peasants were only prepared to do what the government asked out of 
deferent obedience to their own lords. Accepting their subordination to the 
regent was the best way of safeguarding the colonial tribute. Resident Van 
Motman’s statement in 1816 that, left to their own devices, the inhabitants 
of the Priangan would prefer to grow rice, needed no substantiation: the 
chiefs were necessary to supervise the cultivation and delivery of coffee. 
In reply to the question why the colonial authority would be incapable of 
achieving the same objective, Engelhard had replied – and he spoke from 
his own experience – that the native chiefs had hundreds of means of 
persuasion which the European off icials knew nothing about.
The Commissioners-General took this advice on board, as a result of 
which – by contrast with the rest of Java – the state of indirect rule persisted 
in the Priangan. The policy was, however, not pursued with any great convic-
tion. Van der Capellen, who remained in command after the departure of 
the other Commissioners-General, stated that it would have been different 
‘if the native population had possessed a greater capability to fulf il the 
obligations imposed on them directly by the European authorities’ (Van 
Deventer II, 1866: 56). The decision to settle for a ‘for lack of better’ solution 
could therefore be attributed to the shortcomings of the natives rather than 
to the unreasonable demands imposed on them by their colonial rulers. 
There was no choice but to involve the local chiefs, though their room for 
manoeuvre was to be limited so that their actions did not constitute a 
threat to the established order. Lawick and Van de Graaff warned, however, 
that the elevated status of the regents and the duty of the peasants to obey 
them unreservedly should be heeded with alacrity. Persistent belittling 
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of the gentry could lead them to neglect the tasks entrusted to them and 
that must be avoided at all costs. They added that the pikul money paid to 
the local chiefs should be increased to secure their loyalty and devotion, 
and that the Resident, together with the coffee sergeants and warehouse 
masters (one for each regency), should also receive a higher commission to 
secure their interest in coffee production. In other words, the native and 
European managers were entitled to what was withheld from the peasants.
Commissioner-General Van der Capellen was amenable to treating 
the local chiefs with courtesy, feeling himself that this had been lack-
ing under Daendels. During his f irst inspection tour, he had noticed the 
disdain which almost all the regents had to suffer. In his view, this was a 
legacy of Daendels, under whose rule the regents’ authority and income 
had been destroyed. They had to surrender their lands, on which their 
patron-client relationship with the peasantry rested. It was a radical reform 
in which the Commissioners-General that followed him had acquiesced. 
The remuneration paid to the nobility since then in no way compensated 
for this loss. Certainly, European off icials could act as a buffer to protect 
the peasants against repression by their lords, but it should be realized 
that what outsiders saw as extortion was deeply embedded in traditional 
institutions. Preserving them made it possible to impose burdens on the 
colonial subjects, ‘which would have driven any other people to desperation 
and rebellion’ (Van Deventer II, 1866: 57).
In 1820, to make the local chiefs feel that they were important, 
Commissioner-General Godert van der Capellen announced a regula-
tion describing their rankings and the rights and duties associated with 
them. The f irst article stated that the Resident, the European off icial in 
charge of the Priangan, should treat the regent as his younger brother. 
The subsequent provisions stipulated the variety of tasks entrusted to 
the local chiefs: to promote agriculture, improve transport, educate the 
people, guarantee their security, ensure they practised their religion, 
act against malevolent elements, mobilize labour, and keep records and 
statistics. Their tasks did not, however, include imposing and collecting 
taxes or managing the government’s warehouses; nor were they permitted 
to operate as agro-industrial entrepreneurs in their own right, do business 
with the government or set themselves up as contractors or suppliers. 
This meant that the chiefs were not permitted to engage in economic 
activity at their own risk and expense. Their public role became purely 
decorative, reduced to displays of prestige and, of course, mobilizing 
the population to grow coffee. Measures had to be taken to ensure that 
they did not appropriate part of the coffee intended for delivery to the 
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warehouses to sell at a higher price on the coast. To combat this ‘silent 
prof it’, it was necessary to keep a close eye on the chiefs’ activities. In his 
annual reports, the Resident noted that most district chiefs had no other 
choice than to supplement their very meagre income by illicit means so 
as to keep up the appearances required by their status. In these minutes, 
sent to his brother the Commissioner-General in Batavia, the Resident of 
the Priangan Regencies Robert van der Capellen described in detail the 
code of conduct he observed.
The native – from the regent down to the most humble peasant – is very 
diff icult to understand. To hide nothing from them, to approach them 
openly and, as I have noted in every report, to treat them completely 
unself ishly and candidly with composure, the necessary f irmness and 
never to waiver in giving orders or to retract them, is certainly the best 
way to ensure they serve as is required. (Algemeen Verslag van den 
Resident der Preanger Regentschappen over 1822, 7 February 1823. NA, 
Baud collection, 90)
The subject was once again addressed in the report for the following year 
and the Resident clarif ied that a benign but aloof attitude towards the 
regents was the secret of a successful policy. Conf ining the local lords in 
the colonial harness was mitigated by permitting them to display their 
dignity. They did this by decking themselves out with insignia, off icial 
uniforms and other paraphernalia like payungs, parasols that showed 
the rank and standing of their owners by their colours and the width of 
the gilded rings with which they were decorated. Although severe sanc-
tions awaited those who wore these signs of distinction without being 
authorized to do so, it proved necessary in 1837 to modify the guidelines. 
Native dignitaries had adopted the habit of decorating their costumes with 
golden trimmings and embroidery that made them look suspiciously like 
the ornamental uniforms of Dutch civil servants. This resemblance was of 
course inadmissible. A regulation in 1820 stated that rank and stand should 
be distinguished by the size of a dignitary’s retinue. An adhipatti, for 
example, as the regent’s deputy, and his immediate family were permitted 
an entourage of 65 servants, while the next on the list, the tommengong, 
together with his wife and sons, was allowed 50 servants. This went down 
to the lowest levels, where local chiefs had to make do with just a few 
servants. Nearly half a century later it became clear that the lords of the 
Priangan had blatantly ignored the instruction to cut back on the number 
of servants in their service.
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In search of the hidden labour reserve
An extremely important point that Lawick and Van de Graaff addressed 
in their report was the discrepancy that they identif ied between the total 
number of households and those of coffee planters. Since there were far 
fewer of the latter than the former, they concluded that there was a serious 
problem of underused capacity. There must be a large pool of labour that 
remained largely or completely exempt from the tribute. The households, 
registered as cacah kopi, were responsible for planting, maintaining and 
harvesting the beans from 1,000 trees a year. But, as the reporters explained, 
they were not the equivalent of a household in Europe, but could comprise 
a composite formation consisting of four nuclear households. They had 
also ascertained that, in Limbangan and elsewhere, there were around 50 
per cent more planters than appeared in the records. This reinforced their 
belief that coffee cultivation was not evenly distributed among the districts 
and households. They were not concerned, however, about the injustice of 
this situation, the possibility of distributing the burden more evenly so as 
to alleviate it for all. Their conclusion from this discovery was that there 
was a reserve of hidden labour, which should not be exempt from efforts to 
increase production. The reporters suggested that their superiors commis-
sion a survey to determine the exact size of the population of each district 
and how many people actually comprised a cacah kopi. What also had to 
be determined was the distances from the gardens to the warehouses and 
what means of transport were available. They emphasized that it would be 
inadvisable to rely on the information provided by the local chiefs, but to 
order colonial off icials to collect and check the f igures. This follow-up study 
was conducted in 1821 and the results became available the following year. 
The immediate reason for the study was the regrettable fall in the volume of 
coffee produced under the forced cultivation system in the previous years. 
Van Haak, Inspector of Finances, was the man entrusted with establish-
ing the causes of this unexpected decline. He took his task very seriously, 
visiting 460 coffee plantations throughout the region in only 126 days. 
This site-level investigation enabled the Inspector to identify the greatest 
obstacles to the cultivation and delivery of the crop. He started his report by 
referring to the discrepancy between the number of planters and the total 
stock of fruit-bearing trees. This meant that the households charged with 
growing the coffee did not attain the target of 1,000 trees a year that still 
applied to them. He offered various explanations for the shortfall. First of 
all, under British rule, a large number of gardens had been destroyed or so 
neglected that their productivity had been seriously affected. In addition, 
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in the years of restoration after the British left, in the haste to expand the 
gardens, the new trees were not always planted in suitable soil, so that 
many of them, once they had reached maturity, produced only a meagre 
harvest, if at all. It had however become clear that mountain plantations 
like those in Bandung were thriving. The disappointing results were thus 
only temporary and, if the course set out was followed resolutely, production 
would soon recover.
There was some improvement in the transport of the coffee. Cart tracks 
had been laid from the plantations to the warehouses, making transport 
easier and increasing the volume. The regents were encouraged to solve 
the shortage of carts – they could obtain advances from the government to 
pay for pedatis to be made and to buy draught animals – but the end of the 
buffalo caravans, in which many hundreds of these pack animals lumbered 
on for several weeks, was nowhere in sight. The Inspector was concerned 
about the widespread smuggling of coffee, but how was this problem to be 
tackled if the huge gap between purchase cost and sale price could not be 
reduced? It was a veiled but futile attempt to persuade his superiors to pay 
the peasants better. The isolation of the Priangan Regencies had become 
porous under British rule. Chinese merchants roamed the region, buying 
coffee from the peasants and selling them simple consumer goods. After 
Dutch rule was restored, the policy of isolation was resolutely re-imposed. In 
1820, the ban on being found out in the Sunda highlands without permission 
was reintroduced, and applied to both Asians from outside the region and 
to Europeans.
The f irst controleurs – junior off icials in charge of a district – were now 
being introduced in the residency, but Van Haak observed that these civil 
servants were still sadly lacking in the required expertise. Although they 
were responsible for checking on coffee production, they were unable to do 
so effectively because they understood neither the crop nor the language. 
Their interaction with the chiefs was restricted to superf icial contact and 
they were even further removed from the population at large. In the opinion 
of the Inspector, the 1820 Regulation on the proper treatment of the native 
aristocracy fell short in addressing the grievances of the regents. Acceptance 
that the chiefs were indispensable in directing the production of coffee did 
nothing to alter the deplorable contempt with which they were treated. The 
loss of prestige of the lords of the land had not escaped the notice of the 
common man and this awareness only exacerbated the chiefs’ humiliation 
and demoralization. They had been relieved of all f inancial management 
responsibilities and were disdainful of the close surveillance of their every 
move by young colonial off icials with neither experience nor knowledge of 
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the local situation. Van Haak gave an interesting sketch of the Sundanese 
character. He had been struck by the frankness with which the people 
approached their chiefs, an assertion which in his opinion was a trait of 
all mountain-dwellers. This squarely opposes the stereotypical image of a 
subordinate and docile peasantry. The intractability that the Inspector of 
Finances described cast doubt not only on the notion of listless subalternity 
that made the Sundanese peasant grow coffee, but also on the idea that 
the regents were able to force their subjects to accept an advanced state of 
servitude. The nature of the people of the Priangan, as described by Van 
Haak, seems more applicable to the conduct of peasants who were not yet 
tied closely to the land, i.e. the tillers of gaga and tipar. In this connection I 
would like to recall that in one district of Sumedang, the f irst sawahs were 
not laid out until around 1822 (Eindresumé II, 1880: 33; De Haan IV, 1912: 
444). Van Haak’s report dated from a period in which shifting cultivation 
was still widely practised and, as described in Chapter I, this method of 
food production generated a completely different interaction between the 
peasants and the landed gentry than the closed village system typical of 
sedentary and wet-land agriculture on the coastal plain.
Van Haak also commented on the contraction and dedifferentiation of 
the Priangan peasant economy over a prolonged period. The inhabitants had 
been accustomed in the past to making their own clothes, as Jacob Mossel 
had reported in 1751 (Van Rees 1867: 484-5). According to Nederburgh, in the 
late nineteenth century ‘home-grown and spun cotton was used for weaving 
in all campongs’ (Consideratiën, 1855: 125) while in 1809, in reply to a question 
about the economic activity in the Priangan Regencies, Van Motman said 
that, although spinning had become less common, each family still had its 
own weaving loom and manufactured its own linen. The tradition came 
to an end when the peasants no longer had time to do anything other than 
grow paddy and coffee. Van Haak concluded in no uncertain terms hardly 
ten years later that cottage industry had ceased to exist. This meant that the 
peasants were forced to buy cloth that had been manufactured elsewhere. 
On the orders of the lower chiefs, the drivers of the pack animals bought 
clothing and other wares from merchants who plied their trades around 
the warehouses. When they came back, these foreign goods were sold on 
local markets for a much higher price. But because of the peasants’ low 
purchasing power, this trade remained very modest, as the Statistische 
Beschrijving (Statistical Account) of 1822 made clear (De Haan IV, 1912: 889; 
see also De Wilde 1830: 141).
An outbreak of cholera in 1822 had reduced rice production. The price shot 
up, also because of the continued export to Batavia and the surrounding 
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Ommelanden. This resulted in a shortage of food for the inhabitants of the 
Priangan. Resident Van der Capellen also referred to these shortages, which 
most seriously affected the poorest of the coffee planters, in his annual 
reports.21 Peasants even sold their stock of seeds, and were thus unable to 
plant the next season’s crop. In response to these reports, Van der Capellen 
announced a ban on the export of rice and gave orders to expel bulk buyers 
of paddy and buffalo from the region. This failed to solve the problem that 
the peasants did not have enough spare time to grow food because their 
labour was nearly entirely taken up by coffee cultivation. That led to famine 
and they had no other choice than to eat wild roots for months at a time just 
to survive. They supplemented this def icient diet with boiled pisang stems 
and leaves. Van Haak accompanied his warning that food cultivation should 
not be neglected with the additional comment, however, that paddy should 
of course not be grown at the expense of coffee. In an annex, he discussed 
the concept of a cacah kopi, explaining that the term referred not to a single 
man but to a composite household and, without going into detail about its 
exact size, stated that it was the responsibility of all the members to take 
part in the cultivation of coffee. This formalized the long-standing practice 
of laying claim to the labour of men, women and children to grow this export 
crop. It was the only way to ensure that the colonial tribute could continue 
to be f ixed at 1,000 mature trees per household.
In previous years, there had been little change in the slow growth of 
the population. The Priangan coffee regime made it a less than attractive 
prospect for inhabitants of the much more densely populated neighbouring 
regions, such as those along the north coast of Central Java, to settle down 
in the Sunda highlands. Added to this was the high mortality rate, a direct 
result of epidemics or malnutrition, which claimed many victims among 
the young in particular. As vaccination against smallpox became more 
widespread, deaths from this disease declined. This improvement followed 
the decision to entrust inoculation to the clergy, for which De Wilde had 
taken the initiative in 1820 (Kalff 1923). The village priests proved better at 
fulf illing this task than the European coffee sergeants had been (Geogra-
phische en statistische bijzonderheden 1835: 71). It took some effort to train 
them to administer the vaccinations but, after a few years, the number of 
vaccinated children increased rapidly, leading to a fall in mortality among 
the young. A more important cause of the low population density, however, 
was the fact that a large number of inhabitants did not appear in the colonial 
21 Algemeen Verslag van den Resident der Preanger Regentschappen over 1822, 13 March 1822. 
NA, Baud collection, 90.
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records. The high tribute meant that both higher and lower chiefs had an 
interest in recording lower population numbers, and the headcounts they 
were required to carry out were very unreliable. The authorities had good 
reason to suspect that the discrepancy between real and submitted numbers 
continued to be substantial. It was clear that the accelerated population 
growth at the end of the 1820s was due more to improved record-keeping 
than any sudden increase in actual numbers of inhabitants. This meant that 
more hands became available to grow coffee, but it was still not enough.
Indispensability of the chiefs, for the time being
The critical attitude towards regents and the Priangan gentry at large that 
was prevalent especially in Daendels’ time, was now reversed. The more 
favourable light in which they were seen by the restored Dutch administra-
tion was however limited to the insight that continued reliance on this 
intermediate layer between rulers and ruled was essential to the effec-
tive exercise of power. In 1818, the Chief Inspector for Coffee Cultivation 
strongly recommended granting the chiefs the dignity they demanded. 
Only a few years later, this tactical advice proved not to go far enough 
for Commissioner-General Van der Capellen. In 1822, fulminating against 
private estate owners and other members of the old guard, he posed the 
problem in much more principled terms. The author of the 1822 colonization 
report summed up this revised opinion succinctly. The argument now was 
that, in the past, the native chiefs had been treated with too little respect. 
This recognition of their political role, however, brought no change in the 
belief that the feudal lords conducted themselves as parasites in their deal-
ings with the peasantry.
I have ascribed the oscillations in colonial policy in the early decades of the 
nineteenth century to the strongly fluctuating opinions of the state-makers 
regarding the economic course to be followed. The continuing inadequate 
understanding how indigenous society was structured played an important 
role in this respect. The old guard would exaggerate their knowledge of the 
country and its people to the newcomers. But this experience, gained from 
daily practice, did not go very deep. They had hardly made a start on a more 
systematic management of economy and society. Both Daendels and Raffles 
ordered that a register be set up and maintained listing numerous details 
of every peasant locality on Java. The instructions of both governors came 
little further than good intentions, largely because there was insuff icient 
attention and capacity in the meagre administrative apparatus to perform 
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this task. It proved not only diff icult to gather all the information required 
but also to process it and translate it into clear-cut instructions. That this 
gradually improved is illustrated by the setting up of separate off ices, for 
example for f inancial administration and for land registration (the Land-
Rent Inspectorate in 1817). Aff iliated to this agency was an Inspectorate for 
Coffee Cultivation on Java, headed by an off icial appointed by Daendels in 
1808. From 1820, Residents had to submit annual reports and, when they left 
off ice, had to leave a memorandum of transfer for their successor. Lastly, 
in addition to the regular administration, special enquiries were initiated 
which were considered necessary to build up a comprehensive statistical 
database (Kommers 1979; Stevens 1982: 85-94). Although progress was 
made in counting, measuring and weighing, registering and classifying, 
it should not be forgotten that the f igures and other data presented were 
not infrequently to a large degree the product of the imagination of those 
who gathered them, who had to rely on what the local chiefs told them. The 
chiefs’ desire to above all please their superiors, as well as to keep them in 
the dark, meant that large areas of the colonized landscape remained opaque 
to the small group of colonial administrators who were presented with a 
strongly distorted portrayal of the situation. Elout blamed the incomplete 
and incorrect reporting on the inferior quality of those who had come from 
the metropolis for a career in the colonial civil service.
‘... what do we do with people who are on the drink, who combine con-
ceitedness with shamelessness, while they lack any merit to speak of?’ 
Thus complained the Commissioner-General in a letter to the Director 
of the Colonies. (Van Deventer 1891: 186)
‘The era of doubt’, was how Stokvis (1922: 27) described the years following 
the restoration of Dutch rule. But behind the capricious fluctuations in the 
standpoints of the colonial state-makers, a policy line gradually emerged 
which would leave its mark on the mode of economic exploitation for 
another half a century. The debate on what to do with the Asian colony, 
how to drain a sizable surplus from the overseas possessions, which had 
been extracted since the beginning of the century, was in fact the Dutch 
variant of the discussion going on around the same time between English 
utilitarians on the shape and direction of British policy in India (Stokes 
1959). A modality of colonial management that was soon rejected for Java 
was to rely on the economic rationality of the peasant population. Despite 
a number of prominent advocates of this school of thought – Dirk van Ho-
gendorp, Raffles and Van der Capellen, with Muntinghe as the link between 
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the last two – the prevailing view was that the native peasant lacked the 
incentive of enlightened self-interest and the urge for accumulation that 
was required to raise production and improve their living standards. In his 
colonization report, dated 1827, Willem van Hogendorp22 stated once again 
‘that the population is incapable of exerting any kind of industrious effort, 
no matter for what purpose. (in Steijn Parvé 1851: 22).
In the debate on what kind of policy should be pursued, the applicability 
of the economic rationale in a colonial setting was repeatedly questioned. 
Perhaps not only the Javanese peasants but also the colonists imported 
from Europe failed to act as expected of homo economicus. The owners of 
the private estates seemed to prefer trade and speculation to agro-industry 
and adopted a lifestyle that was more feudal than capitalist. They were only 
prepared to act as entrepreneurs if, along with the land, they were also 
allowed to make use of the labour power of the peasants at a price far below 
the real market value of both of these factors of production. This made the 
question of whether they were pro or anti liberal much more ambiguous. 
The parties in the discussion on the best course to adopt had little diff iculty 
agreeing that free labour could not form the basis of capitalist enterprise. 
Viscount Du Bus de Gisignies may have based his plans on the assumption 
that the Javanese would report for work on the newly cultivated lands in 
great numbers and of their own free will, but his argument did not stand 
the test of experience. Without the use of force, both the old and the new 
generation of landowners believed that they would not be able to f ind the 
labour they needed in suff icient numbers. The principle of free labour 
was hardly a point of discussion. A much more important issue was the 
choice between market or state, with the advocates of private initiative 
on one side and an economy regulated by government on the other. The 
latter won the day, above all because of the much higher profits that the 
metropolis expected from this regime. This prognosis was by no means 
purely hypothetical. The Priangan system was based on a long-established 
monopoly from which it could be concluded that the low costs of the system 
of forced cultivation and delivery – for the state at least – resulted in very 
high profits. But did these benefits outweigh the costs? There were a few 
critics at the time who protested at the state of unfreedom in which the 
22 The Van Hogendorps belonged to a family of politicians well connected f irst to the Dutch 
republic at the end of the 18th century and then to the restored monarchy. Gijsbert Karel van 
Hogendorp was one of a small clique which paved the way for Willem I to the throne in 1815. His 
younger brother Dirk made his career in the colony and it was following his track that Willem, 
son of Gijsbert Karel, went to Java as secretary to Commissioner-General Du Bus de Gisignies.
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people were forced to live. Pieter de Haan used the term ‘political slavery’ 
to condemn the colonial regime on Java and this applied especially to the 
system of forced coffee cultivation in the Priangan Regencies. The shifting 
cultivation that the peasants had practised in the region was, in his view, not 
a form of primitive farming but a mode of production that enabled them to 
escape the hated and feared forced cultivation of coffee. He described how 
many died of need, while others fled to uninhabited regions and survived 
by growing mountain rice or by eating only roots (P. de Haan 1829: 182).
Colonial archivist Frederik de Haan stated plainly that it had never been 
the intention of the VOC to use the system of coffee cultivation to guide the 
people of the Priangan on the road to progress (De Haan I, 1910: 144). But in 
the nineteenth century a justif ication was needed to continue the system of 
forced cultivation and that pretext was found in the alleged non-economic 
mentality of the peasantry. The need to turn the colony into an enterprise 
that was highly prof itable for the metropolis continued to be the main 
concern and one which, since the state coffers were exhausted, was given 
the highest priority. To fulf il this mission, someone was required who was 
decisive and self-assured, a strong character driven by the right ideas and the 
capacity to put them into practice. The man who fitted the bill was Johannes 
van den Bosch, who had previously been on Java and had completed several 
important state missions for the King, including a reorganization of the 
West Indian possessions. When, in 1829, he was presented with the plans 
devised by Du Bus de Gisignies, Van den Bosch reacted very sceptically. 
His critical comments were driven by both pragmatic and more principled 
considerations. He noted that using Javanese wage labour to open up new 
land was going to be a time-consuming business and required large invest-
ments that would only generate f inancial returns after many years. A more 
substantial argument was that the course proposed by Du Bus de Gisignies 
was incompatible with the current backward state of native society. In a 
study published ten years earlier on how the Netherlands should manage 
its overseas territories, Van den Bosch had emphasized the importance 
of a manner of colonial rule that was as compatible as possible with the 
institutions of the country and its people. His advice on how to proceed 
in the East Indies fulf illed these criteria and promised the so desperately 
desired profits to pay off the runaway Dutch national debt in a much shorter 
time. King Willem I was convinced, undoubtedly for this last reason, and 
decided to send his counsellor to the colony as Governor-General.
The cultivation system introduced by Van den Bosch in 1830 forced the 
peasant population in large parts of Java to grow various crops and supply 
them to the colonial government for export. The new agrarian regime 
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represented on the one hand a return to the system of forced cultivation 
and delivery imposed primarily on the inhabitants of the Priangan by the 
VOC from the early eighteenth century onwards, but it also reflected an 
acceleration in the process of globalization. That process crystallized into 
a restructuring of the international division of labour between ‘West’ and 
‘East’. In the specif ic case of the East Indies, Van den Bosch set himself the 
goal of promoting economic growth on Java and making it competitive with 
the slave-labour-based production of tropical crops in the West Indies as a 
supplier of agrarian products to the industrializing and urbanizing world in 
the northern hemisphere. After the VOC was disbanded, a few high-profile 
colonial reformers had in the early decades of the nineteenth century taken 
a principled stand against continuing the forced cultivation of coffee in 
the Priangan and everything associated with it, including extremely low 
payments to the producers, preserving the authority of the native chiefs, and 
the government monopoly on buying the products. In the new revisionist 
view, this mode of production had become outdated. The top of the colonial 
apparatus could only justify the temporary continuation of the system in 
the highlands of West Java with the argument that these revenues remained 
as yet indispensable. Not only to cover a wide range of expenses – the 
high cost of the Java War (1825-30) in particular – , but also and especially 
to demonstrate to King Willem I and his advisers in the metropolis the 
profitability of the overseas possessions. Preserving an aberration of what 
was intended to become the general modality of collecting taxes seems to 
have embarrassed the policy-makers. In their f inal report to the Minister, 
the Commissioners-General returned to the question of whether it was 
advisable to continue the regime in the Priangan Regencies on the old 
footing or whether it would perhaps be more eff icient to introduce the land 
rent system here, too. Their conclusion, however, was a resounding ‘No’ to 
the latter option. They turned the lack of uniformity in the system now into 
a recommendation for pluriformity (Report of 16 March, 1818, Van Deventer 
I, 1865: 393). In later arguments, the apology for the failure to standardize the 
revenue policy throughout Java would be deftly transformed into a plea to, 
above all, take account of ‘historically developed relations’, thus justifying 
diversity on the basis of an imagined tradition.
The Priangan variant as a ‘colonial constant’
The Priangan coffee regime, which had survived into the early decades of the 
nineteenth century as a backward remnant of early-colonial exploitation, 
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now served as a model for establishing the cultivation system. Van den Bosch 
aimed not only to increase cash crop production on Java but also to extract 
a greater surplus from it. Although he never tired of repeating that peace 
and order could only be assured if the prevailing situation was disrupted as 
little as possible and rejected out of hand any whisper of reform, far-reaching 
changes in the nature of the Javanese peasant economy and society were set 
in motion under his rule. The ultimate aim of colonial domination remained 
the same as at the start of the process of state-building. Van den Bosch left 
no doubt at all that the East Indies were conquered territory. The people had 
the right to good governance and could expect their own institutions to be 
respected as far as possible. But, having said that, he added immediately, 
‘For the rest, the interests of these lands should be completely subordinate 
to those of the Mother Country.’ The coercion inherent in the cultivation 
system implied not only the obligation to provide the required labour, but 
also to accept the unilaterally imposed compensation for the export crops 
produced without complaint. As had traditionally been the ‘custom’ with 
the compulsory supply of goods, there would be no bargaining about the 
price. The native races of the tropics had a natural tendency to sloth and 
indolence. There was no alternative to the use of force, and that applied 
equally to growing coffee, which would not succeed without rigorous 
discipline being imposed by the government. Free labour was an illusion, 
and perhaps always would be. As Van den Bosch insisted also in retrospect:
With a people, that can hardly be compared with our own children at 
the age of 12 or 13, no arrangements or institutions should be expected, 
through which the fruits of labour as referred to above, would be distrib-
uted fairly, and to achieve that through the influence of an extremely 
limited number of off icials spread widely among millions of inlanders, 
of whom less than a dozen understand their language reasonably, is 
equally impossible, so that the dessa dwellers too leave command over 
their harvest entirely to their chiefs. (Van den Bosch 1864: 79)
If the absence of a work ethic could not be seen as a genetic trait, the cause 
was found to lie in the morals and customs that had dominated the lives of 
the Javanese since time immemorial. This reference to an ancient tradition 
was very useful to Van den Bosch, as it enabled him to reduce the payment 
the peasants received for their forced labour to the lowest conceivable level. 
A precondition for the success of this policy was to keep the people of the 
Priangan in an advanced state of quarantine, as contacts with the outside 
world could be expected to increase their aspirations. This ran counter to 
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the colonial interest, which required that nothing should be permitted that 
might arouse a desire among the people for more assets or introduce new 
customs that would disrupt the simplicity of peasant life.
Money was also saved by cutting back on the costs of imposing discipline, 
that is to say all expenditures relating to supervising the introduction of and 
compliance with the cultivation system. Increasing the peasants’ agrarian 
production was achieved by delegating this responsibility from the govern-
ment to native intermediaries. Recognizing ‘traditional’ holders of authority 
had the advantage of being a mode of cheap governance. What it came down 
to was that the peasants themselves paid the bill for their exploitation and 
subordination. The frequently heard suggestion that the colonial govern-
ment restored the former dignity of the native chiefs is misconceived. The 
state apparatus had indeed become less feudal and more bureaucratic under 
Daendels. The deposition of the landed gentry from their former positions 
of authority may have been reversed to a certain degree in the years that 
followed, but this by no means constituted a process of re-feudalization. 
Relatively strict rules were imposed to avoid the highhanded and whimsical 
way in which the native aristocracy had acted in earlier times. As off icials 
integrated in the colonial administration, the regents and lower dignitaries 
were placed under the stewardship of white superiors, which signif icantly 
restricted their freedom of operation. This all applied to a much lesser extent 
to the Priangan region, where the authority of the native chiefs retained 
a real signif icance, also under the newly introduced cultivation system. 
Since the start of the system of compulsory supply by the VOC in the early 
eighteenth century, this tried and tested practice continued to exist in the 
highlands of Sunda until deep into the nineteenth century, even after the 
colony had been transformed into a state domain. The cultivation system, 
which came later and lasted for not yet half a century, had a much less 
impressive track record. The Priangan regents had more autonomy than 
their counterparts elsewhere, including the right to collect tribute, while 
expatriate off icials enjoyed less authority than elsewhere on Java. The 
region that the VOC had f irst laid claim to was not integrated into the land 
rent system but had to continue to produce crops for export. When more 
modern forms of government were introduced on Java, f irst by Daendels 
and then Raffles, it became common to speak of ‘the Priangan system’, 
and from 1816 the term was also used in off icial documents. The term is 
misleading, not only because it never became a fully f ledged system – the 
administrators simply continued with what others before them had decided 
– but also because it was not the Priangan that adopted a new course, but 
the rest of Java. The regime in the region was therefore not an ‘exception’, 
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as has often been suggested, but had been a constant feature throughout 
the history of the colony. It became an unequalled success formula for the 
colonial exploitation of the East Indies, surviving from around 1720 until 
1871 – a good century and a half. The Priangan was transformed, but as a 
gradually evolving economic, political and social order rather than a system 
as such, into a strangulated mode of production based on coercion and a 
whole network of arrangements that as good as excluded change, from 
within or outside.
In colonial circles, there was a tendency to attribute the exercise of 
force inherent to the cultivation system to shortcomings in the inborn 
non-economic mentality of the Javanese, perhaps in combination with 
historical circumstances. An alternative explanation was suggested by 
ethnologist Herman Nieboer, who made the connection between regimes of 
open versus closed resources. If land is not a scarce commodity, he argued, 
people will not freely place their labour power at another’s disposal, prefer-
ring to remain independent and open up as yet uncultivated land. In this 
situation, the only way to lay claim to the labour of another is by exercising 
extra-economic force. This was how Nieboer explained slavery in tribal 
societies (Nieboer 1910). Willemina Kloosterboer applied this theory more 
widely, using it to understand various forms of unfree labour in colonized 
and other pre-industrial societies (Kloosterboer 1954). As long as waste 
land was relatively widely available on Java, it would not be possible to 
f ind wage labour for the Western-led agro-industry on a voluntary basis. 
This situation would gradually change in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, as land replaced labour as a scarce factor of production. As the 
population increased, so did the pressure on agrarian resources. In addition, 
the steady advance of commercialization in the rural economy helped 
create a landless proletariat from which large agribusinesses could fulf il 
their requirements for a casual or permanent workforce. I shall return to 
this turnaround in Chapter VIII. Without wishing to deny that there was a 
shift in the balance between land and labour along these lines, I would like 
to point out that a landless underclass had formed within Java’s countryside 
much earlier. The existence of this underclass had already been identif ied 
in early-colonial reports, including in the 1822 colonization report, drawn 
up for Commissioner-General Van der Capellen by Muntinghe.
The Javanese kings, having insufficient funds always to pay their subjects 
for the services they required of them, found it equally impossible to 
demand that this unpaid labour be carried out by the poorest members 
of their populations, who owned no land at all, and possessed no other 
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means of subsistence than the work of their own hands. Demanding 
that this numerous class among their subjects should provide them with 
compulsory unpaid labour would amount to condemning them to hunger 
and destitution. The kings were therefore forced to restrict the obligation 
to provide unpaid labour to the owners of the Sawa f ields. A share in the 
yields from the Sawa f ield was their payment for the compulsory labour, 
in place of money. (republished in Ottow 1937: 268-9)
A landless class of pre-capitalist origin remained conf ined in the peas-
ant economy in a relationship of unfree labour, a position from which it 
was only very gradually liberated in the later colonial era. As we shall see 
the labour mobilized en masse for cultivation and corvee services was 
largely performed by land-poor and landless peasants. The switch from 
labour being in short supply and therefore kept in bondage to a situation 
in which labour became abundantly available because the free access to 
land was blocked, marked the transition that took place in the course of 
the nineteenth century. This also meant that the need for coercion by the 
government gradually declined, as the conditions required for a free labour 
market were now in place. But this change was not only brought about by 
the free play of social forces determined by a combination of demographic 
growth and economic expansion. It was by no means a coincidence that the 
abolition of the cultivation system and of the Priangan system coincided 
with the announcement of the Agrarian Act in 1870. The Act regulated the 
lease of uncultivated land on Java, which the colonial state declared its 
property. In the late colonial era, the government exchanged total control 
over labour with control over land. This was the unbridled violation of the 
rights of the native population that Muntinghe had feared.
The system of land rent revenue, so much was crystal clear, would never 
yield what the managers of the colonial enterprise had promised themselves: 
a steadily growing surplus that could be transferred to the state budget in 
the metropolis. What was under the land rent scheme called the lease of 
farmland by the state to the peasants might perhaps be suff icient to cover 
the costs of governance and administration but there was no substantial 
surplus to be expected from the imposed taxation. That could only be 
achieved by increasing the volume of export crops even further. The global 
economy was developing at a steady pace and it was important that the 
price of colonial goods sourced from Java was certainly no higher, and 
preferably lower, than that of the Netherlands’ competitors active in the 
business of imperialism. That economic principle ensured that production 
on the basis of unfree labour remained an essential requirement. Only by 
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paying the peasants the lowest possible price for the use of their land and 
labour was it possible to make a prof it for the mother country. It was this 
understanding that persuaded Johannes van den Bosch to reject the model 
of private estate-based production using free labour that had been suggested 
to him. His mission to the West Indies on behalf of the King to reorganize 
the way these colonies were managed strengthened his conviction that it 
was only possible to achieve a minimum production price by saving as much 
as possible on the costs of native labour. This reasoning lay at the basis of 
the cultivation system that Van den Bosch devised and put into practice. 
So who was Van den Bosch, how did his plans take shape and what were 
his modes of operation?
Spreading benevolence at home and on Java
Johannes van den Bosch started his promising career in 1799 as an off icer 
in the Engineering Corps in the East Indies. During his f irst ten-year stay in 
the colony, he bought a large estate close to Batavia, which he ran eff iciently 
and profitably. He was forced to leave Java in 1810 after a disagreement with 
Governor-General Daendels. On his return to the metropolis, he reflected 
on the knowledge and experience he had gained in colonial practice in 
the East Indies. This resulted in a two-part treatise, dedicated to the King, 
which was published in 1817-18, Nederlandsche bezittingen in Azia, Amerika 
en Afrika, in derzelver toestand en aangelegenheid voor dit Rijk, wijsgeerig, 
staathuishoudkundig en geographisch beschouwd, met bijvoeging der noodige 
tabellen en eenen atlas nieuwe kaarten [Dutch possessions in Asia, America 
and Africa, considered in their state and relevance for this Kingdom, from 
a philosophical, political and geographical perspective, with the required 
tables and an atlas with new maps]. He most likely also made his way to 
the upper echelons of the freemason movement in The Hague and that 
connection to the haute bourgeoisie helped him to become a confidant of 
the royal family. His interest in political economy led Van den Bosch to 
an in-depth study of metropolitan poverty, which had become even more 
pressing as a result of the economic crisis that still held the country in its 
grasp. Despite his steady rise to higher ranks in the military, he left active 
service to devote himself to solving the misery in which the lower classes 
were confined. In 1818 he established the Benevolent Society with the sup-
port of a select group of influential f igures, including Frederik, the King’s 
second son. The economic distress, deteriorating into pauperism, in which 
the urban poor in particular lived, was alleviated by relief provided by the 
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church or the municipality. This charity was an acceptable remedy for those 
unfit to work, such as the chronically ill, the disabled or the elderly, but did 
not offer much relief for those who were unable to meet their basic needs 
because there was no work. The Benevolent Society aimed to rehabilitate 
them by facilitating their re-engagement in the labour process. The designer 
of the plan arranged for the unemployed to be moved to the east of the 
country, where they could make themselves useful opening up waste land 
for self-cultivation. The initiative led to the establishment of three agricul-
tural colonies, named after the King’s children, where the deserving poor 
were housed. To facilitate the transition from hopeless urban pauperism to 
tilling unproductive land, these victims of poverty required not only some 
instruction in the basics of agricultural work but also strict supervision to 
teach them how to live properly through gainful employment. Exposed to 
this drilling in good behaviour gave the experiment a strong disciplinary 
character, despite the recruitment being on a voluntary basis. This was 
not the case for another class of destitutes, including vagrants, beggars, 
alcoholics and other misfits, who were considered too lazy to work. The local 
authorities in the west of the Netherlands were given the opportunity to rid 
themselves of these undesirables by having them locked up in two institu-
tions, which were also opened in the east of the country. Teaching moral 
and civic behaviour to this class of undeserving poor of course called for a 
much stronger dose of re-education. Being committed to the institutions 
itself was already a form of punishment, but for these wayward people, the 
ultimate aim was to change their mentality so that the imposed discipline 
would be replaced by self-discipline and self-provision. Delinquents were 
eligible for discharge when they had suff iciently demonstrated that they 
had regained their virtuousness. Rehabilitation was the condition for their 
return to mainstream society, but if they relapsed into their old habits, they 
would be confined again. The passage below shows how strict the regime 
was to which these involuntary inmates were subordinated.
The new institutions were large (100 to 145 meters long), square buildings 
with a central courtyard. At Veenhuizen, a central wall ran the length of 
each wing, dividing the inner courtyard for undisciplined ‘beggars’ from 
the 125 individual apartments for ‘colonist families’, which ringed the 
outer facade. The inner courtyard was accessible by only two gates, one for 
men and one for women, who were kept separate by a fence that divided 
the courtyard in half. The living arrangements in the inner courtyard 
consisted of fourteen single-sex dormitories, each sleeping eighty people. 
Undisciplined, criminalized pauper families were split up and placed 
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in these dormitories at their induction. Supervisors’ apartments were 
placed between the dormitories, so that the overseers could observe 
residents’ behavior without themselves being seen. Couples who could 
demonstrate that they were married and who were wellbehaved were 
allowed to settle in the family apartments in the outer ring of the build-
ing. To ensure that those in the outer ring did not take advantage of their 
relative independence to drink or leave the premises, as had the ‘free’ 
colonists at Frederiksoord, a moat, guarded by sentries, was dug around 
the building (Schrauwers 2001: 311).
Van den Bosch was assured of royal protection in implementing his plan 
for combating poverty in the metropolis by agrarian colonization and the 
King now began to make use of his services for overseas purposes as well. 
Almost ten years after their f irst meeting, Willem I felt that this confidant 
was the man he needed as his consultant for colonial affairs. Van den Bosch 
went on a mission to the West Indies to come up with proposals to improve 
the unsatisfactory f inancial and administrative state of affairs in those 
colonies. Satisf ied with the report that Van den Bosch submitted in 1828, 
the King appointed him Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies later 
that same year. He was given the task of making the colony profitable for 
the mother country. The intention was clear, but how was Van den Bosch to 
achieve his pledge to generate a colonial surplus to stimulate growth and 
prosperity in the metropolis? This was a question on which many advisers 
continued to hold conflicting opinions. Van den Bosch was given the benefit 
of the doubt to put his ideas into practice.23
The cultivation system that the new Governor-General started to intro-
duce immediately on his arrival in 1830 was not a blueprint, a ready-made 
design with detailed instructions on how to act. What later merited the 
name ‘system’ only emerged piecemeal. Its main characteristics are clear 
from its basic principles. The point of departure was the cultivation and 
delivery of agrarian products by the peasant population for sale on the world 
market at a competitive price. To generate the profit required to stimulate 
the metropolitan economy, these commodities had to be acquired at the 
lowest possible cost. That was the only way to compete with suppliers 
23 In addition to his own writings, I made use of published biographies for information on the 
way in which Van den Bosch devoted himself to eradicating poverty in the metropolis and to 
the introduction of the cultivation system in the colony. See J.J. Westendorp Boerma, Johannes 
van den Bosch als sociaal hervormer; de Maatschappij van Weldadigheid. Groningen 1927 and, 
by the same author, Een geestdriftig Nederlander: Johannes van den Bosch. Amsterdam 1950.
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from elsewhere in the world, such as the slave-based plantation-industry 
in the Caribbean. Cheap labour had always been the cornerstone of the old 
colonial regime and this continued under the new policy. Apart from paying 
the peasant-producers as little as possible, it was also important to keep 
administrative overhead – especially the costs of ensuring that the peasants 
complied with the obligations imposed on them – to a minimum. This could 
be achieved by preserving the mode of operation applied during the VOC 
era, which, according to Van den Bosch, was simply a continuation of what 
came before. In the Priangan, this was the trust that the peasants placed 
in their local chiefs, while elsewhere on Java it was the village system that 
was alleged to be founded on ‘traditional’ institutions. These two principles 
– the heavy burden imposed on the peasantry and low expenditure on 
surveillance – were intended to change the colony into a source of income 
for the metropolis. Force was an undeniable component of this new policy. 
It was said to be necessary because the colonized population had simple 
needs and therefore lacked any zeal to work. Was the coercion inherent 
in the cultivation system not a problem for its founding father? Van den 
Bosch put forward a variety of arguments to counteract this opinion. First 
of all, forced labour was the continuation of customs from the pre-colonial 
past. Secondly, the forced cultivation and delivery of crops only took up a 
modest proportion of the time and assets that the producers needed to fulf il 
their own basic needs. Lastly, Van den Bosch claimed that the obligations 
imposed on the peasants would lead to a real increase in their incomes. 
Indeed, their standard of living would rise even more than they could expect 
if they were allowed to freely dispose of their labour as they wished. Of 
course, left to themselves they did not want to exert themselves and seek 
redemption from indolence. From this perspective, the compulsion had a 
beneficial effect because it put an end to the underutilized labour of the 
peasantry, an outcome which would f irst and foremost benefit the people 
themselves. It was basically the same argument with which Van den Bosch 
had justif ied the detainment of urban poor in the Netherlands as the best 
way to achieve their rehabilitation to citizenship.
The next chapter elaborates on the way in which the cultivation system 
was implemented. Before that, however, this f inal section will examine 
what happened to Van den Bosch himself during and after the introduc-
tion of the system of which he was the architect. The new policy made a 
somewhat hesitant and unsteady start in its early years. These initially 
disappointing results did not, however, persuade Willem I to abandon his 
trust in his favourite. On the contrary, Van den Bosch was given more and 
more authority, until he eventually had carte blanche to act as he saw f it. 
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The Governor-General succeeded in demoting the Council for the Indies, 
whose members had shared in governance of the colony, to the status of 
a purely advisory body. On being appointed, Van den Bosch had agreed to 
take on the position only on condition that he would not hold it for more 
than three years. It was ultimately a little longer – though not much – and 
before departing in 1834 he took the trouble of giving his nominated suc-
cessor, Jean Chrétien Baud, thorough instruction in the ins and outs of the 
job. Back in the metropolis, the King immediately appointed Van den Bosch 
Minister for the Colonies and, in that position, he continued to monitor the 
enforcement and expansion of his policy, which had now taken on all the 
characteristics of a full-scale system. The success that the founding father 
had in mind had now been fully achieved. The best evidence of this was 
the steady increase in the colonial surplus, which the metropolis not only 
gratefully accepted, but more or less took for granted. The role of the colony 
as a source of prof it was not up for discussion. Van den Bosch himself 
had returned home a rich man. His wealth had not been gained from his 
governmental services but from the income from his enormous estate, 
Pondok Gedeh. This area, known as the gateway to the Priangan, covered 
an area of 22,000 hectares and included 80 villages, whose inhabitants 
grew and delivered crops as prescribed by the cultivation system. He had 
bought the estate from Nicolaus Engelhard in 1832 and the advantageous 
deal that the Governor-General agreed with this old hand showed that the 
kongsi at the top of the colonial administration had remained intact after 
the changing of the colonial guard. The King would not have begrudged 
his protégé this fortune, as he himself had reaped much greater prof its 
from the services Van Den Bosch had performed on his monarch’s behalf. 
For his part, Van den Bosch remained loyal to his patron, including in 
later years when parliament increasingly criticized the King for being 
headstrong, and especially for refusing to reveal the f inancial accounts 
of the colony. The dispute reached breaking point in 1840 when Willem 
stubbornly refused to render account for the colonial loans he said that he 
needed as his privy. To see it debated in parliament was, in his perception, 
an inadmissible infringement of the rights of the Crown. Van den Bosch 
sided with his royal patron, allegedly against his better judgment, and 
resigned when the King’s wish was overruled by a parliamentary majority. 
As a reward for his counsellor’s unswerving loyalty, the King immediately 
appointed him Minister of State and elevated him to a higher rank in 
the nobility, with the title of Count. With hindsight, too, Van den Bosch 
continued to defend the principles and effects of the cultivation system 
with undiminished fervour.
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Before examining the enormous rise in production on Java for sale on 
the world market more closely, I would f irst like to make a few additional 
comments on the main lines of what would go down in history as the policy 
of surplus. The discussion that surrounded its launch demonstrated a funda-
mental conflict between ideas and interests. The ideas that Van den Bosch 
propagated were grand, dogmatic and fashionable, while the underlying 
interests were crude, pragmatic and driven by pure self-interest. In an 
ideological sense there was a deep belief in the potential for development 
that lay dormant in every human being and could be given free rein by an 
enlightened government, but politically, the main concern was the need 
to discipline a peasant population, subject to a system of coercion that 
they despised and hated, to increase the cultivation of crops for export. In 
the early decades of the nineteenth century, the colonial administration 
began to be associated, for the f irst time but indelibly, with a rather suspect 
objective. Illustrative of the fundamental inequality between the colonizing 
rulers and those they colonized was the assertiveness with which Willem 
van Hogendorp, as the closest colleague of Du Bus de Gisignies, spoke of 
the inferiority of the Javanese race. He outlined his views in a letter to his 
family in the Netherlands. White supremacy, he claimed, was based not 
only on the possession of weapons but also on superiority of character and 
reason, which the people of Java accepted subordinately and with docility 
(Hogendorp 1913: 78).
The principles on which this foreign domination was based ran 
completely against the tide of new political and social opinions that had 
emerged in Europe in the wake of the French revolution and which were 
gradually gaining ground there. In the colony the received wisdom took on 
the characteristics of an ideology, systematically justifying and legitimiz-
ing oppression. In the decades that followed, this ideology increasingly 
acquired the character of a fundamental contradiction between white 
and black. Illustrative of this school of thought was a memorandum from 
1850 with which Jean Chrétien Baud ended his career as Minister for the 
Colonies. He not only described this contradiction in an absolute sense, as 
purity that could not tolerate any form of contamination, but also gave the 
impression that the dominated race endorsed white superiority and had 
become convinced of its own inferiority.
History teaches us that any contact between the white race and the 
dark-skinned peoples has resulted in the subjugation of the latter by the 
former. This experience has convinced the black races that the white race 
is a higher form of being, and that it is the destiny of both that the one 
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should dominate over the other. That right of domination is however, in 
the strictest sense, considered to be solely a characteristic of the pure 
white race, so that, while a black man will bow submissively to a white 
man, he is reluctant to obey a man of mixed blood.24
With this statement, the man who for many years held the highest colonial 
off ice expressed the undiluted racist prejudice that underlay policy in 
the colony. Could indeed the steady rise in coffee production be seen as 
a yardstick for the degree to which the subordination which the colonial 
authorities invoked to justify the exploitation of the Javanese peasants had 
become internalized?
24 The reference to Baud’s memorandum is included in the Algemeen Overzigt van de staat-
kundige gesteldheid van Nederlandsch Indië over 1852 (pp. 314-5) in which G.G.A.J. Duymaer van 
Twist reported in 1855 on the governance and policy pursued. NA, Ministry of the Colonies. 
1850-1900, inv.no. 5870, Exh. 9 June 1855, no. 303 secret.

VI The coffee regime under the 
cultivation system
A new surge in the colonial tribute
The argument that forced labour was unavoidable to keep the cost price at 
the lowest possible level had to be played down in the public presentation 
of the government’s policy to generate a surplus in the colony. The minister 
in charge of colonial affairs stated with regret that the Javanese people did 
not possess the work ethic required to extract all the potential benef its 
offered by the fertility of their island. This observation led him to declare 
in 1830 that the starting point for government on Java was ‘to guide the 
people to devote their labour to that purpose that was most in accordance 
with the interests of the mother country’ (Van Deventer II, 1866: 497). The 
reverse argument, that the price to be paid for prioritizing these interests 
was clearly to the disadvantage of the colonized population, was however 
much more diff icult to justify. The imminent abolition of slavery – although 
introduced with much delay by the Dutch government25 – suggested that 
the plea to maintain the regime of unfree labour on Java would not nec-
essarily be greeted abroad with unanimous approval. This explains the 
government’s concise summary of its intentions in the colony, ‘to obtain 
the best possible product of the best quality and at the lowest price, without 
putting the population under pressure’ (quoted in Van Gorkom 1880b: 177-8). 
To ensure that the suff ix to this sentence did not remain in the realm of 
f iction, the government decided to present its policy of demanding that the 
people of Java engage in productive work as encouraging them to an effort 
that would benefit both them and their country. Since these people were 
not willing to grow crops for export of their own accord, because of their 
childlike, non-economic mentality, there was nothing else for it than to 
impose the necessary discipline upon them. As long as they showed no signs 
of having internalized the need to work, coercion would remain necessary 
to lead them towards progress.
When explaining the foundations of the cultivation system he envisaged, 
Van den Bosch referred to forced cultivation and delivery of commercial 
crops as the main pillars of the regime pursued formerly by the VOC. In 
25 After stepping down as Minister for the Colonies in 1848, Baud accepted the chairmanship 
of the commission set up in 1853 to prepare for the abolition of slavery.
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his view, a return to that policy was in line with the principle of raising 
tribute, to which the peasantry had already been accustomed in the remote 
past. The people of the Priangan Regencies were living proof that there 
was no cause to doubt that orders from above would be carried out loyally. 
After all, the traditional arrangement had been preserved in this region, 
with the help of the native chiefs. So why not introduce the same regime 
on the rest of the island? Not everyone was, however, convinced that this 
precedent would work as Van den Bosch suggested. In an early protest 
against the new policy Cornelis Theodorus Elout stepped down as Minis-
ter for the Colonies. Jean Chrétien Baud, at the time Director of Colonial 
Affairs and later on his successor as Governor-General and Minister for 
the Colonies, critically responded that breaking with the ancien régime 
outside the Priangan Regencies had brought about changes that would 
be diff icult to reverse. The blueprint revealed by Van den Bosch did not 
include the return of the landed gentry elsewhere on Java to a leading role 
in the cultivation and collection of the crops. Certainly, the Sundanese 
people had proved to possess an exceptional propensity for obedience, but 
was it realistic to expect the peasants in other regions of the island to do 
what was required of them, without the native chiefs having to intervene 
directly and at close quarters? It was arguable whether the greater docility 
ascribed to the people of the highlands of West Java could be attributed to a 
difference in mentality or to a form of governance that had intentionally left 
the structure of native authority in the region intact. Engelhard’s statement, 
that the Priangan regents kept the peasants under control with a whole 
range of means that were not only invisible to the European off icials but far 
beyond their reach, comes to mind in this context. The cultivation system 
was introduced at a time when the colonial apparatus was still far removed 
from the workfloor. In other words, there was no guarantee that the orders 
issued would have the desired effect. The solution found for this problem 
– outside the Priangan – was to designate the village council made up by 
local headmen as the link between the government and the people and to 
reward its members, at the expense of the majority of inhabitants, with 
tax-free land holdings. This village structure, which Raffles ‘discovered’ and 
identif ied as the traditional basis of the peasant order, became the focal 
point for the allocation and distribution of the burden of growing crops for 
export imposed on the people under the new tribute system. In that sense, 
colonial exploitation in the Priangan Regencies – where the village system 
that was prevalent elsewhere did not exist – was organized differently than 
it would be under the cultivation system. My account will continue to focus 
on the introduction and impact of the system in the highlands of West Java.
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Coffee and more
The range of products that fell under the system of forced cultivation and 
delivery varied according to region. This was partly due to variation in 
administrative practices and partly to agronomic considerations. On the 
northern coastal plain of Java, to the east of Cirebon, sugarcane soon took 
up a substantial proportion of the farmland and the labour capacity of the 
population. In the upland areas of Central and East Java, the same applied 
to coffee. I will discuss the similarities and differences between growing 
coffee in these regions and its continued cultivation in the Priangan later. 
However, I would f irst like to examine attempts to prescribe the planting 
of other crops with promising prospects on the world market. These ef-
forts to promote diversif ication came rather unexpectedly, since in many 
districts the order to plant coffee had been accompanied by a pledge that 
the producers would be exempt from other cultivation obligations.
The designation of the Priangan highlands as the centre of indigo 
cultivation coincided with the start of the cultivation system. At f irst, 
this crop was reintroduced – the VOC had insisted on its being produced 
here at the end of the seventeenth and in the f irst half of the eighteenth 
centuries – on a limited scale. Doubts about its prof itability and a lack of 
effective monitoring to ensure the required quality had led to a decline in 
interest in its production, but it had never disappeared from the Priangan 
completely. At the end of the eighteenth century, the VOC management 
had declared itself to be critical of claims that the highlands were not 
suitable for growing cotton and indigo (De Haan III, 1912: 817). Reports of 
Pieter Engelhard’s inspection tours of the Priangan in the early nineteenth 
century show that, during his tenure as Commissioner, he had issued orders 
to plant a number of f ields with indigo by way of experiment. There is 
also, however, no lack of reports showing that reintroduction of the crop 
would be strongly resisted. The peasants did grow indigo, but only to dye 
textiles they had woven at home for their own use. In his annual report 
for 1800, the inspector for Cianjur warned that peasants were so afraid of 
having to grow indigo that they would flee at the f irst signs of preparations 
being made (ibid.: 823). Van den Bosch nevertheless decided to give indigo 
priority even over coffee. According to off icial reports, indigo was to be 
planted on land that was not or was no longer suitable for growing coffee. 
As provisional inspector of the new crop, G.E. Tesseire, was ordered to 
conduct an investigation and his f indings, based on a tour of the regencies 
of Cianjur, Bandung, Sumedang and Limbangan in April 1830, led to the 
Priangan being designated as a production area for a substantial share of the 
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envisaged volume of indigo. Cirebon was also identif ied as a region where 
production could be successfully introduced. To encourage the managers 
in charge of cultivation and processing to make a greater effort, they were 
assured of a tenth part of the revenue from the sale of the crop. Government 
off icials and native chiefs received this ‘cultivation commission’ on top of 
their regular salaries or other emoluments (Reinsma 1980). To process the 
indigo into dye, Tesseire requested and was given permission to build 19 
factories spread throughout the Priangan Regencies. The factories were 
built close to the f ields (Van Deventer II, 1866: 148-54).
The peasants may have had a great aversion to growing coffee, but its 
replacement by the new crop that had to be processed in a factory before 
delivery imposed an even greater burden on their already meagre means 
of subsistence. In reaction to reports of massive land flight the authorities 
ordained that the peasants who stayed behind would have to bear the full 
weight of the new obligations. The assumption that it took some time for 
the colonial authorities to become aware of the disastrous consequences 
of this policy is incorrect. The Resident of Cirebon indicated as early as 
December 1830 that not everything was going according to plan. The revolt 
he referred to was not unusual in this traditional centre of unrest, but a 
hastily set up commission of inquiry concluded that it was not inconceivable 
that the introduction of indigo had aroused much resistance (Van Deventer 
II, 1866: 195-6). Van den Bosch had tried to mollify him and, a month later, 
insisted that growing indigo was very lucrative for the producers, as they 
were paid well for their labour and were exempted from all corvee services. 
Among themselves and behind closed doors, the policy-makers could be 
more candid in exchanging views about the unwillingness of the peasants 
to do what they were told. A member of the Council of the Indies noted in 
a memorandum that the resolute assurance of the Resident of Cirebon that 
the peasants planted indigo of their own free will was incorrect and that it 
had been touch and go whether the whole residency would be up in arms. 
He also warned that paying cultivation commission to the off icials and 
chiefs charged with supervising the cultivation and processing of indigo 
encouraged abuse. Council member Pieter Merkus, at this stage a declared 
opponent of the Governor-General, took a more principled approach to the 
problem. He called the assumption that the Javanese peasants were aware 
that they had entered into a contractual agreement with the government 
misplaced (ibid.: 221). In a subsequent memorandum, he warned against 
going any further with the use of force to acquire labour and products 
from the peasants. He had little confidence in the report by the Resident 
of Cirebon, since it was his policy that had led to the unrest surrounding 
the Coffee reGiMe under the CuLtivation systeM 215
the introduction of indigo to the region. Reading between the lines of its 
report, it is clear that the commission of inquiry had ordered the Resident 
to exercise caution and advised him not to advocate a situation in which 
‘the chiefs felt bound to physically conf ine those unwilling to work’ 
(ibid.: 295). In July 1831, the Resident of the Priangan Regencies suggested, 
choosing his words carefully, that growing indigo was too demanding on 
the peasants, but Van den Bosch stood his ground. Criticism now came 
from lower down in the colonial apparatus, and focused on the conflict 
of interest between indigo and coffee. By 1834, the initial optimism had 
been replaced by doubts about the wisdom of continuing the cultivation 
of the new crop in the Priangan Regencies. Shortly after Van den Bosch 
had left the colony his successor, Jean Chrétien Baud, went on a tour of 
inspection which led him to express his satisfaction with the situation in 
the residency and the willingness of the people to do as they were ordered. 
The new Governor-General spoke less favourably about the cultivation of 
indigo. He was concerned that it was being grown at the expense of coffee, 
which was much more important commercially. A year later, cultivation of 
this new crop – introduced with such high expectations – was abandoned. 
A report by Inspector for Cultivation Louis Vitalis on the situation in East 
Priangan was very influential in reversing the previously so optimistic 
outlook. The Inspector wrote that the people of Sukapura and parts of 
Sumedang lived in small, widely dispersed settlements. These peasants were 
still nomadic and depended for their livelihoods on growing food on dry 
ground, which produced very little. They had no time to grow indigo and 
what they earned from it was not enough to live on. In addition, they were 
forced to travel long distances over diff icult terrain. It was not uncommon 
for them to take two weeks to reach the production site allocated to them, 
while they were at great risk from attack by rhinoceroses, tigers and other 
wild animals on the way. In the three factories that Vitalis visited during 
his f irst inspection in April 1835, several thousand peasants had died of 
hunger. He described graphically his encounters with walking skeletons 
that dragged themselves from place to place, many of whom expired from 
the rigours of their ordeal. Some were so exhausted that they died as they 
ate the food that was issued to them as an advance on their f irst meagre 
wage.26 A second report by Vitalis on the situation in Sumedang was equally 
alarming.27 Lack of food had led to an unimaginably high level of mortality. 
26 Report on the state of indigo cultivation and factories in the Priangan Regencies residency 
by L. Vitalis, 14 April 1835. NA, Baud collection, 461.
27 Idem, 29 June 1835. NA, Baud collection, 461.
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Vitalis recommended closing all indigo factories in the Priangan Regencies 
except one, abandoning cultivation of this crop and giving the f ields back to 
the peasants to grow paddy. These recommendations were put into practice 
almost immediately.
As with the cultivation system in general, abolishing the forced cul-
tivation of indigo proved more diff icult than its introduction. That had 
everything to do with the assumption at the top of the colonial bureaucracy 
that labour could be requisitioned without restraint and for the lowest 
possible payment – if it was paid for at all – from a pool of workers who 
were required to be conveniently available at all times. Later criticisms of 
the problems surrounding the cultivation of indigo were much sharper 
with the benefit of hindsight, but a climate had developed at the time in 
which reports voicing any form of criticism were dismissed as biased and 
unfounded. This dismissive response found its way back to the metropolis 
and critics, who clearly knew what they were talking about, were obliged 
to express their complaints anonymously. A publication from 1835, for 
example, expressed this criticism in no uncertain terms, denouncing the 
negative impacts of indigo cultivation in the Priangan Regencies (Blik op 
het bestuur 1835: 54). The complaint was backed up with facts that only 
insiders were privy to. Indignation among the main policy-makers about 
these ignominious allegations ran high and led to a ban on civil servants, 
whether still in active service or not, making off icial documents public. The 
leaking of information had to be stopped to ensure that critical discussion 
on the new regime would be restricted to only a small circle of those directly 
involved.
What is striking about the introduction of the cultivation system is that 
the line of command in the colonial enterprise did not acknowledge any 
countervailing opinion and that its stated objective had to be achieved 
at any cost, irrespective of whether the burden on the peasantry was too 
great. Although food production was extended rapidly in large parts of the 
Javanese countryside, agricultural activity was primarily focused on grow-
ing cash crops for export. Besides the fact that the scaling up of production 
was accompanied by the exercise of force, the government also had an 
inadequate understanding of the structure of the native economy and the 
resources on which the peasants relied for their survival. Managers and 
the actual cultivators had insuff icient agronomic knowledge and no effort 
was made to investigate whether eff icient production was possible with the 
existing techniques and tools. A small number of experimental agricultural 
stations were set up but were unable to bring about any great change due to 
the lack of a clear agenda. The policy-makers showed hardly any interest, 
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if at all, in what the forced delivery of these crops meant to the mass of the 
peasants. Attempts to introduce improvements in the shortcomings that 
emerged in practice were more incidental than planned. This haphazard 
approach explained the tendency to improvise and the ease with which 
objectives were simply replaced with others if that proved potentially more 
expedient. An important step towards improving these aspects was the 
appointment of a Director of Cultivation at the end of 1831 to supervise 
the production and expansion of the prescribed crops. This meant that, in 
addition to the specif ic policy pursued in the separate districts, there was 
now an inspectorate with the task of inspecting, coordinating and reporting 
on cultivation activities across the whole island. A small batch of young men 
were taken on as probationers and provided with agricultural training. An 
off icial was given the job of compiling a statistical record for each district 
containing reports and other documents from the government archives, 
and including maps and sketches.
The government focused its attention on the cultivation of sugarcane, 
coffee and indigo. In a memorandum in mid-1830, Van den Bosch indicated 
that other crops should also be encouraged, including cotton, silk and tea. 
Tobacco, pepper, cinnamon, cochenille (used for dyeing) and cinchona 
were later added to the list. Most of these products did not get past the 
experimental stage, or not until much later, and interest in them seemed 
to be inspired more by a sudden and short-term fascination than a sensible 
weighing up of the pros and cons. Of course, the introduction of coffee 
more than a century earlier had been no less unplanned: its unexpected 
import from distant regions, random planting f irst in areas that proved less 
suitable for it to grow, placing off icials in charge with no knowledge at all 
of the crop, and uncertainty as to how it would sell on the world market. In 
my view, it is the persistence of this ineptitude that is so striking. What had 
been introduced informally, almost as a hobby, at the start of the eighteenth 
century continued to be approached in the same way in an age in which 
rural Java had been, in the words of a later commentator, turned into one 
huge labour camp. This may have been an exaggeration, but it did not 
change the fact that the expertise with which the colonial policy-makers 
had initiated the cultivation system was anything but impressive. It seemed 
to lack the essential features of a system: cautious preparation, careful 
implementation and close monitoring of the impact. Vitalis related how 
he repeatedly had to suggest that a failed crop should no longer be grown. 
During an inspection in 1837, he discovered 2,000 coffee planters who had 
been working in a garden for f ive years. Some of them had to cover a distance 
of 28 miles just to get there. In this period, their efforts had produced only 
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a total of three pikul of coffee (Vitalis 1851a: 3). The ‘production method’ 
basically entailed setting ambitious goals and then taking resolute but 
impetuous measures to pursue them. If this produced disappointing results, 
but it was too diff icult or impossible to adjust the manner of working for 
practical reasons that could not be overcome at that time, the experiment 
was abandoned, the books were closed and the costs incurred were written 
off. Attention would then shift to another crop, as demand for colonial 
commodities was growing as never before. This development was closely 
linked to increasing integration in the world system and the search for new 
commercial crops which, as the consequence of a limited understanding of 
market forces, were hitherto unknown or had at least until then remained 
out of sight. Some of these were plants that grew only in the wild and which 
were now being considered for cultivation. In 1830, the Dutch consuls in 
Egypt, Peru and Chile received requests to supply cinchona seeds. Egypt 
and Chile both replied that it would be diff icult to comply with this request 
and that costs would be high due to the inaccessibility of the areas where 
the seeds grew. Behind the apparent success of the main products on which 
the cultivation system focused – primarily sugar and coffee – there is a long 
history of failures and disappointments. The reports on these experiments 
are obscure and do not express fully the extent to which the sometimes 
extremely high costs were usually charged on exclusively to the native 
producers. And who should care, as the experiments required little invest-
ment, while the required labour could be requisitioned at no cost at all?
More and more coffee
The Priangan region retained the function it had been designated a century 
earlier: as an epithet for the forced cultivation and delivery of coffee. How 
did the region fare under the cultivation system? Not well, at f irst. Its 
founder had in the early 1830s decided to give priority to indigo in the f irm 
conviction that it would be much more prof itable, as the price of coffee 
had fallen on the world market. The Resident of the Priangan Regencies, 
who had opposed what he considered to be the over-hasty introduction 
of indigo as it imposed too great a burden on the peasants and would not 
be prof itable for the government, was relieved of all involvement in the 
new crop by the Governor-General and even threatened with dismissal 
when he continued to object. On the other hand, there are reports that 
the native chiefs found it easier to motivate the peasants to grow coffee 
so that they would not be mobilized for the feared cultivation of indigo. 
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When the price of coffee rapidly recovered, the Sundanese hill people were 
forced to enormously increase the number of trees they planted without 
a corresponding reduction in the quota set for indigo. This only started to 
fall after 1833, when colonial policy-makers had f inally become aware of 
the disastrous effects of growing the crop. The population of the Priangan 
had paid a high price for this failed experiment.
With indigo out of the picture, coffee retained its place at the top of the 
list of prescribed crops. In the Priangan Regencies, it would remain the 
primary product for many years. Encouraged by the favourable prospects of 
rising consumption in the Atlantic world, the process of expanding coffee 
cultivation to other parts of Java that had already been set in motion now 
speeded up. Van den Bosch ordered that the stock of trees must increase 
to 40 million a year, which could only be achieved by planting trees on the 
highlands in the west, centre and east of the island. In 1832, after Merkus 
had tendered his resignation as a member of the Council of the Indies to 
avoid escalation of a difference of opinion with the Governor-General,28 he 
was given the task of drawing up a regulation on growing and delivering 
coffee under the cultivation system. Within two months, Merkus had a 
draft ready, which started with the question of how the obstinate reluc-
tance of the peasants to growing coffee could be overcome. In his view, 
this aversion was not caused by the heavy workload. Once the trees had 
been planted, maintaining them took little time and effort. As we shall see 
later, the veracity of this claim is utterly misplaced. However, past attempts 
to encourage coffee production without using force had failed. Nothing 
had come of the formal freedom to grow coffee granted to the peasants 
outside the Priangan in 1817. According to Merkus, everyone knew that 
the government had made coffee production compulsory again because 
of the peasants’ unwillingness to grow it voluntarily. This repugnance was 
partly attributed to the excessively low price they were paid for their efforts, 
but was also seen as a consequence of them lacking the incentive to work. 
Merkus argued that, if abolishing the obligation to grow coffee led to the 
gardens being neglected and destroyed, preserving forced cultivation was a 
logical response, given the interests at stake for the metropolis. But, he said, 
this should occur on condition that the peasants were paid a fair price for 
growing coffee against their will and that the government should claim no 
more than a f ifth of the yield. Making them supply the coffee exclusively to 
28 Van den Bosch rejected Merkus’ request apparently because he preferred to have his op-
ponent close by and under his authority than at a distance where he would be more diff icult to 
control.
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the government protected the innocent Javanese peasants from the harmful 
practices of private traders, mainly Chinese and Arabs. But it was not only 
non-Javanese Asians who were excluded from the region. A ban had been 
in place since 1823 on all persons not in the colonial service to visit or stay 
in inland Java without the express permission of the Governor-General 
(Van Gorkom 1880b: 171). Establishing a monopoly on purchasing coffee 
production certainly guaranteed the government greater prof its, but the 
measure was allegedly taken mainly to serve the interests of the peasants.
To overcome the Javanese aversion to work, the planters had to be assured 
a suff icient reward for their efforts. Van den Bosch could see the merits of 
this argument and agreed to a number of Merkus’ recommendations. He 
was even in favour of paying the peasants at least 20 per cent of the value of 
the product for their labour. But the Governor-General would not go as far 
as to pay them a f ixed proportion of the average market price. He reminded 
his adviser that the peasants were simply overgrown children with limited 
powers of reason. A continually changing income would only confuse them. 
Goedhart noted correctly that, from this perspective, coffee planters were 
seen as wage labourers employed by the government, who were paid for 
the work they did (Goedhart 1948: 34). The f inal decision in 1833 displayed 
some willingness to pay the peasants a reasonable amount. The government 
would index the payments by adding a bonus of 40 per cent per weight unit 
if the market price fell below average, and 30 per cent if it rose above it. The 
Governor-General had shown himself to be an excellent businessman. He 
initially estimated earning a surplus f ive million guilders on government 
products in 1833, but he f irst adjusted this to eight million, then expressed 
the hope that he might be able to push it up further to twelve million in the 
long term, and eventually succeeded in transferring goods worth sixteen 
million guilders a year to the Netherlands (Van Deventer II, 1866: 528-9 and 
542-3). To fulf il this promise, he needed to expand the monopoly, at f irst 
restricted to cultivation and delivery, to selling the procured products on 
the home market. The Dutch Trading Company had taken it upon itself to 
organize transport of the export crops to the metropolis and to sell them 
by public auction on arrival.
Van den Bosch anticipated that coffee production would grow from the 
300,000 pikul of the previous years to 500,000 pikul in the near future. Did 
the new regulation mean that there would be one standard regime for the 
whole of Java? The situation on the rest of the island now more closely re-
sembled that in the Priangan Regencies: forced cultivation and compulsory 
delivery. Yet substantial differences remained. Under the instruction that 
came into force in 1832, the coffee planters elsewhere on Java had to plant 
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and maintain 500 fruit-bearing trees a year rather than 1,000, the number 
imposed on the people of the Sundanese highlands since the late eighteenth 
century. A second difference was that, in the long established centre of 
coffee production, the tribute was collected by the native chiefs while on 
the rest of the island it was the village council that mediated between 
government and people. Thirdly, the coffee peasants in the Priangan were 
not paid the same amount as the inhabitants of other regions on Java. 
Although this f luctuated as the market price rose and fell, the difference 
was always more than double the ‘wage’ with which the Sundanese peasants 
were fobbed off.
In the course of time, the cultivation of coffee had been relocated from 
the low-lying land to the foothills and then to even higher ground. But there 
had also been another shift in terms of location: when coffee had f irst been 
introduced in the early eighteenth century, the trees had been planted close 
to the settlements, around the peasants’ homesteads, in the strips of land 
separating their f ields, and on plots not used to grow food. As this land 
became scarce, they had to start clearing the forest a little further away but 
still reasonably accessible. They would leave the taller trees, cutting away 
the undergrowth and planting coffee in the newly opened up terrain. In his 
instruction to increase production, Van den Bosch had initially based his 
calculations on the land available to grow ‘hedgerow’ (pagger) and ‘forest’ 
coffee. The expansion in the years that followed primarily took the form 
of specially laid out ‘gardens’.
Table 6.1  Types of forced coffee cultivation
Year Plantations Forest Hedgerow
1836 25% 28% 47%
1845 46% 14% 40%
1850s 60% 10% 30%
source: Clarence-smith 1994: 253
The work in the gardens – from the preparation of the ground, planting and 
maintaining the trees, to picking the berries – was strongly regimented. 
Supervising the labourers was also much less problematic than in the widely 
dispersed and much smaller plots on which the hedge and forest coffee 
was grown. The discipline characteristic of both plant and planter in the 
gardens perfectly matched the command structure inherent in the cultiva-
tion system. The priority given to this large-scale mode of production was 
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expressed in the statement by Director of Cultivation Burchard Joan Elias in 
1836 that ‘garden coffee’ produced the highest yield (Van Baardewijk 1986: 7).
A rather megalomaniac blueprint drawn up by the colonial management 
at the end of 1833 planned to increase coffee production to 100 million pikul, 
which would require more than 263 million trees. This target, specif ied for 
each residency separately, was based on the idea that a berry-bearing coffee 
tree produced almost a third of a pikul of beans. The calculation not only 
vastly overestimated productivity per plant, it also failed to specify whether 
the required labour could be requisitioned and where from. How did this 
target affect the Priangan Regencies? The enormous area needed to plant 
the new trees was no longer available close to the peasant settlements in 
the lower-lying parts of the region. The path towards expansion led upward, 
requiring the cultivation of the zone between 1,000 and 1,500 metres high, 
which was still thickly forested and uninhabited. This, together with the 
uneven, mountainous terrain, made cultivation a diff icult prospect, but 
there was ample ground here unused and suitable for growing coffee. To 
open up these virgin lands, labour was brought in from far and wide in large 
numbers to clear the primal forest and prepare the gardens for planting 
the trees. The work was arduous and was made even more diff icult by the 
unfavourable climate at these altitudes. Cold and rain, which started here 
before the end of the morning, and lack of food and shelter affected the 
workers’ health which, together with the wild animals that lived in the 
forests and the mountains, contributed to the high mortality rate. In his 
account of a tour of the Priangan Regencies, Philippus Pieter Roorda van 
Eysinga noted that, in a period of two months, 33 people in Bandung had 
been attacked and savaged by tigers (1830: 210). In his inspection report from 
1835, Vitalis wrote that, during tours of the coffee gardens, off icials were 
preceded by angklong and tambourines to scare the animals off.
Often, land to lay the new gardens was chosen with insuff icient care. 
Preparing mountainsides for cultivation bore the risk that the soil was not 
deep enough and, after having been turned over with a pacul, it would 
easily be washed away by heavy rain. All the work in the gardens was done 
carelessly and with great haste. The saplings were planted too close to 
each other, so that as they grew the branches became entwined and the 
space between them, required after three to four years to pick the berries, 
disappeared. The planting itself was also performed with insuff icient care. 
Shoots ripped from old coffee trees were stuck roughly into the ground. 
Because the plants were damaged, they were guaranteed to bear inferior 
fruit, but this was not discovered until later, if at all. The maintenance 
of the trees during the growing cycle was equally inexpert. Mostly, they 
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received such little care that neatly laid out gardens soon turned into wild 
forests. The gardens were divided up into sections, which were separated by 
main avenues and side paths intended to make a neat and tidy impression 
during inspections. If the ground was hoed too eagerly, the fertile topsoil 
would be removed and trees would lose their vitality. Such shortcomings, 
individually and in combination, explained why many gardens were already 
‘depleted’ after six or seven years, having delivered no more than two or, 
at the most, three harvests. But, again, there was no lack of uncultivated 
land and it was just as easy to f ind labour to prepare it. It was a form of 
plantation management that came close to slash and burn agriculture. Not 
only was the forest cleared with total disregard, but the people mobilized 
en masse to lay out the new gardens were not paid a single cent for their 
efforts. Because they assumed that the coffee trees were naturally no longer 
productive after only a few harvests, colonial off icials had no diff iculty at 
all in writing off gardens scarcely six or seven years after they had been laid 
out. Later research in Ceylon, for example, showed that even on less fertile 
ground, coffee plantations could remain in production for up to 20 years, 
and without the enormous fluctuations in yield that so typif ied the history 
of coffee production in the Priangan Regencies. The forced cultivation of 
this crop resulted in a boundless waste of both land and labour.
When growing coffee was still concentrated in and around the villages, 
the peasants were accustomed to growing paddy or other crops between the 
young coffee trees. Until the beans could be picked after three or four years, 
they could at least derive some benefit from the time that they had spent in 
planting the trees and for which they had received no payment whatsoever. 
Their work in the gardens, which were often at great distances from their 
villages, made the possibility of growing food even more crucial. They could 
not go back and forth each day and they could not take enough food with 
them for the duration of their stay. But the strict regime enforced in the 
plantations did not permit them to grow any crops in between the coffee 
trees. Their only option was to eat roots that they found in the forest around 
the gardens or to try and clear a plot where they could sow a little rice.
When these people lay out coffee gardens, it is blessing for them if they 
are permitted to plant paddy or rice in the gardens, as they will frequently 
get a better harvest from them than from the Gagas that they have laid 
out for this purpose. This has often been forbidden by some off icial or 
other who is either unfamiliar with the lot of the poor Javanese or does 
not care about it; there are incidences of paddy that has already been 
planted having to be uprooted (De Wilde 1829: 42-3).
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The argument for not allowing food crops to be grown between the coffee 
trees, which was formalized in an instruction in 1829, was that it would 
affect the vitality of the trees. In his annual report for 1833, the Resident 
noted with satisfaction that neither his off icials nor the local chiefs were 
lacking in enthusiasm for the work entrusted to them. If they were not 
motivated by a sense of duty, their efforts were driven by the promise of 
the cultivation commission they received. On the downside, the prevailing 
lack of paddy meant that it was very diff icult to get the peasants to go to 
the coffee gardens to work and to make sure they had enough food for 
themselves for the duration of their stay.
Approaching the workfloor
Between 1833 and 1840, coffee cultivation expanded frenetically. The pay-
ment of high cultivation commissions made an important contribution to 
the eagerness with which the managers – both European officials and native 
chiefs – devoted themselves to their main task (Enklaar 1871: 131; Croockewit 
1866: 314-5). The Resident’s report for 1833 noted that the population had 
increased to 554,771, distributed among 92,127 households, 5,835 kampungs 
and 84 districts. The average of a little less than 100 inhabitants per settle-
ment (less than 20 households) was not evenly spread over the whole region. 
By contrast to the somewhat larger clusters in the more densely populated 
areas, Sukapura had a much lower average of fewer than 50 inhabitants per 
village. The fall in coffee production from more than 100,000 pikul in 1825 
to a third of that volume in 1831 was rectif ied by planting a total of no less 
than 330 million extra trees in the period up to 1840. A memorandum sent 
by the Assistant Resident for Bandung W.A. Nagel to his superior in 1834 is 
informative.29 It was the f irst time that the situation in a regency had been 
described from so close up and showed that the European off icials were ap-
proaching the workfloor. Nagel spoke from long experience. He had worked 
in Cianjur from 1820 to 1827, when he was appointed Assistant Resident for 
Bandung. On his arrival there he found coffee production in a bad state of 
repair. The gardens had been carelessly laid out, the wrong kind of soil had 
been chosen, the trees had been planted much too close together and the 
work was not divided evenly. In addition, there were no records of how things 
had been done in the past. He achieved substantial improvements in all of 
29 Memorandum from W.A. Nagel to the Resident of the Priangan Regencies, Bandung, 
20 August 1834. NA, Baud collection, 442.
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these areas, but that included writing off a million trees that appeared in 
the tallies submitted by the local chiefs but had never existed. That meant 
scrapping a very sizeable percentage of the total stock, which amounted to 
less than six million trees in 1827. Under his charge, their number rose to 
almost 24 million trees in 1834, a sixfold increase in only seven years. This was 
subdivided as follows: garden coffee – 6,719,150 trees; forest coffee – 6,485,250 
trees; kampung or hedgerow coffee – 10,456,951; total 23,661,351 trees.
For such a large and densely populated regency, Nagel felt that Bandung 
produced very little coffee. The quantity of hedgerow and forest coffee had 
risen after 1831, as the peasants had a clear preference for planting trees close 
to their homes, and in 1833, hedgerow coffee still topped the list. However, 
more promising were the large-scale coffee gardens at a higher altitude 
that the Assistant Resident had started laying out in 1828 and which were 
now beginning to bear fruit. In the years that followed, these plantations 
would account for the lion’s share of the coffee produced. Nagel had great 
diff iculty in mobilizing suff icient labour for the mountain gardens. He had 
appointed local chiefs to the position of kometir (commissioner) and made 
them responsible for arranging the mobilization and employment of plant-
ers in the kampungs in his area. The work gangs (t’rup) were led by petingi.
The plantation was divided into plots, each with a pole stating the number 
of the kampong, the number of trees and the year they were planted, so 
that the inspectors could see at a glance if the planters were following 
orders correctly. (Nagel 1834)
The Assistant Resident specified the authority and obligations of the petingi 
and komitir in detail in an instruction issued in 1832. The district chief gave 
him a list of the kampungs under his charge, how many planters each had to 
supply, and the location of the lands under cultivation. It was his job to visit 
all the sites and do whatever was necessary to produce the coffee. His records, 
which the village priest would help him with if necessary, would be sent to the 
district head, who was supposed to pass them on to the regent. These statistics 
would show, again at a glance, the state of coffee production from year to 
year. The implication was of a system of surveillance that could not fail. The 
planters who were set to work in gangs came from different kampungs and 
worked separately from each other under their own foreman. The pickets 
bearing the names of their kampung showed how they were divided into 
sections. The plantations were large-scale workplaces for many hundreds of 
men and women, who would stay there for weeks on end during the harvest 
time which was the peak season. At nights, they sheltered in the drying sheds 
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that Nagel had had built for the berries and which could each accommodate 
300 to 400 people. Cart-makers were located close to the gardens to ensure 
that there was sufficient capacity to transport the harvest. Nagel noted that in 
the year of his report, 650 new pedatis (carts) had been made, at no cost at all 
to the government. During the busy seasons, district and lower chiefs stayed 
in these establishments to ensure that production and transport went off as 
planned. Building all accommodation also fell under the corvee services the 
planters had to perform, for which they received no payment at all.
The sharp rise in coffee production required not only more peasant labour 
but also more managers. In the Priangan, the corps of civil servants remained 
limited to a handful of European officials. Du Bus de Gisignies had drawn up 
an instruction for the coffee controleurs in the Priangan Regencies in 1829 
(De Roo de la Faille 1895: 176), but they were few in number and remained at a 
distance, not concerning themselves at all with the daily business of growing 
coffee. These tasks were primarily the responsibility of the lower chiefs, and 
management at this level took place as Assistant Resident Nagel had outlined 
in his 1834 report. Alongside the line of governance that ran vertically from 
the regent down to the district head and branched off through the camat, 
his deputy, and other off icials charged with specific administrative tasks, 
there was another line of management with, at its top, a chief kometir for 
the coffee who operated from the headquarters of the regency. He was in 
contact with the European controleur, who told him how many trees had 
to be planted and accompanied him in seeking out suitable land. They also 
conducted inspections together to remain up to date on the progress of the 
work. At district level, responsibility for coffee production lay with a kometir 
who received orders from his superior and passed them on to the petingi. They 
were responsible for putting together and mobilizing the t’rup, the gangs 
into which the cacahs, the households eligible for compulsory coffee service, 
were organized. A t’rup could contain 30 to 50 and up to 100 cacah. Right at 
the bottom of the management column were the mandur, the foremen who 
supervised the work of planting, maintenance and picking in the gardens. The 
gangs they were in charge of contained members from different kampungs.
The Assistant Resident had improved the infrastructure by widening the 
stretch of the Great Trunk road running through his area of command. The 
roads used to transport the harvest were also improved, so that the carts 
took much less time to carry their loads to the warehouses. Lastly, he had 
smaller roads built in many locations. All this work fell into the category of 
corvee services for which the labourers were not paid a single cent. He had 
given orders for a few people in each district to be designated to carry out 
small road repairs to the Grote Postweg. Major repairs required the periodic 
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mobilization of a large number of conscripted labourers. As far as the native 
chiefs were concerned, he was able to prevent or eradicate many abuses by 
keeping a close eye on them and, if necessary, replacing them. By classifying 
the kampungs and gangs in the districts by number and registering the 
number of planters or cacahs afresh, the Assistant Resident had discovered 
that the population of his jurisdiction was much greater than had been 
assumed. The number of inhabitants – 73,000 in 1826 according to the 
numbers submitted by the chiefs – had now risen to 178,000. The cause of 
this mass underreporting in registration was the attempt by the chiefs to 
exempt their clientele from the obligation to grow and deliver coffee. In 
short, Nagel looked back with satisfaction at his many achievements in the 
past eight years and expressed the hope that his superior would endorse 
this assessment. The Resident was indeed full of praise for his assistant’s 
industriousness and expertise, but Nagel’s long career came to a premature 
end when he was murdered in 1845 (De Waal 1866: 369). Colonial sources 
maintained a steadfast silence concerning this remarkable incident, with 
The Great Trunk Road at Puncak (1875). Buffalo teams stood by to help carts on the 
steep sections.
source: f. de haan – Priangan, vl. 1, p. 485
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the exception of a short announcement that Resident Jan Baptist Cleerens 
had been relieved of his post. As a further expression of administrative 
displeasure, the regent of Bandung was also dismissed on suspicion of being 
involved in the crime. No further details were forthcoming.
Shortly before his untimely death, Nagel had drawn up another statistical 
report showing the changes that had taken place in the regency since his 
appointment as Assistant Resident in Bandung in 1827. With 17 years of 
service in this position, preceded by seven years in a lower-ranking post in 
Cianjur, he must have been an exceptional expert on the state of affairs in 
the Priangan within the small corps of European officials. Comparison with 
the detailed report that he had brought out ten years earlier showed that the 
population of his jurisdiction had increased to 201,485, distributed among 
39,824 households in 811 kampungs and 1,683 hamlets (cantilan). Only a tenth 
of all households were exempt from all cultivation services. The greatest 
majority – 28,173 households, or nearly three-quarters of the total – were 
involved in growing coffee. They were divided into 105 gangs and worked 
in 186 gardens. They tended 30,600,000 trees, 22 million of which were 
fruit-bearing. On this basis, each household was responsible for 1,066 trees. 
Production had risen to 88,359 pikul in 1844, a f ivefold increase over a period 
of 30 years. The table below, based on data specified in Nagel’s records, shows 
how this increase developed. It was characterized by large fluctuations, while 
comparison with the f igures for the Priangan as a whole show that the share 
of the regency of Bandung had increased from around two-fifths to more 
than half. The Assistant Resident himself would have benefited substantially 
from this enormous rise in production. The cultivation commission must 
have made him a wealthy man and his annual dividend was probably the 
reason he never left Bandung to take up a higher-ranking post elsewhere.
Table 6.2  Rise in coffee production in the regency of Bandung, 1813-44
Year Pikul Year Pikul Year Pikul Year Pikul
1813 18,891 1821 26,525 1829 25,562 1837 65,977
1814 17,586 1822 25,109 1830 22,084 1838 54,155
1815 20,416 1823 24,781 1831 17,723 1839 113,595
1816 18,132 1824 23,050 1832 22,328 1840 59,427
1817 22,212 1825 22,138 1833 33,290 1841 49,583
1818 19,993 1826 21,293 1834 74,428 1842 130,049
1819 21,011 1827 30,448 1835 46,260 1843 92,413
1820 18,568 1828 23,139 1836 76,278 1844 88,359
source: Preanger Statistiek, in archive of western manuscripts, kitLv
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Table 6.3  Distribution of coffee trees in the Priangan Regencies, 1835
Regency Number of trees Total
Fruit-bearing Saplings
Cianjur 3,617,709 9,399,297 13,017,006
bandung 3,179,500 12,762,658 15,942,158
sumedang 1,728,011 8,243,166 9,971,177
Limbangan 1,437,360 4,528,629 5,965,989
sukapura — 375,000 375,000
Priangan reg. 9,962,580 35,308,750 45,271,330
source: van beusechem 1835
The table clearly shows the greater effort that accompanied the introduction 
of the cultivation system. The missing f igure for Sukapura is undoubtedly 
related to fact that, in the early years of the system, priority was given in this 
regency in particular to growing and processing indigo. Although the forced 
planting of this crop had been a complete failure, it had also been pursued 
frenetically and inevitably led to the destruction of millions of coffee trees.
The Resident of the Priangan Regencies repeatedly urged that the 
purchase price of coffee – which had remained at two and a half cents 
a pound – be raised, but to no avail. He was supported in his argument 
by Director of Cultivation Jan Isaac van Sevenhoven, who declared that, 
while en route from Bandung to Sumedang during an inspection tour in 
1833, Van den Bosch had pledged to pay more if production rose above his 
target of 65,000 pikul. This target had been achieved and the total stock 
of 42,184,720 trees showed that the population had not failed to make the 
effort required of them. By 1834, the harvest had doubled and the number 
of trees per household had risen to well above 1,000. Anyone familiar with 
the terrain must have concluded that the poverty-stricken peasants were 
paid a pittance for their heavy labour, receiving less than f ive cents a day for 
work that took up 225 days a year. Van Sevenhoven’s request was rejected 
out of hand, but he persisted, writing early in 1835:
I imagined how the coffee planters had to stay in miserable huts made of 
leaves repeatedly, for days and nights, in these high mountains, poorly 
clad and simply fed, in this inhospitable and always damp climate, where 
the rain pours down incessantly, stiff with cold, having to survive these 
piteous times far removed from their villages and households – This is 
no romanticized portrayal, the product of an overactive imagination; I 
can solemnly assure you, this is a true description of the state in which 
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the large majority of these planters have to live. And then think of the 
drying, cleaning and transport of the coffee, as the small warehouses 
are at some poles distant from the gardens or villages; and you can then 
ask yourself; should it not be seen from another viewpoint, so that I, 
completely convinced of the truth of the matter, exclaim: Is that any 
reward for so much labour! (Van Deventer II, 1866: 726-7)30
The Director of Cultivation, also a member of the Council of the Indies, 
was called to order for revealing the pledge made by Van den Bosch, not 
publicly but in the company of a small group of high-ranking off icials. It 
was unpardonable that he had addressed the now retired Governor-General 
in such uncivil terms. Besides reprimanding Van Sevenhoven, new acting 
Governor-General Baud added that granting the request submitted by him 
and the Resident of the Priangan Regencies would reduce the surplus. His 
words revealed the true merchant spirit of the colonial enterprise: ‘to pay 
f l. 7.50 voluntarily for something that can be acquired for f l. 2.92 is ill-
advised from a f inancial perspective’ (Van Deventer II, 1866: 625).
What impact did the cultivation system have on coffee production in the 
Priangan Regencies? After Dutch rule was restored in 1815, this main area 
of production gradually lost its advantage over other parts of Java. Total 
production had been pushed up to 400,000 pikul by 1827, but the Sunda 
highlands accounted for only 122,000 pikul of this, less than a third. The 
relative signif icance of the Priangan Regencies declined even further in 
years after 1830, but that was due to substantial expansion of production 
elsewhere rather than an absolute decline in this region, which had been 
growing coffee for more than a century. The Priangan was now no longer 
dominant but retained a leading role in the cultivation of coffee. In 1833-34, 
it was the regency with the largest number of newly planted trees on Java: 
9,771,510, of a total of 39,586,205. The explosive growth throughout Java 
continued until 1840 and resulted in a tripling of production between 1830 
(288,742 pikul) and 1839 (905,200 pikul). The increase in total stock from 
50 million in 1828 to 330 million in 1840 shows that the growing number 
of trees was not reflected in a proportional increase in the total weight of 
beans produced. This led Van Gorkom to conclude that yield declined as 
production increased (1880a: 80). Nevertheless, the burden on labour been 
massively intensif ied.
30 Memorandum of 22 December containing the reply by His Excellency the Governor-General 
on the increase in the price of coffee in the Priangan Regencies. NA, Van den Bosch collection, 
604.
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The happiness of the innocent
As in the past, the number of trees remained the main yardstick for the 
state of coffee cultivation and what is striking is the apparent exactness 
of the numbers recorded throughout the years: down to the nearest tree, 
suggesting a degree of control of the production process that extended right 
down to the workfloor. The counts were, however, a grotesque distortion 
of a reality that lay far beyond the reach and the vision of the reporting 
off icials, who exaggerated the numbers to show how diligent they were in 
performing their duties. The young trees only bore fruit after three or four 
years, by which time a new reporter would often have replaced the old one. 
If the yield fell far short of expectations, he could always claim that the 
trees were of inferior quality or had been planted in bad soil, or that the 
berries had not ripened because of adverse weather conditions (too wet or 
too dry). But millions of trees only existed on paper and had to be written 
off because the predecessor’s records were inaccurate. Van Gorkom (1880b: 
186) wrote disparagingly that coffee production may have been pushed up 
to unprecedented volumes, but that the off icials responsible for it sorely 
lacked the knowledge required to do their jobs properly, a situation that did 
not change after the introduction of the cultivation system.
The Resident of the Priangan Regencies reported with satisfaction in 
his annual reports on the progressive recovery of coffee production. The 
commission paid to the European staff had encouraged them to ensure that 
the recovery was consolidated, and was one reason for the excellent result 
in 1834, when the harvest was more than double that of the previous year. 
This rising trend continued as a consequence of the enormous expansion 
in the number of new trees planted in the recent years. The expansion of 
cultivation to southern districts was facilitated by the opening of a coffee 
warehouse in Pelabuhan Ratu on Wijnkoopsbaai. The Resident did note 
that it was more and more diff icult to f ind suff icient people willing to go 
to the coffee and indigo gardens far away from their habitat. Many peas-
ants f led to evade paying the compulsory tribute. The information that 
accompanied the Resident’s reports showed only a slight increase in the 
European staff involved in the administrative work relating to compulsory 
cultivation in the Priangan. The Resident now had a secretary, a clerk, three 
Assistant Residents, four coffee controleurs, four warehouse masters and 
a small number of off icials for other crops. Although coffee production 
was expected to stabilize at the level of 150,000 to 200,000 pikul a year, 
the Resident warned cautiously in his prognosis for 1835 that the govern-
ment should be prepared for a slight fall in production. Adjustment after 
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adjustment followed, by tens of thousands of pikul at a time, and the f inal 
estimate of a little less than 100,000 pikul proved still too high. The harvest 
had fallen again to half of the previous year. But this only encouraged the 
government to plant even more trees: 11,981,06 in the 1835-36 season. In 
the light of this persistent effort it is not so much the sporadic increase 
in production in the course of time that demands our attention but the 
fact that it was interrupted by a drastic fall, followed by a new peak. For 
decades, cultivation of this primary export crop would be characterized by 
strong fluctuations. Nevertheless, the tone of off icial reports in this period 
continued to be optimistic, resolutely suggesting that the prospects for the 
future were good and remained bright.
Official reports during the period of the cultivation system were strongly 
ideological, radiating a blend of self-righteousness and self-confidence. The 
self-righteousness was inspired by the conviction that an economic process 
had been set in motion that produced excellent results, and not only for 
the Dutch treasury, which benefited from the high profits that remained 
after operational costs had been deducted, but also for the colonized 
population whose production and productivity had increased considerably. 
The self-conf idence came from having penetrated deeply into an alien 
landscape to pursue a policy based on improved knowledge of the land and 
its inhabitants. The collection of all kinds of information was evidence of 
this desire to know more. As far as the natural environment was concerned, 
this intelligence related to geographical distances and accessibility, fluctua-
tions in temperature and weather conditions, the changing of the seasons, 
the height of mountains, the sources and courses of rivers, and flora and 
fauna. Specifying all these observations in reports, records and statistics 
removed the uncomfortable feeling of working in terrain that was as yet 
uncharted where things happened to which outsiders were unaccustomed. 
Gradually, however, the foreign rulers gained a greater understanding of 
the land they had colonized. Registering data on inhabitants and settle-
ments was necessary to enable them to be governed and helped legitimize 
colonial domination. After all, the new rulers upheld the pretence that their 
instructions built on the situation that had existed before their arrival and, 
in that sense, the colonial order had to be understood as in keeping with 
practices that had been in place much longer. This link between present 
and past made it necessary to construe a process of historical change based 
more on continuity than on a break with the past.
A good example of the progressive compulsion to check and record source 
material was a series of monographs describing the statistics and history 
of districts. In 1832 J.M. van Beusechem, acting president of the Council of 
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Justice, had been given the task of making a start on a statistical description 
of the Dutch East Indies, using data in the government archives. After 
producing a report on Cirebon in 1835, he came out with a follow-up on 
the Priangan Regencies a year later.31 The region was still thinly populated, 
but the population had doubled to 507,000 between 1796 and 1832. The 
count was actually too low, as the population had grown by several tens 
of thousands in the preceding f ive years. This was not so much the result 
of natural growth as of the fact that the people were no longer afraid that 
the government would impose a higher and higher tribute. The prejudice 
against censuses was now a thing of the past, as it was no longer necessary 
to claim that there were fewer households than there actually were. Van 
Beusechem expressed his confidence that the next time, the report would 
reflect the true f igures. He believed that the government deserved to be 
admired for not eroding the authority of the local chiefs in the Priangan 
Regencies. He admitted that the lords of the land much enjoyed displaying 
their pomp and circumstance and undeniably lived far beyond their means, 
but they did preserve law and order. Where the introduction of the land rent 
system had led to unrest and rebellion in other residencies – by which he 
meant the Java War, which had raged from 1825 to 1830 – in the Priangan, 
under its well-behaved regents, public order had been maintained without 
a single garrison having to be stationed in the region. As to the devotion of 
the people, there should be no doubt whatsoever. Even when rabble-rousers 
from elsewhere had tried to encourage the people to resist the colonial 
authority – like the rebels who had penetrated the regency of Sumedang 
from Cirebon in 1830 – their advance failed thanks to the resolute response 
of the chiefs. With these expressions of praise, Van Beusechem indicated 
that the Priangan system had been the right choice and that to continue 
with it would be in the interests of all and sundry.
The regents could count on the obedience of their subjects, compelled 
them to perform a wide variety of services without payment, and showed a 
remarkable predilection for public displays of prestige. Their aloof presence 
demonstrated that they were elevated far above the mass of the population 
but kept a very close eye on what was going on. Van Beusechem added 
that the government reserved the right of succession to these positions of 
regional power. It was the Resident who decided who would take over when 
the position of regent fell vacant and, after 1809, the same started to apply 
to district chiefs. The native administration was responsible for simple 
31 Serie Statistiek en geschiedenis van de regentschappen op Java, no. 3 Priangan Regencies. 
J.M. van Beusechem 1836. NA, Ministry for the Colonies, 3046.
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police tasks, but more serious offences were subject to the higher colonial 
courts. The regent was assisted by a patih, his second in command and the 
executive arm of the native government apparatus. The patih lived and had 
his off ice in the main negorij, close to the regent but outside the three walls 
encircling the latter’s court. The chiefs’ sons often spent some years training 
as clerks at the off ice of the residency, so as to learn about the practice of 
governance. Their training would include writing simple reports, keeping 
records and conducting correspondence. They used the Malay language, but 
wrote in Latin characters. In addition, there were Islamic clerics, who were 
also divided into different ranks. The elite were imam or haji, from whom 
the high priest (panghulu) was chosen and who also sat on the regency 
council and in courts of law. The lower clergy acted as village priests and 
doubled up as schoolteachers. Their elementary knowledge of reading and 
writing – gained during several years of study in pesantren, institutions 
that fell outside the control of the government and gave religious instruc-
tion – explained why they were also called upon to perform a wide range 
of non-religious duties, such as administering cow-pox vaccinations and 
organizing the cultivation schedule of food crops. The residency report 
for 1846 specif ied a total of 2,563 members of the clergy, dividing them 
into higher and lower ranks. The best known priestly school (pesantren) 
were in Limbangan and Sumedang. The f irst, run by Kiahi Nawawi, had 
100 pupils while the second, headed by Kiahi Abdul Jalil, had 300 pupils. 
The government school set up by Resident Van der Capellen for the sons of 
local chiefs in Cianjur in the early 1820s had reopened after being closed 
to save costs, but now had only 20 pupils. The regent paid for the writing 
materials and the native teacher’s meagre salary and allowed the school 
to use a room in his dalem. The teaching focused on the skills considered 
useful for relations with local chiefs while ‘avoiding anything that could 
give the education a religious import’.
To ensure that tradesmen did not purchase food crops at a much too 
low price – due to the peasants’ eagerness to have a little money in their 
pockets – the government had issued a ban on free market enterprise. 
This measure had ensured that the people of the Priangan, innocent as 
they were in matters of trade and monetary transactions, did not suffer 
unnecessary losses.
The Government of the Indies was thus always intent on leaving these 
simple people in their innocence and protecting them against the de-
ceitful actions of prof iteers. The happiness of a people is relative and 
where they can enjoy peace and tranquillity, and generally suffer no 
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lack, they can be considered to live in a certain degree of happiness. (Van 
Beusechem 1836: 72-3)
The benevolent situation in which the people of the Priangan found them-
selves was, according to this off icial chronicler, partly because they had an 
ample supply of food, resulting from the expansion of paddy cultivation. 
In Cianjur and Bandung especially, irrigation projects had turned many 
swamps into fertile f ields. The increase in coffee production may have 
remained below expectations but, thanks to a better division of labour 
across the population, a much higher yield would be possible in the near 
future. As yet, however, there was no sign of a steady linear increase. Based 
on the production f igures for 1833 and 1854, it seems justif iable to conclude 
that there was indeed a sharp rise in production in the intervening period, 
from 336,000 to 1,065,100 pikul for Java as a whole. But by comparing two 
other years, it was equally possible to show that the yield had halved, rather 
than doubled, from 905,200 pikul in 1839 to 455,200 in 1849. The enormous 
fluctuations from year to year concealed the fact that, until about the middle 
1840s, there had been a sharp increase in production but after that the 
volume, with extreme peaks and troughs, had remained virtually constant. 
This levelling out is striking, given that the population were driven to plant 
more and more trees. That also applied to the Priangan Regencies, whose 
share had now declined to less than a f ifth of total production on Java. The 
pressure applied by the government was not restricted only to expanding 
the stock of trees; the work required to plant and maintain them, pick the 
berries and transport them to the warehouses meant a huge increase in 
the burden on the peasants. The colonial policy-makers had devised an 
ingenious solution to this problem in 1839: to impose the obligation to grow 
coffee not on the cacah – the composite peasant household comprising 
the landowner and the sharecroppers and farm servants dependent on 
him – but on the somahan, the co-habitation unit of man, wife and children.
Stagnation
The closer the exercise of colonial power came to the base of peasant society, 
the more sharply the shortcomings of the regime of forced cultivation, which 
had been decided upon in the early days of the eighteenth century, were 
revealed. The relocation of coffee production to the higher lands meant that 
the peasants continually had to shuttle back and forth between their homes 
and paddy f ields in the valleys and the coffee gardens in the mountains. 
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The distance was too great to make the journey every day. Although it had 
been ordered in 1829 that trees should not be planted more than 12 poles 
distance from the villages, no one had ever paid heed to the instruction. 
As a consequence, the peasants were forced to travel long distances to 
the gardens, and had to continue to do so, as the trees lost their fertility 
only a few years after the f irst harvest. New plantations had to be laid out 
from scratch elsewhere, a phenomenon known as ‘wandering gardens’. 
Fences were built around the gardens not only to keep wild animals out, 
but also – and no less importantly – to keep the peasants in, so that they 
could not escape their obligation to work. The only way in and out was 
closed at night and not opened again until the following morning. Garden 
mandur lived on the spot for the whole season and their surveillance helped 
improve the effectiveness with which the planters were confined to the 
gardens for as long as was necessary. The men in particular would be away 
from home for months at a time to open up new gardens, a necessary and 
frequent activity, given the constant need to relocate. For the harvest, the 
entire family was obliged to move to and stay at the plantations for up to 
two months, so that, in busy periods, they became true labour camps, which 
were deserted again after new trees had been planted or the harvest was 
over. This restless coming and going took place in the opposite direction 
in the villages. Such wasteful use of labour on a very large scale could have 
been avoided by allowing the planters to clear f ields near the plantations to 
grow their own food. As already mentioned, however, the peasants were not 
permitted to do this, nor were they allowed to use vacated gardens to grow 
food as it was assumed that, after the trees had been thinned out or lopped 
back to their stumps, the gardens could be used to grow coffee again after 
a few years. The peasants therefore had no other choice than to continue 
their up-and-down mobility and, for good or bad, try to satisfy their own 
needs in the time left to them.
Delivering an increasing volume of harvested and dried beans now took 
less effort than in the past, thanks to the much improved transport capacity, 
the possibility of delivering the consignments to district warehouses, and 
the building of two shipping warehouses on the south coast at Pelabuan 
Ratu and Banjar for the coffee produced in Cianjur and Sukapura. New 
roads were laid throughout the area to accommodate the carts carrying 
the coffee. The following travelogue by Junghuhn paints a clear picture 
of the enormous caravans that passed back and forth along these tracks.
As I approached the district of Pawenang, I discovered more and more signs 
of a rather monotonous activity. I saw many hundreds of two-wheeled 
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pedatis, either in long rows, one behind the other, or clustered together 
in a circle alongside the road to form a sort of stronghold, in the middle 
of which the plump draught animals sat chewing the cud like elephant 
calves. Some of these pedatis were on the way to the Karangsambung 
warehouse to deliver their coffee, from the whole valley of Garut, etc., 
while others were on their way home. It was like looking at the following of 
an army, and I’m certain that half the population that was f it to work and 
the entire buffalo population was on the move. (Junghuhn 1845: 338-9)
Maintaining the roads was understandably as labour-intensive as building 
them. The hooves of the draught animals and the heavy, cumbersome carts 
with their great wooden wheels broke up the road surface. The unrelenting 
repair work required the continual mobilization of labour to perform corvee 
services. An official, the kepala jalan, was appointed in each district to make 
sure that enough people could be press-ganged into performing these ‘public 
works’. He received his orders from the district chief and kept a record of 
when, where and to whom his pool of workers had to report. On the through 
roads, there were permanent maintenance gangs every 500 rods32 to make 
small running repairs whenever necessary. These labourers doubled up 
as guards, ensuring the security of the traff ic on the roads and providing 
transport assistance where necessary.
Daendels was the f irst Governor-General convinced of the necessity of 
improving the infrastructure. Once this was on the agenda, his successors 
applied themselves to constructing a wide variety of public works, including 
roads, bridges, off icial residencies, warehouses, checkpoints, stables, lodg-
ing houses, storehouses and guardhouses, etc. This resulted in a network 
of communications and facilities that enabled the transport of goods and 
persons to be expanded. And, as always, to meet this increased demand, 
the peasants were compelled to perform unpaid services, either by working 
as porters, loaders, escorts and messengers, or by providing their horses, 
buffaloes and carts free of charge. Who had to perform corvee services for 
the government and who was exempt, and how was this policy put into 
practice? These questions can be answered by referring to a memorandum 
drawn up in 1832 by Van Sevenhoven, the f irst Director of Cultivation.33 
The document contained many of the observations he had made during 
32 One rod is equal to roughly 3.5 metres.
33 Memorandum on agriculture and the setting up of a coolie establishment, by J.I. van Sev-
enhoven, Director of Cultivation to the Residents, 8 September 1832. Ministry for the Colonies 
1814-49, 3202.
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his numerous inspection tours throughout Java. He had noticed that, at 
the jangol – the places where the labourers had to report for work every 
day – people were often left hanging around because there was no work 
for them. Rather than seeing the corvee services as work conducted by a 
pool of reserve labour, he envisaged an approach similar to what he had 
encountered in Pekalongan, where a coolie establishment had acted as a 
depot for regulating employment for several years. The coolies brought 
daily together at the establishment worked on the orders of the govern-
ment but could also be hired out to private entrepreneurs for payment. Van 
Sevenhoven wanted to introduce these arrangements throughout Java to 
create a pool of reserve labour. The inhabitants of the main negorij were 
exempted from the obligation to provide corvee services. Van Sevenhoven 
believed that it would be politically unwise not to respect this exemption. 
Certain categories outside the main negorij were also exempt from corvee 
services, either because they held positions of local authority or because 
they paid to be relieved of the obligation. That meant that the burden was 
the heaviest on those who were the most vulnerable economically. What 
could be done to ensure that it was not the worst off who were the victims 
of this unequal division of obligations? Firstly, by using labour more ef-
f iciently and effectively, as was already the case in Pekalongan. Rather than 
requisitioning people arbitrarily for corvee services, which was excessively 
unequal, it would be better if the Residents were to calculate how many 
coolies they needed for the work that had hitherto been performed as corvee 
services. This demand could then be met by entering into an agreement with 
the owners of paddy f ields obliged to provide labour services that would 
exempt them from paying the annual land rent tax in exchange for them 
fulf illing this obligation. Van Sevenhoven clarif ied this proposal by noting 
that the privileged class had a considerable influence on the people and that 
acting against their interests would be sure to have adverse repercussions. 
In exchange for a reduction in the land rent on the ownership of the land, 
sawah holders would have to surrender one labourer for a period of six 
months. Then followed a passage in which Van Sevenhoven showed that 
he was familiar with the cacah, the composite peasant household which 
was the primary social formation in rural Java.
... if the sawa holder has three men, who are dependent on him, each 
of them will have to work for two months. I hope that all the Residents 
will be suff iciently familiar with the Javanese household to know, that 
the sawa holders, are actually the descendants of the original settlers 
and heads of the families, which are dependent on them, and which 
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they protect and to whose livelihood they contribute or are completely 
responsible for, and who will be obliged to assist them, primarily in the 
provision of corvee services and in cultivating fields, etc.; these hereditary 
owners and the families dependent on them have special names which 
are different in each Residency, but are known to each Regent and each 
chief, such as Tjatja, Sikap, Orang Bibit, Kredja, Patjol, Krawan, Kroman, 
etc., etc. (1832: 23-4)
Going into more detail, he explained that the mass of the population fell 
into two classes: the landowners, who were liable to pay taxes and provide 
services, and the rest, who tilled the formers’ land. These dependents usually 
performed the services imposed on their masters. Van Sevenhoven’s plan 
was essentially to continue this practice, but to make more effective use 
of the requisitioned labour by allowing them to be hired to third parties, 
so as to prevent idleness or waste. Although this proposal was received 
with interest at the highest level, the going practice remained as it was: 
the concentration of a labour reserve in the main negorij to perform all 
the services required by the government. This f loating reserve assembled 
at the balebandong, the public grounds in front of the regent’s residence, 
where the patih and the jaksa (the public prosecutor) had their off ices. 
The requisitioned labour gathered in the main negorij and in the district 
headquarters to perform transport services on the government’s orders, 
with or without their animals and carts. In 1857 in the Priangan Regencies, 
500 riding horses and 2,853 gladak or draught horses were kept available just 
for the regular ferrying of persons and goods (De Haan IV, 1912: 661 and 929). 
According to another source, it was 500 riding horses and 5,000 servant’s 
horses, for which 4,500 families had to be set aside and kept exempt from 
all other services (De Waal 1866: 566). For road construction and repair, the 
conscripted coolies probably reported directly to the workplace.
The mobilization of peasant labour in the service of the colonial economy 
did not stop the native chiefs from resolutely defending their right to have 
their subjects perform a wide range of services for them, too. These obliga-
tions, the scale and frequency of which were very diff icult to catalogue, 
were a major source of irritation to European off icials. For that reason, the 
authorities tried to declare the resolution of early 1836 restricting corvee 
services applicable in part to the Priangan by urging the regents to draw 
up and submit a description of these services (De Waal 1866: 362). The 
unexpressed hope was that this would have a restraining effect on the 
servitude of the peasants to their lords. After all, labour was needed on 
an increasing scale to grow and supply coffee and to perform the public 
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works associated with it. To achieve this objective, it was logical that all 
other claims, including those of the local gentry, should take second place. 
The question was how the size of the army of labourers could be expanded 
to increase the colonial tribute, without others being able to lay claim to 
their labour power.
It was with this aim in mind that the Resident – without incidentally being 
authorized to do so – initiated a radical intervention in the social order that 
prevailed in the Priangan Regencies in 1839. The somahan ruling abolished 
the cacah formation, which was the basis of the agrarian economy on Java. 
Van den Bosch had drawn attention to the existence of the cacahs in 1830, 
possibly on the basis of information that Nicolaus and Pieter Engelhard, or 
perhaps Lawick and De Wilde, had included in reports to their superiors and 
which had been preserved in the government archives. According to Van 
den Bosch, the larger landowners, or sikap, employed the landless to tend 
to their f ields. In return for a share of the harvest, the labourers – known in 
the Priangan Regencies as bujang – performed the tributary services that 
their masters were obliged to provide as landowners. The multi-layered 
peasant households consisted of an average of 22 members or four nuclear 
families. In the introduction to a document outlining the principles of 
colonial taxation, the Governor-General described the household structure 
as follows.
The Javanese are – according to traditional native institutions – divided 
into tjatjas or families, comprising a head, and several households that 
are dependent on him. The households often consist not only of blood 
relatives, but also often include labourers, who are subordinate to the 
head of the tjatja. (Blik op het bestuur 1835: 154)
The 1839 somahan ordinance meant giving up the principle that the tribute 
was imposed on the basis of landownership. Under the new provisions, 
all households were equally liable to a variety of levies. Instead of being 
imposed on the primary production formation of three or four families, 
the tax now applied to each of them individually. On paper this gave the 
cultivation services the character of a levée en masse. Landless households 
had long been mobilized to grow and supply coffee, but did this work on the 
orders of their masters, the heads of the cacah. The latter could no longer 
meet their obligations solely by sending their dependents; they now had to 
go and work in the coffee gardens themselves, along with their wives and 
children. Although this was not the primary intention the new rules, if 
strictly applied, would have brought about a radical change in the peasant 
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order. The direct mobilization of peasant labour meant that those who did 
not own their paddy f ields but leased them as sharecroppers, were no longer 
completely under the control of the landowners. In this way, the regulation 
violated the golden rule of colonial policy, not to bring about any change in 
the unequal relations between the landowning and the landless classes at 
the base of society. Eroding the power and prestige of the better-off class 
ran against the principles of a policy aimed at not upsetting the balance 
of local power.
Crisis
Despite the intensif ied mobilization of labour, coffee production in the 
Priangan fell rather than rose. The Resident’s report for 1846 spoke in sombre 
terms about the planting of new trees. A total of 562 fruit-bearing trees were 
required for one pikul of beans. Through lack of maintenance, new gardens 
were soon overgrown with grass (alang). The mobilized labourers simply 
failed to do what was required of them.
The influence of the chiefs and the clergy is enough to lead and direct the 
people, who are soft-natured and amiable, and to subject them willingly 
to any task imposed upon them, even though this may require great 
sacrif ice on their part. It cannot be said, however, that they are content, 
as the cultivating class, by nature slow and oppressed, who are thereby 
able to fulf il their basic needs with ease, display an apparent indifference 
to all special services required of them by the existing institutions and 
shows little interest in improving their lot through labour, industry or 
engaging in enterprises of benefit to themselves or in the general interest. 
(Verslag Residentie Preanger Regentschappen 1848: 87)
The coffee cultivation system had been notorious for many years for the 
ease with which the Priangan peasants could be mobilized to raise the 
colonial tribute without the claim on their labour having to meet even the 
minimum requirements of effectiveness and eff iciency. ‘Working aimlessly 
because they had to work’ was already a well-entrenched malady as early as 
the VOC era, as Goedhart noted (1948: 58), and later generations of colonial 
off icials continued this policy with undiminished fervour. Complaints 
about the lack of transparency and accuracy of the native chiefs could not 
hide the fact that the colonial accounts were of not much better quality. 
‘Fanciful’ was how Van Gorkom described the off icial records drawn up by 
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the Resident’s staff. Any errors discovered had to be corrected covertly so 
as to avoid any troublesome questions from higher up.
The number of trees seems to change quickly and radically, and we 
have no reason to believe the accuracy of the count. Many years ago, a 
controleur in the Priangan discovered, through detailed investigation, 
that a garden which off icially had 100,000 trees, actually contained no 
more than 10,000. The Resident felt embarrassed to issue an order for the 
immediate correction of the off icial records. Afraid of an unpleasant 
response from Batavia, he advised rectifying the error gradually. (1880b: 
189)
Did the somahan ordinance have the desired effect? Most probably, the 
army of mobilized labour did increase considerably and the Resident did, 
at least on paper, succeed in f inding the necessary hands to enable the 
area planted with coffee trees to be expanded. One regent had objected in 
vain to the new regime, claiming that it took no account of the traditional 
distinction between the classes. In reply, he was told that a more equitable 
distribution of the labour burden would improve the economic situation 
of the poor segment of the population (Van Rees 1867: 510). This suggested 
that the new measures would bring about a more equal distribution of 
wealth, while its real aim was of course to increase the burden of labour 
for everyone. De Waal also observed that the link between landownership 
and the duty of servitude had been broken and replaced by a system based 
on the nuclear household (1866: 368). Others, however, did not confirm the 
assertiveness of this claim. According to an anonymous source, a private 
landowner in the region who gave the impression of being up-to-date on 
the latest developments, the ordinance failed because it did not impose 
the obligation to servitude uniformly across the whole population. Other 
reports also showed that the heads of the cacahs were still in the f irst 
instance responsible for providing the labour required to grow coffee, but 
that in busy periods the workforce expanded by direct requisitioning all 
segments of the population. That also applied to the corvee services imposed 
by the government. The claim that, at the time of the cultivation system, 
the whole of Java was one large labour camp, is considered an exaggeration 
by Van Niel and others, but for the Priangan Regencies it would seem, at 
least in intention, not far from the truth. Van Gorkom’s observation that the 
peasants made no distinction between unpaid corvee services and badly 
paid cultivation services is also relevant in this respect (1880b: 185). Both 
were founded on coercion, which would have been reason enough for the 
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peasants to evade them wherever they could or, as this became increasingly 
diff icult, to perform them slothfully and with obvious dislike.
The conclusion displays a certain doubt whether the total mobilization of 
labour achieved the intended aim of increasing the level of production. This 
question must be answered in the negative. In the f irst place, distributing 
the burden more evenly across the population did not mean that it was 
lighter for the coffee planters individually. The continued expansion of the 
area under cultivation and the increase in the number of hands required 
to raise the colonial tribute did not lead to a corresponding rise in yield. 
Many trees died because they had been topped off or pruned without the 
required care. They were planted with similar lack of zeal. The available 
work reports paint a picture of planters who, often working in the pouring 
rain, would quickly dig a rough hole in the ground and stamp down the 
young plant with their pacul and their feet. The young plants were called 
cambutan, literally ‘ripped out’, and with good reason; the planters pulled 
the saplings roughly out of the nursery gardens and left them lying on the 
ground with broken roots for several days before planting them. The more it 
was forced up, the less productive the cultivation of coffee became, a trend 
expressed in the increasing number of trees required to produce a pikul of 
beans. The expansion of the labour base led to lower rather than higher 
yields. The long-standing hatred of the peasants for the yoke under which 
they laboured was fuelled by the steady fall in the price of coffee on the 
world market between 1842 and 1849, the brunt of which they had to bear 
(Goedhart 1948: 43). The decision to reduce the payments to the peasants 
was at variance with Van den Bosch’s pledge not only to allow the producers 
to benef it from higher prices but, conversely, also to protect them from 
the risk of lower revenues. Although there was probably no change at all 
in the amount paid to the peasants in the Priangan, maintaining the basic 
price – already f ixed for several decades at 3.15 guilders per pikul – signif ied 
a continuation of the injustice under which they had long suffered. Van 
Gorkom summarized this ruthless policy as follows:
As always, the people had to foot the bill; the coffee cultivation system 
became their nemesis, their long history of suffering. ... In the Priangan 
Regencies, this was worse than elsewhere. (1880b: 186)
In 1854, the Directorate of Cultivation reported that there were 64,712,369 
coffee trees in the Priangan Regencies; in 1855, that had risen to 69,168,370 
and, a year later, yet again to 69,911,622. The survey also recorded the stock 
of garden trees, forest and pagar or kampung trees, together with precise 
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details of the average yield per tree, the number of planters, etc. Started in 
1837, these records would be kept dutifully for the whole of Java for several 
decades. Everything had been done on far too grand a scale, concluded 
Goedhart with the wisdom of hindsight. Sometimes the whole population 
was mobilized to prepare land and lay out gardens, taking no account at all 
of how this would affect the work they needed to do to secure their liveli-
hoods. Furthermore, trees were planted because it was prentah (ordered), 
but no one concerned themselves with making sure that the planting was 
successful (Goedhart 1948:52). This author reported that, in the second half 
of the 1840s, cultivation in regulated gardens on Java rose from 147 to 183 
million trees, while the planting of hedge and forest coffee fell from 173 to 
129 million trees. The results of later research showed that, after 1845, the 
system of garden coffee was expanded with unleashed fury, especially in 
the Priangan Regencies.
Table 6.4  Priangan coffee production 1847-64







source: Colonial report 1870-71
To make inspections easier, the widely dispersed gardens were merged to 
form enormous plantations. Sometimes there was no more than one in 
each district, so that many tens of kampungs, often located far away, had 
to provide the necessary labour. The mass planting of new trees in these 
years initially led to a sharp rise in production but it proved impossible to 
sustain. It proved too much for the workforce, as the f igures for the period 
from 1847 to 1864 show.
Van Gorkom, who spent the whole of his long career in the coffee busi-
ness, reported in 1866 that, of the 50 million trees recorded in the Priangan 
residency, four-f ifths were fruit-bearing. Nevertheless, their yield was 
extremely low, and he explained why in his accompanying notes.
If we take a walk through one of the most magnif icent and expansive 
gardens in the coffee residency, the Priangan Regencies, we are amazed 
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at the variety of trees that form the borderlines and which are laden 
down with fruit, but which surround a core that is the equivalent of a 
wilderness, that surrounds itself in darkness and permits itself as little 
air and light as possible, so that fructif ication of the trees must remain 
an illusion. There they lie, the splendid coffee forests, extending for 
many poles, and because of incomplete and insuff icient maintenance, 
perhaps half are not productive. And yet rich forests have been sacrif iced 
to plant these gardens, immeasurable forces have been employed, and 
are still employed, and hundreds and thousands of men, women and 
children – and the plantations as well – waste away there, because the 
division of labour is as f ictitious as the direct, judicious and industrious 
inspection. (1866: 399)
The persistence of this stationary production, despite the intensif ied effort 
to expand the area of land under cultivation and mobilize more and more 
labour, eventually forced the government to acknowledge that it had no 
other choice than to introduce radical reforms. The report on the great 
coffee survey conducted in the 1860s (discussed in Chapter VII) spoke of 
‘the fatal system of planting coffee in regulated gardens’ which was seen 
as the predominant cause of the crisis after 1845 (Colonial Report 1870-71: 
2768). In 1856, to give him a greater insight into the nature of the problem 
and possible solutions, the Director of Cultivation ordered Resident Van der 
Wijck to conduct an investigation. The main issue he was to address was 
whether the burden of forced coffee cultivation had been increased to such 
a degree that it exceeded the capacities of the population in parts of the 
residency. Although Van der Wijck’s report concluded that this was not the 
case, it was clear from reading between the lines that a turning point had 
been reached and that the area used to cultivate coffee would inevitably 
decline in the long term as much of the land had been depleted through 
persistent use. Another objection was the remote locations of the gardens. 
Not only were the plantations often as far as 20 poles from the villages but, 
with the latter in the valleys and most of the gardens at between 2,000 and 
4,000 feet, the peasants also had to deal with considerable differences in 
altitude. Reassuringly, the Resident added that the peasants were used to 
this inconvenience and could not do without the income it generated, little 
as it was. The total number of coffee trees in the Priangan Regencies grew 
from 45,271,330 in 1835 to 69,911,622 in 1855. It was an ominous sign that this 
increase was not maintained, but declined again after this extensive effort. 
In 1866, the stock of trees had fallen to 39,660,814 and then rose again the 
following year to 48,945,945. These f igures have to be taken for what they 
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are worth – very little – but there can be no doubt about the downward 
trend. During this period, there was also a shift from forest and kampung 
coffee to garden coffee. The predominance of the f irst two kinds in the 
early years of the cultivation system, as described in the discussion on the 
report by Assistant Resident Nagel, was completely reversed. Of the stock 
of 48,945,945 trees in 1867, 41,651,489 were planted in gardens, and were 
therefore generally a considerable distance from the peasants’ villages.
Resident Van der Wijck managed to avoid being the harbinger of only 
bad news. The number of inhabitants had grown to 806,000. Based on the 
substantial increase in the number of paddy f ields and new kampungs, the 
Resident made it clear that he did not share the often-heard opinion that 
the population suffered under the burden of the new system. He stated 
cheerfully that, with the exception of a few districts not blessed with riches 
by nature, abundance reigned throughout the residency. In fact, in his 
opinion, the inhabitants of the Priangan were much better off than their 
counterparts in other parts of Java (Report by Van der Wijck to the Director 
of Cultivation 1856: 3). The Resident referred to the high revenues from the 
sale of salt as proof of the prosperity of the inhabitants and praised the 
progress made in the recent decades. Of course, the great distance that 
the planters had to travel to the gardens made it diff icult for households 
to maintain 1,000 trees and it was therefore advisable to reduce this to 800 
or even 600-700 as an absolute maximum. In the thinly populated and 
still uncultivated southern part of the Sunda highlands, where nomadic 
agriculture was still practised, the gaga peasants lived far from the coffee 
gardens and could not be expected to tend more than 500 trees. Finally, 
given the very low revenues, Van der Wijck considered it advisable to abolish 
the cultivation of coffee in a small number of districts. However, he warned 
that this might cause peasants to desert from nearby areas, where forced 
cultivation was still in place. To illustrate the depletion of the coffee gardens 
in Cianjur, Van der Wijck pointed out that in 1834 a total of 5,250,000 trees in 
this regency had produced 46,712 pikul, while in 1855, 14,000,000 trees had 
yielded only 37,000 pikul. This meant that three times as many trees were 
needed to produce one pikul in the later year than in 1834. The Resident’s 
anxiety exclusively focused on the sharp decline in productivity. It was a 
telling sign of the one-sided nature of his investigation that he completely 
failed to address the growing imbalance between the work involved in 
growing coffee and the payment the planters received.
A radical change in the organization of the work that was disadvanta-
geous for the planters was the introduction of the West-Indian method 
of preparing the berries after picking. This work was subcontracted to 
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European businesses which, after 1848, had been given permission to set 
up mechanical hulling mills in a number of locations. This meant that the 
ripe berries, until then peeled and dried in the gardens, now had to be 
delivered to the hulling mills for further processing. The pickers continued 
to use the former drying sheds to sleep in at nights and to shelter from the 
rain during the day. The sheds, known as ‘chicken runs’ (Goedhart 1948: 
68) were not at all suitable for these purposes. Carrying the freshly picked 
berries every day to the mills, which were mostly at some distance from the 
plantations, was a heavy and time-consuming job. The mills had insufficient 
capacity during busy periods, meaning that the carriers sometimes had to 
wait a long time to deliver the berries. The mill managers also used them 
for all kinds of coolie services. Other complaints were that the mill-owners 
did not pay the full amount for the berries they received or refused, rightly 
or wrongly, to accept unripe berries. To put a stop to the damaging and 
repressive impact of the mills, the Resident advised in his report returning 
to the old method of preparing the berries. His advice was taken up in the 
following years and the licences for the mills, which were processing 40 per 
cent of Priangan coffee production in 1854, were rescinded. As a concession, 
the pickers were given permission to take the harvested berries back to 
their villages for drying. Although this meant carrying the sacks with fresh 
berries, a heavy load, to their homes, it considerably reduced the amount 
of time the pickers had to spend at the plantations in accommodation that 
was inadequate in all respects (Van Heeckeren van Brandsenburg 1865).
Security patrols along the borders of the Priangan Regencies and on the 
roads could not prevent the smuggling of clandestinely acquired coffee. The 
Resident had to admit that the continuing low prices paid to the peasants 
contributed to their collusion in these illicit practices. He specif ied low 
payments and a lack of suitable land as the main problems, adding that 
there was little to be done about the second. In an attempt to solve the 
f irst problem, the cost price per pikul in the Priangan was f inally raised 
in 1859, from 3.15 to 5 guilders, and then by 25 cents a year to 6 guilders in 
1865. But the increase had little signif icance, as what the Sundanese peas-
ants received remained way below the price that coffee planters were paid 
elsewhere on Java (40 guilders per pikul in 1866). Van Gorkom calculated 
that, in 1864, a total amount of 180,129.02 guilders had been paid to the 
Priangan producers for 31,328 pikul. Distributing this amount among more 
than 85,000 households required to take part in the forced cultivation of 
coffee meant a revenue of 2.11 guilders per household. This was the pay-
ment each household received for an average of 100 working days, including 
the labour of the wife and children. The pittance was completely out of 
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proportion with the effort involved. The producers of this commodity, 
which generated such high prof its for the colonial rulers, were accorded 
absolutely no economic value. Van Gorkom concluded his calculations with 
an indignant exclamation.
And yet the expansion continues, and yet the population is driven 
further and further every year to increase the statistical tallies! ... The 
cancer has to be sought in the system. This system is preposterous. 
(1866: 400)
Non-compliance
The claim on labour rose to unprecedented heights in the mid-nineteenth 
century. The question is, however, whether the colonial authorities in the 
Priangan also succeeded in their objective of distributing the obligation 
to work equally across the whole population. Only those incapable of 
working – the disabled, the elderly and very young children – continued 
to be exempt. Chiefs, the clergy and others of high status, such as those 
held in esteem for their pious behaviour, were also not called upon to 
supply their labour. Furthermore, not all those registered as obliged to 
work actually turned up in person. Sending a substitute was permitted 
and occurred on a wide scale, paid or not. But did this also apply in the 
Priangan Regencies, where the somahan ruling of 1839 had explicitly 
put a stop to the composite peasant household, which also contained 
sharecroppers and farm servants? Resident Van der Wijck suggested that 
imposing the obligation of servitude on all households meant that the 
cacah heads would lose their control over the land-poor segment of the 
population, which would irrevocably led to redistribution of landowner-
ship (Van Rees 1867: 510-1). In an essay published much later, De Roo de la 
Faille agreed with the Resident, concluding that there had been a process 
of levelling off between landowning and landless households. In his view, 
this process of homogenizing the peasantry of the Priangan had been set 
in motion as early as 1789, in Rolff ’s instruction, and consolidated half 
a century later in the household regulation. The process had broken the 
link between the bumi-juragan and his numpang dependants. It became 
impossible for the former to retain more farmland than he could tend 
to with his own immediate family and bujang, and he had to release the 
other household heads dependent on him. (See De Roo de la Faille 1941: 
423-4.)
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The results of a number of local surveys conducted by colonial off icials 
in the 1850s contradicted this conclusion. Shortly after being appointed 
Assistant Resident in Sumedang, Kinder de Camarecq published a report 
containing detailed information on Sembir, a kampung not far from the 
main negorij. He had conducted a survey in 1856 by meeting villagers, 
without involving the regent. They told him that all forms of servitude 
were vested in land and were therefore concentrated in the cacah. The 
introduction of the somahan household system may have meant that the 
numpang were now also obliged to provide services, with the intention of 
distributing the cultivation obligations more equally, but this change had 
not had the desired effect. The replacement of the cacah by the somahan 
system, Kinder de Camarecq concluded, had not resulted in a radical 
restructuring of the peasant order in Sembir. Although the 44 numpang 
were now directly involved in growing coffee, they were still subordinate 
to the 17 landowners as sharecroppers. Study of the division of labour in the 
coffee gardens also showed that the cacah heads were taxed a little more 
heavily than the numpang and that three of the former were employed 
as a gang boss (patinggi), a coffee mandur (in the gardens) and a coffee 
supervisor (in the district). The bujang – young, unmarried, farm servants 
living in the cacah household – were also still exempt from all compulsory 
labour. They only worked on the orders of their master, as had always been 
the case. The last category to be exempt from corvee services (but not from 
growing coffee) were peasants who tended the apanage f ields held by the 
chiefs and who were panukang, working directly under the orders of their 
masters ( juragan) (Kinder de Camarecq 1861: 275).
Dating from around the same time is a description by Van Marle of a 
kaluruhan in the regency of Cianjur. Appointed as a controleur at the Land-
Rent Income and Cultivation Off ice, he had taken the trouble to carry out a 
survey in 1852 on social life in a village community. He started by making it 
clear that desa life in the Sunda lands was different to that elsewhere on Java. 
A kaluruhan consisted of several kampungs or lembur, often surrounded by 
one or more hamlets (babakan). The obligation to provide services rested 
on the inhabitants, who were registered either as bumi (or cacah baku) or as 
numpang. Originally, only the landowners (bumi or cacah baku) were obliged 
to perform services, but when most of the sawah land fell into the hands of 
chiefs and the next of kin of the regent, there was a shortage of compulsory 
labour. This led to the obligation to be expanded to include the numpang, 
whose labour had formerly only been requisitioned on an occasional basis 
and who assisted the landowners if there was too much work. The bujang 
also did not perform forced labour unless ordered to do so by their master 
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or juragan. Lastly, the chiefs’ paddy f ields were tended by panukang, who 
were also exempt from compulsory labour. All these regulations applied, 
however, to corvee services but not to growing coffee. Everyone took part 
in picking the berries in the gardens, including women and children. The 
regent of Cianjur, who the controleur asked to verify the information he had 
received, told him that all those with property and no rights of exemption 
were obliged to provide corvee services. He specif ied property as: a wife, 
children, subordinates, sawah, buffalo, pedati and kampung. The more of 
these prerequisites, known as rukun, a man possessed, the more corvee 
services he had to provide. Anyone who possessed all these rukun was 
known as gemblang (fat) and his duty to provide services was the greatest. 
However, all those who exercised authority in some way or another were 
exempt from corvee services, together with women, the disabled, children 
under the age of fourteen and all those without property (orang miskin). A 
f inal category was those exempt because the chiefs required their labour 
services. These included the orang pawong, who worked in their lords’ 
houses or stables, and the rahayat, who were part of his entourage. The latter 
had no fixed tasks, doing whatever the lord required of them. The exemption 
from the corvee services for all these people did not apply, however, to coffee 
cultivation or road repair work. They would perform this labour in turn. 
Van Marle noted that this regulation was not applied strictly. In the case of 
urgent work requiring a large number of hands, everyone capable had to 
help, including the elderly and young children. Van Marle’s classif ication 
suggests that the situation he found was similar to that described by Kinder 
de Camarecq in Sembir. Van Marle, however, also provided f igures to sup-
port his argument. The f irst kaluruhan he surveyed had 639 inhabitants 
divided among 117 households. Fifty-two of the households were exempt 
from corvee services, 24 because their heads were chiefs and 28 because 
they were elderly, disabled, orang pawong or rahayat. Of the remaining 65 
households, 50 were obliged to work in the coffee cultivation system, and 
the other 15 performed other services: six maintained the regent’s house, 
two worked at the brickworks, two manned the guards’ lodges, two were 
responsible for the security of bridges, and one guarded the pasangrahan. 
A second kaluruhan had 1,327 inhabitants, with 216 households. Of these, 
103 were exempt from corvee services (as chiefs, disabled, orang pawong 
and rahayat) and 113 had to provide services, 84 cultivating coffee and the 
rest performing a wide range of activities.
These sources describing the base of economic activity produce the 
following picture: f irstly, the greater the capacity of the household, the 
greater was the burden of labour imposed upon it; secondly, only those 
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registered as obliged to provide labour services took part in the work in 
the coffee gardens; thirdly, the demand for labour was flexible, in the sense 
that if there was little work, many were not called up, while in busy periods 
practically everyone had to be available. Kikir, f iling or scraping, was the 
name given to the campaigns introduced by directors and managers to 
mobilize labour. Even women, ‘with their sarung tied up between their legs’, 
were then forced to go to the gardens and help pick the berries. Only the 
eldest and the youngest remained behind in the villages. Exemption was 
a privilege extended to all who were acknowledged as chiefs or persons of 
local renown and it is clear from both sources that this was a considerable 
number of individuals. Lastly, the strong increase in the colonial tribute 
resulting from the expansion of coffee production under the cultivation 
system did not stop the landed gentry of the Priangan from successfully 
preventing the entire labour power of the peasants from being requisitioned. 
They continued to insist on servitude by their subordinates, and refused 
to account for this to the colonial authorities. They could not, however, 
prevent peasant labour being used for corvee and cultivation services on a 
colossal scale. In 1867, the Resident of the Priangan Regencies informed the 
regents and district and local chiefs that each individual eligible for corvee 
services could be required to perform these services at least 52 working days 
a year (one day a week) and that this burden should be shared as equally 
as possible (Colonial Report 1869-70: 309). How heavy was the burden of 
labour in the coffee gardens? According to a report by Van den Bosch, a total 
of 471,949 individuals from 14,119 households were involved in producing 
coffee in 1830 while 30 years later, when the population had risen to 829,525, 
of the total of 108,816 agrarian households, 89,900 were engaged in coffee 
cultivation (Enklaar 1871: 133). While the population count submitted by 
the native chiefs had less than doubled in this period, the number of people 
active in the forced cultivation of coffee had increased more than sixfold. 
The increase in volume of this most prof itable of colonial goods was by no 
means proportionate to this mass mobilization of labour. Equally disturbing 
was the fact that more than half of these agrarian families did not own 
paddy f ields. This percentage of landless was higher than elsewhere on Java 
and, together with the drastic rise in rice prices after the departure of the 
English interim government, appeared to suggest that too little attention 
was being devoted to growing food (ibid.: 134-5). In 1818, Van den Bosch had 
warned against excessive expansion of coffee production because it would 
have an adverse effect on the cultivation of paddy. It was a crisis in more 
than one sense, that could no longer be denied and required resolute action. 
But what was the remedy?
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Table 6.5  Coffee production in the Priangan Regencies, 1801-70
Year Pikul Year Pikul Year Pikul
1801 62,987 1811 21,348 1821 81,352
1802 46,143 1812 43,717 1822 68,361
1803 43,919 1813 43,866 1823 52,123
1804 56,053 1814 42,710 1824 54,094
1805 53,046 1815 60,186 1825 105,684
1806 78,874 1816 62,563 1826 77,838
1807 104,000 1817 68,578 1827 53,962
1808 112,028 1818 88,788 1828 46,306
1809 100,366 1819 65,303 1829 64,647
1810 99,428 1820 46,534 1830 52,735
Year Pikul Year Pikul Year Pikul Year Pikul
1831 39,230 1841 168,130 1851 217,363 1861 116,900
1832 53,236 1842 250,598 1852 147,006 1862 82,700
1833 65,103 1843 171,803 1853 130,127 1863 172,600
1834 160,023 1844 152,123 1854 243,554 1864 31,200
1835 81,085 1845 57,150 1855 272,300 1865 90,800
1836 152,274 1846 123,690 1856 199,900 1866 205,300
1837 116,300 1847 126,707 1857 130,300 1867 136,300
1838 96,100 1848 92,136 1858 156,200 1868 48,106
1839 234,014 1849 39,647 1859 101,500 1869 136,812
1840 109,644 1850 103,132 1860 162,000 1870 126,698
1880 87,431 1890 28,041 1899 39,403
source: 1800-10: de haan i, 1910: 920-4 
1810-30: Nota omtrent de Javasche koffie, speciaal die uit de vroeger onder dier naam bekende 
Jacatrasche en Priangan landen, December 1833. van den bosch Collection, 438. 
nb. between 1808 and 1821, the figures sometimes include coffee supplied by private estates in 
krawang and bogor. 
1831-54: Colonial report 1870-71: 2921-2 
1855-70: Colonial report 1871-80 
nb. the archive sources disagree on the scale of production (reporting higher or lower figures for 
some years). these differences do not, however, affect the general trend: strong fluctuations from 
year to year and, until shortly after the middle of the nineteenth century, a rising trend, followed 
by a fall which continued after 1870.
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Table 6.6  Reported population growth in the Priangan Regencies, 1808-71
Year Population Year Population
1808 146,700 1836 701,403
1815 188,000 1837 707,890
1817 191,000 1841 713,121
1822 198,057 1846 727,550
1823 207,275 1856 806,000
1829 470,031 1860 829,525
1830 471,949 1865 882,354
1833 554,771 1871 998,777
nb. these figures come from residency annual reports and other sources based on numbers 
submitted by native chiefs.

VII Winding up the Priangan system of 
governance
‘A system that is arbitrary, repressive and secretive’
The public debate in the metropolis on whether to continue the cultiva-
tion system began to gain momentum after the middle of the nineteenth 
century and focused on the role of the government in the colonial economy. 
The question also arose of whether forced levies should be replaced by 
free labour as the basic principle of the cultivation of crops for export. 
The political choice that would ultimately be made was the outcome of a 
long-drawn-out dispute between the various schools of thought within and 
outside Dutch parliament. Advocates on all sides of the argument had to 
take account of the impact on public opinion in the mother country of the 
publication in 1860 of Max Havelaar. The book, written by former Dutch 
colonial off icial Eduard Douwes Dekker under the pen name Multatuli34 
and subtitled ‘Or the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company’, had 
in the words of the leader of the liberal lobby sent ‘a shudder’ through the 
country (Van der Meulen 2002: 418). The change in the foundations of 
colonial policy that gradually took shape was preceded by an extensive 
survey of the production of the two main commercial crops regulated 
under the cultivation system, coffee and sugar. In 1863, the government 
of the East Indies was ordered to recommend improvements in the coffee 
production of Java. The investigations which would be the basis for the new 
policy were initially entrusted to C.P.C. Steinmetz. As former Resident of the 
Priangan Regencies (1851-55) and as the author of yet another manual on the 
cultivation of coffee (1865), he was eminently qualified for the task. However 
failing health prevented him from what he set out to do and after his death 
in 1865 C.J. Bosch, Chief Inspector of the Department of Cultivations, was 
designated to complete the off icial enquiry. In 1868 he had completed his 
report – Algemeen Verslag der Uitkomsten van het onderzoek betreffende 
de Koffijkultuur op Java – which found its way through the bureaucracy to 
parliament in the Netherlands where it was included in the Proceedings 
of the States-General 1870-71. Because coffee cultivation was organized 
along different lines in the Priangan Regencies than in the rest of Java, the 
situation in this region and the problems that occurred there were described 
34 Literally, ‘I have suffered much’.
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in a separate memorandum.35 What is striking is the exceptionally critical 
tone of this account on the working and impact of the coffee regime in the 
Sunda highlands. ‘A system that is arbitrary, repressive and secretive’, was 
the judgment on the mode of production in the Priangan Regencies, which 
had previously received so much praise. Each of these three condemnations 
was explained in detail.
Secrecy had led to all information that might have detracted from the 
success of the colonial enterprise being omitted from off icial records, 
resulting in a make-believe portrayal that presented what was going on in 
exaggeratedly rosy terms and systematically underrepresented the reverse 
side of the policy pursued. The need to provide good news that would keep 
their superiors content caused off icials to cover up or even distort facts 
and f igures in their administration that might give the impression that 
set targets had not been met. If disappointing results of the coffee regime 
could no longer be suppressed, they were blamed on faulty decisions by 
a predecessor, e.g. the choice of the wrong terrain for plantations, or on 
circumstances beyond the control of the government, such as inclement 
weather. Only when the situation got really out of hand and failure could 
no longer be concealed, even the highest echelons of the bureaucracy had 
to come up with a radical reappraisal of what had been reported before. 
A poignant example of this belated acknowledgment of misrepresenta-
tion was the f iasco of indigo cultivation. Early indications that growing 
and especially processing this crop would seriously disrupt the peasant 
order in the Priangan were blatantly ignored. The whistle-blowers were 
reprimanded by their superiors higher up in the colonial machinery and 
told to shut up. The true scale of the indigo disaster did not penetrate to such 
lofty heights until Vitalis, as Inspector of Cultivation, drew attention to the 
widespread starvation, staggering mortality and mass desertion. Publicizing 
inconvenient information was traditionally considered improper, a blem-
ish on the reputation of the obedient colonial off icial who knew exactly 
what his superiors expected of him: confirmation of the administrative 
order of the day. During the great coffee survey now under way, all district 
heads were asked if they were aware of any facts regarding the aversion 
of the peasants to coffee gardens being laid out at great distances from 
their villages. Shocked, the Assistant Resident for Sumedang stated that 
both the regent and the controleur had told him under oath that they had 
not given any information of such a nature to Chief Inspector Bosch. The 
35 Aanteekeningen betreffende de koff iecultuur in de residentie Preanger Regentschappen, 
Bijlagen Handelingen van de Staten-Generaal 1870-71: 2759-2951.
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latter added a note to this reply: ‘It puts one in mind of a crime and it was 
indeed a crime in the Priangan to tell the truth to a delegated off icial of 
the government’ (Colonial Report 1870-71: 2774). It can be assumed that 
the government’s policy-makers did discuss its impact in detail, but that 
occurred without them having to account for their actions or to consult 
outsiders on the decisions they made. Colonial governance took place in a 
closed shop atmosphere and this inward-looking bias was only reinforced by 
the hierarchical structure of authority. The recalcitrant Multatuli was one 
of the few who broke through this wall of bureaucratic silence. He described 
the chain of good news that ran from the lower ranks of the colonial ap-
paratus to headquarters, a fabricated optimism that the Governor-General 
upheld in his reports back to the metropolis.
And what should the Governor-General do if someone should write him 
letters claiming that the Javanese are badly treated here and there? The 
answer is obvious. The Governor-General should not read the letters, 
as it is clear that reading such letters will disturb him in the fulf ilment 
of his duty: protecting the Javanese people. And if the writer of such 
improper letters should persist? Then the Governor-General must make 
his displeasure known to him and force him to resign his post. This is 
how our system works, gentlemen. (Multatuli 1862: 59)
Brushing off undesirable news was not, however, restricted to the reports 
of European off icials. They, in their turn, complained about being misled 
by the native chiefs, who also saw to it that only propitious news reached 
the ears of their superiors. The colonial off icials had little direct contact 
with the peasantry. Inasmuch as this did occur, questions and answers that 
were exchanged during these encounters could be edited to comply with 
the desired portrayal of the situation. Penetrating to the base of society 
was no guarantee of the accuracy of the information obtained, as Kinder 
de Camarecq pointed out in the introduction to his detailed investigations 
of a Priangan settlement shortly after the middle of the nineteenth century.
The respect of the Javanese, and especially the Sundanese, people for 
their regent is such that as soon as the lower chiefs order them in his 
name to deny or be silent about something, they will be certain to obey 
the order. (1861: 60)
The author emphasized that he had gathered his data during a recurring, 
long-lasting and good-natured survey he conducted in the settlement, with 
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no intervention from the regent. His knowledge of the Sundanese language 
had enabled him to follow the conversations of the district head – who 
remained present during his visits – and to ask further questions if he 
felt the need. This method of collecting data still qualif ied as ‘supervised’ 
investigation. It reveals the different layers of obfuscation and secrecy that 
made it diff icult to obtain a clear picture of how the peasant economy 
actually worked. The off icial view focused on blaming the local chiefs for 
shirking their duties, while the colonial authorities remained carefully out 
of the line of f ire.
Repression. The coffee report brought to light in great detail the onerous 
burden that the forced cultivation of coffee imposed on the people of the 
Priangan. The gradual relocation of production from in or close by the 
peasants’ villages in the valleys to higher and distant gardens had made 
a signif icant contribution to this steadily increasing burden. ‘The fatal 
system of planting coffee in regulated gardens had to predominate’ was 
how one commentator summarized the trend of producing ever more and 
more beans (Colonial Report 1870-71: 2768). The distance that the peasants 
were made to travel to the gardens had increased considerably over time; 
to more than 30 poles, according to the most recently available f igures. To 
make supervision easier, the gardens had been grouped together in gigantic 
plantations.
The district of Ujungberung [Kulon], for example, has only one garden, 
which is tended by 44 dessas, some of which are 1-2, others 7, 8 or 9, but 
most 10, 12 and 14 poles distant. The district of Cilokotot also had one 
garden for 65 dessas; the districts of Pesser Maleber, Cikondang and 
Jampang Wetan, with a total of 62 dessas, also plant their coffee in one 
garden, while the distance to the dessas vary widely from 1 or 2 to 31 poles. 
(Coffee Report 1870-71: 2775)
In the very hilly terrain in which coffee was grown, covering a pole took 
twice as long as on a flat road. It was therefore not surprising, continued 
the report, that – given that it was much more diff icult to tend to the trees 
and pick the berries in coffee gardens more than six poles away from peas-
ant abodes in flat country – most gardens produced a very low yield. An 
instruction dating from before the introduction of the cultivation system, 
forbidding the laying out of plantations in the Priangan more than 12 poles 
from the settlements, was disregarded on a large scale and this continued 
to be the case in 1865 and 1866. Even this provision dating from an earlier 
era set the distance three times longer than for the rest of Java, namely 
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four poles. The only way to maintain the trees and pick the berries during 
the harvest season was to confine the peasants to the gardens. The work 
sites became temporary living quarters for both the labourers and their 
supervisors. The coffee report calculated that a skilled planter could pick 
the ripe berries from no more than 10 trees a day during the peak period. 
As the harvest extended over some 15 rounds, the work – after the berries 
had been picked, they had to be dried and the beans shelled – took up a 
large part of the labour capacity of the peasant household. According to 
an estimate by the Resident in 1864, this added up to around f ive months, 
‘during which time the people, with the exception of occasional visits, were 
away from their homes’ (Coffee Report 1870-71: 2763). The labourers would 
often try to cut short their stay at the plantation by ripping the fruit from 
the branches too early, throwing away the green berries and only taking 
those that were ripe to the drying sheds. The adults and children used 
the sheds to sleep in at nights. These communal shelters were miserably 
inadequate and this way of life, which forced the peasants to live as coolies, 
led to ‘much loose behaviour’.
After the work in the gardens was completed, the women and children 
returned home, but the men were not done until they had delivered the 
beans to the warehouses. This was, after all, besides growing the coffee, part 
of their compulsory delivery duties. Here, too, the distance from the gardens 
to the coffee warehouses was a serious problem. There were far fewer depots 
in the Priangan than in the other residencies on Java. The time required to 
transport the beans could extend to several days, and there would often also 
be a long wait at the depot, where the warehouse master refused to accept 
beans that had not been properly dried and sorted by quality. Rather than 
having to do this work all over again or wait even longer, the planters would 
often hide the rejected coffee or throw it into a gorge. The transport and 
delivery of the beans were not only time-consuming but also incurred costs 
that the planters had to pay themselves. They had to arrange for carts and 
draught animals, and the high mortality among the latter, caused by the 
bad state of the roads, meant that they might have to buy new animals en 
route. To spare the animals, some planters preferred to carry the beans to 
the warehouses on their own backs. This was clearly only possible for short 
distances. Sometimes the burden of transport was so strenuous that planters 
simply gave the beans away or were even prepared to pay hesitant recipients 
to take them off their hands (Coffee Report 1870-71: 2774). Lastly, the burden 
of work was made even heavier by the fact that the gardens regularly had to 
be relocated. The first harvest could take place when the trees started to bear 
fruit, but the yield began to decline already after a few years; most gardens 
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were only productive for f ive to seven years. They would then be abandoned 
and the work would be transferred to newly opened up land. All the work 
of laying out the garden, planting the trees and maintaining the crop in the 
f irst years before the trees began to bear fruit had to be performed without 
the planters receiving a single cent for their efforts.
Even when they were f inally paid, it was still very little, despite the fact 
that the rate had been increased by 25 cents a pikul each year after 1859, until 
it had reached 6.5 guilders in 1867. It meant that for much more demanding 
work, the peasants were at best paid only half that earned by coffee planters 
in other residencies, while basic necessities were more expensive in the 
Priangan than elsewhere. Between 1853 and 1864, the lowest wage paid on 
Java for free, unskilled labour was 20 cents a day and, in some areas, could 
be as high as 50 cents. But only a few residencies paid the lowest rate for 
growing coffee. In the same 12-year period, the daily wage in the Priangan 
remained stagnant at 3.5 cents (Coffee Cultivation on Java 1871: 267). The 
coffee report sought the cause of this much lower wage in the operation of 
the Priangan system, which had subordinated the peasants to their lords 
in serfdom.
Not only do the people of the Priangan pay as much tax as their counter-
parts elsewhere, they actually pay more. Collecting the taxes is beyond 
the control of the European authorities, and the lower class is left to the 
mercy, or lack of it, of the chiefs, and it is known how far that goes; we 
know from experience in the Priangan, that the tolerance and patience 
of the people are inexhaustible, and the chiefs take advantage of this to 
extort and torment their inferiors with no regard for their misery or the 
heavy burden impressed upon them. (Coffee Report 1870-71: 2773)
Based on the 118 days a year required to grow the coffee stated by the Resi-
dent – a f igure that was much too low, according to the coffee report – the 
highest daily wage in the residency was nine cents in 1863 and the lowest 
less than one cent in 1864. The wages paid in the f ive regencies fluctuated 
from way below to far above these amounts. The conclusion that followed 
came as no surprise: the tortuous work and the exceptionally low payment 
had given the people an aversion to growing coffee. This observation was 
followed by statements by colonial officials who now had the opportunity to 
say what they had always had to suppress or deny. They had never been able 
to reveal facts that might have displayed the peasants’ hatred of growing 
coffee. For example, that planters in Sukapura had once destroyed young 
coffee plants by pouring boiling water on them. It also became known that 
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a controleur in Garut once called out the prajurit (a corps of native police) 
to force the peasants to pick the coffee at bayonet point and that on many 
occasions the chiefs punished open resistance with immediate and cruel 
beatings. The controleur at Blubur acknowledged that wide-scale aversion 
did exist but added that it could not be supported by facts because the 
people were too scared to show their real feelings.
Arbitrariness. The more insight the colonial apparatus acquired into 
the native workfloor, by appointing controleurs, the fewer opportunities 
there were for escaping from the system of forced cultivation. Although 
the population continued to be undercounted, off icials in the region were 
able to register more and more inhabitants who had escaped their notice 
in earlier counts, or had been intentionally kept out of their sight by the 
native chiefs. Colonial policy-makers saw the discovery of the cacah, the 
composite peasant household, as proof that there was a large pool of reserve 
labour which they could employ as they saw f it. The Resident had issued an 
order in 1839 that, from then on, the obligation to grow and deliver coffee 
would apply to each nuclear peasant household. The extent to which this 
instruction was actually enforced in practice can best be answered by 
reversing the perspective and examining how the peasants responded to 
this order for the mass mobilization of labour to grow coffee.
The descriptions referred to in the preceding chapter, of the situations in 
two peasant settlements in the regencies of Sumedang (by Kinder de Cama-
recq) and Cianjur (by Van Marle) shortly after the middle of the nineteenth 
century, offer an impression of the way in which the increased burden was 
distributed among the local population. A considerable proportion of the 
inhabitants of these settlements were exempt from providing cultivation 
services. These were, in the f irst place, those who were unfit to work – small 
children, the elderly and the disabled – who lacked the physical strength 
to meet their own basic needs. Secondly, there was a privileged category 
consisting of chiefs, the clergy and others (including hajis), whose high 
status exempted them from taking part in compulsory coffee production. 
But these privileges were no longer permanent or complete. When the 
picking season arrived, they too had to join the army of labourers in the 
gardens. The instruction that women should pull up their sarungs between 
their legs showed that they, too were required to work. More or less the same 
applied to the corvee services that had to be performed for the government 
for a maximum of 52 days a year by the same classes of people who bore the 
brunt of the compulsory work in the coffee gardens. What was perceived 
by the colonial authorities as arbitrariness started with the peasants who 
worked as panukang in the f ields of the landed gentry. The lords tried to 
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ensure that these labourers remained exempt from the cultivation and 
corvee services imposed by the government as far as possible and to call 
on their labour for their own private use. The same applied to the rahayat, 
who were part of the chiefs’ entourage and had to perform a whole range of 
duties for their masters which would have become virtually impossible if 
they had to provide compulsory services for the government as well. Their 
status of rahayat to a prominent lord did not take the form of economic 
servitude but was primarily an honour indicative of a rank that gave them 
prominence in the peasant landscape, suff icient reason to claim exemption 
from compulsory services.
The f inal way in which the principle of universal servitude to the 
government was eroded in practice was through the possibility of buying 
exemption. Peasants who owned suff icient land could free themselves of 
the despised and low-paid work in the coffee gardens by paying lower chiefs 
an amount of money. As a result of all these exceptions, the households that 
were not exempt had to bear an even heavier burden. In essence, it meant 
that land-poor and landless households were more likely to have to fulf il 
their obligations to provide cultivation and corvee services than those that 
were better off. The colonial authorities did not concern themselves with 
these mutual arrangements, but were aware of them. Van Sevenhoven, 
the f irst Director of Cultivation, even devised a plan to wrest dependent 
members of composite households free from the grip of the cacah so that 
they could fulf il their labour obligations directly to the government. 
Clearly, not everyone was subject equally to the colonial tribute, despite 
what the instructions prescribed. The question then remains to what level 
the labour burden that the government imposed on peasant households in 
the Priangan had increased under the cultivation system.
Taxation, resistance and retribution
When forced coffee cultivation was f irst introduced in the early the eight-
eenth century it allegedly imposed no great burden on the planters. The 
trees, few in number at f irst, were planted close to the peasants’ homes 
and supposedly required almost no maintenance. All the planters had to 
do was collect the berries when they fell from the trees. The berries were 
then dried in a shed and the peasants could process them into beans while 
continuing their work in the paddy f ields. In short, it was a job that – at 
least in the eyes of VOC off icials – required little effort and provided the 
peasant households with welcome additional income. That this was an 
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inaccurate portrayal of the situation became clear when coffee production 
was increased through the use of force. Compelling the peasants to work was 
seen as justif ied, f irstly because it represented a continuation of traditional 
native practices, according to which the peasants were in servitude to 
their lords, and secondly because of the reluctance of the peasants to work 
of their own free will, a consequence of their non-economic mentality. 
Their inborn tendency to laziness and the absence of anything more than 
the simplest incentive to meet their basic needs had to be combated by 
imposing work morals and discipline. Force would lead to an increase in 
labour productivity, a precondition for a better livelihood in the long term. 
Gradually, another argument came to the fore which was intended to f ind 
a rationale for the claim on the peasants’ labour. In this perception, which 
became the essence of the cultivation system, the tribute – in the form of 
a claim on land and labour – was seen as a form of taxation to which the 
people of Java had already been accustomed in the pre-colonial era. Van den 
Bosch calculated that the colonial equivalent of this tribute would entail 
making available one-f ifth of agricultural land to grow export crops and an 
equal claim on the total labour power of the peasant population, set at 66 
days a year. Without notif ication, the basic unit for meeting these obliga-
tions had been shifted from the male provider to all the members of the 
household, with the consequence that not only the head of the household 
but all other employable men, women and children had to pay tribute in the 
form of one-f ifth of their joint labour power. It was a long time before the 
nature and size of the composite household, as the basic unit on which the 
peasant order was based, could be determined with any accuracy. The initial 
view of the cacah as the basic unit, on which Van den Bosch also based is 
calculations, allowed the peasants some scope to spread the tribute out over 
the three to four households that made up the cacah. That was no longer 
possible after the introduction in the Priangan of the numpang instruction 
in 1789 and the somahan instruction in 1839, which required each nuclear 
household to provide cultivation and other corvee services. This of course 
entailed far more than the 66 days a year that Van den Bosch had specif ied.
But how much more? Another way of calculating what level of taxation 
was acceptable dated from the end of the eighteenth century and prescribed 
the planting, maintenance and harvesting of 1,000 trees per household as 
the standard for servitude. The sources do not make clear why and when 
Rolff, the Commissioner for Interior Affairs who f irst set the target in 
1789, arrived at this number. There is no doubt, however, that his decision 
was inspired by the growing demand for coffee by the VOC, which saw 
increasing opportunities for selling this commodity in the expanding 
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world market, rather than by the productive capability of the peasants. 
Henceforth, the norm of 1,000 trees was imposed by force with no one even 
bothering to f ind out how many working days were required to meet that 
target. When asked for his opinion, Resident Van der Wijck admitted in his 
report in 1856 that the scale of this burden effectively made it impossible 
to maintain and that the most that could be expected of the planters was 
two-thirds or even half of the set amount. But, he added, the peasants had 
become accustomed to the work regime. In 1835, after the introduction of 
the cultivation system, Van Sevenhoven had tried to persuade his superiors 
to adopt a more accommodating attitude towards the coffee planters. The 
brutal conditions in which the labourers had to work in the mountain 
gardens, which he estimated at 225 days a year including corvee services, 
and the exceptionally low payment they received for their efforts took 
on the tone of a complaint against the Priangan regime in his report. His 
call to at least increase the payment fell on deaf ears. On the contrary, 
the f irst Director of Cultivation was severely reprimanded for his candid 
protest. Van Gorkom, who had an intimate knowledge of coffee cultivation, 
observed in an article published in 1866 that a standard household of man, 
wife and children spent an average of 100 days in the mountain gardens. 
This calculation did not include, however, the time spent on laying out the 
gardens, planting young trees, drying the berries and processing them into 
beans, or transporting and delivering the coffee to the warehouses (Van 
Gorkom 1866: 400). The coffee report commissioned in 1863 also provided 
f igures for the number of working days required to grow and deliver coffee 
in the Priangan: according to the Resident’s calculations, tending to 1,000 
trees from the laying out of the gardens to picking the berries and producing 
the beans took up an average of 125 days per household. Native chiefs came 
up with a slightly higher f igure of 137 days. The authors of the report said 
that these f igures were too low and incomplete, partly because they did 
not take account of the time the planters needed to get to the garden and 
to carry the beans to the warehouses. This is also shown by the statement 
elsewhere in the report that the work in the gardens took up no less than 
f ive months a year per household.
The burden of labour was not of course restricted to the forced cultivation 
of coffee. The government also requisitioned labour to provide corvee ser-
vices for public works, including the building of not only roads and bridges, 
but also off ices, warehouses, stables, sentry posts and accommodation 
for civil servants, the transport of goods and services, guarding roads and 
villages and, lastly, a small army of guards, messengers and servants for the 
off icial and personal convenience of colonial authorities. These obligations 
windinG uP the PrianGan systeM of GovernanCe 265
could extend to 52 days a year for each taxable household. It was permitted 
to avoid this work by sending a substitute. The summary shows that cultiva-
tion and corvee services together monopolized the peasants’ labour power 
for at least six months of the year. Because it was allowed to send substitutes 
or to buy exemption from these obligations, it is practically impossible to 
calculate the average burden imposed by all these services. The absence of 
the better-off, for payment or otherwise, meant that burden was heavier for 
those who did turn up for work, who mainly came from the land-poor and 
landless segments of the peasantry. The two categories of colonial servitude 
were recorded separately in the government’s off icial records, but it was an 
incomprehensible and irrelevant distinction for the mass of those subjected 
to the regime of forced labour. Of course, the planters received a meagre 
payment for the coffee they delivered, while in most cases they were paid 
nothing at all for the public work they performed. In practice, however, 
the differences were much smaller than they appeared on paper. The work 
in the gardens fell under the cultivation system, while building drying 
sheds and accommodation for lower and higher work bosses, as well as the 
construction of depots and warehouses, were registered as corvee services 
in the off icial records. These compulsory activities, referred to generally 
as work by order of the government, imposed an excessively heavy burden 
on the peasant economy.
Over and above the colonial tribute to which the inhabitants of the 
Priangan districts were subjected, there were the shares of their food crops 
that they had to surrender to their lords. The most important was the cuke, 
which was set at one-f ifth of the paddy yield; half of this went to the chiefs 
and the other half to the clergy. In addition to the cuke, the peasants had to 
supply a wide variety of other items, including bamboo, f irewood, chickens 
and ducks, present gifts on festive occasions and during religious celebra-
tions, perform stable and household services, and provide manpower for 
the building and maintenance of homes for the landed gentry. Lastly, there 
was a range of ad hoc taxes, for example on the sale or slaughter of cattle, 
a market tax, ferry tolls, inheritance tax and other tributes whenever they 
were demanded. And, of course, not to be forgotten, the tending of f ields 
appropriated by the gentry and other services provided by the panukang, 
who the local chiefs tried to exempt from the colonial tribute as far as 
possible. Some of these claims were imposed on all of a chief’s subjects, 
but other applied only to the rahayat, clients who were members of the 
lord’s personal entourage. Servitude to the landed gentry could mean full 
or partial exemption from obligations towards the government, but in the 
course of time the colonial authorities gradually tightened their grip on the 
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local population, resulting in an accumulation of claims on the labour power 
of the peasants. The picture was made even more complex by the fact that 
the different kinds of servitude were not applied uniformly in practice. The 
better-off had more chance of being relieved of their obligations or, if that 
was not successful, they could show their willingness to serve by sending a 
substitute. This differentiation, however, does not change the fact that the 
total claim on the labour power of the peasants had risen to an extremely 
high level under the Priangan system.
Did the order from above to produce increasing volumes of coffee not 
meet with resistance from the people of the Sundanese highlands to the 
regime of forced cultivation? The government saw the lack of any overt and 
sustained resistance as proof that there was suff icient capacity among the 
peasants to raise the desired tribute. Peace had never been disturbed by 
mass protest and it had never been necessary to station troops in the region 
to maintain law and order. While persistent protest movements had threat-
ened to develop into popular uprisings in other parts of Java, such as in the 
Princely States and neighbouring Cirebon, the people of the Priangan lands 
Coffee warehouse on the Citarum river. The boats waiting to be loaded are owned 
by a private company contracted for shipping the coffee beans to the coast (photo 
pre-1880).
source: kitLv Collection
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were considered obedient and content with their lot. Their subordination 
to colonial domination was mediated through the authority of local chiefs. 
Acknowledging the latter’s power and prestige had proved an effective and 
cheap means of forcing the peasants to deliver the main trade crop in the 
past century and a half. If they did not respond to the coercion with acts of 
resistance it was because their traditional subordination to the local chiefs 
was used to introduce the cultivation of coffee for sale on the world market 
and to steadily increase its volume. Of course, the landed gentry had to be 
paid for their loyal mediation but the cultivation commission received by 
the regents was only a fraction of the prices that the coffee raised at auctions 
in the metropolis. The awareness that without the collusion of the local lords 
the resistance of the peasants against the forced cultivation of coffee would 
have been much greater was a running theme in colonial reports from the 
end of the eighteenth century. This streamlined image of forced cultivation 
and delivery did not mean however that there had been no resistance at 
all. It was a sensitive topic that was treated with considerable reluctance or 
avoided completely in off icial reports. The government could only uphold 
the impression of docile peasants and their co-opted lords if resistance was 
presented as sporadic, limited in scale and easy to defuse. And then only by 
not looking behind the off icial facade of favourable facts and opinions for 
evidence to invalidate them. Occasionally, however, and almost in passing 
a reality was exposed that was intended to remain concealed. For example, 
in the private correspondence between Van den Bosch and Baud, shortly 
after the introduction of the cultivation system, in which they discussed 
with obvious concern reports of land flight from the Priangan and Cirebon 
and mentioned the rebellious spirit that dominates in the latter region.36 
Would the resistance to the heavy tribute not lead to a new war in Java after 
the one that had been successfully fought in Central Java from 1825-30?
The mild and generous attitude to the usually obedient Priangan 
population soon made way for a harder approach if the progress of 
the coffee cultivation came under threat. Affairs like that described 
by Multatuli in Lebak also occurred in the Priangan. A complaint, for 
example, submitted anonymously for fear of being punished simply for 
reporting it. Such cases, of claims that intimidation had taken on violent 
form with the lower local chiefs being the main culprits, found their 
way into colonial reports. They could also, after all, be interpreted as 
proof that hard-handed action was regrettable but necessary. In his time, 
36 Letter from Baud to Van den Bosch, 24 February 1832 in Westendorp Boerma, J.J. Briefwis-
seling tussen J. van den Bosch en J.C. Baud, part 2, Utrecht 1956: 107.
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Commissioner Rolff did not shy away from calling prestigious chiefs to 
order by slapping or kicking them, bawling out regents in public and 
threatening to dismiss or banish them. It was Nicolaus Engelhard himself 
who asserted that no native would wish to plant coffee without the use 
of physical force, being beaten or put in the stocks (De Haan I, 1910: 160). 
As repressive measures against the higher native chiefs involved in coffee 
affairs gradually became milder, it was mainly the lower chiefs, such as 
petingi and garden mandur who were called to order with a f logging or 
being chained in the stocks. Punishing the bosses of work gangs now 
aroused colonial sympathies.
Such a poor fellow was then humiliated for many hours, hung up by his 
big toes, buried bare-headed in the mud, etc. It is no surprise that he 
would then later take every opportunity to vent his rancour on the gang 
he supervised. This was how mutual hatred was aroused in the villages. 
(Janssen 1888: 8)
Corporal punishment was banned in 1866, but it is doubtful whether it 
was strictly enforced. Illustrative of the general attitude was the approving 
tone in which, many years later, an incident was recalled during which 
Kinder de Camarecq had devised an original method of putting a stop to 
the widespread theft of cattle while he was serving as Assistant Resident in 
Sumedang in 1854. He summoned all 30 district heads in the regency to his 
off ice and told them each to bring the ten most likely culprits from their 
districts with them. When all 300 suspects were assembled before him, he 
ordered them f irst to identify from their midst 30 as possible cattle thieves. 
The group of 30 were them asked who were the three ‘baddest’ among them, 
after which these three had to decide amongst themselves who the ‘guilty 
party’ was. This man was then informed that, every Saturday, he would be 
given 40 lashes in the presence of the whole group. This public chastisement 
would continue until the criminal confessed. The f irst f logging took place 
immediately and when everyone returned the following week, his wounds 
were not yet healed and he fell into a swoon after twelve lashes. When he 
regained consciousness, he begged to be hanged but his judge said that 
the punishment would continue every week until he confessed (Gonggrijp 
1919: 974-5). Almost three-quarters of a century later, the chronicler of this 
incident expressed his admiration for the innovative and resolute action 
of this colonial off icial. According to him, Kinder de Camarecq continued 
to be seen by the people of Sumedang as a man who brought them order, 
peace and prosperity.
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Repression continued to be endemic to coffee cultivation, but the colonial 
authorities’ view of the situation extended no further than the native man-
agers, who were held responsible for day-to-day discipline on the workfloor. 
And was it not, incidentally, the higher and lower chiefs who tended to 
resort to excessive violence to punish their subordinates? They made use of 
agents, known as jagos or f ighting cocks, who came from the peasant class, 
were familiar with the local situation, provided information that was not 
available through the regular channels, and spared their bosses all kinds 
of susah (Sollewijn Gelpke 1879: 142-4; Hasselman 1891: 104). In the colonial 
state system, these f ighting cocks acquired a new role, acting as informal 
mediators for the chiefs, intimidating the peasants – if necessary by the 
use of violence – to fulf il their tributary obligations. In this sense, the jagos 
had become exponents of the colonial power structure (Schulte Nordholt 
& Van Till 1999). They also sometimes worked at their own risk, initiative 
and expense. In his indictment of the evils of the cultivation system, Vitalis 
mentioned gangs, led by close relatives of the regent, who committed rob-
beries and murders in Cirebon. In his view, the population was nowhere as 
badly tormented and repressed than in the Priangan Regencies. He related 
how, during an inspection tour of the region, he had encountered a group 
of ten old men, who had been tied by their thumbs to a rope thrown over 
the branch of a tree. They had then been hoisted up until their toes could 
just touch the ground. Another time, he came across naked men with their 
arms tied crosswise and lying on the ground, where they remained exposed 
to the blazing sun. According to the inspector, it was not only members of 
the gentry who committed such excesses. Dutch off icials were also guilty 
of harassment and torture, including beating victims until they were half 
(or completely) dead and, in another instance, covering the bare upper body 
of a young woman with ants (Vitalis 1851a: 118-20).37
The continuing and far-reaching surveillance in both the villages and 
the coffee gardens – the costs of which were not borne by the government 
– ensured that resistance did not develop into collective action. Although 
the coffee report noted a few incidents that had not previously come to light, 
it by no means reflected the extent or the nature of the peasants’ obstinate 
refusal to work. It is perhaps suggested a little more clearly in a report on the 
37 This Inspector of Cultivation not only had strong words to say about the perpetrator of this 
abusive treatment, but also mentioned another case that he had witnessed in a report that he 
sent to G.G. Rochussen. When he received no response, he repeated his complaint verbally at a 
reception at the palace in Bogor. The Governor-General reprimanded Vitalis on this occasion 
that his actions were inappropriate and ordered him never to trouble him with such cases again 
(TNI, 1852: 295).
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long waiting times at the warehouses that made the peasants ‘recalcitrant’ 
and could only with great diff iculty be prevented from throwing their loads 
into a gorge. This is not easy to reconcile with the traditional portrayal of 
the Sundanese people in the official records as docile and timid, acquiescing 
in their fate. The peasants employed the weapons of the weak, but it was 
an arsenal that they used frequently and on a large scale. The controleur at 
Sukabumi gave a number of examples of sabotage and determined obfusca-
tion, which the authorities could do nothing to discourage.
1st tending to gardens carelessly and inadequately, despite repeated orders 
to do it better, for instance damaging the trees with the pacul, despite 
being ordered to keep a foot away from the trunk with tools;
2nd picking and transporting berries carelessly, so that they can be found, 
including many unripe ones, on the ground in the gardens and on the 
roads, proof of insuff icient care, while dried coffee berries still hang on 
the trees. (Coffee Report 1870-71: 2774)
The machine of coffee cultivation, which had steadily moved into a higher 
gear over a period of a century and a half, had now lost its power and 
momentum. The planters refused any longer to do what was required of 
them: to grow and deliver ever larger quantities of coffee. As Van Gorkom 
observed, more and more trees were producing fewer and fewer beans (1866: 
400). Colonial reports had described the Javanese people in general and 
the inhabitants of the Priangan in particular as almost endearingly docile 
and eager to please. That cliché was fuelled by the argument that there had 
seldom been collective and organized open rebellion, while the authorities 
persistently refused to acknowledge the covert and stubborn resistance that 
the people – with no other means at their disposal – displayed in response 
to all attempts to force them to cooperate in a system of production in which 
they were ruthlessly exploited. With hindsight, it is necessary to revise the 
impression that there had been no public resistance to the forced cultivation 
of coffee. Cirebon remained a hotbed of unrest for the entire period in which 
coffee cultivation imposed a heavy burden on the people and Peter Carey 
refers to sources showing that the peasants’ hatred of growing coffee was an 
important reason for the broad popular support Dipanegara enjoyed in the 
early years of the Java War (Carey 2007: 466). Reports from the eighteenth 
century and the f irst half of the nineteenth century refer to considerable 
land flight, the classic form of protest resorted to by peasants labouring 
under an excessive burden of obligations.
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Table 8.4 shows how the colonial apparatus steadily lost its grip on coffee 
cultivation in the Priangan Regencies. It compares the way in which the 
system was applied in the East Javanese district of Pasuruan and in the 
Sundanese highlands between 1853 and 1864, the results and revenues, the 
scale of the harvests and the annual payments to the planters. The f igures 
hardly require detailed elaboration. Although the number of trees in the 
Priangan Regencies had increased enormously and most of the coffee was 
produced in gardens, the revenue remained far behind that of Pasuruan. 
The heavier burden of cultivation services imposed on the people of the 
Sunda highlands produced fewer rather than more coffee beans, while the 
incomes of the Sundanese planters stagnated also at a much lower level.
Table 7.1  Coffee cultivation in Pasuruan and the Priangan from 1853 to 1864
Pasuruan Priangan
total number of coffee-planting households 386,291 1,061,020
in the 12-year period
total number of trees in gardens 41,153,873 596,918,294
number of trees in kampungs, pagars and forests 276,123,535 174,249,973
Coffee production in pikul 2,129,601 1,535,157
number of trees to maintain per household:
– in gardens 112 563
– in kampungs, pagars and forests 750 164
average annual production in pikul per household 5.78 1.73
average number of trees required for 1 pikul of coffee 140 464
average household income per year fl. 54.91 fl. 6.70
source: Coffee report 1870-71: 2776
Cultivating coffee and growing food
Separate attention should be devoted to the question whether the forced 
cultivation of coffee took place at the expense of growing food. The prevail-
ing view was that it did not affect the way the peasants met their basic 
needs. After all, coffee was not grown on the land that they used to grow 
food. While coffee trees were largely planted in mountain gardens, the 
sawahs were mainly located near the streams and rivers down in the 
valleys. From this perspective, by contrast with the sugarcane grown on 
the lowlands, producing coffee did not impinge on any of the resources 
the peasants needed for their basic survival. Both Cees Fasseur (1975) and 
Robert Elson (1994) used this argument to suggest that, as it was grown 
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high up in the mountains, coffee had a much less radical and burdensome 
effect on the peasant economy. But did coffee indeed require as little 
land as this favourable appraisal suggests? Laying out dry or irrigated 
f ields close to the coffee gardens to grow paddy was not allowed to keep 
pace with the expansion of the coffee cultivation itself. The labourers 
mobilized to perform the heavy work required to prepare the land for 
new plantations had to survive on roots and plants they found growing 
in the wild. When they went to the gardens to tend the trees and pick 
the berries, they took food with them from their homes and, if that ran 
out before they were f inished, new supplies would be brought up. The 
peasants were not permitted to use abandoned gardens – of which there 
were many – for growing food. This instruction had to be re-issued in 
1854 because the peasants invoked age-old rights to cultivate waste land. 
The colonial authorities refused to release gardens that were no longer in 
use as they expected to be able to resume production when the soil had 
become productive once again. Conversely, the increasing scarcity of land 
to grow food in the lower-lying areas forced the peasants to lay out rice 
f ields where they had not done so before. The enormous expansion of 
coffee cultivation after 1840 had made the shortage of suitable terrain for 
new coffee gardens even more acute, so that the government laid claim 
to all as yet unused land in the immediate vicinity of the kampungs. In 
this light little remains of the argument that growing coffee and paddy 
did not compete for the same land.
The colonial high command was of course aware that coffee production 
could only expand if the peasants had enough food to eat. In the VOC era, 
the Company off icials knew that the people could only fulf il their obliga-
tion to supply commodities if they had suff icient time and space to grow 
paddy. In the report describing his impressions during his f irst stay in the 
colony, Van den Bosch had warned against excessive expansion of coffee 
cultivation at the expense of food production (1818: 225). He was, however, 
the f irst to completely ignore his own good advice when he returned as 
Governor-General. A later commentator called this forgetfulness typical 
of this man, who did not concern himself in the least with the welfare of 
the population (Enklaar 1871: 134-5). The shortage of paddy f ields meant 
that even a minor failure of the crop would result in insuff icient staple 
food and supplies had to be brought in at short notice from elsewhere. 
The priority given to expanding coffee cultivation after Dutch rule was 
restored in 1816 caused the price of paddy to double. An instruction banning 
the export of paddy from the Priangan districts resulted in a further rise, 
rather than the intended fall. There were serious famines in the highlands 
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on at least two occasions. Pieter Engelhard recorded the f irst in 1804-05, 
attributing the widespread starvation to the forced planting of hundreds of 
thousands of coffee trees (De Haan IV, 1912: 462-3). Although the shortage 
was here limited to a few districts, there were considerably more victims 
in 1833-34 when the introduction of indigo caused the paddy crop to fail in 
the Sumedang and Sukapura regencies. An off icial report, which was only 
made public much later, concluded that:
a large percentage of the population had to survive on roots and leaves, 
while thousands died of hunger. (Report of the Priangan residency for 
1846: 88)
The virtual stagnation, if not reduction, of coffee cultivation in the Priangan 
under British rule offered the peasants a welcome pause for breath. The 
Resident, who returned to his old post after Dutch rule was restored in 1815, 
noted in his f irst report that new paddy f ields had been laid out everywhere 
and that the number of kampungs had increased substantially (De Haan 
IV, 1912: 463). In his report for 1822, Van Haak noted that the peasants had 
no time to grow any crops other than their own staple food and coffee. 
One consequence of this was that they no longer produced the cotton they 
needed to weave their own cloth. This contraction of the rural economy 
meant that the peasants now had to buy more expensive foreign textiles 
to clothe themselves. Van Haak did not fail to mention that it would be 
incorrect to interpret this as evidence of increased welfare, since there was 
no longer a cheaper alternative. The lower paddy harvest in 1821, resulting 
from an outbreak of cholera, and the resulting price rise encouraged the 
peasants to sell their share of the harvest to pay off their debts rather than 
use it to feed themselves and to lay in a store of seed for the new season. The 
Inspector of Finances expressed his concern about food production lagging 
behind the cultivation of coffee. Measures to increase paddy production, no 
matter how important they were to meet the demand, must not however 
be taken at the expense of what was and remained the most important 
concern: the cultivation and delivery of as much coffee as possible. In his 
1834 memorandum on the state of affairs in his regency, Bandung, Assistant 
Resident Nagel noted that he impressed on the native chiefs and priests the 
necessity of ensuring that the paddy fields were tended to in good time every 
year. That his show of concern was not heeded, or not to a suff icient degree, 
is clear from statements by native sources, consistently underutilized in 
the colonial historiography of Java. In a publication on the situation in the 
early nineteenth century, Soekanto referred to a prediction by the famous 
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painter Saleh that the heavy burden of labour imposed on the peasantry 
would ultimately lead to a popular uprising (Soekanto 1951: 29).
Buying up paddy, openly or by smuggling, could easily upset the pre-
carious balance between supply and demand. The f irst step taken if a food 
deficit occurred or threatened was to introduce a ban on exporting paddy 
from the region. In the case of an acute shortage, the authorities arranged 
for a supply of paddy, cheaply or even free of charge, hastily brought in from 
elsewhere. It was of course more effective to expand the area of land used 
to grow paddy and to support the construction of irrigation networks. The 
government would occasionally offer grants to encourage the cultivation 
of food crops. Nevertheless, there continued to be a chronic shortage of 
paddy f ields because coffee cultivation imposed a disproportionate burden 
on the labour of the peasants, leaving them insuff icient time to till, let 
alone expand their own f ields. In addition, the gentry laid claim to a large 
proportion of the food production. Landowners were obliged to surrender 
a f ifth of the food they produced. Local chiefs and clergy used the cuke not 
only for their own consumption but also traded it on the market. As the 
population of Batavia and the surrounding countryside increased, the paddy 
from the Priangan could be sold easily at not too great a distance. As we 
shall see later, the regents earned more from selling part of their share of the 
food crops than from the commission they received for their mediation in 
the production of coffee. In 1848 the regent of Limbangan sent a letter to the 
kepala cutak (district chiefs) of the regency, ordering them to make sure that 
the panghulu and lebeh inspected the sawahs under their command daily.
The trade in paddy was so lucrative for the local chiefs that there was at 
times a risk of food shortages because they demanded that the cultivators 
surrender food needed for their own requirements (Van Deventer III, 1866: 
186). As before, the authorities blamed the peasants themselves for the 
resulting shortages. According to the received wisdom, they were inherently 
lazy, lived from day to day and knew that the government would help them 
if the situation became serious (Croockewit 1866: 318). The combination 
of growing paddy and coffee created a dilemma. The colonial authorities 
could only expand coffee production on higher ground in the mountains, 
but had to allow the peasants to settle as close as possible to the lower-lying 
sawahs. This combination remained feasible until the end of the eighteenth 
century, but the fourteen-fold rise in the number of coffee trees in the 
mid-nineteenth century increased the distance between the villages and the 
gardens even more. The problem was related not only to the choice of which 
land to use but also the way production was organized. Planting the coffee 
close to the villages had led to a loss of control over production. Relocating 
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it to the large mountain plantations made it much easier to supervise the 
work regularly and to keep the workforce under tight control.
The welfare of the people
There was considerable disagreement about the impact of coffee cultivation 
on the local population that persisted for the entire period during which the 
Priangan regime was in force. The introduction of the coercive system was 
justif ied by the low standard of living of the peasantry, supposedly caused 
by their non-economic mentality. From this perspective, discipline had to 
be imposed to ensure progress for both the country and its people. It was 
an early expression of the late-colonial doctrine that foreign rule should be 
seen as a means to realize the economic potential that could not be achieved 
from within. By contrast with the opinion widely held earlier that colonies 
were there to serve the interests of the metropolis, this mise-en-valeur 
argument gave priority to the ultimate benefits for the local population. 
The former view had lost little of its cogency in the early decades of the 
nineteenth century, as can be seen from statements by Governors-General 
like Daendels and Van den Bosch. It was not until the middle of the century 
that the idea that the impact on the local population should be the yardstick 
for assessing the outcome of colonial domination began to gain ground in 
the public debate on what direction that policy should take.
The discussion on the operation of the cultivation system focused partly 
on its consequences for the welfare of the population. Early answers to this 
were unanimously favourable: the unfreedom in which the inhabitants had 
been accustomed to living from generation to generation remained in place 
for the time being, but was no great burden to them as they were simple 
people who were attached to custom. The colonial rulers, however, made 
every effort to improve their livelihoods and kept a watchful eye on the 
extortionate practices of the native chiefs. The simple and regular nature 
of coffee planting opened for the peasants the path to a less troublesome 
way of life. Anyone travelling through the Priangan could only conclude 
that the inhabitants were content with their lot. Of course, the peasants had 
to learn to work diligently, but they were treated with leniency and were 
paid accordingly. Land flight no longer occurred, a sign that the situation 
of the inhabitants of the region had substantially improved. In short, coffee 
cultivation had a benef icial impact and appeared to offer the prospects 
of f inal redemption from their state of servitude. A little over a decade 
later, however, Van Hoëvell, as the most vocal critic and a campaigner for 
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a change of regime, came to a completely different conclusion after his 
tour through the Sundanese highlands. Compared with the situation in 
the other residencies on Java, he had been struck by the deep misery and 
immense lethargy of the people in this region. This clergyman, who was 
later to lead the liberal faction in Dutch parliament, identif ied the Priangan 
system as the root cause of these problems, as it allowed the native chiefs 
to take advantage of their subordinates.
The opinions of successive Residents in the region varied widely. I restrict 
myself to those who held off ice later and who expressed their views on 
whether the Priangan system should be continued. Within the colonial 
apparatus, doubts about this undeniably increased over the course of time. 
After the involvement and leadership of the regents had been considered 
indispensable in getting the people to do what they were ordered to do 
for more than a century – to grow and supply increasing quantities of 
coffee – the balance of costs and benefits now seemed to have swung in 
the opposite direction. This reversal began to manifest itself from the end 
of the 1830s. There had certainly been critical voices before, but they had 
always been tempered by the counter-observation that the authority of 
the chiefs was necessary to overcome the aversion of the peasants to the 
claims on their labour. Symptomatic was the strongly critical tone of the 
memorandum drawn up by Inspector of Cultivation Ament reporting on 
his inspection of coffee production in the Priangan at the end of 1839. He 
observed that the gentry had taken control of most of the wet-rice land and 
forced their subordinates to tend to the f ields without remuneration. The 
peasants suffered even heavier burdens and, besides the forced cultivation 
of coffee, had to perform more public and private corvee services than their 
counterparts elsewhere on Java, while they received hardly a third of the 
amount paid to coffee planters in other residencies. J.F. Hora Siccama, who 
was Resident between 1839 and 1841, agreed with these conclusions and 
stated that the situation of the people of the Priangan was by no means as 
favourable as many claimed. He added that the influence of the chiefs must 
be great and the docility of the peasants unlimited for this system to survive, 
but no one could seriously deny that it was extremely unfair and repressive. 
His successor, Cleerens (1841-46), did not hesitate in rejecting this criticism 
out of hand. He denied that the people of the Priangan were in a pitiful 
state and advised against any reform of the existing system. P.J. Overhand, 
who came after him (1846-50), had been the Resident of Banyumas and 
had expected to f ind the inhabitants of his new jurisdiction in a state of 
greater need. He was relieved to discover that this was not the case and 
that the level of poverty was not so severe at all. He expressed his opinion 
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shortly and sharply: ‘The misery, in which the lower class of the people live, 
according to critics with no f irst-hand knowledge of the situation, does not 
exist’ (De Waal 1866: 369). Minister for the Colonies Pahud did not share this 
viewpoint. In a memorandum in early 1851, he noted that the widespread 
poverty and misery in which the people of the Priangan Regencies lived 
inevitably meant that the Dutch rulers could not make themselves popular 
in the region. At the end of the same year, Governor-General Rochussen 
explicitly contradicted him. On his resignation, Rochussen showed himself 
to be an outspoken supporter of the status quo. Van der Wijck, Resident from 
1855-58, also proved in his 1857 memorandum to be a fervent defender of 
the work regime that had existed in the Sundanese highlands for so many 
generations. He admitted that the peasants led a meagre existence, but 
refused to listen to tales of distress and improvidence. On the contrary, he 
concluded that, on the basis of his experience, the peasants on Java were 
nowhere as prosperous as in this region.
Supporters and opponents of a change of regime created the impression, 
however, that their contrasting standpoints were based on how they valued 
the income that the cultivation system generated for the treasury. In positive 
assessments of the system, colonial interests – in other words, those of the 
metropolis – took precedence, while its impact on the native population 
was and remained a subordinate question. This was also why the members 
of parliament in the Netherlands, having at length discussed the critical 
coffee report of 1868, concluded at the end of their deliberations that major 
changes were indeed required but revisions should not have a negative 
impact on the profit made from this cultivation. Abandoning the welcome 
flow money into the Dutch treasury – still estimated at around 50 million 
guilders annually – was considered too high a price to forfeit. Reforms were 
due, no doubt, but not in haste and no drastic ones, was the political message 
to the policy-makers (Goedhart 1948: 64-5). I leave my own judgment on 
the social impact of the Priangan system until the f inal chapter, which is 
both a review of the past and a preview of the consequences of the regime 
in the longer term for people’s welfare. In advance of this weighing up of 
the policy pursued in the Priangan lands, I would like to draw attention in 
this part of my argument to the differentiated impact of the colonial tribute 
over a period of around a century and a half. Examining the effect of forced 
coffee cultivation on the native population between 1720 and 1870 shows 
that its consequences varied for different classes within it. This was largely 
due to the unequal distribution of the burdens imposed on the people, and 
especially on taxing the labour power of peasant-producers. In accordance 
with traditional practice, the tribute was imposed on the propertied class, 
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the landowners who laid claim to the largest share of the means of existence. 
Because they had greater carrying capacity, it was reasonable to tax them 
more harshly than the class that possessed little or no agrarian property. 
In an attempt to increasingly raise the level of the tribute as a result of the 
growing demand for colonial goods on the world market, the VOC and later 
the government switched to a more widely distributed means of collecting 
it, which was intended to have a levelling effect. In practice, the system of 
coffee cultivation meant that the main landowners designated land-poor 
and landless households to do the work that had been imposed on everyone 
under the rules of public servitude. The social structure was already based 
on a division between lords and peasants; the colonial regime, with the 
tribute as its main component, simply reinforced these divisions and the 
complexity of the hierarchical order. One indication of this was that, in 
1860, of the 108,816 households that practised agriculture in the Sunda 
highlands, more than a third possessed no paddy f ields, a signif icantly 
higher percentage than elsewhere on Java (Enklaar 1871: 134). Another source 
set the landless class even higher, at more than half, pointing out that the 
area of land used to grow food was growing more slowly than the population 
(Aardrijkskundig en statistisch woordenboek van Nederlandsch Indië, 1869: 
832-3). The Priangan system had helped advance a process of proletarianiza-
tion in that small landowners in particular found themselves having to sell 
their sawahs and even having to give the buyer money to relieve themselves 
of the oppressive burden of labour (Scheltema 1927-28: 292). Abandoned 
paddy f ields were not rare and local chiefs would add them to the land 
they already had appropriated. The colonial sources devote little attention 
to how this agrarian underclass emerged in the Priangan Regencies. I will 
examine the social and economic polarization that developed over time 
more closely at the end of the following chapter. The small paddy growers 
of the Priangan had been turned into coffee coolies. Besides growing paddy 
and coffee there was hardly any other economic activity in the region. The 
report for 1846 noted the lack of regular market places and sheds to store 
goods in the residency. Warung stalls offered a variety of food and goods 
for daily consumption in the headquarters of each regency, but this was on 
a very small scale (Report on the Priangan Regencies 1848: 90).
Good governance
The cause of the crisis that developed in extracting the tribute was not 
primarily sought in the heavy burden under which the population laboured 
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or the meagre payment the planters earned for their work, but in the way 
coffee production was managed. Although it was now accepted that it had 
to be organized along different lines and that it was no longer possible to 
further postpone a modest increase in the price paid to the producers, 
what primarily emerged was the need for the colonial bureaucracy to come 
closer to the workfloor and become more directly involved in the manner of 
exploitation. This came down to eliminating the authority of the regional 
aristocracy, on which the Priangan system had been founded since the early 
eighteenth century. This modality had been chosen in the time of the VOC 
because of the lack of insight into and control over the structure of native 
society. The rationale was that the new rulers, operating in a landscape that 
was alien to them, had insuff icient reach to take charge of the collection 
of the tribute at the source. The forced cultivation and delivery of crops for 
export to the metropolis was allegedly the continuation of a pre-existing 
practice deriving from the servitude of the peasants to the landed gentry. 
This was a biased appraisal of their relationship devised to legitimize the 
claim on the labour power of the population. The lords of the Priangan 
acquired more power than they had ever had before and the peasants found 
themselves – as a result of the policy of sedentarization, territorialization 
and hierarchization – conf ined in a relationship of subordination that 
they had not experienced in the pre-colonial era. Deserting or looking for 
another lord who was less demanding, as frequently occurred in the past, 
was no longer an option. When the early-colonial state was set up in the 
f irst decades of the nineteenth century, the existing method of raising taxes 
in the Priangan Regencies was maintained. Elsewhere on Java, a different 
form of indirect governance was chosen, namely the desa system, which was 
also a colonial invention (Breman 1979 and 1980). In the Sunda highlands, 
the government remained at a distance from the workfloor of peasant 
production. The continued mediation of the regional gentry was required 
to ensure the servitude of the peasant settlers in growing and delivering 
larger quantities of coffee. This mode of production, now designated more 
correctly than previously as the Priangan system, combined high profits 
with low costs, as supervision and management were paid at the expense 
of the monetary reward received by the peasants. The principle of cheap 
governance on which colonial exploitation in the Sunda highlands had 
been based was abandoned in the f inal quarter of the nineteenth century 
when there was a growing awareness that the disadvantages of indirect rule 
were greater than their advantages. What had so long been an exception to 
the governance model introduced in the rest of Java earlier in the century 
now had to be adapted to it. In that sense the abolition of the Priangan 
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system accommodated the desire to streamline the colonial bureaucracy 
across the island.
Behind the expressions of praise, repeated ad nauseam, for the way 
in which the chiefs had contributed to the system of forced cultivation 
throughout the years, serious doubts had always been voiced about the 
genuine willingness of the regents and their subordinates to commit 
themselves to increasingly high targets. The assumption that the landed 
gentry managed to get the peasants to do more than a small number of 
colonial off icials would be able to achieve could no longer be taken for 
granted. Certainly, the idea that the peasants’ servitude towards the 
regents was the best way of overcoming their aversion to forced cultivation 
was still to be found in off icial memoranda, but the question was whether 
the native chiefs actually performed their tasks as surmised. The high 
command in the metropolis became increasingly doubtful about this 
as time passed. These sceptical voices culminated in the accusation of 
failing management, as the coffee report bluntly stated (Coffee Report 
1870-71: 2759) The criticism manifested a reversal of the previously so 
favourable opinion of the exceptional qualities of the generously rewarded 
taskmasters of the coffee production, who had successfully persuaded the 
people of the Priangan to abide by the rules of the cultivation system and 
made sure they continued to do so. That this was no longer the case was 
blamed on the chiefs and not on the peasants. Underlying the criticism 
was the suspicion that the lords did not possess the necessary entrepre-
neurial acumen to raise the tribute to the required level. This appraisal 
was based on the conviction that the regents’ feudal lifestyle did not equip 
them to act decisively and to show their subordinates the way forward 
to progress. Was the parasitical way of life of which the local chiefs were 
now accused not, however, the logical consequence of a policy initiated 
in the VOC era, to place the lords on a pedestal and force the population 
to remain subject to them, and to use this servitude as a lever to impose 
an excessive tribute?
In a retrospective review of his time in off ice, the architect of the cultiva-
tion system continued to adhere to his standpoint that eroding the position 
of the native chiefs would weaken colonial authority (Van den Bosch 1864: 
104). On the other hand, there was no lack of early supporters of the view that 
giving the native chiefs a privileged position would be counterproductive. 
Andries de Wilde already considered the regents superfluous in his time. 
He proposed shortly and sharply that these good-for-nothings should be 
relieved of their functions, allocated an annual allowance and allowed to 
keep only the paddy f ields that were their own personal property, while 
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their positions as coffee managers should be taken over by Dutch off icials 
(De Wilde 1830). The course adopted by Godert van der Capellen after the 
restoration of Dutch rule ran completely counter to this advice: permitting 
the native chiefs their dignity, showing them the respect that their elevated 
status required, but also restricting them to a role that permitted them no 
economic interest of their own. They must not show any entrepreneurial 
ambitions at all and were explicitly forbidden from any commercial activi-
ties, such as engaging in trade, transporting goods, or acting as business 
partners. Permitting them only a purely decorative signif icance, limiting 
them to displays of prestige so as to instil in their subordinates their duty 
of unswerving loyalty, did not however affect their position as managers 
of the coffee production. They were not permitted to engage in business 
activities at their own risk and expense, but as managers working for the 
government they had to meet high standards. The contradictory nature of 
these obligations was not a subject of discussion, but as the years passed 
the colonial rulers became increasingly irritated by the regents’ insistence 
on idle ostentation, their privilege to do nothing other than make a show of 
their prestige and status. This displeasure was expressed in the administra-
tive reorganization of the Priangan that now followed.
Van Rees, the special investigative commissioner entrusted with this 
delicate operation wrote in the letter accompanying his f inal report in 
1867 that the special rights claimed by the gentry in the Priangan were 
the f igment of colonial imagination and practice. The backward nature of 
native governance should be replaced by the modus operandi of the regular 
bureaucracy that had already been introduced in the rest of Java half a 
century earlier. The incentive for excluding the native aristocracy from the 
exercise of colonial power was partly the observed desire of the Sundanese 
chiefs for a life of pomp and circumstance as far removed as possible from 
the common people. The appearance of the regents in public, surrounded 
by their entourage of clients, had the air of a display of sacral authority 
that harked back to the behaviour of the princes in the pre-colonial era. It 
had all the ceremonial trappings of sovereign authority, with the priyayi 
surrounding the ruler according to rank. In this courtly atmosphere, a form 
of stylized behaviour developed, emphasized by the proximity of courtiers 
around the regent, that removed itself from the milieu of the common 
people, while serving as a model for them. Even the simplest of peasants 
carried themselves with a modesty and dignity that outsiders found strik-
ing. The ‘modern’ colonial observer took objection to the demonstrative 
display of native humility towards superiors, but was also aware that it 
helped maintain peace and order.
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The aristocracy, to which the peasantry naturally showed their f irst 
allegiance, could no longer do anything right in the eyes of their foreign 
rulers. The respect and courtesy to which the local chiefs were entitled, 
according to Van der Capellen, had made way for contempt and conde-
scension. Behind their facade of eminence, they were seen as displaying 
no outer, let alone inner, features of civilized behaviour, but only rank 
vulgarity, boastfulness and triviality. Van Hoëvell, who would make his 
name as a colonial critic, painted an extremely negative portrait of the 
regent of Cianjur whom he visited to pay his respects during his tour of Java 
in 1847. His host proved indeed to be a wealthy man. His palatial house was 
richly furnished in European style but ‘with little taste, with large mirrors, 
paintings and sofas’, which Van Hoëvell found ‘nothing special’. He also 
met the regent at a reception at the house of the Resident. The chief was 
accompanied by his wife, an entourage of courtiers and servants, and the 
traditional eight dancers. The liberal clergyman’s detailed description of 
what he witnessed was heavy with contempt (Van Hoëvell I, 1849: 23). The 
mixture of traditional and modern was typical not only of the regents but 
Kraton of the regent in Cianjur. His residence-cum-office was destroyed by an 
earthquake in 1879.
source: kitLv Collection
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applied just as much to the district chiefs, who imitated the European way 
of life, wearing Western clothes and furnishing their houses with mirrors, 
hanging clocks, billiard tables and silver cutlery. ‘You will miss nothing but 
the good taste’, one liberal noted sarcastically (Van Soest III, 1871: 180). Veth 
spoke with similar disdain of the regent of Bandung, who had surpassed 
his rival in Cianjur in wealth and appeared in front of European guests in 
‘garments glittering with diamonds’. At receptions, courtiers would crawl 
along behind their lord on their knees, as he strutted along with his stick, 
hat, cigar-holder and spittoon (Veth III, 1882: 253) ‘Too lazy even to carry 
his own sirih box’ was the comment of one European who witnessed this 
display, on whom the f inesses of court etiquette were clearly lost.38
38 This portrait would not be complete without drawing attention to the extent to which the 
privileged expatriate class had adopted local customs and styles. De Haan pointed out that ‘no 
self-respecting pure-blooded Dutch lady would be seen without a servant carrying her sirih box. 
In elite circles, the women had adopted the habit of chewing sirih and blackening their teeth. One 
Office of the Resident in Bandung. The seat of the Dutch colonial bureaucracy in 
the Priangan Regencies was initially in the Cianjur foothills but was relocated here 
in 1864. The building had, of course, to exceed the kraton of the regent of Bandung 
in magnitude and splendor (photo pre-1880).
source: kitLv Collection
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The district head of Banjaran surrounded by his retinue of servants and officials. 
[Banjaran lies to the south of Bandung, at the foot of the Malabar mountain.] A 
payung is held above the wedana’s head to demonstrate his authority (photo pre-
1880).
source: kitLv Collection
In the nineteenth century the Priangan regents assumed the airs of minor 
princes who had to show respect to no native sovereigns above them, renamed 
their humble dalem a ‘kraton’ and demanded that their clients pay court to 
them in the best traditions of the kingdom of Mataram. They showed their 
European masters that they had adapted to the demands of the modern world: 
they drank champagne, kept stables of racehorses, gave their sons an education 
and held official positions. Towards their own people, they tried to articulate 
their sacral-royal status. As in the Mataram period, or at least how it was por-
trayed, the hierarchical structure of native society in the nineteenth-century 
visitor came across a member of Batavian high society, the wife of a former Director-General, 
on the back porch in sarong and kabaai, her hair loose, on a mat on the ground, surrounded 
by slave girls doing some kind of work or another, while the lady of the house was cleaning 
vegetables; next to her ladyship was a large silver spittoon, into which she would, from time 
to time, spit long streaks of blood-red sirih juice’ (De Haan I, Personalia, 1910: 252, note 1). The 
sarcasm underlying this portrayal of the East Indies lifestyle of the elite in the mid-19th century 
must be understood in the light of the more bourgeois European lifestyle increasingly adopted 
by the subsequent generation of colonial off icials and their families.
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Priangan reflected on a smaller scale how the inferior chiefs paid homage 
to their overlords. It was a ceremonial ritual accompanied by great public 
displays of prestige and which appeared to have withstood the test of time. 
Hunting parties and tournaments showed how feudal the lifestyle of the na-
tive aristocracy had become while, in the eyes of the colonial officials, such 
behaviour simply proved how useless and superfluous the elite had become. 
The guests themselves paid for these lavish affairs, since they had to provide 
everything required free of charge. The regents assumed the right to lay claim 
to all the possessions of their subordinates. The moderation and kindness that 
early sources attributed to the lords in their treatment of the peasants was 
replaced in this revised colonial perspective by an emphasis on the regents 
as tyrants, exercising their power like veritable despots. The government had 
not succeeded on alleviating the misery of the people of the Priangan.
Private ownership unknown to the native, not even over his wife and 
children, if the will of his chiefs came into play. (Phitzinger Report 1863: 146)
From this perspective, the chiefs subjected the people to an advanced form of 
subordination that left the latter no space to build up a decent existence. This 
critique was accompanied by the suggestion that the poverty of the peasants, 
if it existed, was caused by the fact that all surplus generated by their labour 
was expropriated by their lords. In 1861, in the magazine he himself edited, 
Van Hoëvell addressed a comment to Multatuli, intended not only to place 
the author in the camp of those who criticized the cultivation system but also 
entreating him to show some understanding for colonial officials, who were 
genuinely concerned about the miserable lot of the Javanese peasants. It was 
not they who were the root of all evil, it was the native chiefs who behaved with 
impunity. The liberal leader reserved his wrath for the chiefs of Lebak and their 
counterparts in the Priangan and he expressed his deep regret that Multatuli 
did not wish to see the Dutch government as an ally in his crusade against 
them. The dissenting author, however, pronounced sentence by accusing 
the government and the chiefs of conspiring to prevent the Javanese people 
from improving their lives. By choosing to fight his battle on a broad front, he 
incurred the displeasure of both the liberals and the conservatives at home.
From protectors to exploiters
The colonial authorities now openly expressed their suspicions that the 
native chiefs were not only unsuited to take responsibility for collecting the 
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tribute, but also put their own interests ahead of those of the government. 
The cultivation and delivery of coffee, lucrative as it was for them, was not 
their only – or even their primary – source of income. According to calcula-
tions by Resident Overhand in 1849, the regents had earned twice as much in 
the previous year from their share of a tenth part of the paddy harvest than 
from coffee. Of the total of 50,318 guilders that the regent of Cianjur earned 
in 1848, according to this off icial report, his income from the sale of paddy 
amounted to 32,368 guilders, he earned 500 guilders from taxes on the 
slaughter and sale of cattle, a further 2,200 guilders from the tax on warungs, 
and lastly 15,250 guilders from the cultivation and delivery of coffee. His 
colleague in Bandung, who earned a total of 86,524 guilders, made twice 
as much from coffee: 30,000 guilders. But his share of the paddy was also 
worth much more, at 51,224 guilders. The compilers of the coffee report, in 
which this overview was included, warned that the regents themselves has 
presented the f igures, which did not include what the compilers referred 
to as ‘unknown legal and illegal benef its’. In other words, the declared 
account of the regents’ earnings was on the conservative side. The same 
applied to the statement of the average incomes of the regents between 
1862-64 submitted to Commissioner Van Rees by Resident Christiaan van 
der Moore in 1866-67: 299,498 guilders. The regent of Bandung accounted 
for about half of this, while those of Limbangan and Sukapura had to set-
tle for a meagre sum of a little more than 20,000 guilders. Besides these 
considerable differences between the chiefs, the strong fluctuations over 
time are also striking. These were mainly caused by good or bad coffee 
harvests and widely fluctuating revenues from paddy taxes. The only two 
constant factors were the great unpredictability in the pattern of incomes 
and expenditures of the regents and the colonial administration’s lack of 
insight into their magnitude and composition. The uneasy feeling that the 
f igures were arbitrary and concealed a hidden reality could no longer be 
avoided.
Van Rees confirmed this suspicion by determining that, of the total of 
168,521 households in the Priangan, no fewer than 20,030 were exempt from 
colonial servitude. That meant that nearly an eighth part of the population 
was at the disposal of the chiefs for their own convenience. This substantial 
segment probably included not only the rahayat, the class of peasant-
landowners that made up the entourage of the landed gentry, but also 
the panukang, who tended the chiefs’ f ields as dependent sharecroppers. 
According to colonial off icials, the servitude of the peasants towards their 
lords was driven by the latter’s love of ostentatious displays of prestige. 
The claims they made on the peasants’ labour power served no productive 
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purpose at all. Exempting households from growing coffee meant the 
available labour was being underutilized, and that the volume of tribute 
was suffering at the expense of the chiefs’ indolence. This interpretation, 
however, ignored the fact that the gentry persistently used this exempted 
category of peasants to cultivate land to grow paddy and thereby to increase 
their incomes. A government investigation into the land rights of the local 
population conducted in later years showed that sawahs were laid out by 
peasants providing corvee services in the regencies of Cianjur, Bandung and 
Sumedang until the second half of the nineteenth century (Eindresumé II, 
1880: 32-5). Cultivating land at the initiative of local lords was undoubtedly 
the main reason for the emergence of large-scale landownership which 
gave the Priangan highlands the character of an agricultural frontier in the 
early-colonial period. The concentration of cultivated land in the hands of 
the chiefs increased as they took possession of holdings abandoned after 
their owners had left or died. There were also cases of owners being forced 
to relinquish their agrarian property (De Haan I, 1910: 368). The heavy 
burden that landownership entailed also facilitated its transfer to members 
of the higher or lower landed gentry, as they were exempt from servitude 
(Eindresumé II, 1880: 52). This source, which presented the results of the 
government’s investigation of land tenure, confirmed that the landed gentry 
controlled a large share of the cultivated land, either through inheritance or 
in the form of f ields which went together with the off ice they held. The fact 
that the f ields were widely dispersed and were assigned to large number of 
sharecroppers concealed the extent of this large-scale landlordism. Because 
servitude was based on landownership and notables were exempt from this 
duty, the unequal distribution of ownership led in the long term to a critical 
shortage of compulsory labour.
While the government’s attention was focused on the main export crop, 
the chiefs made every effort to expand the land used to grow food and to 
acquire as much of it as possible for themselves. Land registered in the 
colonial administration as belonging to the chiefs by virtue of their position 
had often in reality been expropriated from its original peasant owners 
and their descendants. The coffee report made note of this trend towards 
dispossession and how it had led to the accumulation of agrarian resources 
in the hands of the rural elite. The refusal of the lords of Priangan to give 
priority to colonial interests – the cultivation and delivery of increasing 
volumes of coffee by their subordinates – and the fact that they put their 
own interests f irst led to their f inal exclusion from governance. The earlier 
courtesy towards local chiefs increasingly made way for a coolness border-
ing on hostility, expressed through a growing number of complaints about 
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their misdeeds. This achieved such proportions that orders were issued from 
higher up for greater moderation in reporting the chiefs’ misdemeanours 
(Van Deventer III, 1866: 323). The government took the opportunity offered 
by the regents’ abuse of their power to present itself as the true benefactor 
and protector of the people’s interests. They would do what the chiefs had 
failed to do: ensure that the burden of servitude was shared more justly and 
less unequally. In the contest between the government and the native chiefs 
over scarce labour, which had been going for a century and a half, the latter 
had stubbornly resisted the loss of their right to lay claim to the peasants’ 
labour power. This is demonstrated by the persistent complaints of f irst 
VOC agents and then colonial off icials about the insufficient distribution of 
obligations under the system of forced cultivation. That was the main reason 
for the abolition of the distinction between bumi and numpang towards the 
end of the eighteenth century and the replacement of the cacah formation 
by the somahan, the core household, as the basic unit for the tribute in 1839. 
The unequal distribution of the burden reflected the tradition of corvee 
services, where some classes of the population were heavily burdened while 
others were exempted and where available manpower was underutilized 
in general. The chiefs in the Priangan exempted many people from other 
obligations – including cultivation services – so that they could be used to 
advance the chiefs’ own interests and prestige. As late as 1869, the Colonial 
Report noted that the Resident of the Priangan Regencies personally and 
in clear terms had to urge regents and district and village chiefs to assure 
a more equal distribution of corvee services.
In administrative jargon, the chiefs’ manner of granting exemptions 
was designated as ‘arbitrary’. Concerns were sometimes driven by a desire 
for reform, but more often by irritation with the fact that these practices 
withdrew valuable labour power from the system of colonial exploitation. 
The motivation for wishing to distribute cultivation services more widely 
was to improve production; since the time of Daendels, the focus had not 
been on combating the ‘arbitrary’ exercise of power by the chiefs but on 
making the collection of the tribute more eff icient. ‘Extortion’ was another 
term that was popular in bureaucratic circles to describe a wide variety 
of counterproductive practices by native managers. It was undoubtedly a 
justif ied accusation with its roots in the fact that lower chiefs did not receive 
any form of regular reimbursement. They were in the service of regents or 
their off icials, but received meagre payment for their efforts, inadequate 
to fund their lives as minor gentry. They were entitled to a third share of 
the cuke, which was collected at the source. For their involvement in the 
cultivation and delivery of coffee they had to wait and see what remained 
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for them after the cultivation commission had been paid to the regent. 
This was often very little or nothing at all. They made up the def icit with 
what were known in the Company era as ‘hidden profits’. All actions that 
were inextricably and traditionally bound up with the native aristocracy 
were denounced as ‘arbitrary’ and ‘extortionate’. From this perspective, 
good governance was seen as the task, even the apostolic mission, that the 
modern colonial government was expected to pursue.
The whole society was autocratic, both in structure and attitude. Blind 
obedience and unconditional subordination to one’s superiors had, 
through centuries of custom, struck deep roots in the hearts of the people. 
No wonder that, with this unbridled power on the one hand and almost 
boundless submission on the other, the Javanese lordly regime was not a 
powerful and benevolent autocracy but an unprincipled, unpredictable 
and often intolerable tyranny. A completely different spirit inspires the 
Dutch government. Its aim is to further the welfare of both Mother Coun-
try and Colony by creating and maintaining law and order. (Nederburgh 
1877: 434)
The unpredictability, arbitrariness, abuse of power and other failings of 
which the native chiefs were accused must be understood in the light of 
the hierarchical structure of the colonized society. The way the regents 
exercised their authority was arbitrary by nature. They distributed favours 
and imposed obligations unequally, exempting some from servitude and 
demanding it from others, and withholding payments or meting out punish-
ment as they saw f it. Chiefs, no matter how insignif icant, were exempted 
from performing compulsory services for the government and when the 
substantial lower class of gentry were no longer able to claim this privilege, 
they were permitted to send others to perform their cultivation or corvee 
services in their place. The lack of precise instructions and rule to which 
subordinates could appeal was neither coincidental nor exceptional, but 
purposeful and systematic. The descendants of local chiefs told of punish-
ments meted out in the past for not following orders. One particularly 
brutal taskmaster was the son of the regent of Cianjur, who as kumetir was 
in charge of coffee cultivation in the early nineteenth century (Inlandsche 
verhalen 1863: 293) But it could be worse – the regents would not shy away 
from murder as a form of punishment. In these accounts, it was the higher 
and lower chiefs who incurred the wrath of their lords, but they would 
have been equally as cruel in their treatment of the peasants. Justifying 
such excessive behaviour as traditional ignores that fact that it was to a 
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large extent the product of early-colonial rule. The regents in the Priangan 
lands were elevated to the level of rulers, since giving them greater power 
than they had enjoyed before was seen as a perfect way of guaranteeing 
the collection of the tribute, in the form of the compulsory cultivation 
and delivery of coffee. The policy of sedentarization, territorialization and 
hierarchization had conf ined the peasant population in an authoritar-
ian regime and denied them any power to resist. In short, rather than 
perpetuating a pre-existing system of autocratic rulers versus submissive 
followers, the subordination of the peasants had been enforced with help 
from outside.
It is most certainly true that, according to the standards of the Dutch 
bureaucracy – or at least the modern-colonial interpretation of them – 
arbitrariness and extortion did occur. The question is, however, whether 
such practices were not also the result of insuff icient control over the chiefs 
by the regents, and of the peasants by the chiefs. The ‘gaps’ in the system of 
colonial rule also occurred in native management: it was unable to close 
all loopholes and lacked the bureaucratic expediency to respond promptly 
and effectively to problems as they arose. The confinement of the peasants 
in the Priangan system did not prevent them from resisting the heavy 
burden imposed especially on their labour power. They did not engage in 
open or violent action against their lords or the alien rulers, but adopted 
more subtle ways to resist, such as evading their duties, sabotage and other 
forms of disobedience, which eventually brought the coffee regime to a 
standstill. There was certainly a lack of administrative eff iciency and ef-
fectiveness in the Sundanese highlands. Making use of ‘traditional’ leaders 
and institutions to enforce the cultivation system did not lead to a system of 
perfect control but to one of compromise and striking the best possible deal. 
Coffee cultivation did not transform the landed gentry of the Priangan into 
a dynamic, let alone dynamizing, economic vanguard, but merely offered 
new, rich sources of income from which the majority of the peasants hardly 
benefited. To break through the stagnation that this brought about in the 
exploitation of the people and land of the Priangan, the colonial mission 
had to be reformulated. Governance at arm’s length had to be replaced 
by more direct and close-up intervention by European off icials, and the 
system of coffee cultivation had to be transformed into one that was also 
attractive to the producers.
The way in which this occurred will be considered, albeit summar-
ily, in the following chapter. Here, my further argument focuses on the 
administrative reforms that were introduced in the Priangan Regencies 
and their ideological underpinning. The high-ranking off icial entrusted 
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with the reorganization marked this change of course by establishing 
that the Priangan peasant was by no means insensitive to the privilege 
of being free ‘to do as he himself sees f it with his own will, his time, his 
labour, his family and his possessions’ (Van Rees 1867: 60). This viewpoint 
tied in closely with the thinking of a new generation of colonial policy-
makers who, like their predecessors, were imbued with their beholden duty 
to show the people the way to progress and prosperity. Without careful 
guidance, however, the peasants – once freed from the burdens imposed 
by their native lords – would not be able to take this path under their own 
steam (Nederburgh 1877: 436). This facade of well-intentioned guardian-
ship concealed scepticism and doubt on the part of the government. The 
long-pursued policy of indirect rule had failed to consistently increase 
the colonial surplus and improve the lot of the common people. Direct 
surveillance by colonial off icials close to the base of native economy and 
society was considered necessary to achieve these noble objectives. It was 
considered obvious that exchanging the authority of the regents for that 
of colonial off icials would be an improvement. But was this assumption 
necessarily true? In 1865, shortly before Van Rees embarked on his mission, 
the Assistant Resident for Cianjur was dishonourably discharged for cruelty 
to prisoners and improper treatment of native chiefs (Fasseur 1995: 271). It 
is signif icant that the good governance operation was conducted without 
Van Rees saying a single word about this unusual incident. Of course, 
the offence was discovered and the perpetrator punished. However, this 
well-intentioned explanation – offered by Fasseur – did not change the 
fact that the rotten apple had been removed without the whole basket 
being inspected more closely. Where the defects of the regents’ author-
ity were now scrutinized in great detail, white off icials had to commit 
serious violations before they were called to order. I noted earlier how, as 
Assistant Resident in Sumedang, Kinder de Camarecq had solved a case 
of cattle theft by giving the ‘offender’ a public f logging. Despite the fact 
that his handling of the case was based on intimidation rather than factual 
evidence and that the victim barely survived his repeated beatings, this 
deed assured him the reputation among his peers, also retrospectively, 
of being a bold and resolute off icial of the old school (Gonggrijp 1919). 
Besides such wrongdoings and abuses of power, did the colonial apparatus 
not also contain other elements that were little different from what, ac-
cording to the norms of modern bureaucratic governance, was considered 
so pernicious in the rule of the regents? Van Hoëvell himself referred to 
the bragging and f lattery that was considered desirable behaviour in the 
entourage of the Governor-General.
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... he is the sun, on which all eyes are focused; if he laughs, then everyone 
laughs, if he looks serious, the whole company looks serious, and if he is 
sad, then all those who approach him weep with him. (I, 1849: 9)
Douwes Dekker (Multatuli) and Vitalis were particularly vocal but also 
quite exceptional in bemoaning the lack of space for critical voices within 
the colonial apparatus.
The reform operation
The longer-standing intention to restructure regional governance started 
to take shape after the middle of the nineteenth century, on the basis of 
recommendations made by various past Residents. Their aim was to bring 
the administrative machinery of the Priangan Regencies more in line with 
the colonial bureaucracy introduced half a century earlier elsewhere on 
Java. What they disagreed on was the urgency of a far-reaching reorganiza-
tion. After his appointment as a member of the Council of the Indies in 
1864, Van der Wijck, Resident from 1855 to 1858, issued a report in which he 
stated in no uncertain terms that he considered the imminent reform of the 
administration and taxation system in the Priangan Regencies a highly risky 
undertaking. Current Resident Van der Moore was, however, a f irm advocate 
of the need to change the regime by depriving the region’s aristocracy of 
their far-reaching rights to self-governance. He felt strongly that the time 
had come to make a decisive change. Minister for the Colonies Fransen 
van der Putte sent a confidential letter to Governor-General Baron Sloet 
van de Beele on 25 April 1864 requesting him to ‘urgently make a change 
in the Priangan system a matter of investigation’. On 16 June 1866 it was 
decided to entrust this important assignment to Otto van Rees who, after 
a successful career as a civil servant, had been appointed to the Council of 
the Indies. He was issued with the following instruction:
to organize a mission to the Priangan Regencies, with the objective, after 
consulting the head of the regional administration and the Regents, of 
submitting def initive proposals regarding the question of changing the 
so-called Priangan system, on the same basis as that on which the other 
regions on Java are structured.39
39 NA, Ministry for the Colonies, Vb. 29 June 1870 A22/184e.
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In 1866-67, Van Rees spent six months in the Priangan to acquaint himself 
with the way coffee cultivation was organized, how labour was mobilized 
and how the higher and lower gentry were involved. The investigation he 
initiated was limited to gathering the information he needed to support his 
recommendations. The decision to introduce radical reforms became the 
starting point rather than the conclusion of his mission. His resolute ap-
proach was illustrated by a meeting on 31 July 1866 in the residency capital, 
Bandung, to inform the heads of the five regencies of the proposed measures. 
Van Rees explained to them in plain language what they could expect to 
happen. The regents were not asked to sign the minutes of the meeting, to 
make sure they understood that their responses would be listened to but not 
taken into account. The message that Van Rees presented in his introduction 
to the meeting was that his respected audience did not have their forefathers 
to thank for their noble standing but the colonial authorities.
Van Rees submitted his report at the end of October 1867. The speed 
with which the architect of the reforms fulf illed his mission certainly had 
no effect on the thoroughness of his report. The depth of his argument 
is demonstrated by the fact that the f irst part of the report, which gave a 
detailed description of the history of the Priangan Regencies, was published 
separately shortly afterwards, with the permission of the government (Van 
Rees 1880). The second part, which contained four chapters (written by hand 
and covering pages 320-665), was considered too politically sensitive for 
general publication and disappeared into the archives. This part examined 
the working and impact of the Priangan system and discussed the proposed 
reforms, summarizing them per article. The fact that his f indings, analysis 
and recommendations were kept secret made the public and political debate 
following the reform operation more diff icult. The Dutch parliament was 
not permitted to see the report and the colonial policy-makers in The Hague 
produced an ‘excerpt’ which severely curtailed and toned down Van Rees’ 
original document. Van Rees extensively discussed the development of the 
regime of forced cultivation in the eighteenth century as a consequence of 
the assumption that the peasants would refuse to grow trade crops of their 
own free will. In his opinion, the VOC tradition had remained practically 
intact in this part of Java. Recognizing that the cultivation and delivery of 
coffee was based on unfree labour and that the coffee planters sometimes 
had to be driven by force to the gardens, Van den Bosch had nevertheless 
suggested in 1834 that nowhere else in Java the people were as satisf ied with 
their lot. After all, the government had never seen a single trace of unrest 
in the region. In Van Rees’ opinion, this portrayal of the state of affairs was 
not reflected in reality. Pressure to increase coffee production had resulted 
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in a stock of 70 million fruit-bearing trees in 1856, the highest total ever 
achieved. The stock of trees had decreased again after this but, in 1866, 
1,232 of the 1,432 desas that supplied labour for the coffee gardens lay at a 
distance of more than six poles from the plantations, so that the labourers 
had no other choice than to stay in the gardens during the f ive-month 
harvest period, living in demoralizing accommodation. Using language 
reminiscent of reports from a century earlier, Van Rees described how the 
people of the Priangan had been systematically exploited and oppressed. 
The fact that working in the coffee gardens did not entitle them to exemp-
tion from other forms of taxation only added to the injustices imposed on 
successive generations of Priangan peasants. Besides the share of the paddy 
harvest that had to be surrendered to the local chiefs and the clergy, there 
was a range of other services and taxes that the peasants had to provide as 
a consequence of their state of servitude. Nevertheless, the underpayment 
for the work they performed growing coffee over the years remained the 
greatest injustice. A typical feature of the Priangan system was the sealing 
off of the region to the outside world, to prevent both the ‘illegal’ export 
of coffee and the intrusion of Chinese tradesmen. The simple way of life 
of the mountain people had to be protected. Their labour power had to be 
reserved for growing coffee and they had to be prevented from using it for 
other purposes, apart from producing the food they needed for themselves. 
Cordoning off the region had caused a rise in the prices of basic necessities 
and, together with the heavy burden of labour – the market price of coffee 
was 40 guilders per pikul, of which the growers received only 6.5 guilders, 
the equivalent of a tax of 33.5 guilders per pikul – this sum exposed the 
inability of a large part of the population to meet their basic needs. Van Rees 
concluded that the price paid to the coffee planters should immediately be 
increased to the same level as that paid in other residencies.
The commissioner’s report continued with a detailed summary of the 
tribute that the inhabitants of the Priangan had to supply to the colonial 
government and the local lords in money, in kind and in labour services. The 
main obligations imposed by the government were the work in the coffee 
gardens and the additional mobilization of unpaid labour for public works 
(or what passed for it), while the peasants also had to surrender a f ifth share 
of their paddy harvest to provide the primary source of income for the local 
chiefs and the clergy. Van Rees did not fail to point out that, until the start 
of the nineteenth century, the share of the paddy that had to be surrendered 
was f ixed at a much lower level – in the Priangan lands that came under 
Cirebon, it was no more than a twentieth part of the harvest – and had 
been raised by Daendels to a tenth part for the regents and a tenth part for 
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the clergy. The Governor-General had undoubtedly taken this decision on 
the assumption that this generous gesture would assure the loyalty of the 
secular and clerical elite, but it was hugely detrimental to the peasants 
and at no cost at all to the government. The legal basis of surrendering 
the compulsory share of the harvest to the local chiefs lay in the system of 
servitude that had remained intact in the Priangan Regencies. The ‘inborn 
subservience’ referred to in colonial sources took on extra signif icance in 
the case of households that belonged as clients (rahayat) to the entourage 
of an influential lord ( juragan) or master (dunugan). Engagement in such 
a relationship of patronage meant that servitude to the lord – in the form 
of tending to his f ields in exchange for a share in the harvest, as well as 
performing services in the house and the stables – exempted his clients 
from providing services to anyone other than the lord. The regents and 
local chiefs used this ngawula relationship to exempt their subjects as far 
as possible from the cultivation and corvee services imposed by the colonial 
government. The more signif icant this external burden became and the 
more the foreign rulers understood the workings of the peasant economy, 
the less the landed gentry were able to protect their clients against the claim 
on their labour by the government and especially their obligations to grow 
coffee. Despite this, however, Van Rees calculated that, in 1886 an eighth 
part of the total number of households – i.e. 20,030 – worked exclusively at 
the behest of the local chiefs. He himself considered this estimate a little 
on the low side. The f ive regents together had 3,788 households at their 
disposal, which were responsible for tending to the regents’ extensive f ields. 
The majority of the rahayat were therefore clients of the lower chiefs. To his 
observation that the relationship of patronage still existed, Van Rees added 
that there were degrees of servitude. Sometimes the entire population was 
obliged to provide unpaid services, while there was also a category (tugur) 
to whose labour the lords could only partially lay claim and who had to 
perform services by rotation. As far as the clergy was concerned, nowhere 
on Java were they as richly endowed with earthly goods and enjoyed such 
a high standing as in the Priangan. The members of the clergy did not form 
a separate class but were closely related to the local chiefs at the different 
social levels. They collected the shares of the harvest for them, made sure 
they were distributed to those entitled to them, supervised the irrigation 
works and were responsible for the agrarian calendar. The institution of 
servitude extended to the highest level of clergy. In 1864, head and district 
panghulu, mostly members of regent families, were together serviced by 
3,561 subservient households, which were exempt from government services 
for this reason. Assured of high incomes and aff iliated to the local chiefs, 
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the priest class enjoyed greater prosperity, influence and prestige than the 
mosque attendants in other residencies.
Release from servitude
How did Van Rees assess the impact of the Priangan system? He had nothing 
but praise for the excellent state of the roads and the ordered, well-organized 
main settlements (negorijen). However, he continued, the passing traveller 
did not see the less positive aspects of the system, which he attributed to the 
state of unfreedom in which the people had been forced to live for so long. 
Referring to early sources, he described the system’s shortcomings. Progress 
had been held back by the chiefs expropriating all surplus and it was, in 
Van Rees’ opinion, only the limitless submissiveness of the peasants that 
had sustained such a repressive system for so long. The root of the problem 
lay in the subordination of the peasants to allow coffee to be delivered 
to the government at the lowest price and the native aristocracy to live 
a life of luxury. The reform urgently required was to release the people 
of the Priangan from their subjugation and give them the opportunity to 
live their lives as they wished. Using data left behind by his predecessor 
Steinmetz – who had initially been entrusted with the reform mission but 
fell ill and died – he calculated how little the peasants received for their 
forced labour. One indication of the lack of progress was the modest increase 
in the population from 707,890 in 1837 to 882,354 in 1865, a rise of 24% in a 
period of 28 years. Moreover, Van Rees was inclined to attribute this higher 
number more to improvements in the greater precision of headcounts than 
to any real demographic growth.
A source of concern was that, in recent years, paddy production had 
not grown in proportion with the expansion of the area of cultivated land 
and the number of agrarian households. Van Rees noted that there was 
undeniably a link between the heavy burden of almost or completely unpaid 
services that the peasants had to provide and the falling productivity of 
land used to grow paddy. If the individual right to own land had not been 
retained in the Priangan, he believed that the peasants would have been in 
an even more miserable position. Van Rees then addressed the impact of the 
abolition of the cacah system in 1839. The decision had been taken by the 
Resident, without permission from higher up, with the intention of allowing 
more labour to be requisitioned to grow coffee. The social consequences of 
the decision were, however, not considered. It was concluded later that it 
had not led to redistribution of landownership; land remained concentrated 
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largely in the hands of higher and lower chiefs, the clergy, hajis and well-off 
landowners who were most likely the descendants of former cacah heads. 
Van Rees called into question whether the cacah configuration had indeed 
disappeared. It remained clearly visible in the spatial organization of widely 
dispersed settlements: kampungs comprising several hamlets, each housing 
a number of households, but lacking the compact enclosure and village 
governance structure found in desas elsewhere on Java.
The regents were accustomed to living like royalty. Van Rees correctly 
countered their objections to the proposed changes to the regime by point-
ing out that what they considered their rights had been invented by their 
colonial masters and that the privileges of their limited self-governance 
were now to be revoked. With this counterargument he was in essence 
denying that the power of the regents lay in adherence to tradition. On 
the contrary, both during the time of the VOC and later, granting a limited 
degree of self-governance to the native aristocracy in the highlands of West 
Java had been a political decision erroneously presented as a continuation 
of pre-colonial practice. In his report, Van Rees calculated what the chiefs 
had earned from their cooperation throughout the years. Certainly, their 
lifestyles were so expensive that they were deeply in debt. These debts 
contributed to their high prestige, but also made them vulnerable to decep-
tion, fraud, blackmail, corruption and other dubious practices. The f igures 
Van Rees included in his report show that the chiefs’ incomes fluctuated 
widely from year to year, that it was almost impossible to estimate the labour 
performed for them free of charge, and that the value of the coffee commis-
sion they received was often lower than that of the paddy they requisitioned 
and sold. In the report, Van Rees urged that the incomes and legal status of 
lower chiefs be improved. The practically unbridled power granted to the 
regents and their entourage denied subordinate chiefs at district and lower 
level all authority and capacity for resilience. In anticipation of the arbitrary 
nature of the orders they received from their superiors, lower local chiefs 
hastened to appropriate paddy f ields, cattle and other assets and were then 
happy to be dismissed from service.
The large majority of the chiefs and their off icials – 7,998 of a total of 
9,114 – belonged to the lower ranks. Of the 1,116 supra-local chiefs, almost 
half (542) were higher-ranking off icials – patih, (head) supervisors of coffee 
cultivation, head mantri, kliwon, wedana, camat, petingi – while the other 
half worked at the base of the native administration as scribes, gang bosses, 
market masters, guards, messengers, water supply supervisors, etc. The 
village administrations included 1,763 lurah, 2,876 kobaijan, panglaku and 
tua tua, as well as 1,078 constables (pancalang), a total of 5,715 off icials. 
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A further 2,283 worked for the colonial administration as lower-ranking 
staff at government off ices, warehouse employees, prison guards, postmen, 
clerks, native public prosecutors, dokter jawa, vaccinators, prajurit and 
their staff, foresters, midwives, mandur, postillions, teachers, etc. Some 
of these low-ranking off icials, who were exempt from compulsory labour, 
received a meagre wage and they all lived more or less at the expense of 
the community, whose members performed household services for them 
and tended their paddy f ields. Because they were paid so badly, these 
off icials made up for what they did not receive from the regents and the 
government by taking what they could from the peasants. The same applied 
to the various ranks of clergy, who totalled 2,679. At the top of the religious 
hierarchy were f ive head panghulu, located in the regency headquarters, 
six head kalipah who acted as their deputies, 72 district panghulu and 99 
district kalipah. This upper layer supervised 1,692 village priests (amil or 
lebeh), 169 precentors (ketib or imam) in the local house of prayer, 465 mudin 
who assisted at weddings, 96 merbot and bilal who beat the drums to call 
the faithful to prayer and 45 jakat scribes who wrote down compulsory 
contributions and voluntary gifts. Van Rees attempted to record the pay-
ments to the higher and lower priests but had to acknowledge that his f inal 
estimate was both very approximate and minimal. His detailed calculations 
were intended to show the total budget required to pay for the system of 
self-governance.
In the f inal chapter of his report, Van Rees left no room for misunder-
standing about the urgent need for reform: freeing the population from the 
yoke of servitude that prevented the colonial government from fulf illing 
its civilizing mission and effectively addressing the development of the 
country and its people. The change of regime had to make the lower native 
chiefs pillars of public authority rather than slavish servants concerned only 
with enriching themselves at the expense of the common man. In the early 
nineteenth century, colonial policy-makers had already tried to curb the 
arbitrary power of the regents and restrict their abuse of their far-reaching 
powers. The British rulers focused on decreasing the distance between the 
European administration and the local people but, after Dutch rule was 
restored, the policy-makers had failed to bring the Priangan regents into 
the confines of good governance. They had no reason to do so, as the people 
were docile and produced increasing quantities of coffee for practically 
nothing. But behind the facade of self-government, the regents continued to 
strengthen their own influence and pursue their own interests. The idea of 
reorganizing the administration so as to curtail the abuses of their power by 
the landed gentry undoubtedly came up repeatedly. In a secret letter written 
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in 1840, Resident Hora Siccama had suggested cutting back the number of 
native chiefs considerably, to gradually introduce the land rent system in 
the region and to increase the price of coffee to the same level as in the rest 
of Java. His successor Cleerens denied, however, that the population was 
engulfed in poverty and resisted the abolition of the Priangan system. The 
colonial leadership’s already minimal confidence in Cleerens dissipated 
entirely when his Assistant Resident Nagel was murdered in Bandung at the 
end of 1845. Cleerens was forced to step down and the regent of Bandung 
was removed from his post. It was a clear indication of the displeasure of 
the colonial government that, rather than appointing the regent’s legitimate 
heir as his successor, they replaced him with an illegitimate son mothered by 
a concubine. It later emerged that the dismissed regent had been innocent 
of complicity and was entitled to be reinstated, or at least to have his name 
cleared. Behind the scenes, the discussion on a radical reorganization of the 
administration continued, fuelled by a memorandum written by Resident 
Overhand in 1849. With barely concealed sarcasm, Van Rees observed that 
the government could not in any case be accused of being overly hasty: ‘If, 
after so many have acknowledged the need for improvement, it has not been 
put into effect after more half a century, there is certainly no question of 
undue haste’ (1867: 577-8).
During his tours of the region, the government commissioner concluded 
that the proposed intervention would come as no surprise. News of the 
imminent changing of the guard had not been kept secret, right down to the 
peasantry, and Van Rees pointed out that it would be inadvisable to allow 
the state of uncertainty to go on for too long. The question was whether the 
proposed reform would have undesirable social effects. Former Resident 
Van der Wijck predicted growing unrest, but Van Rees did not share these 
fears. There would certainly be no resistance from the lower chiefs or the 
regents. The latter, placated with the promise of a f ixed annual allowance, 
seemed – with the exception of the regent of Bandung – to have accepted 
in advance that they were to be relieved of their powers. The administrative 
reorganization, they had been assured, was intended to genuinely serve the 
interests of the native population. And how would the Mohammedan clergy 
respond? They would no longer be permitted to play a role in cultivating 
paddy or collecting taxes, or lay claim to worldly authority in any form, but, 
in turn, the government had promised not to interfere in religious matters. 
To compensate for their loss of income and influence, higher-ranking priests 
(head panghulu and panghulu) were also assured of an annual allowance 
for the rest of their lives. This material pledge proved suff icient to avert 
resistance from these quarters (Van Meerten 1887: 36).
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Afraid to lose their power and certain that they would lose a large part of 
their informal income, the regents did make a last ditch effort to sabotage 
the reforms. Their henchmen started rumours to make the people afraid of 
the coming changes. The new land rent, to be paid in cash, would be higher 
than the value of the share of the paddy that the peasants had to surrender 
to local chiefs and the clergy. Furthermore, the system of private landowner-
ship that had always existed in the region would allegedly be replaced by a 
system of communal land tenure. Accompanied by Resident Van der Moore, 
Van Rees paid visits to the main negorijen and called together the village 
heads, local chiefs and their entourages to refute these malicious reports 
and to inform them of what was really going to happen: the peasants would 
be subject to the land rent regime, as was the case in the rest of Java. The 
reform, he explained, had no other ambition than to promote the welfare 
of the inhabitants of the Priangan lands by freeing them from the restric-
tive ties that prevented them from escaping poverty. In general terms, the 
reorganization would entail the following package of concrete measures:
– Setting the coffee price at the same level as elsewhere on Java. According 
to Van Rees, the government had a moral duty to take this step, which 
would mean that the Priangan planters would be paid twice what they 
now received.
– Abolition of the ngawula system, under which the peasants had to 
provide services to all those who were elevated above the common man 
by virtue of their off ice, birth or wealth. Recognizing this principle of 
subordination was incompatible with the civilizing mission that the 
metropolis in Europe had set itself regarding the East Indies. No one 
would be permitted, with the exception of the state – to lay claim to 
the labour power of another. This measure would be accompanied by 
a radical reform of the native administration, in favour of the minor 
chiefs.
– Abolition of the apanage or off icial ownership of land by chiefs, with 
the exception of village-level off icials. Private landownership, which 
had always remained intact in the Priangan, was probably the reason 
why the gentry possessed so much land. A large part of that consisted 
of uncultivated lands used for hunting, but it also included the sawah 
carik or kaprabon, farmland that the local chiefs allocated to their 
clients for cultivation.
Dividing up the region, which covered an area two-thirds the size of 
the metropolis, would make it easier to govern. The plan devised by Van 
Rees included the formation of three residencies, sub-divided into twelve 
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sub-residencies and 63 districts, with a considerably higher number of 
European civil servants than had hitherto been the case. The compensation 
paid to the regents meant that they would not actually have much less than 
their average income over the past three years. This implied that the regent 
of Bandung would earn more than the Governor-General. Part of that was 
a f ixed annual emolument of 20,000 guilders plus a personal allowance, 
while the largest part was a percentage commission on the coffee produced 
in their jurisdiction. Van Rees also drastically slashed what he called the 
exaggerated number of native chiefs and off icials. Many were not eligible 
to be incorporated into the lower ranks of the colonial administration. The 
reductions largely affected the intermediate chiefs, patingi, kliwon, umbul 
and priyayi, who had no clearly def ined tasks. They were appointed for 
political reasons and made up part of the network through which higher 
and lower chiefs exercised their authority – they would pass on the orders 
of their lords and report back on whether and to what extent they had been 
obeyed – but were not part of a well-def ined line of command. Van Rees 
made a considerable effort to calculate exactly what the reforms would cost. 
It was clear that the budget for the administrative reorganization would 
have to be modest while, of course, he was notif ied that it should lead to 
higher revenues for the government, not lower.

VIII Eclipse of the coffee regime from the 
Sunda highlands
The dilemmas of political expediency
Initially the reforms proposed by government commissioner Otto van Rees 
were resolutely stonewalled at the highest colonial level. The Governor-
General did not conf irm receipt of the report and thank him for the 
dedication with which he had fulf illed his assignment until the end of 
August 1869, two years after Van Rees had submitted it. Why did it take 
so long? The pressure was off because, during the debate in parliament on 
the budget for the East Indies for 1868, the Minister for the Colonies had 
made it clear that he was not convinced of the necessity or urgency of the 
recommendations. He explained his hesitation by arguing that a system so 
steeped in tradition should not be abolished so lightly. His reticence was 
clearly fed by the difference in opinion among the managers of the colonial 
machinery about changing the regime. Governor-General Pieter Mijer used 
this pause in the proceedings to express his reservations about Van Rees’ 
viewpoint and proposals in a memorandum to the Minister. A copy was also 
sent to Christiaan van der Moore, who was still Resident of the Priangan 
Regencies and a warm advocate of Van Rees’ opinions, and to the Director 
of the colonial Civil Service. The discussion that arose in a small circle had 
to remain behind closed doors and when the documents were sent to the 
two senior off icials, they were instructed not to make them public.
Governor-General Mijer rejected Van Rees’ explicit conclusion that the 
poverty of the people in the highlands was due to the forced cultivation of 
coffee. In his letter to the Minister, the Governor-General held forth on the 
continuing and improving state of welfare in the Priangan as exemplif ied 
by increasing population and cattle stocks, a rapid rate of land reclama-
tion, generally rising food production, and increasing sales of salt. In his 
categorical denial that the regime of unfree labour had resulted in the 
impoverishment of major segments of the population, the land-poor and 
landless classes in particular, Elson quoted from this letter of Governor-
General Mijer as persuasive proof of the benign impact the system of forced 
coffee cultivation and delivery had made on the peasantry (Elson 1990: 
34). This claim was, of course, diametrically opposed to what Van Rees 
had verif ied in the course of his investigations and those inimical f indings 
were substantiated in rich detail in his report. With total disregard for the 
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uncomfortable evidence that Van Rees had brought back from his mission, 
the Governor-General accused the commissioner of having exceeded his 
mandate. He had been requested only to submit proposals for an adminis-
trative reorganization, a limited assignment that gave him no authority to 
make more far-reaching statements. According to the Governor-General, 
the main aim of the mission entrusted to Van Rees was to abrogate the 
authority of the local chiefs to participate in government and their col-
laboration in the collection of taxes. The abolition of the Priangan system 
was therefore intended not to release the people from their alleged poverty, 
but to introduce a system of governance that was already in place elsewhere 
on Java. Yet Mijer was unable to completely refute the critical report that 
Van Rees had presented to him. He had to acknowledge that the burden 
of taxation and corvee services was distributed extremely unequally and 
weighed heavily on the landless population (Memorandum from Mijer 1869: 
17). While taking note of this appraisal, it is important not to forget that the 
unequal distribution of the tribute had been a condition for the Priangan 
system functioning so well throughout the years. Without exempting the 
landowners as much as possible and the higher and lower chiefs – together 
with the substantial entourages with which they surrounded themselves – 
completely, the system of forced coffee cultivation would have foundered 
much earlier in the face of mass resistance. It had always been largely the 
land-poor and landless peasants whose labour power was requisitioned.
The question that concerned the Governor-General was how the peas-
antry would respond to the abolition of servitude. For him, cutting the ties 
of their subordination to the native chiefs was much more of a political 
than a legal problem. He considered the possibility that the regents might 
appeal against this decision less important than whether those who had 
to pay the tribute would submit to the will of the government. How great 
was the risk that they would fail to comply with the changing system of 
taxation? The ‘good faith’, ‘patience’ and ‘docility’ of the common people 
had been referred to ad inf initum. Would they transfer their obedience 
towards their own lords to the colonial bureaucracy without complaint? 
It was not fear of resistance from above, from the regents, that caused the 
reform operation to take so long, but the danger that those at the base of 
the economy might evade their duties, that they would try to escape the 
burden imposed on them. Throughout this entire process, it was striking 
that European off icialdom in the colony, and its impact on native society 
in the Priangan lands, had never been the subject of investigation. Van Rees 
gave it hardly any attention, while higher-ranking government off icials 
displayed no desire at all to scrutinize their own role in the present or the 
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past. The Dutch parliament felt that it had been bypassed in the delibera-
tions, which had taken place in closed circles. This mistrust was reflected in 
pointed questions to the Minister for the Colonies. Had the regents agreed 
to the proposed changes and how genuine was their consent? How had the 
clergy responded to the loss of their worldly power? Resistance from these 
quarters to the social revolution unleashed by Van Rees could undermine 
law and order in a region where the clergy as a class enjoyed greater prestige, 
power and wealth than elsewhere on Java (Van Herwerden 1871).
The task now facing the Minister for the Colonies was whether and how 
to continue with the reform operation. The silence that followed the comple-
tion of the government commissioner’s mission had not gone unnoticed in 
the Sunda highlands. Van Rees himself was of the opinion that the people 
of the Priangan were impatient for the reorganization to start. This belief 
was strengthened by what his main informant Karel Frederik Holle told 
him. Holle, owner of a tea plantation, had befriended the head panghulu 
Haji Muhamad Musa from Garut and married or cohabited with his sister. 
He was the source of a series of reports stemming from native spokesmen 
to the effect that the lower chiefs and the mass of peasants interpreted the 
cutting of ties with the high-ranking aristocracy as a sign that better times 
were coming. The people were looking forward to the advent of the aturan 
baru, the new regulation. This welcome news, which was of course also 
passed on to the Governor-General, helped to break through the impasse. 
The Colonial Report for 1869 reported that both chiefs and subjects were 
well disposed towards the government and also praised the priests for their 
show of goodwill. Van Rees had gone to the Netherlands on leave in 1868 
and was a member of parliament for a short time, but returned to Batavia in 
1870 as president of the Council of the Indies. This honourable promotion, 
an upward step towards his later appointment as Governor-General, made 
clear that the lobby in his favour had come off best. The Minister for the 
Colonies mandated Governor-General Mijer to take the decisions required 
to put the proposals into practice. Decrees were published announcing 
the abolition of the Priangan system as of 1 January 1871. In protest against 
being by-passed and indignant about the sudden haste, parliament rejected 
the budget for the Indies. Minister De Waal resigned, on the pretext of bad 
health. Under his successor Pieter Philip van Bosse, the budget was approved 
a short time later and the Governor-General was given permission to start 
introducing the reforms as of 1 June 1871. And so the reform became a reality.
The right to collect taxes, in cash, products and labour, until now left to the 
regents, as well as the general state of servitude of the native population 
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to the chiefs and others of high rank or other persons (ngawula), are 
now abolished. (Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees for the Dutch East 
Indies 1870: 122, art. 1)
The reorganization of the colonial administration now set in motion may 
have entailed an increase in European staff at public off ices in the district 
towns, but they certainly no more than doubled in number. The new civil 
service apparatus in the Regencies comprised a total of 38 Europeans. As 
before, the lower ranks were reserved for native off icials, who may have 
had little training and education but who also had to be content with a 
low wage. The government kept a detailed record of how much money the 
reorganization cost and how much it generated.
In a f inal report on his assignment submitted to the Governor-General in 
August 1871, Van Rees did not fail to praise the man who had been his most 
important adviser and source of information, Karel Holle. Impressed by 
Holle’s intimate familiarity with the Priangan and its people, the Governor-
General even wanted to appoint him as Resident (Janssen 1888: 25). This 
was no small honour for the now independent tea planter who had started 
his career in 1846 as a young clerk at the residency off ice when it was still 
located in Cianjur. However, Holle rejected the offer, but did allow Mijer to 
appoint him as honorary adviser for native affairs. As we shall see Holle, 
proclaimed ‘friend and benefactor of the Sundanese people’, played an 
important role in helping to bring about radical social changes from the hill 
estate he ran near Garut. Before examining this in greater detail, I shall f irst 
deal with the measures taken in parallel with the abolition of the Priangan 
system to alleviate the burden imposed by the forced cultivation of coffee.
A turn for the better?
The real crisis, as I argued in the previous chapter, was not caused f irst 
and foremost by the modality of governance that had been practised for 
so long. The system of forced cultivation ultimately foundered not because 
the regents were given responsibility for collecting the tribute, but because 
of the perpetual drive to increase the volume of coffee and the abysmally 
low payment received by those who produced it. Despite this draconic 
policy around the middle of the nineteenth century the government was 
unable to maintain the high level of coffee production in the Priangan, let 
alone push it up any further. The report on the inquiry set up to investigate 
the causes of the stagnation, which was included in the Colonial Report 
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for 1872, announced a radical change in how production was organized. 
The basic intention was to reduce the burden on the population as much 
as possible without losing sight of the importance of the cultivation and 
delivery of coffee for the sake of the treasury in the metropolis. For Mijer, it 
was unthinkable to abandon this overriding Dutch interest and many others 
agreed. This proviso of course reduced the room for manoeuvre in seeking 
a new method of colonial taxation that was less burdensome for the people 
while remaining prof itable for the state coffers. The task of making this 
transition was assigned to three experts: Holle the tea planter, agricultural 
specialist Karel Wessel van Gorkom and D. Ples, Assistant Resident for 
Bandung. The f irst two were known critics of government control over the 
cultivation of coffee. As a man with practical experience, Holle had already 
outlined the conditions that had to be f illed for a new approach to succeed.
The regulation the experts proposed intended f irst of all to increase 
the price for delivering the coffee, initially to ten guilders per pikul and a 
year later to thirteen guilders, the same as the rate paid to planters else-
where on Java. They wanted to create a system of cultivation that would 
guarantee a tribute that was easy to collect, while also giving the people 
of the Priangan a source of sustenance and prosperity. The idea was that 
the planters should be paid a daily rate for their labour that was at least 
as high as what they earned from growing their own food crops. A radical 
measure was to relocate the cultivation of coffee away from the large, far-off 
gardens to land closer to the peasants’ settlements. This essentially signified 
a return to the manner of planting coffee that had been employed in the 
very beginning: on small plots in the immediate vicinity of the villages. It 
also put a stop to the mass mobilization of labour. Strict compliance with 
the instruction that only those segments of the population obliged to grow 
coffee could be mobilized to do so meant essentially that the tribute applied 
only to landowners. As before, village chiefs and the clergy were exempt, 
even if they owned land. A further measure to alleviate the workload was 
reducing the number of additional trees that had to be planted each year 
to a maximum of 50. This was a belated acknowledgement that the norm 
of 1,000 trees a year established a century previously was far beyond the 
capacity of the planters. Lastly, the planters could choose themselves to 
which warehouse they delivered their harvest. By building local warehouses 
at many more places than before, from where the coffee could be forwarded 
to the main warehouses, the time and effort required to transport the beans 
could be reduced to a more acceptable level.
The package of measures designated as the new Priangan regulation (for 
coffee cultivation) came into force in 1872 and was extended three years later 
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to apply to all regions on Java where coffee was produced for the government. 
It was no longer permitted to plant coffee trees further than twelve poles 
from the homes of the planters without off icial authorization. The limit was 
f irst set at four poles, the maximum distance that the workforce could cover 
from home and back in a day in mountainous terrain, but this instruction was 
rescinded when it became clear that it would mean abandoning most of the 
gardens. The problem was also finding sufficient unused land to grow coffee 
close to the kampung. Where it was found, using it for coffee meant that the 
villagers had no reserve for growing food in the future. They lost what they 
had always had – the right to own and cultivate land that they had used off 
and on for a variety of purposes. What happened to the large plantations far 
from the settlements? A fair number of them, known as merdika gardens, 
were rented to local people with enough resources of their own to tend to 
the trees, pick the berries and deliver the beans to the warehouses at their 
own risk and expense and for the price set by the government.
When he stepped down from off ice in mid-1874, Resident Van der Moore 
concluded that the reorganization had been a great success. There had 
been no resistance from the regents, the lower chiefs received a decent 
reimbursement for the functions in which they had been consolidated and 
had strengthened their position, while the lower clergy had accepted their 
exclusion from worldly authority. The revival of peasant economic activity 
and trade showed how much progress had been made in general terms. He 
was also very satisf ied with the prospects for coffee cultivation. The favour-
able effects of the new measures, documented in the Colonial Reports of the 
1870s with the usual optimistic tone, proved however to be only a short-lived 
revival that lasted less than a decade and were by no means introduced with 
so few problems. As early as 1874, the Director of the Civil Service had to 
send around a circular letter warning against the tendency to reverse the 
meaning of the term ‘voluntary’. Little came of effective monitoring by the 
government. Relocating the cultivation of coffee to small, widely dispersed 
plots of land made it almost impossible for the off icials who were given full 
charge of the task of inspection to determine whether households were actu-
ally fulfilling their obligations. Now they no longer received a commission for 
the quantity of coffee delivered to the warehouses, which meant that they 
had no incentive to perform the services required of them. Moreover, the 
government’s administration was still very unreliable. In short, the relocation 
from the far-off gardens to the villages did not bring the expected success.
It is not possible to determine the size of the harvest from the quantities 
that found their way to the government’s warehouses through the off icial 
channels. Van Gorkom estimated that around half of the coffee produced 
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was sold off at a higher price on the black market and was never recorded 
in the off icial f igures (1880a: 76). As before, smuggling was the order of the 
day and, now that the planters could deliver the beans where they wanted 
to, it was not possible to prove that they were trying to evade the obliga-
tion to deliver only to the government’s warehouses. Theft also eroded the 
monopoly that the government demanded. One off icial who documented 
the many kinds of illicit practices included in his account a taste for cof-
fee, which had become popular among the native population. In his view 
permitting the peasants to drink coffee as happened in some districts was 
a misplaced act of kindness as they had no real need to do so. He proposed 
conducting house searches to restrict this clandestine consumption (Esche 
1891: 189). Policing was actually practised in several residencies.
In Cirebon the people were not allowed to drink coffee. To lend this 
measure some force, after a harvest peasants’ houses were searched for 
beans that might have been withheld from delivery to the warehouses. 
For a number of years the people of the Kuningan regency had to hand 
in all their kettles to the government. (Baardewijk 1994: 165-6)
Another colonial off icial reported that the peasants drank an infusion of 
coffee leaves, as they were not permitted to use the beans (Casembroot 1887: 
21) We have already seen how, in the early 1820s, Resident Van der Capellen 
tried to maintain control over the transport of coffee with checkpoints, 
mobile patrols and spies. In his report, Van Rees spoke of security guards 
in the gardens to ensure that the planters did their work dutifully and did 
not slip off to drink coffee somewhere unseen. Such references created the 
impression that surveillance was successful, but the manpower deployed 
was insuff icient to make it effective and, more importantly, the guards 
were themselves involved in fraudulent transactions. The coffee brought in 
twice as much on the open market than the price that the government was 
willing to pay. As Van Gorkom noted, this meant a potential prof it of 100 
per cent was disappearing into the state’s coffers. According to this expert 
of long standing, it explained the disappointing results of what had been 
propagated as a crop benefiting the peasantry f irst and for all.
The Priangan regulation has no soul; that soul is a reasonable price to 
pay for the coffee. The Priangan regulation is strictly speaking not a 
regulation at all, as it prescribes everything conditionally; in all its parts, 
there is room for manoeuvre. The core idea remains the same throughout: 
more trees, more prof its for the state. (Van Gorkom 1880a: 75)
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From the very start, the new Priangan regulation was founded rather 
precariously on two ideas: on the one hand, it had to assure the peasantry 
more freedom and more benefits from the cultivation of coffee while, on the 
other hand, the profits had to benefit the state coffers as much as possible. 
This formula clearly shows the incompatibility of the regulation’s double 
objective: encouraging free cultivation but delivering coffee at off icially 
f ixed, low prices. Furthermore, the authorities were accustomed to a system 
in which all initiative came from higher up and all willingness to please 
from below.
A substantial and persistent fall in the volume of coffee delivered in the 
second half of the 1880s resulted in a new survey, the f indings of which, 
together with a detailed summary of errors and problems, were included in 
the Colonial Report for 1891. One remedy that was considered was whether 
increasing the price to 20 guilders per pikul would raise the planters’ 
income to 20 cents a day. The conclusion that this would not occur was 
accompanied by the comment that, during the more productive years of 
1879-83, households earned three-and-a-half cents a day or less. In light of 
this discouraging observation, the verdict that abolition of forced cultivation 
was inevitable came as no surprise. The Resident of the Priangan Regencies, 
however, rejected the proposal, submitted as a separate recommendation, 
to replace the forced cultivation of coffee for the government by a state-
regulated system based on free labour. He expressed his objections in the 
following words.
With the system of free coffee cultivation practised by the natives, each 
planter works at his own expense and owns his own coffee garden. In 
the case of state enterprises, the natives will have to come and work 
for as wage labourers, with the consequence that the class of peasant 
farmers and garden-owners will be reduced to one of wage labourers 
and proletarians, living from day to day. It can never be the intention of 
a Government to turn the peasant cultivators into a class of proletarians, 
such as now exists in Europe on a large scale, and with which we have 
had the most miserable of experiences.40
One consequence of this policy reappraisal was that, in 1894, a scientif ic 
adviser for coffee cultivation was appointed, in the hope that his expertise 
would inject new élan into the production of the crop. However, Dr W. Burck 
40 Annex TT1, annex C, 5.46, no. 15, Advies van de Resident der Preanger Regentschappen, 
p. 132, Colonial Report 1891.
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was an expert in agronomic, rather than social and economic matters and 
his recommendations proved unworkable and unwelcome. He clashed with 
high-ranking colonial off icials, took sick leave, and was then no longer con-
sidered eligible to resume his duties. In 1903 he was granted an honourable 
discharge and his post remained unfilled. He had tried in vain to wrest the 
management of coffee cultivation free from the interference of the regional 
bureaucracy. After he had left, however, a new Department of Agriculture was 
set up, whose responsibilities included coffee cultivation. This expressed the 
gradual shift from what had always been the task of the regular bureaucracy 
towards technical specialists. A wide range of modern-age ‘experts’ made 
their entrance, including surveyors to draw up land cadastres, consultants 
to advise on how to grow various crops, and engineers to supervise public 
works. They were operating from new off icial agencies and their arrival 
resulted in restriction of the room for manoeuvre that members of the civil 
service were equipped with or appropriated for themselves.
As Van Gorkom concluded in a retrospect (1918: 246), government-
controlled coffee cultivation eventually went out with a whimper. The 
f inancial profit for the government, 50 million guilders in 1870, had shrunk 
to 11-12 million by 1890 and, when the system was abolished, to only a few 
hundred thousand guilders a year. The Minister for the Colonies f inalized 
the decision in a bill in 1915. During the debate in parliament, he identif ied 
the opposition of the peasantry as the reason for the demise of the system, 
but admitted that this had partly been caused by neglect and errors on 
the part of the government. One member of parliament identif ied the 
cause more precisely as the fact that native planters were never paid more 
than 15 guilders per pikul, while the market price was three or even four 
times this amount. In his view, the system had failed because of the greed 
that had prevailed until the very end (De opheff ing der gouvernements-
koffiecultuur 1915: 302). Most commentators, however, did not lay the blame 
in the f irst instance with the colonial government, but sought the cause of 
the f iasco in the adverse behaviour of the coffee growers. At the start of the 
twentieth century, the Resident of the Priangan Regencies wrote that the 
people harboured a genuine hatred of growing coffee. Some high-ranking 
colonial off icials advocated a return to the traditional hard-line policy. The 
Director of Finance, for example, called in a memorandum for the coercion 
of the native population to be maintained, restating a well-worn maxim: 
‘as much coffee as possible for as little money as possible’. Although neither 
the Governor-General nor the Minister for the Colonies explicitly distanced 
themselves from this off icial counsel, there was little political support for 
a return to the old regime (Proceedings of the States-General 1914-15: 775). 
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Van Gorkom believed that the native population did not refuse to grow 
coffee of their own free will from some irrational aversion, but because they 
were insuff iciently led by economic incentives. They were driven by simple 
needs that could be satisf ied without having to produce commodities for 
sale on the market. He therefore considered the exercise of force – including 
the ‘soft’ form of coercion concealed behind the mask of persuasion and 
encouragement – counterproductive.
This standpoint went by no means far enough for scientif ic adviser Dr 
Burck. He wished to see genuine consequences linked to the principle of 
forced cultivation. ‘All forced labour must of necessity be properly organized 
so as to achieve the desired results,’ he stated, succinctly. Leaving it up to 
the free will of the growers, to give them the space to decide for themselves, 
would erode the whole concept of self-driven peasant cultivation and defy 
the ambition of leading them towards progress and development. Burck 
agreed with Van Gorkom that the inability of the planters to act economi-
cally was the cause of the failure of free cultivation. They displayed typical 
‘slash-and-burn’ behaviour, giving their immediate needs priority over 
longer-term efforts that would eventually bring in more profit. He argued 
that the same applied to food cultivation.
If off icials and chiefs are not strongly reminded on every monthly depart-
mental reporting day, at every district, sub-district and desa meeting, to 
tend to their sawahs on time, to sow their seeds and to plant and weed 
the padi and secondary crops at the right moment, to make sure that the 
water supply is regulated correctly, etc., etc.; if all this is left to the growers 
themselves, the sawah cultivation would come to nothing, time and time 
again. If coffee cultivation is to become truly peasant cultivation, and 
that I have never doubted for a single moment, it will only happen if it is 
under the same management and control as sawah cultivation and that 
of secondary crops, no more and no less. (Burck 1897: 86)
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the colonial administration 
had f inally penetrated to the base of the peasant economy and could now 
resolutely continue to practise its noble development mission.
Impact of the reforms on the peasantry
The reforms brought the isolation of the Priangan since the early-colonial 
era to an end. From the middle of the nineteenth century, the ban on 
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outsiders settling in the region or even passing through the Sunda highlands 
without the written permission of the authorities was no longer imposed 
with the same strictness as before. After 1853, Europeans were allowed to 
live in the main settlements in the regencies, as long as they did nothing that 
violated the rules of the Priangan system. The Chinese, who along with other 
Asians from outside the region continued to be banned from the residency, 
were granted a little more freedom of movement some ten years later. They 
were not, however, given rights to settle until after the administrative 
reorganization. The reform represented a change of economic policy. Arab 
and Chinese merchants not only took up residence in the main centres 
but also hung around the coffee warehouses, off icially to sell all kinds of 
wares to the peasants who came to deliver their loads, but in reality to buy 
coffee from them at prices higher than the government’s rate. The increase 
in the number of delivery depots made it diff icult to prevent these illegal 
transactions. The presence of outsiders was no longer seen as obstructive 
and harmful but as encouraging the expansion of economic activity. The 
abolition of the pass system also helped increase mobility in the opposite 
direction: inhabitants of the Priangan would leave to seek a better life in 
Batavia or the Ommelanden, the lands surrounding the colonial capital. 
One consequence of this increasing contact with the outside world was 
the introduction of many new consumption goods. The landed gentry and 
native off icials were the f irst to surrender to these temptations, which 
led to a change in their lifestyles. A few decades later, European products 
also proved to have found their way into the lives of the common village 
people (Economie van de desa, residentie Preanger Regentschappen IXa, 
OMW 1907: 81-2). By the start of the twentieth century, the Priangan could 
no longer be seen as an enclave where social life had been stifled. If the 
colonial ideology of limited needs had ever been based in reality, it certainly 
no longer reflected the economic behaviour of the population. To what 
extent can these dynamics be attributed to developments that occurred 
in the f inal quarter of the nineteenth century?
The f irst question that arises here is whether requisitioning more and 
more labour for forced cultivation was accompanied by radical redistribu-
tion of land ownership. The 1839 instruction decreeing that from then on 
all households would have to take part in producing and delivering coffee 
was intended to deprive peasant-owners of the possibility of binding the 
landless to them and utilizing their labour power as sharecroppers or 
farm servants. The landowning class would now themselves be obliged 
to perform the coolie labour that they were accustomed to allocating to 
their ‘dependants’. In a more general sense, this perspective resonated in 
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the criticism that Van den Bosch, as architect of the cultivation system, 
had disrupted the structure of native society (Van Soest II, 1869: 127). In 
Chapter VII, I argued that there is no empirical evidence to support this view 
in the case of coffee cultivation in the Priangan Regencies. The repeated 
attempts in the f irst half of the nineteenth century to distribute the burden 
of cultivation obligations more widely did not lead to any levelling down 
of landownership. It seems justif ied to assume that very little came of the 
relentless attempts – already undertaken in the VOC era and continued even 
more resolutely by the directorate of the early-colonial state – to bring about 
radical change in the class structure of peasant society in the Priangan. 
Lastly Van Rees, who completed his report in 1867, noted that there was a 
class of well-off resident-landowners in the villages made up largely of the 
former cacahs, the heads of the composite households. It is not impossible 
– and even reasonable to assume – that more and more households were 
indeed involved in planting and picking coffee – including women and 
children – but there was still a difference in the level of taxes paid by the 
less and the better-off among them.
How was agricultural land distributed at the time of the administrative 
reorganization and the period that followed? During his village survey in 
1856, Kinder de Camarecq established that Sembir had a total of 61 house-
holds and 73 bahu41 of sawah f ields. Of these sawahs, 26 bahu were owned 
by 17 peasant households. These were the heads of cacah households, but 
they were by far outnumbered by the 44 households of shareholders and 
farm servants. It had been impossible for many generations to expand 
the land under cultivation. Two-thirds of the total cultivated area was in 
the hands of higher or lower landed gentry: 31 bahu as apanage (lungguh), 
while 16 bahu belonged to members of the lower gentry living in the 
village who employed peasants to tend to their f ields in exchange for 
a share of the harvest, as with the apanage. The fact that Sembir was 
not far from the district’s main settlement may be one reason for the 
extremely unequal distribution of land in the locality. But even taking 
this into account, there is no way to ascertain that this situation had 
existed since time immemorial. Throughout the whole Priangan region, 
the landed gentry had managed to lay claim to a very large share of the 
land used to grow food. Another dimension of the aristocratic claim on 
landownership was the possession of expansive areas of wilderness by 
the regents, which they used for hunting. The plain along the Citarum 
river, for example, was the exclusive hunting ground of the regents of 
41 1 bahu = approximately 0.7 hectares.
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Bandung, where renowned stag-hunting parties took place (De Roo de 
la Faille 1895: 48). De Wilde noted as early as 1830 that these lands were 
held in reserve so as to deny the peasants access to them. The chiefs 
gradually abandoned their feudal pastimes and started to clear the land 
for more productive purposes. They used their ancestral heritage as a 
pretext to disguise the fact that they had, over time, appropriated f ields 
that peasants themselves had owned. The latter cultivated land on the 
basis of their explicit right to lay out sawah f ields on waste land that did 
not belong to anyone else.
The fact that the landed gentry were accustomed to appropriating land 
that originally belonged to the peasants came to light during the survey 
of the rights of the common people to agrarian property. The off icial 
responsible for conducting the survey among the peasants in the Priangan 
highlands emphasized that they were unresponsive in answering ques-
tions for fear of the chiefs. Directly below the upper layer of aristocratic 
landowners, a class of wealthy peasants evolved. The core was formed by 
former rahayat who, as the heads of composite peasant households, had 
been incorporated into the direct entourage of the regent families. When 
the higher-ranking chiefs lost their position as intermediaries between 
the colonial government and the peasantry, they became more independ-
ent and, as free agents, developed into a local elite of well-established 
landowners. The changes in the system of taxation that were an important 
part of the reorganization in the Priangan meant that the peasants were 
no longer obliged to surrender a f ifth share of their paddy harvest. From 
1871 this tribute, which was destined for the chiefs and the clergy, was 
replaced by the land rent, which had to be paid to the government in cash 
and was provisionally set at 3/20 of the estimated revenue of the padi yield. 
For the peasant cultivators this meant a substantial decrease in their 
tax burden. The immediate consequence was a rise in the market value 
of cultivable land, so that the price of both irrigated and non-irrigated 
f ields rose sharply in the f inal quarter of the nineteenth century. The 
commercialization of food agriculture had been given a powerful boost 
with the change of regime, which was ref lected in the advent of usury in 
the village economy. The transactions of money lenders reinforced the 
ongoing trend of concentration of ownership of agricultural resources. 
The former owners continued to till the f ields, but now as tenants or 
sharecroppers (De Wolff van Westerrode 1904). Above the common peas-
ant class there now arose a new layer of mercantile entrepreneurs who 
generated income by using the labour power of others. Landlordism was 
characterized not by:
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... large-scale holdings but collections of very widely distributed plots 
of land all with the same owner, each of which was managed as a petty 
enterprise, and which were only distinguished from the property of 
small-scale owners by the size of their landed assets. (Kern 1908)
These large-scale landowners embodied the mercantile capitalism that was 
also emerging elsewhere on Java. What happened to the apanage f ields that 
the chiefs had appropriated? Strangely enough, Van Rees failed to make 
any arrangements relating to these domains after the transfer. It can be 
assumed that this was not from carelessness but for fear that eroding this 
vested interest might cause the landed gentry to resist the loss of their 
authority. The colonial bureaucracy displayed a striking lack of interest in 
investigating what happened to the former cultivated area held as apanage 
land. Frequently the descendants of the gentry enjoyed the usufruct of the 
f ields, while sometimes they retained their apanage status and were used 
by the newly appointed village heads. In other cases, rights of ownership 
passed to the panukang who had tended the f ields as sharecroppers in the 
lord’s service. What certainly did not occur was that the landed gentry 
converted the land that they had held as sawah kaprabon into large-scale 
agricultural estates. Their landlordism was not production-oriented but 
remained mercantile in character.
During the period that the Priangan regime lasted, peasants with little 
land of their own suffered from generation to generation under the burden 
of their obligation to utilize their labour power primarily to cultivate coffee. 
Their tributary duties were so heavy that many were forced to get rid of 
their paddy f ields, often paying the ‘buyer’ to relieve them of the extra 
work attached to their property. Right up to the abolition of the Priangan 
system, they continued to use the strategy employed by their forebears in 
the VOC period, to flee to other areas to evade the repressive claims on their 
productive capacity. But the administrative reorganization put an end to 
this tried and tested form of resistance to the heavy tribute for good. The 
cultivation ordinance announced in 1870 abolished the traditional right to 
cultivate the village waste land. The importance of this traditional custom 
was that it strengthened the negotiating position of the land-poor against 
both the landowning class in their own localities and supra-local lords. 
Clearing this land required no small effort. Preparing a dry f ield in the 
vicinity of the village for cultivation – often with no tools or draught animals 
and, above all, no assured supply of food while opening up the land – was 
an extremely diff icult undertaking right from the start. Yet it was due to 
these efforts that the area of cultivated land expanded from generation to 
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generation. I will return to the impact of the ban now proclaimed on free 
access to waste land around the village and the considerations underlying it 
in the last part of this chapter. Suff ice to say at this point that cutting them 
off from access to agricultural resources denied the landless underclass the 
opportunity of upward social mobility by taking possession of land not yet 
used by others and preparing it for cultivation.
How large was the landless agrarian population in the Priangan Regen-
cies around the time of the administrative reorganization? Of the 108,816 
households that lived from agriculture in 1860, a third possessed no paddy 
f ields (Enklaar 1871: 134). Scheltema concluded a discussion of the progres-
sive concentration of property at the top of the agrarian hierarchy as follows.
... alongside the older form of feudal-aristocratic landownership, a 
new form of large-scale ownership emerged in the second half of the 
nineteenth century as the result of what is seen through Western eyes 
as usury, primarily by a class of hajis and other wealthy members of the 
population. (1927-28: 305)
In the light of this conclusion, it should come as no surprise that an increas-
ing number of land-poor households were forced into a landless existence. 
From petty owners they became sharecroppers or agricultural labourers. 
Accumulation of landownership at one end of the social spectrum and a 
process of proletarianization at the other end determined the character of 
the peasant economy after the administrative reform. De Wolff van Wester-
rode reported in 1904 that the class of agricultural labourers were employed 
by their masters as attached farm servants. They lived in his household and, 
besides their food, they received a share of the paddy harvest. In the lower 
echelons of the village economy, the break with the past was less marked 
than seemed to have been the case at the top. The introduction of the village 
system now also in the Priangan contributed to this by exposing the tension 
between the forces of continuity and discontinuity.
Establishment of the village system
The decision by the colonial government to take over the governance and 
collection of taxes in the Priangan itself brought with it the necessity – as 
had already occurred elsewhere on Java – to designate the village as the 
basic unit for exercising authority. As I described in an earlier publication, 
the renowned village community on Java was not an age-old institution 
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but a colonial construction devised at the start of the nineteenth century 
to gain control over peasant production after the dislocation of the native 
aristocracy from the exercise of power (Breman 1979). My argument was 
based on a historical study into the way in which the early-colonial state 
requisitioned land and labour in the region of Cirebon. In this coastal plain 
of North Java, the colonial tribute was largely imposed on the cultivation 
of sugarcane. The introduction of the land rent system of taxation meant 
that the government designated the ‘village system’ as the focal point of its 
intervention at local level. The exclusion of the Sultan’s role in governance 
in and around Cirebon led to village chiefs being designated as agents of 
the colonial overlords, charged with forcing the peasants to produce crops 
for export. From 1830, the cultivation system would establish this mode of 
exploitation on the island of Java and its people in more concrete form. Reli-
ance on the village system was not introduced in the Priangan Regencies, 
nor were village chiefs ever elected, as the Resident stated in 1858. The native 
chiefs did not mobilize the people along territorial lines culminating in their 
domination of the peasant settlements as well-demarcated and integrated 
communities. In this region, the village was a kaluruhan, a collection of 
separate hamlets, small habitational clusters in which the cacah formation 
could still be recognized. Despite Daendels’ order in the early nineteenth 
century to amalgamate them in larger, more concentrated villages, the 
habitat pattern in the Sunda highlands retained its scattered character. In 
Sukapura and part of Sumedang the people continued to live in small ham-
lets of four or f ive huts, usually about eight to ten poles from each other, until 
deep into the nineteenth century. In 1856 Kinder de Camarecq described the 
settlement of Sembir, near Sumedang, as a locality consisting of a lembur, the 
main kampung, and four hamlets. Another government off icial, Van Marle, 
described a similar pattern of settlement in Cianjur around the same time. 
The administrative reform brought this form of spatial organization, by 
then still different to that in the rest of Java, to an end. The decision by the 
regional authorities in 1865 to have the inhabitants of a kaluruhan choose a 
chief from among their numbers anticipated the designation of the village 
as the anchor point of government administration in the Priangan. The 
choice of local notables had always been the prerogative of native chiefs 
but, when the separate hamlets were consolidated into a single community, 
it was assumed that the village chief would be appointed not from above 
but by the villagers themselves. His appointment and whether he stayed 
or not at subsequent elections were decided in a democratic fashion that 
the colonial authorities tended to attribute to the ‘original’ village system. 
This ‘authentic and age-old institution’ was supposed to have faded away 
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after the intrusion of Muslim-based rule in the peasant heartland. In this 
reconstruction of a past that never existed, the community itself selected a 
number of prominent figures to represent the interests of the other villagers. 
Sidelining higher chiefs was interpreted as restoring a situation that had 
existed in the remote past. The colonial authorities professed not to interfere 
in the election of the desa chiefs. The landed gentry continued to exercise 
influence on local affairs behind the scenes for a long time and saw to it that 
no candidates were appointed who might harm their interests, especially 
their land and the proceeds it generated. What happened in reality was 
that local power was concentrated in the hands of a narrow upper layer of 
village society, consisting of former cacah heads, who had been pillars of 
support for the regents in the peasant landscape. They were part of a social 
vanguard that could now afford to promote their position and interests more 
actively. In accordance with standing practice, the village chiefs and other 
members of the village administration were allocated apanage f ields from 
the cultivated land considered to be the joint property of the community. 
These f ields were tilled by panukang, who were registered as sharecroppers 
of the local elite.
The investigation instigated to decide on the land rights of the native 
population showed that, after the reforms had been introduced in the 
Priangan, the number of chiefs in the newly formed village communities 
was exceptionally large (Eindresumé III, 1896: 190). Having said that, it 
should be noted that, during the administrative reorganization, Van Rees 
had abolished a large group of officials who acted as intermediaries between 
the regents and the people. In off icial documents they were described as a 
parasitic administrative layer of influentials, who had no place in the new 
model of colonial governance. In the course of time the colonial authori-
ties had increasingly forced the native chiefs into a tighter organizational 
straitjacket, giving them specif ic tasks and competences that, despite being 
intentionally kept vague, did not overlap and were functionally separated 
from each other in a vertical ranking. In short, as well as being organized 
along territorial lines, the exercise of power by the chiefs was also strictly 
hierarchically streamlined. The reforms and the new rules revealed that a 
large number of f igures had become superfluous because the interaction 
between the lower and higher echelons now took place on the basis of 
administrative expediency. They no longer f itted in the new configuration 
based on what the colonial authorities essentially saw as a duality between 
the nobility in and around the regents’ court and the peasants in the vil-
lages, with an elongated corps of native off icials liaising between them. 
This particularly applied to the large group of intermediaries between 
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district off icials and desa chiefs, who were known by a staggering variety 
of names in different parts of Java: lurah, kuwu aris, penatus, bekel, glon-
dong, panglawe, mantri, patinggi, palang, panglaku, pancalang, demang, 
bahu aris, patinggi aris or priyayi (see Davelaar 1891). Kinder de Camarecq 
reported that the higher native off icials were formerly referred to as priyayi. 
These intermediate chiefs owned padi f ields in all the villages under their 
jurisdiction and also had the use of messengers, kebajan, who provided them 
with a variety of services as ordered. There was great uncertainty about who 
appointed these intermediate chiefs and what exactly their competences 
were (Breman 1980: 15-21; see also Mulherin 1970-71).
In a system of governance based on lines of territoriality, these inter-
mediaries were no longer useful, but a hindrance. Their exclusion from 
governance was formalized in 1840 when the Resident of the Priangan 
Regencies announced that forthwith he himself would appoint all off icials 
lower than the district chief, rather than leaving it to the regent – a decision 
that he was not authorized to take (De Klein 1931: 86-7). Although this led 
to little change in practice, it was a new step that heralded the erosion 
of the power of the native authorities. This was followed a few decades 
later by the formal abolition of the intermediate heads. The decision was 
taken after the Council of the Indies had published a memorandum in 1864 
criticizing the ease with which the number of intermediate chiefs had been 
allowed to increase under the cultivation system. Such minor chiefs or 
headmen may have constituted the continuation of an old native institution, 
but that was not considered suff icient argument to preserve them. The 
native administration had never been shy of increasing the number of 
chiefs, who all lived at the expense of the peasantry, and this abuse had 
reached unprecedented levels. The time had now come to remove them 
from their privileged positions. When the recommendations of the Director 
of Cultivation and the Residents all pointed in the same direction – abol-
ish the intermediate chiefs – the Governor-General took the same view. 
Vacant positions would no longer be f illed, while dismissed chiefs would 
receive no reimbursement for the services they had rendered. They had, 
after all, never been formally recognized in the posts they held and were 
therefore not eligible for compensation. It was illustrative of their somewhat 
elevated status that they held apanage f ields in all of the villages under their 
jurisdiction. Higher-ranking chiefs who were consolidated in their positions, 
such as wedana, who were given charge of a district, were transferred to 
the government payroll. Interestingly, the pretext for expelling the lower 
class of gentry from their role as intermediaries was that their involvement 
in governance was contrary to the wishes and interests of the people as 
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a whole. It was a continuation of the attempt to abrogate and send that 
segment of the minor aristocracy that was not incorporated in the regular 
bureaucracy back into the peasantry and put a stop to their involvement 
in the administration at supra-local level. No account was taken of the 
fact that these go-betweens were of great signif icance in the exercise of 
power by the Priangan aristocracy. They, of course were not prepared to 
allow themselves to be declared redundant in the new order and simply be 
sidelined. The survey of land rights established that these f igures indeed 
descended back into the peasantry but continued to be identified as sentana 
(Eindresumé III, 1896: 190). On the basis of their former status they were 
integrated into the class of peasants although treated as before with esteem. 
They retained their previous rights, such as apanage land and exemption 
from government services.
A more cumbersome bone of contention was no longer tolerating the 
interference of the clergy in worldly affairs, in particular in f ixing the 
agricultural calendar and collecting the agrarian taxes. The voluntary 
donations from the peasants (zakat) fell to half what they had collected 
under the previous compulsory system (Verslag uitkomsten der reor-
ganisatie van het gewest 1874). Outside the Priangan it was rare for the 
priest class to play a prominent role in regulating the production of food, 
constructing water supply systems, and keeping land records. Daendels 
had allocated these tasks to religious leaders in the Sunda highlands in 
the early nineteenth century, rewarding them with a tenth share of the 
paddy production. That meant a considerable increase in the burden on the 
peasants. The measure illustrated the strong position that Islam enjoyed 
in the area, even at that early stage, and which was probably the result of 
the support its expansion received from the native chiefs. In his report, 
Van Rees quoted a source from 1808 critically examining the piety of the 
regent of Cianjur and referring to the clergy as a plague on the people. 
In the decades that followed, Islam’s inf luence over the whole region 
increased, resolutely facilitated by the involvement of higher and lower 
mosque off icials in a wide range of bureaucratic activities entrusted to 
them under the ultimate responsibility of the chiefs. They were prepared 
for their tasks by being educated in pesantren, boarding schools offer-
ing religious instruction which Van der Capellen had already referred to 
earlier. Even before the end of the eighteenth century, several regents’ sons 
requested permission to go to Mecca, which the colonial authorities only 
granted with the greatest reluctance. From the mid-nineteenth century, 
the number of pilgrims to Mecca reached unprecedented proportions, even 
though the costs meant that only better-off peasants could contemplate 
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making the journey. If a haji was not already seen as a notable f igure in 
the community before the pilgrimage, he was certainly admitted to their 
ranks on his return. The religious desire to go to Mecca was reinforced 
by the knowledge that returning pilgrims were exempted from corvee 
services. For a long time, the government was not generous in issuing 
passes to make the pilgrimage and, after 1825, asked 110 guilders for the 
privilege. When this strict requirement was abolished in 1859, the number 
of pilgrims rose exponentially. Only 71 in 1850, numbers rose to 2,152 in 
1857 and to nearly 5,000 in 1862. Croockewit described this growth in 
the number of pilgrims as ‘frightening’. With the danger that threatened 
from these quarters in mind, countermeasures were not long in coming. 
Despite pious counter-propaganda, instigated by tracts which Karel Holle 
wrote and circulated, it proved impossible to rein in this wave of religious 
fervour. Just like the low-ranking chiefs, behind the scenes the clergy 
continued to perform the tasks that had long been entrusted to them. 
There was often no one else to perform the duties that had been taken 
away from them, while the village authorities now had the task of keeping 
the comprehensive local records. A survey of a desa in 1869 revealed that 
sixteen registers had to be permanently kept up to date. In addition, the 
villagers had to acquire certif icates, passes or permits to do something, 
or not to do it. Every year, 600 pages of village records had to be kept by 
hand (Nederburgh 1877: 429-30).
The clergy were among the few who could read and write and these skills 
were indispensable in interacting with the colonial authorities. It was only 
when scribes began to appear in villages in the Priangan that the district 
chief had a local point of contact for the administration (Eindresumé III, 
1896: 225 and appendix OO: 178), but for a long time it was the village priest 
who fulf illed this need. Disputes about land had to be settled in clerical 
courts, a tradition that did not change. That the higher-ranking clergy 
also failed to withdraw into religious contemplation and retained their 
interest in more worldly matters became apparent in the early twentieth 
century when it emerged that the head panghulu of Cianjur was the largest 
moneylender in the region; he loaned out his business capital, estimated 
at 200,000 guilders, at an interest rate of 30 per cent (De Wolff van Wester-
rode 1904: 71). The government was afraid that strengthening the religious 
feelings of the population might stir up political unrest, a fear that later 
events proved to be well-founded. Van Rees’ recommendation that state 
and church be kept strictly separated should be understood against this 
background. The government decided not to interfere in the religious life 
of the common people but also wanted to put a stop to the administrative 
eCLiPse of the Coffee reGiMe froM the sunda hiGhLands 323
services that the clergy performed under the authority of the chiefs. Just 
as the Priangan reform did not immediately put a stop to the authority of 
the native chiefs, the clergy continued – perhaps more persistently and 
with more subterfuge – to have a great influence on the people. Being able 
to read and write not only made the priests indispensable for the village 
administration, they also used that knowledge in giving religious instruc-
tion to adults and children. Throughout the whole region, but especially 
in the eastern part of the residency, the number of houses of prayer and 
pesantren increased strongly. The close ties between society and religion 
could not of course have escaped the attention of the government, but the 
latter considered it inopportune to devote too much attention to the matter 
in the hope that it would have no political side effects. This hope would 
later prove futile, when religious movements evolved in the Priangan which 
found a massive following. The government was particularly concerned 
about Islamic religious fervour combined with political motives. In 1871, 
for example, a ten-year-old girl and her parents were arrested in a village 
in Garut after a picture of Dipanegara had been found in their house. The 
colonial authorities acted resolutely against any such expressions of proto-
nationalist sentiment.
Shifting the onus of servitude
One important aim of the reform operation was to bring to an end the 
ngawula system that had held the peasants in servitude to their lords. Van 
Rees’ observation that the regents had succeeded in keeping hidden no less 
than one-eighth of their subjects – mainly from the better-off class of peas-
ants – as clients to be used for their own purposes rather than for colonial 
corvee duties, illustrated that the government did not have complete control 
over the productive capacity of the Sundanese peasantry. Stripping the 
chiefs of their authority and imposing strict limitations on the size of their 
entourage were of course a precondition to sever the ties between the lords 
and their peasant clientele, but did it cause a breach in their relationship of 
servitude? To a large extent, this was indeed the case as the most important 
chiefs no longer had direct control over their former clients. They retained 
their prestige but now rarely left the dalem. For the lower lords, up to the 
rank of district chief, the situation was different. Appointed as civil servants 
in regular colonial service they could no longer allow their self-interest and 
desire for prestige to take precedence. Whatever they did, or failed to do, 
was now in the name of the government.
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The village system did however have one aspect that retained a link with 
the old situation: the ngawula system lingered on at the level of the village 
community. The local influentials elected as pamong desa were allocated 
apanage f ields and panukang from landless households to tend to them 
(De Klein 1931: 126). That signif ied a continuation of the master-servant 
nexus at the foot of the peasant economy. Admittedly, it was no longer the 
organizational principle of the larger social order in the Priangan Regencies, 
but continued to be practised as a local-level relationship structuring in 
particular the interdependency between landowning and landless members 
of the village community. The decision to anchor local government in the 
Priangan in the desa system came at a time when many commentators were 
posing critical questions about the policy that the peasant settlement should 
be seen and preserved as a self-managing community. This reappraisal was 
inspired by the growing awareness that the village elite did not necessarily 
act in the interests of their colonial bosses.
The government, for example, wants a chief who will represent the 
interests of coffee cultivation, but the inhabitants of the desa prefer one 
who does not care about the coffee gardens. (Nederburgh 1877: 444)
Besides the problem of too many ‘free riders’, who were allocated apanage 
f ields without doing anything to earn them and who did little or nothing 
to contribute to fulf illing the community’s obligations towards the govern-
ment, there appeared to be, behind the image of a close-knit community 
whose members felt intimately tied to each other and worked together for 
the common good, a completely different reality. Undoubtedly, scepticism 
was long allayed with the suggestion that the ancestral institution had 
been derailed by negative influences from outside. But it was not possible to 
maintain for long the myth that outsiders were to be blamed for the reported 
factionalism and abuse of power. Where the emphasis had previously been 
laid on the social cohesion and communal consensus of the inhabitants, 
the divisions between the various classes at local level now came more 
to the fore. The discussion focused on the election of the village chief. 
Should the villagers be given a free hand and was it advisable to appeal to 
tradition and adhere to a periodical change in desa leadership if, from the 
perspective of good governance, a permanent appointment seemed more 
attractive? The alternative was for the government to put a stop to the 
f iction of the ‘freely elected village chief’ and appoint someone themselves. 
This step would, however, have its price. This off icial would be entitled to 
a salary, estimated to come close to an outlay of ten million guilders a year 
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(Nederburgh 1877: 462). Good governance was important, but should not 
cost too much. Adhering to the f iction that the desa was led by someone 
chosen by his fellow villagers without undue interference from outside 
had the great advantage that the community would continue to bear the 
cost. This situation would remain unchanged until the end of colonial rule. 
Furthermore, Nederburgh added to his cost-benef it analysis, European 
authority had now penetrated to the foot of peasant society and would no 
longer tolerate the desa management engaging in usury and blackmail. The 
village chief and his associates, together constituting the village council, 
remained but would henceforth perform their duties under the strict but 
just surveillance of their Dutch controllers.
The desa system was under pressure from two sides. Although its room 
for manoeuvre was rigorously hampered from above, perhaps even more 
signif icant were the dynamic forces that undermined communal unity and 
consistency from within. In his account, Nederburgh devoted considerable 
attention to the erosion of the corporate basis of the peasant order. This 
was the consequence of a process of social emancipation. He argued that 
a powerful and closed village system evolves in a relatively undeveloped 
stage of society, when the inhabitants of a community depend on each other 
for protection and support. They are prepared to sacrif ice their freedom, 
and respect and obey the leadership of the settlement. But if the power of 
the state increases and it treats its subjects justly and fairly, as happened 
under Dutch rule, then
... the dessa system is no longer strictly required to guarantee the security 
of individuals. Many begin to experience the ties with the dessa commu-
nity and the guardianship of the dessa leadership as cumbersome. They 
hanker after distribution of communal property, individual enjoyment 
of commonly held goods and personal freedom. (Nederburgh 1877: 438-9)
In drawing up the balance, the Resident concluded with satisfaction that the 
Javanese people were on the right track and were moving forward along it 
slowly but surely. The desire for freedom that was signif ied by the dissolu-
tion of the desa community must of course not be achieved at the expense 
of the rights and interests of the colonial state.
And this was where the whole fable faltered. As the native people moved 
forward along the road to development, they were under strict surveillance 
and soon found themselves frustrated in their progress by the services 
the government required them to perform. The attempt to abolish the 
servitude of the peasantry to the native aristocracy did not change the fact 
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that it was maintained in the exercise of colonial power and authority. This 
applied f irst and foremost to the behaviour that Dutch off icials expected 
of their inferiors. Just as the regents would surround themselves with an 
entourage whenever they left the dalem, the Resident, Assistant Resident 
and controleur would be accompanied by native civil servants on their 
tours. And not only to act as interlocutors and interpreters where neces-
sary, but to make the differences in rank clear by their presence and body 
language. The lack of familiarity between Javanese and European off icials 
that Nederburgh referred to was not in the f irst place due to their different 
positions in the hierarchy. The Western off icials may have had more power 
but their Javanese counterparts were better equipped to interact with the 
native population.
If the Javanese, by nature indolent and slow, are spurred on by an energetic 
and irascible European, they become bewildered, while Javanese chiefs 
know and understand only too well the sluggishness of the common 
man, as they too are averse to haste and act completely according to 
Ferry on the Citarum river near Cianjur. A Dutch civil servant is waiting with 
his carriage for the crossing. He is accompanied by a panghulu, a high-ranking 
religious official who is in charge of the district mosque (photo pre-1880).
source: kitLv Collection
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their nature, winning over the inherent slowness of their subordinates 
with patience and by continually cajoling them and leading them in the 
right direction. (Nederburgh, 1877: 409)
The European off icials had a whole retinue of their own, including mes-
sengers, guards and coachmen. On top of these came the household serv-
ants, the number of which varied depending on the rank of the patron. 
Their service to their master was an expression of his standing, his right 
to prestige. It remained customary to summon villagers from far and wide 
to take their turn to perform corvee services for the convenience of the 
Governor-General. Again, this was no different to what the regents were 
accustomed to do. The colonial off icials had adopted ways of acting and 
interacting that they had not brought with them from Europe but had their 
origins in the mannerisms of the Javanese and Sundanese aristocracy. 
Stripping the Priangan regents of their ‘traditional’ powers was accompa-
nied by growing criticism of the arbitrary and extortionate ways in which 
they exercised their authority. Yet, when European off icials engaged in 
similar practices, even if they were punished, the matter was settled behind 
closed doors and there was rarely any public discussion. Colonial servitude 
was more than just a personalized arrangement. It was enmeshed in the 
institutional setting of colonial rule. Corvee services were the name that 
the government used to justify the widespread mobilization of tributary 
labour. Many of these unpaid labourers were used to uphold law and order. 
Posting guards along the main roads made it easier to maintain surveillance 
of all traff ic. Travellers who experienced problems with their transport 
en route were pleasantly surprised when a group of locals appeared from 
nowhere and pushed their carriages uphill or repaired a broken wheel as 
quickly as possible so that their delay was kept to a minimum. The villages 
acquired guardhouses from where conscripted sentries took their turn to 
conduct nightly patrols and sound the alarm if they encountered anything 
out of the ordinary. In this way, the colony turned into a night-watch state. 
In addition to law and order, the government also considered it important 
that the peasant landscape was kept neat and tidy. Travel reports are full 
of praise about the neatness of the main settlements and villages.
Earlier in the nineteenth century, it had been an altogether different 
story. Van Sevenhoven, the f irst Director of Cultivation, had described 
the peasant settlements on Java as shabby and completely without order, 
making them easy targets for all kinds of wandering reprobates. The houses 
were set far apart and he found the scattered clusters of hamlets messy and 
uncared for. He wanted to change that by designing the peasant habitat 
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according to a f ixed pattern: in a square, with gated access to the f ields, 
which could be closed off and guarded, the houses built in rows, bordered by 
a main alley and crisscrossed by narrow paths, with a hedge, moat or stone 
wall encircling the whole settlement. This upgrading and cleaning up of 
the peasant abode would instil a feeling of community among the villagers 
and keep outsiders at a distance (Van Sevenhoven 1840). He clarif ied his 
noble intentions with a model village plan contrasting the situation as it 
had been and would now become.42 The design he made demonstrates a 
well demarcated regularity in a way that would make it easier to exercise 
law and order and achieve what had so far eluded the colonial authorities: 
42 See colour plates VI and VII. The maps comply so closely with Van Sevenhoven’s plan for 
improving the peasant settlements that they could have been drawn at his instigation. However, 
I did not f ind these drawings in the National Archives with his 1840 memorandum but with the 
documents relating to the draft of the cultivation act of 1863. NA, Ministry for the Colonies, Van 
Alphen-Engelhard collection (1896 and 1900), 363.
A gardu (watchhouse) alongside the road on the outskirts of Batavia. Since the 
time of Daendel’s authoritarian rule, each village in Java had to be guarded at 
night by watchmen to ward off danger and raise the alarm by beating the drum 
hanging at the entrance (photo pre-1880).
source: kitLv Collection
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to frame the exact size of the habitat and allow for a reliable headcount of 
the population. Just as the coffee gardens had to be neat and tidy to facilitate 
inspections, the peasants’ houses also had to be neatly arranged and easy 
to oversee. In his design for the model village, Van Sevenhoven juxtaposed 
the settled peasants – who behaved decently and properly – against an 
underclass that had completely gone astray and therefore posed a threat 
to public safety. The latter used to roam around in the wide vicinity and 
were suspected of clinging to their footloose existence to evade the reach of 
authority. In the colonial mindset, vagrancy was synonymous with lawless. 
In the eyes of the architect of this plan, permanent settlement in the village 
would promote sociability and strengthen community feeling.
In its efforts to gain some grip on the lives and work of the population, 
the government employed the method of counting and measurement. James 
Scott called this unrelenting desire for classif ication ‘state simplif ications’.
These typif ications are indispensable to statecraft. State simplif ications 
such as maps, censuses, cadastral lists, and standard units of measure-
ment represent techniques for grasping a large and complex reality; in 
order for off icials to be able to comprehend aspects of that ensemble, 
that complex reality must be reduced to schematic categories. The only 
way to accomplish this is to reduce an inf inite array of detail to a set of 
categories that will facilitate summary descriptions, comparisons, and 
aggregation. (Scott 1998: 77)
But the regime of registration in which the colonial authorities excelled 
was also intended to impose social order and discipline wherever it was 
lacking. The attempt to confine the workforce in the coffee gardens and 
the peasants in the village was seen as part of a mission to elevate native 
society to a higher plane of civilization. Ever since Daendels the authorities 
had tried to concentrate the population in more compact and manageable 
settlements so as to keep them under constant surveillance. In the Priangan 
Regencies, the habitat pattern continued to be widely dispersed, but here 
too the colonial administration had insisted that the kampungs be tidied 
up. In the same way that planting the trees in the coffee gardens in neat, 
regular rows and erecting a fence around the whole garden facilitated 
surveillance of the planters, the villagers were ordered to plant hedges 
around their yards, gravel the paths and f it gates at the entrances to the 
localities. In his report, Van Rees noted the excellent state of the roads, add-
ing that he had never seen ‘such neat and regularly constructed settlements 
as those in this region’ (1867: 57). A separate off icial, the camat gunung, was 
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given responsibility for keeping the village clean and had the authority to 
put those who refused to cooperate in the sticks (De Klein 1931: 85; see also 
Oosterzee 1882: 394). For a century and a half, f irst the agents of the VOC 
and then the government’s off icials had persisted in the belief that the 
peasants had plenty of time on their hands. That assumption was reflected 
in the ease with which the colonial authorities imposed obligations of 
servitude, in the f irm conviction that there was no need to pay for them. The 
accusation that the native people failed to behave economically applied in 
reality to the directors and management of the Dutch enterprise. This even 
resulted in the Governor-General issuing a circular in 1847 ordering that 
‘all work that served no purpose or only for decoration or ornamentation 
and which kept the people from their agricultural tasks should be avoided 
at all costs’ (Circulaire nuttelooze arbeid 1852: 295). This clearly did not 
help, as a Gids voor de Controleurs bij het Binnenlandsch Bestuur, drawn 
up in 1878 by Chief Inspector for Cultivation Van Gorkom, repeated that 
mobilizing labour just to make the coffee gardens appear neat and tidy 
was inadmissible.
Besides the fact that corvee labour had to be provided free of charge, 
this also had to occur in a way that expressed the subordination of the 
native population and their great respect for their European superiors. 
The obligation to servitude had not disappeared but was imposed directly 
on the people by the colonial administration. The change that had taken 
place in the Priangan, the substitution of obedience to the native chief to 
direct subalternity to the government and its off icials was not the subject 
of criticism, or even of discussion. The passage below illustrates this defer-
ential behaviour, adding that this spirit of subordination guaranteed the 
preservation of the established order.
It is striking that, as soon as one has passed the borders of Bogor, the 
natives not only greet Europeans but usually go and sit at the side of the 
road; if you encounter a man on a horse, he will immediately dismount 
(this is incidentally the custom throughout Java), while women gener-
ally avert their faces. Although such displays of subservience appear a 
little exaggerated to me, I am of the opinion, taking the small number of 
Europeans into consideration, that there are many advantages accrued 
to this show of docility, and that it would be politically inopportune to 
completely suppress it among the natives. (Croockewit 1866: 312)
The eclipse of the native chiefs in the Sunda highlands as part of the good 
governance operation was conducive to the transition to what Scott called 
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‘high modernity’, an administrative restructuring founded on a f irm belief 
in social engineering on the basis of a prior plan of action. Implementing 
the plan required the willingness to deploy the coercive power of the state 
to achieve radical and utopian changes in people’s working and living 
habits, moral conduct and worldviews. A precondition for realizing this 
far-reaching transformation is the absence of a civil order – or silencing it 
so that it has no opportunity to resist such high modernist plans.43 ‘Seeing 
like a state’, as I would like to emphasize, was the ideological formula for 
the dirigistic style of the late-colonial administration that took shape in the 
Dutch East Indies towards the end of the nineteenth century. This, with 
the proviso that Scott’s observation with regard to the subjugation of native 
populations elsewhere in the world applied here too: that the pretension 
of an all-encompassing plan of social reform to improve their well-being 
was wafer-thin.
The contours of a new economic policy
In the history of the Dutch East Indies, 1870 is recorded as a decisive turn-
ing point in the economic development of the archipelago. In that year, a 
series of agricultural laws were enacted bearing the stamp of Minister for 
the Colonies Engelbertus de Waal. Parliament approved the basic princi-
ples of a new economic policy that would regulate the phasing out of the 
system of forced cultivation and laid down the conditions for admitting 
private capital to the colony. While the colonial economy had until then 
been founded on the monopoly of the state, these changes heralded the 
beginning of the era of free enterprise capitalism. What the government 
envisaged and expected in 1870 seemed to be confirmed by what happened 
in the years that followed. Yet there was no question of a sharp break with 
the past. First of all, the forced cultivation of coffee continued, albeit 
with the suggestion that it had changed into peasant-directed production, 
although the government continued to prescribe the conditions under 
which it took place. The administrative reorganization had led to an 
eclipse of the regents’ power. The lower chiefs had become government 
off icials and continued to be the f irst point of contact for the people, so 
43 In Scott’s words: ‘the legibility of a society provides the capacity for large-scale social 
engineering, high-modernist ideology provides the desire, the authoritarian state provides 
the determination to act on that desire, and an incapacitated civil society provides the leveled 
social terrain on which to build.’ (Scott 1998: 5)
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that this change had few radical consequences. The cultivation and corvee 
services remained in place for some time and the clergy retained their 
privileged status. The break with the old regime was thus not very sharp 
and abrupt. From the opposite perspective, too, private capital and free 
entrepreneurs were not exactly kicking down the door to invest in the 
Priangan en masse. On the contrary, it would take quite some time, until 
the last decade of the nineteenth century, for the expansion of agrarian 
capitalism to become more pronounced in the Sunda highlands. The 
‘turning point’ was therefore more a process of transition that extended 
over a longer period, from around 1870-90. And the same applied to the 
preceding period; ‘1870’ did not come unannounced in an administrative 
or an economic sense. As we have seen, the prelude to this watershed year 
had already been set in motion in the middle of the century. In summary, 
although the Priangan had stood apart from the rest of Java for a long time 
and enjoyed an exceptional status, a gradual transformation had been 
gathering momentum in many respects since the 1860s that anticipated 
the formal opening up of the region and the administrative reforms that 
were f inally introduced in 1871. On the other hand, although the reforms 
of that year laid the basis for a radical change of course, the changes took 
some while to put into practice.
There was nevertheless a radical break with the past in one respect: 
the decision that all land to which no ownership rights were attached was 
property of the state. The Agrarian Law of 1870 regulated the issue of land 
to both private enterprises and to the native population. This meant that 
villagers would no longer have access to uncultivated land without the 
prior permission of the government. The ban was clearly incompatible with 
the villagers’ right to lay claim to waste land bordering on their habitats. 
The colonial government was clearly aware of this custom, as is shown by 
a memorandum by Governor-General Van den Bosch from 1830, in which 
he stated that the territory of the village comprised both cultivated and 
uncultivated land, and that the borders of the settlements were adjacent, 
with no intervening land between them.
... with the exception of a few uninhabited areas of forest or wilderness, 
there is no land that does not belong to one dessa or another. Not all of 
the inhabitants of a village, however, have rights to reclaim uncultivated 
land, and even fewer have an equal right. These rights are only enjoyed 
by sikaps, who descend from those who have owned the land from the 
earliest times, or who have acquired one or more shares in it through 
purchase or inheritance. (Van den Bosch 1830)
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This shows that only the better-off class of peasants could become usufruc-
tuaries of agrarian property. The privilege allowed them to lay claim to the 
labour of an underclass excluded from free access to unused land within 
or outside the settlement. The only way the class of landless could become 
cultivators of f ields at their own expense and risk was by leaving the village. 
The cultivation ordinance of 1874 essentially confined the villagers to the 
area that they had reclaimed in former times. Without explicit off icial 
approval, a permit issued by higher authorities, no new land could be taken 
into cultivation.
What was the reason for restricting access to the use of waste land to 
grow food? Peasants naturally made use of the uncultivated land around the 
settlements but did not till it permanently until this became necessary as 
the number of households increased. This process of intensif ied use, which 
took several generations, meant that as dry plots were converted to sawahs, 
irrigation canals also had to be constructed. The instruction restricting 
the use of uncultivated land was drawn up by honorary adviser for native 
affairs Karel Holle. His reason for doing so was a f irm conviction that the 
Sundanese peasants were guilty of practising large-scale slash-and-burn 
agriculture. His aim, in preventing them from making unrestricted and, in 
his view, wasteful use of what he saw as unused land was to force these sloth-
ful cultivators to use the resources they required to satisfy their basic needs 
more eff iciently. He had a particular aversion to footloose peasants who 
set up temporary bivouacs in the forests and mountains, roughly cleared 
a plot of land to grow food and, after one or two harvests, abandoned it 
and moved on. These huma peasants stubbornly refused to submit to the 
straitjacket of a civilized existence, as Holle saw it.
You should see them, living in huts f it only for dogs, badly clothed and 
run-down in body and mind and you will look more favourably on the lot 
of the native labourer employed by European planters. (Holle 1879: 82-3)
One district chief had complained to him about ‘slash-and-burn nomads’, 
freeloaders who could not be forced to provide corvee services and who 
simply moved to another area when pressed to do so. The honorary adviser 
also considered the rotating use of dry f ields as a form of slash-and-burn. 
Most villages had an area of land tilled by peasants known as tegalan that 
provided the villagers with a necessary supplement to the yield of the sawah 
f ields. These peasants were not nomadic but did regularly rotate their plots 
of land. Holle considered it primitive that peasants living like settled farm-
ers would grow food in and around their villages in any other way than on 
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irrigated f ields. His conviction that growing food on dry land – not only 
paddy but also secondary crops – was also a form of slash-and-burn cast 
doubt on Holle’s expertise, despite the praise heaped upon him by his many 
admirers, then and later on.44 In a critical examination of what continued 
to be the prevailing perception even after decolonization, Dove points out 
that the much higher yield of irrigated paddy f ields was due to the intensive 
use of labour, which was at a much lower level in the case of tilling dry 
f ields. He concludes that:
... intensive agriculture not only tends to yield a lower return on labor 
than extensive agriculture, but also that it is more vulnerable to state 
extraction. This extraction can reduce the net return on labor in an 
intensive system below that of an extensive system, even in cases in 
which the gross return of the former is higher. (Dove 1985: 7)
This conclusion explains why, as described above, many Priangan peasants 
remained so reluctant to change from dry- to wet-land cultivation, requiring 
considerable pressure from native chiefs and colonial off icials to set the 
process in motion and keep it going.
The argument that Holle, as a beloved friend of the Sundanese people, 
presented against the slash-and-burn practices that he felt the peasants 
engaged in, was even less plausible because, in his many essays on this 
subject, he failed to mention the huge coffee plantations laid out in the 
Sundanese highlands during the preceding half a century. These, too, had 
to be abandoned after only a few years because the yield from the trees fell 
rapidly. The concern that Holle claimed to feel for the damage to the climate 
and to agriculture by deforestation and soil erosion on the mountainsides 
would have been more convincing if he had directed his criticisms towards 
this export industry set up on the orders of the colonial rulers. Boomgaard 
was completely justif ied in calling the years from 1826 to 1865 a period of 
ecological destruction on Java. Large-scale deforestation took place for the 
cultivation of coffee, which was believed to grow well on freshly reclaimed 
forest land (Boomgaard 1988). But it was the footloose peasants who were 
given the blame for the degradation of the Priangan landscape, despite the 
fact that as the nineteenth century progressed they were increasingly only 
to be found in the most remote areas. There were other reasons for denying 
the peasants the right to free cultivation of unused land. The relocation of 
coffee cultivation from the far-off gardens to nearer the villages made it 
44 For example, the effusive ode to Holle in Van den Berge’s biography (Van den Berge 1998).
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necessary to use any land still available for this purpose. That did not hap-
pen immediately and there were persistent complaints about inadequate 
compliance with the ordinance on coffee cultivation. One major problem 
was that land registers were still incomplete and gave a strongly distorted 
view of the area of land that was more or less permanently under cultivation. 
Peasants accused of cultivating waste land denied that they had violated 
the regulations because they had used the land before, albeit periodically 
and not permanently. The government put a stop to what it considered 
clandestine cultivation by conducting cadastral surveys to gain an insight 
into the scale and nature of land ownership. Typical of the much more 
intensive involvement of the European authorities in the peasant economy 
was the reform of the tax system. This started in Cianjur in 1889, in the 
form of an experiment with a land tax, based on cadastral surveys, and was 
extended to the largest part of the Priangan two years later with the issue 
of a new land rent ordinance. The new system recorded the size, type and 
yield of all cultivated acreage. For the sawah owners this meant a tax on the 
yield, while for dry f ields it was more of a tax on the land itself.
Denying the peasants access to more land than they used on a permanent 
basis served another colonial purpose, by allowing large areas to be leased to 
Western enterprises. The ‘waste’ lands that the state had requisitioned would 
in the decades that followed be issued to large agribusinesses at extremely 
favourable terms to produce crops for which there was a growing demand 
on the global market. The main product of these private corporations was 
tea, and the Priangan became one of the most important production areas. 
This development was slow at f irst but gathered momentum at the end of the 
nineteenth century. Like coffee, tea was a perennial crop and was planted 
in gardens when introduced by the government by way of experiment in the 
early 1830s. But, where coffee would eventually disappear from the region, 
tea production expanded steadily in the late-colonial period. In the middle 
of the century, only a small number of tea estates of no great size were in 
business in the whole residency. They were managed by a state-appointed 
administrator who was responsible for the planting, picking and processing 
of the crop. Holle started his career as a tea planter in 1858 when he was 
appointed administrator of one of these estates. Operating these leased 
enterprises proved so unsuccessful that the government decided in 1862 to 
deregulate the tea industry completely. Holle anticipated this policy change 
by applying the year before for a concession to set up a private tea plantation 
on uncultivated land that was leased to him. He f inanced this project with 
credit from the recently established Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank, 
thanks to the intercession of a member of his family by marriage. The 
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loan he contracted illustrated the important role that mercantile capital 
from the metropolis would play in the development of large-scale private 
agro-industry in the following decades. Holle also showed an interest in 
taking over coffee gardens to continue operating them on a private basis. 
The government turned down his proposal, having shown itself earlier to be 
unwilling to leave the cultivation of coffee to European entrepreneurs, as it 
had done with tea. In the mid-1850s, a request from a group of businessmen 
united in the West-Java Koff ie Cultuur Maatschappij for a concession that 
would have laid claim to a very large tract of land, was rejected out of hand 
without even being considered (Goedhart 1948: 48).
Wasada tea estate in the hills above Garut, owned by K.F. Holle (photo pre-1874)
source: kitLv Collection
Holle had little diff iculty in f inding suff icient labour to come and work 
and live at Waspada, his tea plantation on a mountainside south of Garut. 
According to his many admirers, this was because he was a generous and 
compassionate patron. However, I would like to suggest that the increasing 
pressure on agrarian resources had reached such a point that shortage of 
land for cultivation had forced more and more peasants to seek a living 
beyond the village and stop growing their own food. Holle’s coolie workforce 
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settled on the estate and were given shelter on a small plot of land. They 
did not grow paddy, as they received a ration of rice every fourteen days as 
a supplement to their monthly cash wage. By paying them for piecework, 
Holle was assured of reaching his daily target, because without this incen-
tive his workers would not perform their work regularly. He allowed them 
four free days a year and punished those who took unauthorized leave by 
docking two days’ pay. I do not present these facts to harm the reputation 
of ‘the benefactor of Waspada’ as an employer, but only to illustrate that he 
ran his plantation little differently from other tea planters of his time. The 
‘peasant’s friend’ left little doubt that he considered the natives, in terms 
of economic mentality, simply inferior to Westerners, as a passage from his 
annual report to the Handelsbank shows.
... that the greatest obstacle to free labour lies not in the unchangeable 
nature of the native, but that, although much can be achieved with 
humane treatment and the application of sound economic principles, 
the fact remains that, because of the climate and his frailer physical 
build, he does not work as hard as a European workman. (Holle 1869: 11)45
In 1868 the Waspada estate kampung had 512 inhabitants, larger than most 
peasant localities in the Priangan. The emergence of more and more of these 
new coolie colonies testified to the advent of large-scale private agribusiness 
and its enormous expansion as time progressed. In 1870 only 3,385 bahu in 
the residency were in the hands of European agricultural ventures. By 1890, 
however, this had risen to 63,582 bahu, exploited by around 100 enterprises 
on the basis of long-term lease contracts. This explosive growth continued 
into the new century, so that by 1926 private agribusiness in the Priangan 
was in full swing, controlling 309,616 bahu. A large part of this land, which 
was no longer at the disposal of the native peasantry, was taken up by tea 
plantations, while rubber estates had emerged in the lower-lying areas 
(Scheltema 1927-28: 298). This agro-industrial development was made pos-
sible by ensuring that there would be an adequate supply of coolies to work 
on the plantations. And this was the f inal reason for the introduction of the 
Agrarian Law in 1870. It was an argument that had also been put forward in 
45 In her colonial novel The Tea Lords (1992), Hella S. Haasse painted a romantic picture of life 
on the tea plantations in the second half of the nineteenth century. The company coolies form 
part of the backdrop for her portrayal of the tea barons during this period, which is known in 
Dutch colonial history as tempo duluh (the old times). Haasse fails, however, to show the harder 
aspects of the labour system introduced by the f irst generation of tea planters.
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the correspondence of the founders and managers of the cultivation system. 
While persisting in public that the main motivation was to improve the 
lives of the native population, Baud laid out in a private letter to Van den 
Bosch at the start of 1831 why it was necessary to maintain a large class of 
landless peasants.
The unequal distribution of worldly possessions is the only means of 
coercion that will ensure that the large working class will be willing to 
work for the richer classes at a low wage; a general process of levelling 
would mean the disappearance of this class, each individual would plant 
his own crops and all large-scale enterprises would fail of its own accord. 
(Westendorp Boerma II, 1956: 50-1)46
Denying the villagers of the Priangan access to uncultivated land villages 
thus meant not only that they no longer had a reserve to help ensure they 
could grow suff icient food to meet their basic needs but also that, in the 
long term, a pool of labour became available that private enterprises could 
make use of on vary favourable terms – low wages and without regular 
employment contracts.
The agrarian underclasses
As documented in earlier chapters, the predicament of the agrarian un-
derclasses remained underexposed in the late-colonial literature partly 
because the government’s attention was focused one-sidedly on the owners 
of land as the main target for collecting taxes. The preoccupation of policy-
makers with the better-off peasantry is reflected in the data gathered over 
time on the native population and how they lived. Reports on the impact 
of the administrative and agrarian reforms of 1870 on the land-poor and 
landless classes in the Priangan are equally scarce. It is important to note 
that these segments had been present in the rural economy before the 
colonial era and their existence cannot therefore be attributed to colonial 
rule as such. Native society was traditionally based on unequal access to 
land as a way of allowing the privileged classes to lay claim to the labour 
of deprived groups. The more that colonial authorities learned about the 
peasant landscape in which they were operating, the more visible this 
46 Westendorp Boerma, J.J., Briefwisseling tussen J. van den Bosch en J.C. Baud, part II, Utrecht 
1956.
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underside became. Commissioner-General Van den Bosch thus wrote in 
his well-known ‘Memoir’:
Among the Javanese there is a large class of proletarians. Disinclined to 
engage in an enduring employment relationship, they roam the land, 
working when they have the opportunity, otherwise stealing and robbing, 
such that they pose a genuine danger to the public order. Veth included 
this observation in his work on Java, adding: ‘It is these vagabonds, who 
only become orang menumpang when they f ind regular work in the des-
sas, that are responsible for the rough gaga cultivation in the mountains, 
which leads to such reckless destruction of the forests’. (Quoted in Veth 
I, 1875: 660)
It has already been noted that especially land-poor peasants and landless 
labourers were set to work in the coffee gardens. According to a report 
from the Resident of the Priangan Regencies in 1861, in every village in 
his district there was a class of batur or bujang who acknowledged their 
employer as their lord and master and did everything he ordered them to 
do. Their bosses made use of these servants to perform the corvee services 
they were obliged to provide as landowners.
Did the colonial tax system bring about any change in the social composi-
tion of the peasant order? This is a diff icult to answer question, due to a 
lack of empirical evidence, but it is reasonable to assume that the increasing 
pressure to produce greater and greater quantities of coffee exacerbated 
existing inequalities rather than relieved them. Class differentiation among 
the peasantry was accompanied by large-scale and persistent mobility. Van 
den Bosch, who had combated pauperism in the metropolis early in his 
career by deporting the undeserving poor, vagabonds and paupers to penal 
institutions, encountered a social underclass in the colony equally unwilling 
to submit to the authority of the government. The Governor-General settled 
for the same remedy, ordering the confinement of:
... all persons who, by their footloose behaviour, idleness and bad conduct, 
have proved themselves to be harmful to society, without having com-
mitted a specif ic crime, for a maximum of ten years in a penal labour 
institution (Westendorp Boerma 1950: 113-4).47
47 Idem, Een geestdriftig Nederlander. Amsterdam 1950.
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The approach was clearly inspired by Van Sevenhoven’s plans to form a pool 
of unpaid labour which the colonial government could make use of as it 
wished. In his 1856 village monograph, Kinder de Camarecq noted that the 
native population was strikingly unattached to the places where they lived. 
Almost half of the inhabitants of Sembir, the location of his survey, came 
from elsewhere (1861: 269). This shows that mobility was also widespread 
before the administrative reorganization. It is very doubtful whether the 
pass system introduced in 1816 hampered the roaming around of the class 
of landless peasants. But the power to grant or deny permission to leave the 
settlement – even for a short time, let alone move permanently – certainly 
increased the authority of the native chiefs. The abolition of the obligation 
to report on all movements in 1863 occurred at the suggestion of former 
Resident of the Priangan Regencies Van der Wijck. Appointed to the Council 
of the Indies, he had advocated that the owners of agribusinesses be allowed 
to recruit the labour they needed from wherever they could f ind them. 
Defenders of the cultivation system called in vain for the pass system to 
be maintained to prevent people from moving elsewhere, temporarily or 
permanently, to evade their obligations to provide labour services. Yet sup-
porters of free enterprise also expressed their concerns about the transition 
to a labour regime based not on settled peasants, but on a class of footloose, 
unreliable and undisciplined land-poor and landless labourers.
Free labourers are mainly taken from this class of people, who are on a 
very low rung of morality. They like to play games, dice, are addicted to 
opium and seek the company of dancing girls. In order to satisfy these 
passions they have to go in search of employment or steal. The coolie 
establishments for transporting goods usually employ such footloose 
folk. Factories and enterprises also have to use them to do work that 
settled peasants are not obliged to perform. ... [These people] are of a 
much lower calibre than the settled peasants who perform compulsory 
labour, and may God preserve us from too many of these free labourers. 
(Hasselman 1862: 32)
This deep mistrust of unattached labour, nomadic at the foot of the agrarian 
economy, would return later in the century in denunciations of the brazen 
intractability of the coolies contracted for work in the plantation belt which 
emerged on the east coast of Sumatra. The only way to confine this ‘riffraff 
and scum’, recruited from the rural regions of Java, in the straitjacket of the 
plantation and impose discipline on them was to threaten them with penal 
sanctions (Breman 1987b). It did not go this far in the Priangan, but the 
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residency authorities did receive a request from the agro-industrial lobby 
in 1876 to allow measures to punish deserting coolies more severely. The 
new policy of deregulating ordinances restricting or, vice versa, compel-
ling labour mobility followed on from an earlier decision by the colonial 
government to no longer extend off icial support to private entrepreneurs 
in their efforts to recruit seasonal labour. This had long been standing 
practice, as shown by the instruction to the Resident of Cirebon to send 
bujang to the lands around Batavia to work in the sugar mills. Nicolaus 
Engelhard had already opposed the annual requisition of labour in 1794 
because of the coercion that accompanied it (De Haan IV, 1912: 79-80). This 
intercession by the government came to an end in 1834 when it became 
clear that forced recruitment in the regions where the mobilized labourers 
lived had repeatedly caused unrest. Settled peasants obliged to take part in 
this migratory form of labour could exempt themselves by paying a sum of 
money and designating a substitute. The costs however increased until the 
pay-off amounted to thirty guilders, a buffalo team, a quantity of paddy and 
a sack of cotton. Moreover, many of these migratory labourers, an army of 
4,000 men who were under contract for a year, often deserted en route. The 
owners of the agribusinesses were informed that, in the future, they would 
have to f ind their own labour force, just as the Chinese owners of the sugar 
mills were accustomed to doing.
The above shows that the reorganization of governance and coffee culti-
vation in the Priangan was part of a wider package of reforms that marked 
the transition to a system of colonial exploitation based on the free market. 
Bonded labour, which had been the basis of the cultivation system, made 
way for encouraging the voluntary supply of labour, while the previous 
policy of immobilization was replaced by a focus on promoting mobility 
both geographically and between sectors. Under this liberalized economy, 
the existing gap between the higher and lower classes widened. The grow-
ing inequality within the peasant economy was partly a consequence of 
the commercialization of food production, which led to the concentration 
of farmland in the hands of large-scale landowners, at the expense of less 
prosperous households. It was a trend further strengthened by preventing 
the native population from using uncultivated land. This was a restriction 
that especially affected land-poor peasants for whom tilling dry f ields was 
one of the only ways they could preserve their independence from large 
landowners and to move up on the social ladder. One clear indication of 
the steadily increasing pressure on agrarian resources was the worsening 
of conditions for sharecropping during the f inal quarter of the nineteenth 
century, to which Scheltema had drawn attention (1927-28: 332-3; see also 
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Economie van de desa, residentie Preanger Regentschappen IXa, OMW, 
1907: 9). The unfavourable circumstances in which petty landowners now 
found themselves were exacerbated by the fact that they had to perform 
more corvee services than would have been the case if the work imposed on 
the desa as a collectivity had been distributed more evenly. Surrendering 
all their possessions was the most radical solution, when the burden of 
landownership outweighed the benef its. This consideration explained 
why:
... the owners of small plots of farmland, especially if it was lower quality 
dry soil, often preferred to dispose of their land and become panumpang 
or bujang at a European agri-enterprise than to continue to have to 
provide corvee services. (Velders 1909: 87-8)
What means of subsistence were available to the growing rural proletariat 
in the new economy that was now emerging? As before, they continued to 
be dependent on the better-off peasant class, for whom they continued to 
work as day-labourers, farm servants or sharecroppers. They supplemented 
this by performing corvee services for the colonial government, imposed 
as a tribute in the form of labour in addition to the land tax. They were 
obliged to perform these activities either at the orders of their patrons or 
as paid substitutes for others. Outside the village and native agriculture 
they formed a floating pool of labour for the infrastructural projects now 
being undertaken on a large scale, especially building roads, bridges and 
railways. These were labour-intensive public works which reflected the 
progressive opening up of the region. Although they stimulated the growth 
of trade, transport and services, the land-poor and landless classes in the 
Priangan also benefited, even though their access to these new forms of 
economic activity never extended further than to their employment as a 
casual and unskilled workforce. Lastly, from among their ranks emerged 
the great mass of coolie labourers who were employed by large-scale private 
agribusinesses, of which Holle’s tea plantation was an early example. As 
this summary clearly shows, the large majority of land-poor and landless 
inhabitants of the Priangan, with their roots in the lowest echelons of the 
agrarian hierarchy, continued to be confined at the bottom of the more 
diversif ied rural economy both within and beyond the village, and were 
paid an extremely meagre wage. Released from a sedentary existence based 
on subordination and bondage, this underclass was condemned to circulate 
permanently between irregular, unskilled forms of employment based 
on hard capitalist principles. This made them behave with indifference 
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and unpredictability that seemed to justify the negative opinion of them 
expressed by the expatriate managers of the agricultural estates.
In the Priangan Regencies you will often hear not a single complaint 
about anything, not even a murmur, and then the permanent employees 
of an enterprise will suddenly up and leave, and not a few at a time; in 
other words, all of the day-labourers will simply not turn up for work. If 
you then instigate an inquiry, they will say that something came up and 
they found this the easiest way to free themselves of their obligations; in 
the environs of Batavia there is – or was until recently – in some areas 
such a floating population, mostly in the higher parts of the country, and 
preferably in the forested mountains. Because of their constant roaming 
around, they are known as burung, or orang bunjaga or names with a 
similar meaning. They are averse to all outside interference, except by 
their leaders or seniors, and it is very diff icult to get them to perform any 
kind of regular work. The greatest caution is required or they fly away, 
like the burung or birds that they are. (Riesz I, 1883: 100)
This is the classic f light behaviour of a proletarianized class. The manage-
ment of the large-scale agribusinesses responded to this tendency to run 
away to avoid having to comply with the onerous and badly paid work 
regime by demanding heavy punishments for desertion (Ministry for the 
Colonies, mail reports 1876, no. 616). The complaint was that coolies who 
refused to provide the agreed labour services in exchange for earnest money 
or an advance were in breach of their contract.
The price of labour, which continued to be kept at a low level in the period 
before and shortly after the turn of the century (20 to 25 cents a day for 
men, 15 cents for women and 7 cents for children) contrasted sharply with 
the high returns that capital enjoyed from the development of the region 
(Economie van de desa, residentie Preanger Regentschappen IXa, OMW, 
1907: 69-71). The same source reported that coolie wages had stagnated at the 
same low level for at least the preceding twenty years. The administrative 
and agrarian reforms of 1870 paved the way for the release of labour from 
corvee services in the decades that followed but the progress made in this 
respect did little to improve the lot of many inhabitants of the region in any 
signif icant way. The system based on coercion may have been exchanged 
for one based on free labour, but in both cases the mobilization of a large 
part of the native population remained limited to subsidiary work, in a 
manner causing the lowest damage possible to what was and remained 
their prior concern, the provisioning of suff icient food for their own needs. 
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Where spatial mobility had previously focused on uninhabited areas and 
the cultivation of wilderness as a means of escaping the pressure exercised 
by overly harsh masters, migrants now went in search of wage labour in the 
large-scale agribusinesses. The Onderzoek Mindere Welvaart (Diminishing 
Welfare Investigations) instigated at the start of the twentieth century 
showed that footloose labour was the order of the day in the Priangan.
... a class of drifting nomads among the native population and known 
to them as jelema tihang hejo, that is, people who never took the trouble 
to settle down in a somewhat sustainable dwelling, migrants in the 
broadest sense of the word. (Economie van de desa, residentie Preanger 
Regentschappen IXa, OMW, 1907: 7)
This mobility was not vertical but horizontal, as it was as good as impos-
sible to move upward from the lowest rung of the social ladder. In the tea 
gardens the footloose peasants were only eligible for work that required no 
or very few skills, such as picking and sorting the leaves, as practised but 
unskilled labour in the gardens, factories and transport, drivers, carpenters 
and bricklayers for the maintenance of roads, or as smiths to make and 
repair agricultural tools, tea-chest makers, basket weavers, cart-drivers, 
for delivering wood for burning and for carpentry, etc. Almost the only one 
who rose above this was the mandur or foreman, praised as the ‘right-hand 
of the manager’, but who was not entrusted with any form of f inancial 
management for fear that he lacked the integrity for such a responsibility. 
In addition, they also worked as warung holders and pasar traders, but only 
on a small scale. They were cart-drivers but not transport entrepreneurs, 
simple craftsmen with few tools and no match for the much better equipped 
Chinese artisans. Compared with half a century earlier, the purchasing 
power of the population had hardly increased and the ongoing contraction 
of the native economy had not been reversed.
One of the questions in the Onderzoek Mindere Welvaart (OMW) held 
in the early twentieth century was: ‘What articles produced by the Native 
population are in no respect at all inferior to the same articles produced 
elsewhere?’ The answers were very telling: according to experts on the 
Priangan economy, the limited range of native craft products were either 
too expensive or of inferior quality (OMW, Overzicht Inlandsche Handel en 
Nijverheid, VIb 1909). The circulation of money may have been given a new 
impetus but it is very arguable whether it had led to any real progress. Since 
cottage or home-based industry had disappeared during the era of forced 
cultivation, the native population had no other choice than to buy cheap 
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imported clothing, pottery and other consumer goods from Chinese retail-
ers. It would therefore be premature to see the presence of such goods even 
in the households of the lowest classes as an indication that their economic 
situation had improved. The abridged extracts from the Colonial Reports 
between 1849 and 1908, included in the overview in annex 7 of the MWO, 
show clearly that native trade in the Priangan Regencies had stagnated at 
a very low level. The reports were equally damning about local artisanal 
production. It was therefore not surprising that a subsidiary report (IX) was 
added to the results of the MWO in which native respondents themselves 
identif ied laxity as the main reason why the population remained in a 
state of deprivation.
The economic and social system that had evolved in the Priangan Regen-
cies was met with approval by those at its top, since the duality that had 
become visible confirmed the prevailing stereotypical perspective why the 
superior segment should gain and how the losses of the inferior segment 
were caused by their own defects. It was the essence of a speech which Dr J. 
Bosscha delivered to the members of the Sukabumi Agricultural Association 
in April 1909. He gave a concise summary of what had become the tenet of 
modern-colonial ideology. After explaining why the natives simply lacked 
the capacities required to become estate owners themselves – because of 
their insuff icient intelligence, absence of eff iciency, perseverance and so 
on – and that it would be better for them to remain in the slot that had been 
allotted to them, he went on to proclaim that:
A land will only achieve the highest level of prosperity when there is a 
harmonious relationship between capital, intellect and labour. It is a 
completely erroneous policy to wish to transform the latter, which is 
needed in the greatest quantity, into the other two. It would be equal to an 
army in which the largest proportion is made up of generals. The prosper-
ity that is undeniably to be found in areas where there is much industry, 
and the tea industry in particular, would be substantially diminished if 
the happy relationship between the three classes were to be destroyed. 
Everywhere on Java, where this exists, the people are prosperous and 
there is no hunger; the three classes work together and protect each 
other. The worker provides labour, the intelligent class organizes the 
work, and the capital bears the risk. All enjoy the fruits of this endeavour. 
(Velders 1909: 22-3)
Bosscha sketched a process of dependent development that captured 
the character of the transformation that had taken place in the Sunda 
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highlands. This late-colonial pattern had its own dynamics, exemplif ied 
by a political economy in which those who made up the bottom segments 
remained stuck in subordination. For those who were in control, it was a 
prof itable enterprise, but they allowed the labouring classes nothing more 
than a coolie existence. It was a development the foundations for which had 
been laid in the early-colonial era.
 Epilogue: Servitude as the road to 
progress
The cultivation system gave a powerful boost to the production of export 
crops on Java for the world market between 1830 and 1870. The notion that 
colonial economy and society changed radically in this relatively short 
period is correct, but is incomplete unless qualif ied with the understand-
ing that the regime of forced labour that formed the cornerstone of this 
economy had disrupted the peasant order for much longer, especially in the 
Priangan Regencies. The suggestion that the system of forced cultivation 
and delivery of coffee in this region must be considered an early precursor 
to the cultivation system can be reversed, by stating that what developed 
in the hinterland of Batavia in the early eighteenth century developed into 
a pattern of servitude that a hundred years later coerced the population in 
much of Java into serving the interests of the mother country. Between 1831 
and 1866, annual remittances by the government of the East Indies during 
the era of the cultivation system amounted to some 500 million guilders. 
This is a conservative estimate of the prof its that the mother country 
enjoyed from the colony. Recent studies, such as those by Van Zanden and 
Van Riel (2000) and Gordon (2009), mention much higher amounts. Besides 
paying off its debts,48 the Dutch state used these public revenues generated 
overseas to f inance large infrastructural works at home, including the 
building of railways, and exempted the metropolitan bourgeoisie from 
paying an income tax.. On top of this drain from the colony came the profits, 
savings, revenues from the sales of possessions and cultivation commission 
that expatriates (planters, merchants and civil servants) sent or brought 
home with them. Although criticism of the regime of overseas exploitation 
and repression, which drew its main political support from the growing 
metropolitan bourgeoisie, gathered momentum after the middle of the 
nineteenth century, it largely focused on the government’s monopoly on 
the cultivation and delivery of colonial goods. Despite the ripples caused by 
Multatuli, sympathy with the lot of the mass of peasants in the colony was 
48 The surplus earned through unfree labour in the East Indies was also used to buy the freedom 
of slaves in the West Indies in 1863. In Surinam, planters were paid 300 guilders per slave to 
compensate for the loss of their property. The release of some 33,000 slaves cost the state of the 
Netherlands less than ten million guilders. Apart from their manumission, the slaves themselves 
did not receive any compensation.
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subordinate to the desire to reign in the exclusive control of the colonial 
bureaucracy and create greater scope for private enterprise. The proponents 
of economic liberalism in the second half of the nineteenth century were 
unanimously critical of the merits of the cultivation system. A century later, 
a number of studies had been published that took a slightly more cautious 
and apologist approach.
This revisionist tendency, in my view related to a school of colonial his-
tory with a pronounced statist character, is the main thrust of the work of 
Van Niel, Fasseur and Elson, published in the f inal quarter of the twentieth 
century.49 It is certainly not the case that these authors, by contrast to 
earlier accounts that decry the cultivation system, tend to speak only in 
laudatory terms of what policy-makers intended and practised on Java in 
the mid-nineteenth century. But their favourable assessments are f irmly 
focused on the management of the colonial enterprise. Van Niel and Fasseur 
in particular remain far removed from the workfloor and the readers of their 
studies learn very little of how the system affected the peasants on Java. 
Fasseur is aware of the one-sidedness of this approach, explaining it in the 
foreword to his thesis. He is primarily interested in how the policy-makers 
both in the metropolis and in the colony responded to the forces unleashed 
by the cultivation system. In his view, this question excludes in advance 
highlighting the impact from an Indonesian perspective. He adds that such 
an approach would be possible only on the basis of studies that would do 
justice to the local context. In this way, he identif ies an altogether different 
dichotomy that has nothing to do with adopting a Dutch or an Indonesian 
perspective, but with the choice to either focus on the interests of the local 
population or those of the government. Fasseur clearly gives preference to 
the latter. He repeats the argument adopted by Van Niel, namely that the 
great local variation renders it virtually impossible to reach conclusions 
that can be generalized. Van Niel emphasizes that what was presented as 
a system actually disintegrated in practice into an ‘interlocking set of local 
accommodations’. Elson started his study of the cultivation system and its 
longer-term impact by investigating the cultivation of sugarcane in the 
49 ‘Java under the cultivation system’ (1992) is a compilation of essays published by Van Niel 
on this subject over a period of more than 20 years. After his thesis Kultuurstelsel en koloniale 
baten (1975), Fasseur edited a compilation of contributions on the cultivation system by various 
authors, including himself, entitled Geld en geweten (1980). In ‘Javanese peasants and the colonial 
sugar industry: Impact and change in an East Java residency, 1830-1940’ (1984), Elson limited 
himself to developments in one region during and after the introduction of forced cultivation. 
In ‘Village Java under the Cultivation System, 1830-1870’ (1994), he expanded his analysis to the 
whole of Java, taking account of an enormous quantity of archival resources.
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eastern corner of Java. In doing so, he was responding to the standpoint that 
a regional approach is necessary to understand how the regime of forced 
labour operated. This is, however, not the full story as Elson believes that 
it is certainly possible and even desirable to draw conclusions about the 
cultivation system that transcend local differences. The observation about 
the lack of uniformity as emphasized by Van Niel and Fasseur is – in the 
light of a whole series of contrasts between plains and hilly areas, different 
population densities and social structures, divergent forms of governance, 
widely varying agricultural practices, etc. – self-evident rather than striking. 
Despite the specifics of the many different contexts, however, it is important 
to address the question of how the peasant order on Java experienced the 
colonial regime. Elson answers this question in a comprehensive and 
deeply researched follow-up study, but in which he does not succumb to 
the tendency to emphasize the differences rather than the similarities. The 
quotations with which he opens his introduction do stress the diversity 
that confronted those charged with implementing the cultivation system, 
a differentiation that only intensif ied as the chosen course was pursued. 
It is interesting that he justif ies extending his analysis to the whole of 
Java by stating that all historians aspire to draw general conclusions. This 
statement places Elson not so far from the conclusions that Van Niel and 
Fasseur draw from their studies. Important as it is, the couleur locale that 
they drew explicit attention to earlier disappears at the end when they have 
to f ind an answer to the question whether the colonized peasantry ben-
ef ited or suffered from the cultivation system. All three reach the obvious 
conclusion that the lion’s share of the profits from the system flowed into 
the Netherlands’ national coffers, but they also all agree that the increase 
in production brought more benefits than harm to the peasants on Java. 
Their shared parti pris is squarely opposed to my own assessment that the 
large majority of successive generations of coffee cultivators in the Sunda 
highlands remained immersed in poverty and suffered severely under the 
regime of forced labour to which they were exposed in the period covered 
by my study (1720 to 1870), initially with the introduction of the Priangan 
system and later under its extension as part of the cultivation system.50
Van Niel is very resolute in his belief that the system benefited the local 
population, though he does admit that the larger peasant owners benefited 
50 The positive reappraisal of the impact of forced cultivation on the situation of the native 
population has not gone unnoticed in recent Dutch colonial historiography. De Jong, for example, 
welcomes the breakthrough of the revisionist perspective and is satisf ied to conclude that it 
has f inally put paid to earlier critical assessments (De Jong 1998: 203-25).
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at the expense of the classes that owned less land or none at all. As before, 
the land-poor and landless classes remained dependent on the better-off 
segments in the village system (Van Niel 1990: 87). In his considered view, 
however, the quality of life improved across the board under the cultivation 
system, a leap upwards that was even more striking when, after the regime 
of forced labour was abolished, the situation of the local people became 
worse rather than better.
Current research into prosperity in Javanese villages tends to support the 
idea that there was more material wealth in Java during the Cultivation 
System than in the years following its demise. (Van Niel 1992: 214)
Fasseur appears to agree with Van Niel’s verdict, supported by his calcula-
tion that the planters were paid more in wages than was imposed on them 
in the form of land rent. The increased purchasing power meant that the 
common people were now able to buy goods that used to be beyond their 
reach. Fasseur does admit that the planters in the Priangan, where most 
of the coffee was produced, were paid much less than their counterparts 
elsewhere on Java, but this was compensated for by the fact that they were 
exempt from land rent (Fasseur 1980: 124, note 39). Apart from the extremely 
low wage that the Priangan peasants received for their labour, Fasseur 
completely ignores the fact that they also had to surrender a f ifth share 
of their paddy yield to the local chiefs, which in itself was higher than the 
land rent introduced by the government. Another factor that distorts the 
arguments of both Van Niel and Fasseur is that they focus more on the 
cultivation of sugarcane than on coffee. Yet Fasseur himself reports f igures 
that show that coffee was by far the more important crop. Besides the fact 
that coffee generated much more income for the Dutch national coffers than 
sugar, the impact on the local population was also much greater, with two 
and a half to three times more households involved in the forced cultivation 
of the crop between 1840 and 1860 (Fasseur 1975, annex 1). In 1850 56 per 
cent of the peasants in Java were assigned to the forced cultivation of coffee 
while in the same year only 21 per cent were engaged in growing surgarcane. 
This severely unequal burden on labour weighed even more heavily because 
coffee had already been produced for more than a century – primarily in the 
Priangan – when the peasants living on the plains of Java were subjected 
to the forced cultivation of sugarcane.
The criticism of devoting insuff icient attention to the huge army of 
conscripted labour employed in coffee cultivation cannot be aimed at 
Elson. Although his f irst study focuses on the importance of sugarcane, 
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for his analysis of Java as a whole he extended his study to coffee, the crop 
that generated four-f ifths of the colonial prof its. Elson does not dismiss 
lightly the heavy burden imposed on the hundreds of thousands of peasants 
mobilized to grow this important export crop, nor does he fail to mention 
many of the abuses that the system gave rise to. Where the coffee regime 
was far less oppressive and the peasants received a much better price for the 
beans, as in the eastern regions of Java, there was more scope for improving 
living conditions and those of the land-poor and landless classes did not 
deteriorate as they did for their counterparts in the Priangan. Elson ends 
his argument by drawing up the balance of the cultivation system, noting 
the strictures and disadvantages, but concluding that its overall effects 
were positive. He rejects the claim that forced cultivation brought poverty, 
asserting the opposite, that ‘the Cultivation System promoted a previously 
unknown level of general prosperity among the peasantry’ (Elson 1994: 
305). He appeals to his statistics to show that this applies equally to the 
cultivation of coffee.
They indicate the presence, through forced coffee cultivation, of enormous 
amounts of disposable income in the hands of the peasantry, something 
that could not have occurred on so a large scale in the years before 1830. 
Forced labour it was, and cheaply paid to boot, but it was income which 
would not otherwise have been realised. (ibid.: 314)
I would like to counter this argument by pointing out that, during this 
period, there was no substantial increase in the circulation of money in the 
Priangan. The residency reports repeatedly noted the low level of monetiza-
tion of the peasant economy, which was undoubtedly largely due to the low 
wage of only a few cents a day. I will return later to the main conclusion 
from Elson’s argument – the same with which Van Niel and Fasseur close 
their studies. But f irst I would like to refer to two side arguments that 
Elson uses to support his conclusions. The f irst suggests that the cultivation 
of coffee did not require the requisition of land owned and used by the 
peasants. Secondly, he claims that the regime of forced labour may have 
reduced the opportunities for other sources of employment and income – as 
any remaining time had to be used to produce suff icient food – but that 
this disadvantage was considerably outweighed by the peasants’ increased 
purchasing power. In the previous chapters, I have disputed the validity 
of both these claims in respect of the Priangan. Colonial off icials in this 
region refused time and again to accept that the peasants were able to 
satisfy what was their main concern: to produce enough staple food. Year 
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after year, the residency reports noted the inadequate quantities of rice 
available to feed the population. There must have been almost no time 
at all to grow secondary crops like pulses and vegetables, so important 
for a balanced diet. What had initially been introduced as a subsidiary 
activity – planting a few coffee shrubs that required little maintenance 
close to their homes – and which in the eyes of the colonial administrators 
was easy to combine with the time and energy required to grow food, soon 
evolved into a heavy burden. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, 
an instruction was issued to increase the stock of coffee trees to 1,000 per 
planter. This excessive burden was dictated from above to meet the growing 
demand on the world market, with no awareness at all of the amount of 
labour it required. It was now no longer only the male head of the household 
who was exposed to the regime of forced labour. It was taken for granted 
that the women and children would help to grow the coffee. Such a massive 
increase in the burden of labour could not but have a far-reaching impact 
on the structure of the household and the distribution of labour within 
it, for example, on the social and economic position of the women. Elson 
has no problem admitting that women and children were mobilized en 
masse in the forced cultivation of crops (1994: 205). In his view, however, 
this added burden had an emancipatory effect as it brought to an end the 
conf inement of the women to the household and thereby represented a 
breakthrough in the gendered division of labour. This begs the question of 
whether his convoluted conclusion also applies to the enormous increase 
in child labour. The highly intensif ied burden on peasant labour was not a 
point of discussion in early-colonial reports. It was imposed from higher up 
in the form of orders and instructions and those in power expressed their 
displeasure if the quotas were not met, ranted about the excessive laziness of 
the peasants and the lack of pliability of the local chiefs, without concerning 
themselves with the causes of their reluctance. Statements of a more critical 
nature were an exception in off icial documents. Such as the question posed 
by Muntinghe in one of his many memoranda of how a farmer back in the 
Netherlands would respond if told to make do with half, a quarter or even a 
tenth part of his yield. The more the regime of unfreedom became accepted 
as normal, the rarer such attempts to challenge its premises became. By 
then, the notion of the colonized subject as having completely different 
standards to those that prevailed in the West had become well established. 
He was seen as the ‘Other’, to whom one’s own norms and values do not 
apply. Any appeal also to live by them in the colonial domain was neither 
possible nor desirable. The political and social convictions that had taken 
root in Europe were in principle not valid beyond the metropolis. There was 
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no room for Enlightenment ideals in the exploitation of overseas territories, 
as it had evolved in the Priangan lands from the start of the eighteenth 
century. This meant that Muntinghe, now in his off icial guise as president 
of the Council of Financial Affairs, summarized in an advisory report to 
the Commissioners-General on 4 September 1817 what the essence of the 
coffee regime was and should remain.
Working in the coffee gardens gratis and delivering the crop exclusively 
to the government for the lowest possible price undoubtedly produces 
immediate and the greatest benefits. (Van Deventer 1891: 190)
I now return to the main revisionist argument, the alleged increase in 
purchasing power of the peasants as a result of the far-reaching under-
utilization of their labour power being brought to a resolute end. This is the 
well-known mise-en-valeur thesis that the intervention of the foreign ruler 
was necessary to develop the country and its people, to add value where it 
was absent before. Corroborating what he had written on an earlier occasion 
(1990: 45), Elson referred in his summing up approvingly to a colonial source 
stating that:
if [the land at present planted with coffee] were left to the people for 
the cultivation of other products of native industry ... it can safely be 
accepted that nine-tenths of these lands would remain uncultivated and 
the population would enjoy an insignif icant gain from them. (1994: 314)
This is a stereotypical charge dating back to the VOC era and frequently 
repeated to justify the force employed to commit the native population 
to cultivate and deliver agrarian products. Colonial archivist De Haan, 
who processed a colossal volume of documentation in his four-volume 
work at the beginning of the twentieth century, did not fail to mention a 
single case of abuse by VOC off icials in his imposing retrospective on the 
origins of the Priangan coffee regime. His considered f inal judgment was 
nevertheless that the hard hand of authority may have produced much 
pain and suffering, but that it was unfortunately necessary to instil the 
inhabitants of the Sunda highlands with the economic discipline that they 
lacked. The imperative to work was imposed rigorously from above but, 
given the primitive state of development in which the peasants stagnated, 
there was no better alternative. Indeed, the means justif ied the ends, not 
least because the outcome was in the f inal instance also beneficial to the 
coffee planters themselves. The increase in production was achieved by 
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making eff icient use of time that was available in abundance and had 
previously been spent in idleness. But was there not a disproportionate 
gap between the benef its enjoyed by the Company and the costs to the 
population? Creaming off the surplus, De Haan concluded, simply meant 
combating ostentatious laziness and was therefore an intervention that 
contributed to the progress of civilization.
If one speaks of the disproportionate relationship between the imposition 
of rigorous labour and excessive profits made, it should be noted that this 
discrepancy amounts to a loss of time, and that it is more than doubtful 
whether the peasants would have spent this leisure time on improving 
their lot rather than lazing around. Forced cultivation may not have 
led to advancement, but it can hardly have had a stultifying effect on a 
population so unproductive, cultivators who preferred clearing gaga to 
laying out sawahs. (De Haan III, 1912: 578)
De Haan disagreed with Nicolaus Engelhard who, during his time as com-
missioner for native affairs (1791-98), held the view that ‘the Javanese must 
be driven and beaten to work as though they were animals’. Yet the archivist 
did belong with those who tended to see the early-colonial enterprise as 
essentially a development mission. He readily admitted, however, that it 
took a long time for the beneficial effects of this noble endeavour to become 
visible. But that was to be expected. The work of civilization could not be 
achieved overnight. Did the Netherlands also not owe its success to the 
hard struggle fought tirelessly by our forefathers?
A nation such as ours which has worked day and night, which has fought 
endlessly, which has sacrif iced its material wealth and its blood without 
looking back to maintain its position in the march forwards, should 
truly not f ind it too hard that this Sundanese folk with no marrow or pith, 
created as woodchoppers and water-carriers for stronger races, incapable of 
releasing themselves in an eternity from the grind of a slumbering existence 
in slavish servitude to Chiefs and Princes [my italics], that this Sundanese 
folk, we say, should have been forced to work with their hands at the 
orders of foreign masters and to their benef it to share the blessings 
of a state of civilization, which was only reached in the West through 
centuries of bitter struggle. (De Haan I, 1910: 438-9)
In this mindboggling statement, the racist tone that gave a special sig-
nif icance to the encounter between colonizer and colonized can clearly be 
ePiLoGue: servitude as the road to ProGress 355
heard. And as for the coercion that accompanied this clash, when all was 
said and done it was not really so bad and, in any case, a hard hand was 
necessary to turn these obstinate and slothful subsistence peasants into 
eager, fully f ledged producers. This viewpoint, though undoubtedly domi-
nant, was counterbalanced by a radically dissenting perspective already 
early on in which the coffee gardens of the Priangan were seen as slave 
plantations (P. de Haan 1829).
The idea that forced labour may have been unpleasant but was una-
voidable was an elaboration of the mise-en-valeur notion that had many 
advocates in European metropolises during the late colonial era, even in 
more progressive political circles.51 Native populations had to be denied 
their freedom in order to coach them to progress under strict supervision. 
Discipline as a condition for achieving civilization was the ideology that 
Van den Bosch had felt necessary to combat poverty and pauperization in 
the mother country and to arouse the desire of the Javanese peasants to 
work. The Encyclopaedia Britannica hailed him:
... as a statesman who expanded the poor-relief system and instituted the 
paternalistic Dutch East Indies Culture System, by which vast riches in 
export crops were extracted ... and in which he argued against a liberal 
colonial system and for a strongly paternalistic one, claiming that people 
unaccustomed to a work ethic needed strong guidance. (Accessed on 
27-6-2013)
At f irst sight, then, the royal adviser’s activities in the metropolis and the 
colony were driven by the same motivation: to uplift the people and give 
them prospects for improvement. These parallels led historian Albert 
Schrauwers to label the cultivation system, no less than the pauper colonies 
in the metropolis, as Enlightenment projects in modern state-building.52 
Both were designed by the same policy-maker, Johannes van den Bosch. 
While paupers were seen as work-shy, Javanese peasants refused to produce 
a surplus from which they themselves would be the f irst to benefit. The 
approach applied in the benevolent colonies set up in the mother country 
was of the same order as the pressure to which the people of Java were 
subjected, for their own good – both aimed at advancement to a higher level. 
51 See, for example, Albert Sarraut, La mise en valeur des colonies françaises. Paris 1923.
52 A. Schrauwers, ‘The “Benevolent” Colonies of Johannes van den Bosch: Continuities in the 
Administration of Poverty in the Netherlands and Indonesia’, Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, vol. 43/2, April 2001: 298-328.
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Schrauwers concluded that the methods developed to instil this productive 
virtue among the poor in the metropolis were applied on a broader scale on 
Java. Yet this conclusion also signif ies a turning point in his exposé, as the 
method employed to impose discipline – the exercise of force – does not 
change the fact that the purpose and impact of the two courses of policy 
in metropolis and colony were radically different.
The Cultivation System transformed large parts of Java into a para-
penal institution, an enclaved economy. Whereas the colonists of the 
Benevolent Society [in the metropolis] were allowed to progress as just 
outlined, no such progression was possible in Java under the Cultivation 
System (ibid.: 321)
Since the colony was seen from the very beginning as primarily a source of 
profits for the metropolis, any policy claiming to give priority to the welfare 
of the subaltern population in the colony could do nothing more than pay 
lip service to this enlightened objective.
The colonial mode of production generated not only coffee, but also 
the myth of the ineff icient, defective native who lacked the incentive and 
the capacity to set himself to work, and who therefore had to be as it were 
forced to progress. This viewpoint evolved into a basic principle of colonial 
ideology, justifying and legitimizing unfree labour as an unavoidable 
inconvenience that would benef it also the subjected party, if not in the 
short term then certainly over a longer period. This doctrine of backward-
ness denied the native population the capability for self-development 
because it lacked the economic drive, as embodied in the behaviour of 
Western man. In his thesis (1910) Julius Herman Boeke formulated the 
basic principles of the economic and general social dualism in which he 
characterized the deviant behaviour of the Eastern people, whose limited 
needs should be seen not as a time-bound aberration but a permanent 
feature, leading them to live in self-imposed exclusion with extremely 
low living standards. This dogma would resurface after the completion of 
the decolonization process in the second half of the twentieth century, in 
studies that sought to interpret the underdevelopment of the poorer parts 
of the world as due to internal rather than external conditions. Examining 
the applicability of this proposition in the post-colonial era is far beyond 
the scope of this study. Of relevance, however, is the discussion Goedhart 
devotes to the failure of coffee production as a peasant mode of produc-
tion after the abolition of the Priangan regime in the closing decades of 
the nineteenth century. He summarizes the situation at the end of his 
ePiLoGue: servitude as the road to ProGress 357
book with the observation that the conscripted cultivators had become 
redundant in growing paddy and had not succeeded in evolving into free 
coffee peasants, but offered their services as wage coolies to large-scale 
private agribusinesses. In his view, the transition from peasant-owner to 
wage labourer illustrated the unfortunate incapacity of native producers 
to work on the basis of their own enlightened self-interest (Goedhart 1948: 
232). In this explanation, the victims of unfree labour could only blame 
their own defects if they regressed rather than progressed socially. Where 
the state has evolved in interaction with society, a reasonable balance can 
develop between the two. In the colonial situation, however, the edif ice 
of public power and authority may have exerted considerable pressure 
on social relations, but it was unable to acquire more than a fragile and 
inadequate grip on native society, let alone become embedded in it. In 
the context of an expanding global market, the late-colonial state also 
remained a ‘foreign body’ and assumed a position of domination that 
left no space for countervailing power. Nevertheless, this state apparatus 
was unable to impose its will to govern effectively on the society it ap-
propriated. ‘Seeing like a state’ was eventually also a f iasco in the tropical 
territories of the Netherlands.
I would like to briefly examine the modality employed by the colonial 
authorities to achieve what they had ordered: more and more coffee. The 
prevailing view is that they succeeded in this ambition by making clever 
use of native institutions, customs and values. Before and after Governor-
General Van den Bosch, the directorate of the colonial enterprise created 
the impression that, in implementing their designs, they preferred accom-
modation to confrontation, by taking the situation as they encountered it 
as the starting point for achieving their objectives. And with great success, 
if we are to believe not only their own resolute testimonies but also those 
of outsiders.53 For the production of colonial goods, the authorities relied 
on the traditional servitude of the peasants to their lords. Not interfering 
in the affairs of the native population, including in relations between the 
different social segments or in the long-standing arrangements between 
the lords and the peasants, was sacrosanct. This argument permitted the 
heavy burden of labour imposed on the peasants to be seen as continuing 
53 For example, the study by James William Bayley Money, published in 1861 under the title 
‘Java, or how to manage a colony’, is full of praise. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Clive Day was much more critical. His study, ‘The policy and administration of the Dutch in 
Java‘ (1904), dug more deeply and referred extensively to the available source material. Day took 
no pains to disguise his low opinion of Money’s work.
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a centuries-old practice. It also allowed the myth to arise that a uniform 
system was impossible because it was necessary to take account of local 
differences, which could be preserved rather than disappearing under the 
heavy yoke of uniformity. I found no confirmation for this way of thinking. 
In as far as the assumption of ‘an interlocking set of local accommodations’ 
is accurate, in my view this arose from the incomplete reach of the colonial 
policy-makers. Their inability to change what they encountered, rather than 
respect for local practices and institutions, is a more plausible explanation of 
the limited oversight and even more restricted control of the thinly staffed 
administrative apparatus over the situation at the foot of the colonized 
society. The notion of a progressive process of social levelling resulting 
in a de-differentiated peasant order, as suggested by Geertz (1956, 1963), 
illustrates the extent to which the colonial authorities overestimated the 
impact of their intervention. Despite attempts to hunt down reluctant 
peasants trying to evade their obligations to work, the authorities failed 
to mobilize each and everyone in the Priangan to plant coffee. Conversely, 
it is also necessary to reject the view that everything remained as it was. 
In an earlier publication, I referred to the famed village system on Java as 
an early nineteenth-century invention (Breman 1979) and my opinion has 
not changed since. What colonial history describes as a traditional institu-
tion could often be traced back to regulations and instructions imposed 
from higher up. The actions of the Priangan chiefs, for example, should 
not be seen as those of an established elite, respecting existing forms of 
sovereignty. In examining the significance and role of the native aristocracy, 
I have placed them in the context of the colonial policies of sedentarization, 
territorialization and hierarchization that led to far-reaching changes in 
relations between lords and peasants.
While the introduction of the cultivation system was clearly demarcated, 
its abolition was laborious and not at all transparent. Like most authors, 
I have taken 1870 as the watershed year, as that was the year in which the 
Priangan system of governance was abolished. Despite this, however, the 
compulsion to grow coffee remained for some time, even though it was 
now presented as a form of cultivation that gave priority to the interests of 
the peasant-producers. Various reasons have been given for the somewhat 
puzzling demise of the cultuurstelsel, most of which Fasseur rejects as 
unconvincing (1980: 125-9). He himself tends to explain the phasing out 
of the regime in terms of external circumstances, namely pressure from 
an increasingly vocal lobby of liberal businessmen and politicians in the 
metropolis pushing the government to withdraw from the strictly regulated 
colonial economy. Cees Fasseur disagrees with Wim Wertheim, whose 
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seminal work on the changing fabric of Indonesian society and economy, 
published shortly after decolonization (1956), attributes the disappearance 
of the cultivation system to three causes: the transition from government 
intervention to the free interplay of market forces, shrinking profits from 
government-controlled cultivation, and the impact of Multatuli’s book Max 
Havelaar, which had aroused the public conscience. Fasseur rightly points 
out that Dutch capital initially showed little interest in investing in the 
colony. As time passed, however, this interest became increasingly strong. 
Private and large-scale agribusiness had already started to gain momentum 
before the end of the nineteenth century, and this was to grow into an 
extensive agro-industrial complex in the early decades of the new century. 
Thanks to the new Agrarian Law of 1870, which denied the native population 
access to its own land-base, and helped by a government that leased this 
‘waste’ land, now declared state domain, to Western companies for the long 
term and on very favourable terms, agribusinesses emerged that covered 
much larger areas than the coffee gardens ever had.
Fasseur is more correct in rejecting the notion that the cultivation 
system declined because it generated steadily falling profits. On the basis 
of conservative estimates he calculates that, on the contrary, while remit-
tances from the colony accounted for less than a f ifth share of national 
income in the f irst 20 years, by the 1850s they had risen to nearly a third. 
Colonial goods brought in increasingly high profits, to such an extent that 
this was one reason why it took so long to phase out the system. As elderly 
statesman Baud had astutely observed, Java was and remained the cork 
on which the Dutch economy stayed afloat. The desire to drive up colonial 
prof its to the maximum was matched by a compulsion to save as much as 
possible on the costs of colonial exploitation. No increases in expenditure 
could be proposed or approved which, according to Baud, ‘were not, in the 
strongest sense, strictly necessary’ (Van Deventer III, 1866: 22). Lastly, the 
publication of Multatuli’s critique of the colonial enterprise undoubtedly 
had a considerable impact. Nevertheless, Fasseur concludes with good 
reason that his staunch critique of both liberals and conservatives did not 
meet with a warm reception from the political establishment. The tone of 
this dissenter was considered too sharp, and there was widespread unease 
about why it would be necessary to forfeit such an easy and important 
source of income. This was essentially the same argument Baud had used to 
reject an increase in the meagre wages with which the coffee planters in the 
Priangan were palmed off: why pay more for something you could get for so 
very little? The guilty conscience could be kept in check as long as the profits 
were considered to make a welcome and indispensable contribution to the 
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growth of the Dutch economy. Now and in the distant future, a justif ication 
that also applied to the continuation of colonial domination itself.
If this interpretation does indeed do justice to the policy pursued both in 
the metropolis and the East Indies, how should the demise of the cultivation 
system then be understood? As I have outlined in this study, the causes of 
the decline and fall lay in the regime of unfree labour itself. Denying that 
the peasant population on Java had acquiesced in the forced cultivation and 
delivery of crops for trade runs through my argument like a red thread. I 
am therefore fundamentally in disagreement with authors who recognize 
that the burden on peasant labour was unprecedentedly heavy while 
simultaneously expressing their surprise that the large majority accepted 
their fate with docility. Not only Fasseur, but also Van Niel and Elson (and, 
for example, also Blussé 1984: 80), interpret the situation in this way.
Disturbances of the peace that might have shaken the government awake 
did not occur in this period, with the exception of Banten, which was a 
traditional hotbed of unrest. Baud expressed his surprise in 1847 at the 
‘resignation’ of the people, who lived under the yoke of a system that rode 
roughshod over their rights and institutions. Off icial reports referred to 
only very few instances of active resistance to the cultivation system after 
1840 (there were undoubtedly more cases of passive resistance, but these 
were less easy to identify, unless they took the form of mass desertion). 
(Fasseur 1975: 47)
One of the more remarkable phenomenon [sic] of the mid-nineteenth 
century was the acceptance of the Cultivation System by the Javanese; 
if they did not accept it willingly or gladly they certainly did not protest 
as much or as vehemently as in the later period. Generally speaking 
the period of the 1830s to the 1850s saw little protest of a violent sort 
associated with the System. (Van Niel 1992: 115)
Land f light, sabotage, strikes, public demonstration and other forms of 
resistance and protest are all incidentally acknowledged in Elson’s study 
but they do not add up to much and are also absent from the detailed index. 
‘By far the most common response among peasants, however, was simply 
to make the best of their circumstances’ (Elson 1994: 96).
The Indonesian historian Sartono has contradicted the suggestion that 
disruptions of law and order were peculiar to Banten. He begins his case 
study of that region – a revolt which broke out in 1888 – by pointing out 
that agrarian unrest was endemic and erupted in risings of the peasantry 
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against colonial authority time and again in almost all the residencies of 
Java (Sartono 1966: 1-2). The statements of the colonial historians quoted 
above lead me to characterize their assessments as indicative of a statist 
bias.54 In the f irst place because the authors referred to above understate 
the structural violence used to pressgang the peasants to cultivate the 
compulsory crops and to ensure they continued to do so. Secondly, because 
they fail to acknowledge the resistance that did occur; in the Priangan 
immediately after the introduction of the system and in the period that 
followed, not occasionally but persistently and on a large scale, from high to 
low. Creating the impression that the peasants docilely allowed themselves 
to be set to work for a price that made a mockery of the real value of their 
labour, does no justice to the rich arsenal of evasion techniques, sometimes 
extending to sabotage, obstruction or desertion; and if that had no effect, 
a refusal to work could lead to a confrontation with gang bosses, chiefs or 
colonial off icials. On accepting a chair as professor in the history of Asia, 
Schulte Nordholt observed that the colonial expansion of the Netherlands 
created a state of violence that has only been addressed marginally in ac-
counts of the historiography of the metropolis. His conclusion could hardly 
be more explicit.
It is a misconception to claim that this was only something temporary, a 
closed-off phase in the development towards a presumed state of ‘peace 
and order’. Anyone alleging this does not suff iciently recognize that 
the violence experienced throughout almost the entire archipelago 
established a regime of fear, and that this violence continued to resonate 
in the memories of the people until the end of the colonial era. (Schulte 
Nordholt 2000: 8)
As was to be expected, Fasseur thoroughly disapproved of this judgment. 
In a response a short time later, he accused his colleague of ideological 
54 In an otherwise positive appraisal of the Dutch edition of my book – ‘Breman’s account is 
measured, assured and compelling, a splendid piece of sustained analysis’ – Elson takes issue 
with my criticism of his statist bias (Elson 2011). However, I am not the only one to express this 
reservation of his otherwise excellent study on the impact of the cultivation system on Java’s 
peasantry. Knight, another prominent historian of colonial Indonesia who has mainly researched 
and published on sugarcane production in coastal Java for export, has questioned Elson’s use of 
state archives with a minimum of critical discussion. ‘Village Java under the Cultivation System 
makes so relatively little attempt to critically distance itself from the f igurative colonial archive. 
The vast body of opinion and “data” assembled by colonial off icials in the mid-nineteenth 
century is treated as substantially value free.’ (Knight 1996: 122) For another critical appraisal 
of Elson’s argumentation on similar grounds as mine, see Clarence-Smith 1994: 258-9.
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prejudice, because he did not and could not substantiate his argumenta-
tion empirically (Fasseur 2000: 10). Yet this lack of empirical proof was 
precisely the essence of Schulte Nordholt’s criticisms of the source material 
as recorded in the colonial administration.
Fasseur’s robust allegations are completely compatible with his tendency 
to deny all colonial injustices that cannot be supported by factual evidence. 
But can this position itself not also be seen as ideologically biased? This is 
what Levyssohn Norman argued as early as the middle of the nineteenth 
century, with his statement about the wide discrepancy between the 
sometimes malevolent nature of policy practice and the overly favourable 
way in which it was presented. He illustrated this discrepancy by referring 
to the good intentions that the British interim administration in the early 
nineteenth century claimed for itself and the adverse reality concealed in 
off icial documents.
They all breathe the same spirit of paternal concern for those subject to 
the system and of great philanthropic liberality; yet if one lifts the tip of 
the paper veil, one is surprised at the way in which these mild principles 
are – or rather, are not – put into practice. (Levyssohn Norman 1857: 182)
Such misrepresentation of reality did not of course change after Dutch rule 
in the colony was restored. That is clear, for example, from the series of 
residency reports drawn up in 1840-41 on the punishment of village chiefs 
for failing to perform their duties. Baud, now national adviser on colonial 
affairs, had asked the Governor-General in mid-1840 to inform him about 
the custom of disciplining these local headmen by caning them. He let 
it be known that this form of arbitrary punishment was forbidden and 
would henceforth be treated as a serious abuse of authority. An inquiry 
set up six months later by the attorney-general at the Supreme Court of 
the Dutch East Indies exposed a wide range of punishments the colonial 
authorities used to call village heads to order. They varied from reprimands 
to being detained or condemned to forced labour, sometimes together with 
dismissal. In f ive of the seventeen residences reported on – including the 
Priangan Regencies – caning was one of the common instruments of punish-
ment. One Resident reported that in his area of jurisdiction between 1836 
and 1840 around 1,000 village chiefs had been given punishments of widely 
varying severity and that, in 1840, under his authority, 15 to 20 punishments 
of caning had been meted out in coffee gardens and cane f ields. In his 
commentary on this revelation, Van Deventer pointed out that this form 
of punishment should be seen as inherent to the cultivation system. He 
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alleged that, under this regime, village chiefs were put in the pillory and 
whipped until they bled, sometimes to death. A footnote shows that he was 
by no means exaggerating.
We can cite examples where perpetrators have been given twenty lashes, 
which they did not survive. The evil of lashing in general is exacerbated 
by the different ways in which it can be applied, depending on the degree 
of cruelty of the off icial concerned. (Van Deventer I, 1865: 420)
Fasseur is not interested in paper veils. While others provide evidence that 
there was a state of violence, this colonial historian persists in his claims 
that such accusations are inspired by ideological prejudice.
The conclusion of my argument is that the cultivation system declined 
not as a result of external factors but, despite the frequent and excessive use 
of violence, because of it being undermined from the inside and from the 
bottom up. The army of conscripted labour in the Sunda highlands was no 
longer prepared to do what was mercilessly required of them, to deliver an 
ever-increasing volume of coffee beans. In my view, the throttle to make 
the engine turn over faster and faster eventually proved faulty. Attempts to 
repair it were counterproductive and it became more and more diff icult to 
keep the coffee machine running. Those driving it were forced to change 
course. Firstly by dismissing the higher chiefs from their management of 
production and retaining the lower native off icials, who were the actual 
foremen closer to the workfloor, under strict surveillance. And secondly by 
abandoning the cultivation of coffee in far-off plantations and relocating 
it to smaller plots closer to the peasant settlements – a lukewarm attempt 
that ended in failure.
I would like to add a few comments on the excessively heavy burden of 
labour that the colonial government imposed on the Priangan peasantry. 
In the f irst half of the nineteenth century, this burden was increased even 
more by the introduction of corvee services, on top of the mass mobilization 
of labour for the cultivation and delivery of coffee. This meant that, in 
addition to the tasks that the peasants had to perform for their lords, the 
government ordered them to fulf il a wide range of obligations which, in 
addition to cultivation services, took up at least one day a week and included 
guard duties, transport or construction work and tending to the needs of 
higher and lower colonial off icials, including satisfying their desire for 
ostentatious shows of pomp and circumstance. All these services together 
accounted for substantially more than half of the peasants’ working year. 
And how were these obligations met? Firstly, higher and lower chiefs tended 
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to disguise the true numbers of subordinates under their charge. The ap-
parent low population density in the Priangan Regencies and its erratic 
slow increase was largely due to the obstinate under-registration of the 
number of households and how many people they comprised. This was 
one way in which the local aristocracy could put their own interests above 
the demands of the government. But the closer colonial inspectors and 
controleurs came to the workfloor, the more diff icult it became to hide the 
true size of the actual manpower. The gradual growth of the population in 
the region (from 998,777 in 1871 to 2,187,236 in 1900) was more an indication 
of the increasing reach of the colonial authorities than the consequence of 
normal demographic accrescence. An important moment came when the 
authorities decided to shift the basic unit for mobilizing labour from the 
composite peasant household to the nuclear family of husband, wife and 
children. This reform aimed to involve the land-poor and landless under-
classes directly in the cultivation of coffee by removing the dependency of 
the mass of the people on the larger landowners. The persisting problems 
with the coffee regime after this change show that the authorities had only 
partially succeeded in this aim. They never managed to mobilize the total 
peasant workforce. Besides those unfit to work (the elderly, the disabled 
and very small children) a privileged class was exempted from cultivating 
coffee for political reasons. This proved insuff icient since large landowners 
continued to buy themselves free of their obligation to work by sending 
one of their farm servants or sharecroppers or paying for a replacement. 
It will be clear from my account that the cultivation system relied more 
on the land-poor and landless classes than on the peasant-owners. With 
this observation I come to the f inal conclusion, the impact of the system 
of forced labour on the position of the more disadvantaged segments in 
socioeconomic structure of the Priangan.
The developments that took place in the Priangan in the late-colonial era 
confirm neither Boeke’s theory of dualism nor Geertz’s theory of involution. 
The fact that neither of these analytical constructions provides a satisfactory 
explanation does not affect the fact that they can, in a certain sense, be 
seen as complete opposites. While Boeke believed that the stagnation of 
the native population in poverty was a consequence of internal factors, 
namely their lack of an economic mentality, Geertz sought the cause in the 
destructive impact of colonial domination. Both interpretations undeniably 
seem to offer something of an explanation for the developments in the 
Sunda highlands. An enclave of Western economic activity emerged in the 
Priangan as early as the end of the nineteenth century which the native 
population either had nothing to do with, as it was denied access to this 
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capitalist circuit, or remained f irmly at its base as unskilled, unregulated 
and poorly paid coolie labour. This does not, however, allow the conclusion 
to be drawn that the gap between the two sectors was in principle one of 
economic and social dualism based on cultural differences in norms and 
values.
At f irst sight, Geertz’s standpoint also seems to be correct, as can be seen 
from the following statement by a senior regional off icial in 1892.
One of the few things that can be said to be generally true throughout the 
Priangan is that the people, everywhere to a greater or lesser extent have 
time in abundance, but nowhere have money in abundance.55
The image of persistent poverty in which the whole population was im-
mersed as the consequence of a progressive process of social levelling is, 
however, incorrect. Although the relatively privileged upper social layer in 
the Priangan had also failed to survive the regime of forced coffee cultivation 
unharmed and had no opportunity to develop under their own steam, this 
peasant elite – thanks to its close ties with the aristocracy – could usually 
avoid having to perform the despised heavy cultivation and corvee services 
themselves. Having appropriated the largest share of the cultivated land, 
the households of these well-to-do owners even succeeded in strengthening 
their prominent position after the abolition of forced labour. By giving their 
prosperous lifestyle a pious disposition they increased their power and 
acquired a degree of dignity that made them opponents rather than allies 
of the colonial government.
How did the much more substantial rural underclasses fare after they 
were freed from servitude? The colonial policy-makers eventually suc-
ceeded in accessing the labour sealed up in composite peasant households 
and mobilizing it directly to perform the cultivation and corvee services 
required by the government. The pattern of employment changed, as the 
conscripted labourer made way for the footloose coolie, as those who 
had earlier been the victims of forced labour were now able to offer their 
labour freely. Freedom of movement increased but, before commenting 
on this, I would like to note that the land-poor and landless classes had 
been accustomed to moving from place to place since time immemorial. 
These shifting peasants were therefore suited to the demands of mobility, 
roaming around in search of work and shelter, for example by clearing forest 
55 J. Heijting, Resident of the Priangan Residencies, in the Colonial Report for 1892, Annex C: 
17.
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lands or sharecropping for a large landowner in an attempt to move up a 
rung on the agrarian ladder or, conversely, escaping forms of dependency 
that they experienced as too restrictive. These were the ‘vagrants’ that 
Van Sevenhoven considered it necessary to warn against, unreliable folk 
if only because of their footloose lifestyle, who were barely visible in the 
nebulous landscape and against whom villages had to protect themselves by 
denying them access. I described the presence of this proto-proletariat in the 
early nineteenth century in an earlier publication, rejecting the suggestion 
that it was not embedded in the rural order based on agriculture and the 
village (Breman 1987a: 47). Towards the end of the nineteenth century this 
underclass had freed itself of its ties of attachment. This was accompanied 
by an increase in size, a consequence of the growing land pressure. The 
inability of more and more people to meet their basic needs was caused not 
so much by a sharp rise in the population, although it was growing more 
rapidly now, as by the decision to deny the native population access to as 
yet ‘uncultivated’ land. The mobility of the proletariat was also encouraged 
by the abolition of the pass system, that had restricted the free movement 
of labour under the cultuurstelsel. Small landowners experienced a process 
of semi-proletarianization, because the plots they owned produced insuf-
f icient food for even a minimal level of subsistence and they had to do 
paid work to supplement it. The problem was that there was insuff icient 
regular employment available that might offer this enormous pool of labour 
that was now available full- or part-time the prospect of a life without 
poverty and the opportunity to improve their living standards. Did the 
large-scale public works now set in motion to open up the region – the 
construction of roads and railways, better transport, the growth of trade 
and industry – not provide a large quantity of jobs and higher incomes? 
The people of the Priangan were indeed freed from their sole reliance on 
agricultural production in which they had been engaged from generation 
to generation, but only to remain f irmly conf ined at the bottom of the 
new economic order. The benefits of this process of opening up and the 
new infrastructure that accompanied it were primarily enjoyed by those 
who had initiated it, and hardly – if at all – by the large mass who were 
now free to move around at will. The majority of the Sundanese people 
occupied the lowest echelons in the hierarchy of the widening and more 
diversif ied labour market but qualif ied for nothing more than low-skilled 
employment on a casual basis, with a meagre and irregular wage and very 
little chance of improving their lives. Despite the impressive expansion of 
economic activity in the region, the purchasing power of this proletariat 
hardly increased, while the existing inequality, both within native society 
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and between that society and its expatriate managers, remained intact. 
The sharp inequality was recorded in a series of detailed reports labelled 
as ‘Diminishing Welfare Investigations’ in the early twentieth century. The 
course taken after the mass of the people in the Sunda highlands had been 
released from servitude was one of dependent development, in the form of 
their continuing subordination to interests other than their own. It was a 
course referred to in late-colonial terminology as progress.

 Glossary
The spelling of words and terms is according to current usage and is at vari-
ance with the colonial nomenclature.
adat customary law
adhipati title for high-ranking official
agus title for lower gentry
alang long grass
alun open square in front of court or public buildings
amil village priest
anklung (Sund.) musical instrument made of bamboo
aria title for high nobleman
asep title for lower gentry
aturan baru the new order (after abolition of indirect rule in Priangan)
babad Javanese chronicle
babakan hamlet
bahu land measure, approx. 0.7 ha
bahu aris petty chief
bakti ceremonial gift of client to his lord
balebandong centre of native administration




bonken (Dutch) low-value metal coins
bujang farm servant
bumi landowning peasant, head of household
buniaga new settler coming from elsewhere
bupati regent
cacah corporate peasant household, unit of taxation
cacah baku landowning peasant
cacah kopi household charged with corvee duty to grow coffee
camat substitute, deputy of district head
camat gunung official in charge of keeping area clean and tidy
cambutan coffee sapling
carik apanage, land parceled out to sharecroppers
controleur colonial civil servant of junior rank at district level
cuke one-tenth share of rice harvest collected as taxation
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cutak district, area of tax collection
dadap shadow tree
dajeuh (Sund.) court, residence of regent




dokter jawa native doctor, medical practitioner
gaga land under shifting cultivation
gardu watchhouse
garebeg thrice-annual ceremony at the princely court
gemblang lit. fat, a well-off peasant charged with full corvee duty
giring roundup of people for corvee
gladag porters under duty to transport, also draught horses requisitioned for 
corvee
glondong petty chief
gula jawa brown sugar
gusti patron
haji believer who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca
harim (Arab.) village waste land
huma (Sund.) land under shifting cultivation
hormat respect, deference shown to superior
imam priest
jago lit. fighting cock, a tough and violent character
jaksa legal or police official
jalma burung lit. bird people, vagrants
jangol checkpoint along highway, meeting place for corvee labour
jayangsekar mounted police















kepala bandangan overseer of waterworks
kepala jalan leader of gang of corvee labour requisitioned for road maintenance
kepapa t’rup gang boss of corvee labour for work in coffee garden
kepala cuke collector of rice tax
keprabon arable land set aside for officials
ketib one who reads the sermon at Friday and Id prayers
kiyayi respected man versed in Islamic knowledge
kikir lit. scratching, scraping, roundup for corvee duty
kliwon official of lower-middle rank




kota main settlement, residence of regent
koyang measure of weight, approx. 1750 kg.
kraton court
kumetir kopi official charged with mobilising corvee labour for coffee cultivation





lungguh apanage, prebendial domain set aside for officials
madath opium
mandador manager




merbot religious official in charge of maintenance of the mosque
merdika freely cultivated coffee
modin mosque official who gives the public call to prayer




ngalie dung client of lord
ngawula patronage, clientelism
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njeupah (Sund.) festive meal served at house of patron
numpang landless dependent peasant, sharecropper
orang miskin poor people
orang pawong well-off people
paal (Dutch) pole, measure of length approx. 1500 m.
pacul hoe
padi unhusked rice




pangerang title given to higher nobility
panghulu chief religious official
pangkat high-ranking official
panglaku bearer of orders
panglawe petty chief
pangreh pradjah corps of native officials
panukang client tilling fields of lord
parang machete
pasangrahan resthouse for touring officials
pasar market
pasowanan ceremonial audience at court of ruler
patih vizir, chief manager on behalf of regent, chief administrator of 
regency
paying parasol, color indicating rank
pedati cart for transport of commodities
penatus petty chief
pesantren boarding school for religious teaching
petingih official
pikul measure of weight, approx. 62,5 kg
pinter smart
prajurit armed police
pratag shed for drying and storing coffee beans
prentah order, instruction
priyayi nobility, aristocracy
raden title for nobleman
rahayat well-to-do landowner and client of overlord
real Spanish Real known as ‘piece of eight’; Sp.R. 1 = 1.125 Rds (Dutch)
rukun amount of possessions as measure for corvee duty
rijksdaalder (Dutch) high-value currency; Rksd. 1 = 2,50 Dutch guilders
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ryotwari system of land taxation introduced by E.I.C. in British India
said religious title, preacher
sarung native dress to cover lower part of body
sawah irrigated ricefield
sawah kaprabon sawah set aside as apanage for village officials
sedekah religious feast
selir concubine
sentana relatives of priyayi
sikapan ornamental dress for native officials of high rank
sikep landowning peasant, head of household
sirih betel nut
somahan nuclear household
susuhunan ruler of Mataram, later of Surakarta
tandu palanquin
t’rup work gang for corvee duty in coffee garden
tanah priangan Priangan lands
tegal dry land under regular if not permanent cultivation
tipar (Sund.) land under slash-and-burn cultivation
tugur corvee duty
tumenggung title of high-ranking official
tuan mandor VOC official appointed to oversee coffee cultivation and stationed in 
the hinterland
tua tua village elders
ujang lower gentry
ulu ulu village official in charge of waterworks
umbul district head
wayang puppet play
wedana official in charge of district
zakat religious tax, share of income collected for redistribution by clergy
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